



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
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MIDDLE EAST FORUM

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CONTENTS SPRING, 1971

BIRTH OF A TRADITION 9
Helen Khal

SACRED ART IN PERSIAN CULTURE 19
Seyyed Hossein Nasr

IN SEARCH OF A VALID MYTH 39
Cecil A. F. Hourani

THE LEBANESE ARCH 46
Friedrich Ragette

SHAKESPEARE IN THE ARAB WORLD 54
Suheil B. Bushrui

BOOK REVIEWS 67, ON RECORD 77,
BY THE NUMBERS 79

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Responsible Director, Assem Salam
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Contributors



Helen Khal (*Birth of a Tradition*) is an American painter of Lebanese origin who has lived in Beirut since 1965. Born in Allentown, Pennsylvania, she studied at the Lebanese Academy of Fine Arts and at the Art Students League, New York. Her work has been exhibited at one-man shows in Lebanon and the United States, as well as in England, France, Italy, Egypt, Brazil, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. During the past five years she has been a newspaper staff art critic and writer and lecturer on contemporary art in the Middle East. Since 1967 she has taught art at the American University of Beirut. The mother of two sons, Mrs. Khal also specializes in children's portraiture. Her paintings are part of many private collections in Lebanon and abroad, among them the Chase Manhattan Bank Collection in New York.




Seyyed Hossein Nasr (*Sacred Art in Persian Culture*) is Vice-Chancellor of Tehran University. Born in 1933, Seyyed Hossein received his higher education in the United States, first at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (B.S., 1954) then at Harvard (M.A., 1956 and Ph.D., 1958). He has been a member of the faculty of Tehran University from 1958, as professor of the history of Islamic science and Islamic philosophy, sufism, and medieval philosophy, until taking his present post. During 1962 Seyyed Nasr was Visiting Professor at Harvard, and later became first occupant of the Aga Khan Chair of Islamic Studies at the American University of Beirut. He has written numerous works for scholarly journals in English, French, Persian and Urdu, and has published a number of books in Persian and English, including among the latter *Three Muslim Sages, An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines, and Science and Civilization in Islam.*



Cecil A. F. Hourani (*In Search of a Valid Myth*) is a private political consultant to governments and international organizations. Born in 1917 in Manchester, England, he read philosophy, economics and politics at Oxford, where he was Scholar of Magdalen College, and from which he received a B.A. degree with First Class Honors in 1939. He was Lecturer in Philosophy, Economics and Political Science at the American University of Beirut from 1940 to 1943, and Professor of Political Science there from 1951 to 1956. In the intervening period, he held various political and administrative posts with British Army G.H.Q., Middle East, in Cairo; served on the staff of the Arab Office, Washington, D.C.; and was a member of the Lebanese Delegation to the United Nations. For the decade thereafter, he was Personal Adviser to President Bourguiba of Tunisia. Prof. Hourani is author of numerous scholarly essays and books, including *Introduction to Aristotelian Logic, The Future of Constitutional Governments in the Middle East, and The Objectives of University Education.*



Friedrich Ragette (*The Lebanese Arch*) is Associate Professor of Architecture at the American University of Beirut, currently on study leave in Europe. He studied architecture in his native Vienna, then with Mies van der Rohe at the Illinois Institute of Technology. He was a designer with the firm of Skidmore, Owings and Merrill in Chicago and practiced architecture for four years in Switzerland before joining the Faculty of Engineering at A.U.B. in 1962. In addition to investigating the abundant local antiquities as well as enjoying skiing, hiking, swimming and good food which, he says, "are all solid reasons for settling in Lebanon," Prof. Ragette occasionally accepts architectural design commissions for modern buildings, as a complement to his deep interest in traditional Lebanese architecture.



Suheil B. Bushrui (*Shakespeare in the Arab World*) is Associate Professor of English at the American University of Beirut. He was a British Council Scholar at Southampton University, where he received his Ph.D. Subsequently, he taught at the universities of Ibadan in Nigeria and Calgary and York in Canada, and lectured widely at universities in Europe, Africa and America. For his work on W. B. Yeats, about whom he has written four books, Prof. Bushrui in 1963 was awarded the Una Ellis-Fermor Prize. Besides his researches on Anglo-Irish literature—his main field of interest, he has written extensively on English, Arabic and African literatures. Last year he organized the Gibran International Festival in Lebanon, as a contribution to which he was editor of *An Introduction to Khalil Gibran* and several other works on the world's most widely read poet. Prof. Bushrui is a member of the Executive Council of the International Association for the Study of Anglo-Irish Literature, was Chairman of Lebanon's Sygne Centenary Committee, and is currently President of the Association of University Teachers of English in the Arab World.



Abdullah Schleifer (*Jerusalem, Key to Peace: a review*), is radio and television reporter for NBC-News and Middle East correspondent for *Jeune Afrique*. He was formerly Managing Editor of the "Palestine News," Jordan's English-language daily published in Jerusalem until the June War. Now living in Beirut, Mr. Schleifer has written his personal account of that war, *The Fall of Jerusalem*, which will appear in June in an Arabic translation published by Beirut's An-Nahar Press and later in the United States, subject to successful negotiations. Born in 1935 in Forest Hills, New York, Mr. Schleifer is a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania, and before entering journalism was a market research specialist. He then edited the literary quarterly *Kulchur*, contributed poetry and social and literary criticism to *The Nation*, *Monthly Review*, and many other periodicals, and produced documentaries for Pacifica Radio. His articles on the Middle East have appeared in the *Evergreen Review*, *The Arab World*, London's *Sunday Times*, and *The New York Times*, for which he was a foreign correspondent.

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Birth of a Tradition

by *Helen Khal*

Lebanese artists discard traditional Arab Moslem and European motifs and create a vigorous indigenous style — as cosmopolitan and yeasty as Lebanon itself

The personality of a land is necessarily reflected in its art. Art in Lebanon, like its people and its life, is assertive, varied, often appearing to be without a common heritage, and absorbs influences from many different sources. Visually it is a land of diversity and striking contrast —dramatic mountain heights against a flat wide sea, donkeys and Jaguars, bamboo and plastic, veiled women and mini-skirts. For centuries it has been a conglomerate society of race, creed and language. Having felt the imprint of many cultures throughout its long history, it can hardly be defined today as an integrated, whole personality.

Out of this unique, microcosmic world that is Lebanon has developed a contemporary art as stylistically complex and energetic as its origins. Recently a museum director visiting Beirut remarked that he found more artists there in proportion to population than anywhere else in the world. Whether statistically true or not, it is a fact that the current art scene in Lebanon projects a very lively presence. In a cultural season that runs from October to May, it is not unusual that the number of exhibitions held reaches a total figure of two hundred. Most of the works are by Lebanese painters and sculptors, but an increasing number of artists from

neighboring and distant countries as well come to hang their talents on Beirut's walls. If Lebanon has long been called the Switzerland of the Middle East, today a similar nomenclature can be applied to Beirut; it has become, for the artists of the area, their Paris.

Fifty years ago there were no more than half a dozen artists in Lebanon, and a generation before that none. It was a situation similar to that of most other emerging nations of the world. In the forced isolation of a pre-communications and people-separated age, each area of the world followed its own cultural heritage, and each knew little of what was going on elsewhere. For centuries, while Europe moved in its arts through a continuing vertical thrust of refinement that culminated in the Renaissance, lands elsewhere remained remote, their artists following paths of plastic expression significantly set apart and as ancient and unchanging as their traditions and beliefs.

It must be remembered that modern art was created in Europe, and was well into its development before its impact was felt internationally. For all other countries of the world, including Lebanon, it remains an adopted art form. This is an important factor in evaluating the tendencies of non-Western contemporary art.



Tulips, an oil by the late Omar Onsi, one of Lebanon's second generation of contemporary artists, who worked in both oil and watercolor, and interpreted the beauty of his country with a fresh and authentic eye.

Despite its comparative proximity to Europe, Lebanon and the Middle East remained untouched by change and foreign influence in its art forms until the early twentieth century and the growth of our present age of internationalism. For 400 years before that, Lebanon had lived under a Turkish Moslem domination and its artistic heritage was predominantly one of Arab Moslem origin, decisively linked with the advent of Islam in the seventh century. For too long a time, this profoundly influential religion defined not only the manner of life, but also the manner of art. Although not always adhered to, there was established a restrictive concept that rejected any representation of the human figure. Instead, there was a concentration on the abstract

and the decorative, albeit with the use of figurative animal or plant-like forms. This direction led to an abundant and highly creative architecture of mosques and palaces in the Middle East, and to the adornment of their interiors with the intricate geometric and arabesque designs we still find in ample evidence today—in tiles and mosaics, in stained glass, in carpets and calligraphy.

During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, however, the easel painting of Europe gradually found its way to the eastern Mediterranean shores. In the palaces of the aristocracy began to appear portraits and landscapes executed by European painters; sculpture in the classic tradition became an adornment for their gardens. In the scattered churches and monasteries of the area, religious paintings in a renaissance style hung alongside ancient Byzantine icons.

Yet it took a First World War to finally and decisively open the doors of communication and exchange; it was then that the first generation of contemporary Lebanese artists asserted its presence. This first group included *Saliby*, *Srou*, *Corm*, the sculptor *Hoyek*, and the world-famous poet-painter *Khalil Gibran*. Most were trained in France, and their work ranged from a romantic classicism to an early impressionism, except for *Gibran* who studied under Rodin and followed a Blake-esque mysticism to interpret his essentially poetic vision.

Paris was the center of the art world then. The revolutionary genius of men like Picasso, Braque, and Matisse had already broken away from the reigning impressionistic styles; they were well into the abstract structural world of cubism, and the Paris school would influence the creative directions of artists



Exhibition held each spring on American University of Beirut steps leading to the Mediterranean, features works of artists—amateur and professional—from all over Lebanon. Nighttime viewers of *Outdoor 70* inspect some of the hundreds of works displayed during seven-day show.


all over the world for generations to come. For the artists of Lebanon there was an additional stimulant attracting them to Paris. The French Mandate in Lebanon found a ready response among the country's Christian majority; it would leave an intimate imprint on the social and cultural mores of the people, and would bring forth a Western orientation more profound than anywhere else in the Arab world.

In the thirties a second French-trained group began to appear, notably *Caesar Jemayel, Omar Onsi, Mustafa Farroukh, Saliba Doueihy*, and the sculptor *Joseph Ghsoub*. From Paris they brought back in their work an indelible tincture of impressionism; in temperament they were still nineteenth century romantics, and the adven-

ture of cubism and abstraction would need yet another generation to begin to appear in the art of Lebanon.

Of this group there remains today only *Doueihy*, who for the past 20 years has been living and working in New York. During those years he gradually moved from impressionism to an almost abstract expressionism, and more recently to a minimal approach of flat color and limited-form statement. This last work has gained him recognition, and several U.S. museums have acquired his paintings.

Today's painters and sculptors, however, receive most of their instruction in Lebanon. Many still continue their studies abroad, but now it is not only to Paris, but to Rome, Madrid,




Time Pulse by Nadia Saikali is notable example of her recent kinetic constructions of plexiglass, a luminescent combination of light, color and movement.

London and New York as well that they go. The professional artists number over a hundred, most of them graduates of the pioneering Lebanese Academy of Fine Arts, privately established as the first of its kind in 1939. Many of these graduates are teachers today to another generation in the new Institute of Fine Arts, set up by the government in 1966. A prospering economic life, a high rate of literacy, and a democratic, cosmopolitan atmosphere have created a healthy climate for the artist in Lebanon. Notwithstanding occasional complaint and criticism, he thrives there, as in perhaps no other capital of the Middle East. The public response is effervescent, and he can hang his work on many walls. Each spring the Ministry of Education sponsors a salon of painting and sculpture in which all Lebanese artists participate. The amount of work shown

is considerable, and the range of style and content very wide. But the artist need not wait for official encouragement, for unlike the exclusive-gallery system that exists in other art capitals, exhibiting in Lebanon is a free and open enterprise. The artist does not wait for a gallery to "discover" him; any sizeable wall can become his exhibition hall, and he'd just as soon run his own show as have a gallery-owning middleman handle it for him. Exhibitions are held in hotels, decorator shops, schools, public institutions, business offices, private homes, cafes—wherever a receptive wall exists...or even without a proper wall, but outdoors, such as the "Outdoor Art" show held annually on the old stone-and-mortar stairway that winds down the American University of Beirut's hillside campus to the Mediterranean.

One of Lebanon's leading artists today is *Chafic Abboud*. In his mid-forties, he has been living and working in Paris for the past 20 years, but comes back to Lebanon frequently to work and exhibit. The quality of his painting reveals this continuing and close relationship with his homeland. His color is highly emotive, daring, and at the same time provokes a luminal inter-relationship that is a profound expression of the Lebanese landscape and its sun-struck forms. One could label *Abboud* an abstract expressionist, yet his eye retains a humanism that stems from an intimate observation of the real and the physical.


Other artists show an equal preoccupation with the emotive possibilities of color, for in Lebanon the strongly variable terrain provides unique qualities of light that lead to a concern with color and texture. Among them are *Amin El Bacha*, who builds up his abstract compositions in thick mosaic patches of analogous hues that combine to create an intrinsic sense of light and *Elie Kanaan*, landscapist, whose sensuously rich color interest dominates the subject almost to the point of abstraction. *Nadia Saikali* and *Yvette Ashkar* — notable among women painters, who comprise a quarter of the total — also have been following their own path of color dynamics. *Saikali* moves toward a simplicity of form, abstract, with large sensitive color spaces and single, isolated graphic strokes that suggest the enduring, other-worldliness of the Far East. *Ashkar's* form is built up of emotional color, graphically applied and bound together into a dynamic slash that floats against the canvas. *Saikali*, in her most recent exhibition this season, startled the public with an impressive leap from traditional materials into the media of kinetics. Using plexiglass, metals, optic wires, and elec-



Beirut, a cityscape by Joumana Beyazid in bright, primitive colors. Modern in design, its roots lie in the two-dimensionality of Persian miniatures.

tricity instead of paints and canvas, she created constructions of light, color, and movement, and became the first of Lebanon's artists to move into what might be called "space-age art." With the help of a team of technicians, she combined science with art—and managed to mold the materials into a new and exciting poetic expression. Two other women who have gained prominence this past year are *Huguette Caland* and *Odile Mazloum*; their work adds measurably to the total energy and mature presence of women artists in Lebanon.

A few painters begin to search out a meaningful oriental form and are experimenting with both linear and spatial compositions to this end. They



Twist, wood sculpture by Mouazzez Rawdah, combines the imposing form and sensitive regard for material surface that brought her work immediate recognition.

work sometimes through Islamic concepts of design and calligraphy, intricate and abstract, sometimes figuratively through earlier Phoenician borrowings, and sometimes through the closed-form tendencies that reach them from Iraq and Egypt. In this group can be found *Said Akl*, *Wajeh Nahle*, *Hussein Madi*, *Mounir Nejm* and *Stelio Scamanga*—the first three calligraphic, the others most recently space-motivated toward an abstract mysticism.

Still other artists are more personal and literary. Their concern is more one of painting a story idea, and color and form is bent to that purpose rather than permitted its own expressive direction. Their styles range from the primitive to the surrealistic to the folkloric-and-stylized figurative. *Juliana Seraphim* is a surrealist, outspokenly erotic, whose ink drawings are superb in sensitivity and rhythm of line, to the point of a Gothic elegance. *Khalil Zghaib*, self-taught, pure primitive, has an inherent sense of design that gives his paintings of life in Lebanon a strong presence, humorous and refreshing. *Paul Guiragossian*, who has throughout most of his career limited his subject to the human figure, alone or clustered in groups, has moved from the figurative and now expresses his people with single, wide, vertical strokes of assertive color, seemingly abstract, yet still containing an essential humanism. *Farid Aouad*, who also concentrates on the human form, works through an intimate color-and-form relationship reminiscent of Bonnard, to portray his people within their ordinary day-to-day activities. *Joumana Bayazid*, painting in the two-dimensional style of Persian miniatures, is at once sophisticated and naive in her visual recollections of local customs, traditions and architecture.



Basbous brothers Alfred, Joseph and Michel (from left) have turned their terraced mountain village of Rachana into an outdoor museum of modern sculpture.

In the field of graphics, the finest work being done is by *Halim Jurdak*. His black-and-white etchings evoke a rich sense of color. A mature complement to them are his recent oils, spontaneously emotive, perhaps difficult for the ordinary eye to read, yet curiously satisfying. An artist who works primarily in water color is *Moussa Tiba*; with a sure, sensitive technique, he builds his compositions in a mosaic manner, achieving a strength of concept seldom seen in this medium.

A painter-sculptor to be considered separately is *Aref El Rayess*. Constantly changing in style, moving from one medium to another, his is a remarkable, inventive energy that moves from the primitive to the pure non-objective with equal validity and power.


Prominent among the sculptors of Lebanon are the three *Basbous* brothers,

Michel, Joseph and Alfred, who have literally turned their mountain village of Rachana into a museum of carved stone. Their styles vary from the figurative to abstractions provoked by the inherent qualities of the stone or wood itself. Two women sculptors are impressively productive: *Selwa Raouda Shoucair*, a pure non-objective artist both in painting and sculpture, is outstandingly consistent in the sustained direction of her work; her stone pieces are virile and mature, containing an architectonic force that is both primitive and new. *Mouazzez Rawdah*, who began painting ten years ago and quickly turned to sculpture, works in both stone and wood; her pieces have an imposing weight and show a high respect for the physical qualities of her medium. Recently turning to metal sculpture after many years of painting is *Adel Saghir*.


His monumental abstract pieces adorn the entrances to several of Beirut's new buildings, startling and dynamic thrusts of metal energy into the surrounding space.

A large Armenian community in the country has added yet another flavor to the variety of plastic expression that exists. Many of them follow a strong Byzantine and non-Arab influence derived from their own ethnic origin. Prominent among these aprenominal artists are *Torossian, Hrair, Bezdikian, Nourikian, Barsoumian*, and the sculptor *Zavan*.

Many other names can be added to the foregoing list which was made on the basis of prominence and diversity in style. A growing group of younger artists whose work is beginning to attract attention —*Hassan Jouni, Ibrahim Marzouk, George Guw, Farid Haddad, Vahe Fattal, Samia Osseiran, Samir Mirshak* for his ceramic pottery, and *Leila Shahrouri* for her jewelry —though not yet so well-known as their older contemporaries, are the nucleus of a Lebanese artistic tradition now confidently entering its third generation.



Michel Basbous, eldest of the three brothers, works in stone, wood and metal. *Introspection* reveals a deft handling of texture in stone.



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
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Sacred Art in Persian Culture

by *Seyyed Hossein Nasr*

The architecture of the mosque, the design of carpets, the graceful flow of Persian script, even the delicate lines of the miniature—all find a common inspiration in Islam

The very confusion of modern times makes necessary the definition and clarification of subjects which were seen as evident by all pre-modern and traditional civilizations, East and West. One such subject is sacred art, which was intuitively known for what it is, not only among the intellectual elite, but also among the masses, precisely because the awareness of the sacred dominated the consciousness of all men. This awareness was only dimmed in the modern West and its extensions into the East when the meaning of sacred art became gradually forgotten and sacred art became confused with other forms of art completely alien to it. Fortunately, in the West during the past half century the writings of the traditional authors such as René Guenon, Frithjof Schuon, Ananda K. Coomaraswamy and Titus Burckhardt, as well as a host of art historians and scholars inspired directly or indirectly by these authors, such as S. Kramrich, H. Zimmer, M. Eliade, B. Rowland, A. Moreno and H. Sedlmyer in the West, as well as K. B. Iyer and S. Durai Raja Singam in India, have brought back to light with blinding evidence the nature, meaning and function of sacred and traditional art. In their writings, especially those of Schuon, Burckhardt and Coomaraswamy, can be found a wealth of incomparable knowledge about this subject, and we could not but present a poor imi-

tation or summary were we to attempt here to survey again the whole subject of sacred art. Our goal, therefore, is to present in this essay something of the principles and nature of sacred and more generally traditional art in its applications to the Persian scene both past and present. The audience we have in mind is the Western-educated Persian interested in art but cut off from the traditional sources of his own culture in Persian and Arabic by the nature of his educational upbringing, and also the Western student and admirer of Persian art and culture who comes to Iran with more than a passing interest in the rich artistic life of this land and who has not been able to acquire the necessary metaphysical and scholarly background to make Persian art, whose principles like those of all traditional art are so diametrically opposed to modern Western aesthetics, intelligible to him. The vast majority of Persians, who grasp intuitively the pertinence of sacred art because they still have an awareness of the sacred, would have no need of this exposition. Like a fish swimming in the ocean, they do not need to be given an exposition of the nature of water, although such people, as all people of the East, have no sense of discernment concerning the art forms of civilizations other than their own, forms which have until now remained alien to their world view.

To understand sacred art we must understand the meaning of the sacred, and also the meaning of art, which today has become divorced from human life and relegated to a few buildings called museums. To understand the sacred we must in turn comprehend the traditional view of reality, of the universe in its vastest sense, in which men have seen themselves and still continue to see themselves in many oriental countries. By tradition we do not mean of course customs or habits, but rather all that comes from heaven and has a spiritual and metaphysical foundation. Tradition would correspond to the term *din* in Persian and Arabic in its most universal sense. We thus have traditional civilization in which certain principles derived from revelation in its universal sense dominate all life, from cultic practices in houses of worship to politics and economics and even to the baking of bread. And we have anti-traditional societies in which these principles have been rejected or weakened so that all the activities of the collectivity in question do not reflect these principles.

Now, in a traditional view of the universe, reality is multi-structured. It possesses several levels of existence. It issues forth from the Origin or the One, from God, and it consists of many levels which can be summarized as the angelic, psychic and the physical worlds. It is to the metacosmic Source, then to Being, and finally to the three principal worlds mentioned above that the term the "Five Divine Presences" (*hadarat-i ilahiyah-i khamsah*) alludes. Man lives in the material world that is at the same time surrounded by all of the higher levels of existence above it. Traditional man lives in the awareness of this reality even if its metaphysical and cosmological exposition is beyond the ken of the "ordinary belie-

ver" and reserved for the intellectual elite.

The sacred marks an eruption of the higher worlds in the psychic and material planes of existence. All that comes directly from the spiritual world—which stands directly above the psychic world and must never be confused with it, the one being *ruh* and the other *nafs* in Islamic parlance—is sacred, as is all that serves as a vehicle for the return of man to the spiritual world. But this second case is inseparable from the first because essentially only that which comes from the spiritual world can act as the vehicle to return to that world. The sacred, then, marks the "miraculous" presence of the spiritual in the material, of heaven on earth. It is an echo from heaven to remind earthly man of his heavenly origin.

"Traditional" and "sacred" are inseparable, of course, but not identical. The quality "traditional" pertains to all the manifestations of a traditional civilization reflecting the spiritual principles of that civilization both directly and indirectly. "Sacred," however, especially as used in the case of art, must be reserved for those traditional manifestations which are directly connected with the spiritual principles in question, hence with religious and initiation rites and acts, with a sacred subject and a symbolism of a spiritual character. Opposed to the sacred stands the profane and opposed to the traditional, anti-traditional.

Because a tradition embraces all of man's life and activities, in a traditional society it is possible to have an art that has a quality of apparent "worldliness" or "mundaneness" and is yet traditional. But it is not possible to have an example of mundane sacred art. There is finally the possibility of a religious art which is not sacred art because its forms and means of execution are not traditional. Only it

has chosen for its subject a religious theme. To such a category belong the religious paintings and architecture of the West since the Renaissance and also some of the popular religious paintings executed in the East during the past century or two under the influence of European art. Such religious art must be clearly distinguished from real sacred art.

To distinguish between religious and sacred art, which is of interest almost completely only in the case of Western art, is relatively easy. But to understand the finer distinction between sacred and traditional art may be more difficult. Let us take an extreme example: a genuine medieval sword, whether Islamic or Christian, is a work of traditional art in that it reflects the principles and forms of Islamic or Christian art and its “decorations” are symbols of Islamic or Christian origin. But it is not directly connected with an initiation rite or practice. The Shinto sword at the Shrine of Ise in Japan, however, belongs to the category of sacred art because it is a ritual object of high significance in the Shinto religion, connected with the very revelation of that religion. Likewise, in Persia Quranic calligraphy is sacred art, but the miniature is traditional art reflecting the principles of Islam in a more indirect manner.

As for liturgical art, it must be considered as a branch of sacred art usually of a less direct and essential character, representing the extension of sacred art in the domain of the audible. In certain religions such as Christianity it can have a more central role, but even there the icon must be considered as the most central form of sacred art. In other religions such as Islam the liturgical art is none other than the sacred art of chanting the Divine

Book, in this case the Holy Quran, and in Islam, only among certain ethnic groups have forms of religious chanting developed which in a sense can be called liturgical, but in this case they do not play the same essential role. In fact the use of the term “liturgical art,” as well as “liturgical language,” is particularly pertinent in the case of Christianity, and it has become prevalent among certain circles even in Iran recently only by reason of its pertinence in the West. It would be better to deal with the more fundamental categories of sacred and traditional art in discussing Islamic art in general and Persian art in particular.

In all forms of art—the plastic arts, poetry, music, the theatre—there can be both sacred and traditional forms. Even in the theatre, for example, there is the traditional theatre of India or Indonesia or Japan or even the *ta'ziah* of Iran, all of which are traditional but not directly sacred. Then there is the sacred theatre properly speaking such as the re-enactment of the movements of the Buddha, called *mudra* in Sanskrit, which is used in Shingon Buddhism in Japan as an initiation rite for spiritual realization. The traditional art in all such cases possesses a spiritual and religious value, precisely because it is traditional, only in some cases the art has a less direct spiritual function than when it is directly connected with esoteric or exoteric religious rites.

Logically speaking, sacred art is a branch of traditional art, but in fact it is its very essence. But for the purpose of being able to discuss how the Spirit breathes through the forms and institutions of traditional society in different ways, it is necessary to distinguish between sacred art and other aspects of traditional


art of a less direct ritual and cultic character which are not totally profane because of their traditional character, and yet are not directly concerned with a sacred subject, the main reason for their existence being the joy of artistic creativity, but of course always within the confines of traditional forms and techniques.

Ideally, of course, all human life should be a rite, there being no difference between the sacred and the profane. This is seen in the life of the saint where the whole life is like an act of a sacred play. But in the course of human history, because of the ontological and also temporal separation from the Luminous Source of all existence and all revelation, the situation is reached even in traditional societies where the sacred no longer dominates the whole of life to the extent of leaving no place for the profane. Hence sacred art becomes necessary to preserve the Divine Presence and the "Light of Heaven" in an environment which otherwise would be overcome by darkness. Sacred art is a gift from heaven which makes accessible to men who live in material forms the Light which nourishes their souls, and it makes transparent for them the material forms which are chosen, also by the inspiration of Heaven, as its vehicle.

As for art, it must be remembered that the word is derived from the Latin root *ars*, which means "to make." Before the ugliness of industrialism relegated art to the status of a luxury for galleries and museums there was no such artificial concept as "fine arts" or *beaux arts* in French, to which one would have to oppose "ugly art." In the normal periods of human history art has been the correct way of doing or making anything. It has been inseparable from life itself. That is

why, in fact, the daily utensils of ancient civilizations are for us today objects of art to put in museums. Through their very beauty which reveals the creative joy of their maker these objects of most ordinary use are a testimony to the organic link, or the synonymy, of art and life. In traditional society the supreme art is to become a saint, to chisel one's soul until it becomes an artistic work worthy of the Divine. In the case of the saint, therefore, his whole life is an art and all other arts follow this supreme model in making and doing things according to the spiritual principle connected with the particular act in question. That is also why the relation between art and spirituality is extremely profound and in all traditional societies—and here the Islamic offers particularly striking examples—the guilds of craftsmen and the spiritual and initiatory organizations such as Sufism in Islam have been closely linked. To make matter beautiful, to remove its opacity and make it the symbol of a higher level of reality—which is the object of all sacred and in fact traditional art—there must be a living intellectual and spiritual tradition which makes the vision of the intelligible world possible and provides the means to penetrate into the inner meaning of the symbol. The relation of true art and spirituality is like that of the body and the soul. Without the vital energy of the soul the body would soon decompose and decay, as does art when the light of the spirit no longer breathes within a particular cosmic climate, thus delivering matter itself from the bond of finitude and making it a mirror for the reflection of the spiritual world.

In Persian culture the very words used for art reveal its universality and its organic bond with all aspects of life itself.



...in calligraphy, the very forms and their symbolism are related to the Holy Quran and its manner of expression... Detail of satin tomb cloth, enriched with gilt thread in *naskhi* script, 14th century. (From the tomb of Can Grande I, Castello Vecchio, Verona.)

The words by which art is known in Persian are *fann*, *hunar* and sometimes *san'at*. Both *fann* and *hunar*, even as used according to their contemporary meaning, imply having the capability of doing or making something correctly. One often says that each thing has its *fann*, that is, the correct manner of doing it; or to do a particular act needs *hunar*, that is, needs a particular skill or art. In fact the use of the word *hunar* to translate the modern European concept of "art" is a very recent phenomenon. The more classical authors of the Persian language such as Firdawsi have used *hunar* in the widest sense, of art as well as artisanship. As for *san'at*, which

is now also used to mean technology, it refers to the crafts, which are identical with art or more precisely the plastic arts in the Persian and in fact Islamic context. There is no arts "and" crafts; the two are one and the same. To make a beautiful plate or pot is as much art as to paint a miniature. *San'at*, therefore, confirms once again through the very breadth of its meaning the unity of art and life which has characterized Persian culture, like every other authentic traditional culture, throughout its history. This unity is particularly evident among the Persians because they are among the most creative and artistic of all peoples, the delicacy of

their artistic taste running through all aspects of traditional Persian life, from architecture and gardening to cooking and even to smoking the water pipe.

This universal meaning of art in its traditional sense must not of course obliterate the distinction made earlier between sacred art and that aspect of traditional art which is a less direct reflection of spiritual principles. The life of traditional man in all of its aspects, from working to eating and sleeping, has a spiritual significance, but rites and specific religious acts nevertheless exist within the rhythm of daily life and reflect in a more direct fashion the principles which govern all life. In the same manner sacred art is a part of traditional art which is combined with the whole of traditional life, but it is concerned especially with those acts of making and doing that are directly connected with spiritual and religious rites and symbols. And because of this fact it is sacred art that is the most essential aspect of traditional art and the one whose survival is most directly connected with the survival of a religion, even after the structure of traditional society has been weakened or destroyed as we see in so many parts of the globe in modern times.

Before discussing the particular forms of sacred art in Persian culture throughout its history, it is necessary to elucidate further the relation between sacred art and a particular religious form, and the link between art and the initiatory organizations such as the Sufi orders. Because sacred art is the bridge between the material and the spiritual worlds, it is inseparable from the particular religion with which it is connected. There is no sacred or liturgical art possible in a vacuum any more than it is possible to

“write” a sacred scripture without a revelation from Heaven. There is Hindu, Buddhist and Muslim sacred art but not an Indian sacred art if by India we mean a land and a people. It is true that the genius of the ethnic group in question plays a role in the style and manner of execution of sacred art, as we see in the difference between the Buddhist art of Japan and Ceylon, but all these differences are within the limits of the principles established by both the spirit and the form of the religion in question. Sacred art derives from the spirit of a particular religion and shares its genius. It also makes use of a symbolism which is related to the form of the religion in question. And it is these elements that dominate. How different are the Hindu temple of Dasavatara and the Delhi mosque, both of which stand in India, or the naturalistic Roman temples and the other-worldly Romanesque churches, both located in Italy.

It is true that a religion can adopt certain forms and even artistic symbols of a previous religion, but in such a case the forms and symbols are completely transformed by the spirit of the new revelation, which gives a new life to them within its own universe of meaning. The techniques and forms of Roman architecture were adopted by Christian architecture to produce work of a very different spiritual quality. Both Islam and Byzantine Christianity adopted Sassanid techniques of dome construction and produced domed structures which, however, reflect two different types of art. In Persia itself Islamic art adopted many art motifs of pre-Islamic Persia with its immensely rich artistic heritage as well as those of Central Asia, but they became transformed by the spirit of Islam and served as building blocks in structures whose design

was completely Islamic. The same could be said in fact about the Zoroastrian art of the Achaemenian Period which adopted certain Babylonian and Urartu techniques and forms but certainly transformed them into something distinctly Zoroastrian.


To understand sacred art and its efficacy in any context it is far from sufficient to search out the historical borrowing of forms. What is important is what forms and symbols mean. And this question is unanswerable unless one has recourse to the religion which has brought the traditional civilization and sacred art in question into being. One could not understand, not to speak of create, works of sacred art without penetrating deeply into the religion which has produced these works. The attempt of some modern artists in both East and West to do so can be compared to trying to split the atom by copying the outward forms of the mathematical signs found in books of physics. But as far as the result is concerned, this is the opposite, for attempting to create such a so-called "sacred art" is as lethal as the fall-out from a successful atomic explosion.

Throughout Persian history an intimate relation has existed between art and the spiritual discipline deriving from the religion then dominant in Persia. Since little is known of the details of social organization in pre-Islamic Persia, the exact institutional link between the artisans and craftsmen and the priestly class is difficult to delineate. But the results are there to prove that such a link certainly existed. Nearly all important remnants of the art of that period are either religious or royal in character. And since the royalty was of a definite religious character, the royal art was in turn intimately

connected with the Zoroastrian world-view. Even Persepolis has been suggested by A. U. Pope to have been constructed as a palace for religious ceremonies rather than the purely political activity of ruling over the empire. Moreover, the architectural forms and the gardens have a definite traditional and symbolic character, the garden being a form of mandala which closed upon an inner center and served as a "reminder" and "copy" of paradise. It must not be forgotten that the word paradise itself in European languages as well as *firdaws* in Arabic derives from the Avestan *paii-daeza* meaning garden, which itself was the terrestrial image of the celestial garden of paradise.

In connection with other ancient Iranian religions, such as Mithraism and Manichaeism, there is even less evidence to enable us to understand clearly how the sacred art was related through specific institutions to the religions in question. Suffice it to say, however, that in the case of Mani, painting was considered as the particular "miraculous" gift of the founder of the religious movement himself.

The connection between art and spiritual methods is more firmly established and clear during the Islamic period. In the Islamic cities which throughout the ages have produced most of the objects of Islamic art, the craftsmen organized early into guilds (*asnaf* and *futuwwat*), which through their close relation with Sufism and the personality of 'Ali himself derived direct spiritual inspiration from the very heart of the Islamic message. The famous saying, "There is no man of chivalry but 'Ali and no sword but the sword of 'Ali (*dhu'l-faqar*)" (*La fata illa 'Ali la sayf illa dhu'l-faqar*), bears testimony to the basic link between the *futuwwat* and the Sufi orders, the vast majority of both of which derive their initiatory chain (*silsilah*) from



*Rugs also must be classified with gardens in the same category of traditional art, for they too were earthly images of paradise. . . . Tomb cover, multiple cloth, enriched with metal thread, inscribed *The work of Ghiyath*. Yazd, c. 1600. (National Museum, Tehran.)*

‘Ali. Through this spiritual and institutional link, which still survives in certain places, the masters of the guilds become initiated into the mysteries of Sufism and learn the metaphysical and cosmological doctrines which underly the symbolism of Islamic art, as of every true traditional art. The rest of the members of the guild in question emulate the methods, techniques and symbols involved without necessarily understanding all of the more profound levels of its meaning, although on their own level of understanding the work does have meaning for them. They can use all their creative energy in making it and are far from mere imitators of something they do not understand. The joy of creation present in authentic traditional works of art is the best proof of the creative joy of the artist. It is, moreover, because of this depth of expression innate to the symbols and images transmitted from the master to the craftsmen who study and work with him that often a work produced

by a so-called uneducated craftsman has more profundity and intelligence than what many a so-called educated onlooker has the capability to understand.

This same intimate relationship exists between Islam in general and Sufism in particular and the other forms of art. It is not accidental that the vast majority of the great musicians of Persia were connected in one way or another with Sufism or that the most universal poetry of the Persian language is Sufi poetry. Even in calligraphy the number of men associated in one way or another with the esoteric dimension of Islam who were masters of the art is great indeed.

As far as the plastic arts are concerned, in Persia, as in certain other civilizations such as the Christian West, the Hermetic sciences and particularly alchemy played an intermediary role between the purely metaphysical and cosmological doctrines

of Islam and the making of things. Art, according to its Islamic definition, is to ennoble matter. Alchemy likewise is a symbolic science of material objects, of minerals and metals in their connection with the psychic and spiritual worlds. It is not, as so many have thought, a pre-chemistry. It is basically a science of the transformation of the soul based upon the symbolism of the mineral kingdom. For this very reason it also is a way of ennobling matter, of turning base metal into gold. The relation between alchemy and art in Persia, as in Islamic art in general, has been profound. The colors used in so many works of art, far from being accidental, are related to their alchemical symbolism. Through alchemy and similar cosmological sciences Islam was able to create an ambience that was Islamic in both form and content, one in which the religious and spiritual principles were imprinted in matter, in the world that surrounds man in his daily life and has such a profound effect upon the attitude of his mind and soul.

As far as the actual expressions of sacred art in the course of Persian history are concerned, through the definition given above it becomes clear that we can only speak of a Zoroastrian or Islamic sacred art in the context of Persian culture. Even if a particular work of a sacred character of the Zoroastrian period has influenced in its techniques certain works of the Islamic period, that work can be considered as sacred art only in the light of the Zoroastrian religion. Despite the possible existence of a continuity of techniques or forms with the Islamic period it could not be classified strictly as Islamic sacred art. For example, certain building techniques of Zoroastrian fire-temples

were adopted for private houses during the Islamic period. Such an architectural form would be an aspect of Zoroastrian sacred art but not of Islamic sacred art, despite all the resemblances in technique. Conversely, the use of the techniques of constructing a cupola on squinches was developed by Sassanid architects and used in many kinds of buildings, not all of a strictly religious character. But when these techniques were integrated into mosque and church architecture by the Muslims and Byzantines they became a part of Islamic and Christian sacred art. The determining factors in all cases is not a particular form or technique but the spiritual principles derived from the particular tradition in question, which integrate and mould forms into a whole that reflects directly the world view of the tradition involved.

In pre-Islamic Persia, as far as Zoroastrianism is concerned, the forms of art that most likely must be classified as sacred art include the architecture of the fire-temple, the music and poetry accompanying the Zoroastrian rites—remembering here that the parts of the Avesta that are most definitely by the historical Zoroaster are the Gathas, which are songs—and certainly the sacerdotal dress, of which some images have survived. Perhaps also the original gardens in the shape of squares looking inwardly toward the Center were also of a sacred character. Certainly they are among the most important forms of the pre-Islamic traditional art of Persia, possessing a direct initiatory symbolism and serving as models for the later Persian and through them Spanish and Mogul gardens. Rugs also must be classified with gardens in the same category of traditional art, for they too were earthly images of paradise. Also certainly of traditional character and associated with royal initia-


tion and the “lesser mysteries” are the heraldic symbols found in many different forms and shapes and resembling in character and significance the heraldic art of other oriental civilizations and the medieval West.

It is of some importance to note that Zoroastrianism, like Islam that succeeded it in Persia, did not have religious idols as found in other Indo-European religions such as Hinduism and the religion of ancient Greece. Hence, there is no sacred art in the form of sculpture to be found in Zoroastrian Persia. One would have to go to the pre-Zoroastrian religions of Iran to find sacred images, properly-speaking, in the form of statues. Even Mithraism, which arose from a Zoroastrian background and left many statues outside of Persia and especially in Europe, did not leave any statues in Persia itself. The image of Ahura-Mazda represented by two wings is the closest one gets to a sacred image in Zoroastrianism. But even such

images were carved on large pieces of stone or on mountain sides; separate statues were not made from them. The Zoroastrian angels, which would correspond to the “divinities” or “gods” of other Indo-European religions, were spiritualized entities whose representation in concrete forms and images corresponded much more to the Christian icons of Christ and the Virgin Mary than to the statues of divinities in other religions. In this domain Zoroastrianism possessed an “iconoclasm” that resembles the spiritual perspective of Islam which was to inherit Persia from it.

The sacred art of Islam is related in both form and spirit to the Divine Word as revealed in the Holy Quran. The Word having been revealed as a book, rather than as a human being as is the case with Christianity, the sacred art concerns the manifestation of the letters and sounds of the Holy Book rather than the iconography of a man who is himself

Bowl of engraved tinned copper, inscribed *The work of the guild master al-Imami al-Husayni*, dated 1535. (Metropolitan Museum.)



the Logos. The sacred art of Islam in the domain of the plastic arts is more than anything else mosque architecture and calligraphy. One creates a space in which the Divine Word is echoed and the other lines and letters which can be said to be the external form of the Word in the alphabet in which it was revealed, the alphabet of the Arabic and the Persian languages. There are other important forms of traditional Islamic art, but the sacred art par excellence consists of architecture and calligraphy, which moreover are inextricably related to the meaning and form of the Holy Quran and may be said to "flow" from it.


The space created inside a mosque far from being arbitrary and accidental is planned deliberately to remove those coagulations and tensions which would prevent the Word from spreading in an illimitable and harmonious space, a space filled with peace and equilibrium in which the Spirit is everywhere rather than being localised in a particular icon or statue. The iconoclasm of Islam, about which so much has been said, does not mean that Islam is opposed to sacred art, without which no religion can create an appropriate ambience for its earthly manifestations. Rather it means that Islam refuses to imprison the Spirit or the Word in any form which would endanger the freedom innate to the Spirit and kill its reflections through imprisonment in matter. It is also related in a principal manner to the insistence of Islam upon "Divine Unity" (*tawhid*), which cannot be represented in images, and the spiritual style of Islam, which is "nomadic" rather than "sedentary" and hence seeks to avoid coagulation in space.

The architecture of the mosque, therefore, in the aims it seeks to achieve and the spiritual reality it creates, derives from

the spirit of the Holy Quran, no matter what building techniques Islamic architecture borrowed from Sassanid, Byzantine and other sources. Even the outer form of mosques soon developed so as to reflect through its symbolism, in a clear manner and with blinding evidence, the different Divine Names and Qualities (*asma' wa sifat*), the dome corresponding to the Divine Beauty (*jamal*) and the minarets to the Divine Majesty (*jalal*). Many varieties of architectural style were developed, according to the ethnic genius of the people involved, but a profound relationship exists which causes mosques as widely separated as the mosque of Cordova, the Jami' mosque of Isfahan and the Delhi mosque to be united within a single spiritual universe.

Likewise in calligraphy, the very forms and their symbolism are related to the Holy Quran and its manner of expression. Here again, different styles have developed according to the genius of the people concerned. The Persians, for example, have been especially known as masters of the *nasta'liq* and *shikastih*, while the Turks have always produced excellent masters of the *naskh*. Calligraphy in Islamic art has made possible a most powerful decorative art which, however, far from being just a decoration represents also a spiritual style. In the decorated mosque architecture so typical of the tiled mosques of Persia, the two basic forms of sacred art, architecture and calligraphy, join hands to create a crystal in which is reflected a ray of the light of heaven amidst the darkness of material existence.

One of the remarkable features of Islamic architecture, almost unique in the history of art, is that it reached a peak early in its career and has preserved



The space created inside a mosque [is] filled with peace and equilibrium in which the Spirit is everywhere. . . .
Oratory adjoining sanctuary in Masjid-i-Shah, Isfahan, built c. 1616.


it to our own times. A traditional style of architecture results not from that false deity of modern times called "a period" or "the times," but from the encounter of the spiritual style of a particular religion and the ethnic genius of a particular people that embraces that religion. That is why the style remains valid as long as that religion and the people in question survive. Persian Islamic architecture presents a perfect example. From the Damghan mosque to the contemporary traditional mosques there are certainly variations, but always upon the basis of a permanence and continuity that is too evident to need elucidation. Our ancestors were too little concerned with "their times" to produce a local style that, because of its belonging to a particular date, would also soon become out-of-date. They produced an art that was intemporal, that breathed of the eternal and hence was valid for all ages.

Those modern Persians who want to change the style of sacred art, especially mosque architecture, should ponder over the question as to why their "times" or "period" should be any different or more important than any other "times" or "period" which continued to propagate the traditional styles of Islamic architecture. A profound analysis would reveal that the desire to change the style of mosque architecture issues in most cases not from the so-called exigencies of "our times," but from the fact that most of the people who want to carry out such changes have themselves fallen out of the Islamic tradition and have even become alienated from the ethnic genius of the Persian people. Honesty would demand that one not label one's own shortcomings with such epithets as "necessities of the times" and that one not have the audacity to seek to create a new form of sacred architec-

ture when one has no notion of either the spirit or the form of the religion which has brought the architecture in question into being, or even of the deeper roots of the culture of one's own people—who have nurtured this architectural style over the centuries. The catastrophe brought about in any religion by the destruction of its sacred art is no less than that brought about by the weakening of its moral and spiritual teachings and the negation of the injunctions contained in its Divine Law.

In the realm of the plastic arts, Islamic Persia created other important forms of traditional art which are connected with the forms of sacred art directly related to its religious rites and doctrines. In the realm of architecture, the traditional Persian home is a kind of extension of the mosque in the sense that it perpetuates its purity and simplicity. The carpets over which one does not walk with shoes, their ritual cleanliness which enables man to pray upon them like the carpets of the mosque, the "emptiness" of the traditional rooms devoid of furniture, and many other elements connect the house in spirit to the mosque. On a larger scale the whole of city planning is related to the mosque not only through the central role of the mosque in the traditional city, but also in a much more subtle way through the domination of the principle of unity and integration over the whole of the Muslim city, from the private home to the city as a totality. Isfahan and Kashan still afford excellent examples of this principle.

Other traditional plastic arts related to the sacred arts include the so-called "minor arts," which are of extreme importance because they surround man




Even the outer form of mosques soon developed so as to reflect through its symbolism... the minarets [corresponding] to the Divine Majesty... Minaret at Damghan built c. 1058.

in his daily life and hence influence him deeply. In this realm the “seal of the sacred” is to be seen even in the most common everyday objects. The rugs are a recapitulation of paradise, bound by a frame and looking inward toward the center like the courtyard and the Persian garden. The traditional dress in all its forms not only facilitates the Islamic rites but also reveals the theomorphic nature of man rather than hiding it.

The miniature, which is intimately bound with book illustrations, is an “extension” of calligraphy and again a recapitulation of the states of paradise. Based on the wholeness of life which characterizes traditional Persian culture, all of the different forms of art are interrelated through the traditional principles which have introduced into them something of the sacred and of the spiritual principles dominating all aspects of the life of traditional man.

In the realm of the audible, the sacred art par excellence in Islam is of course the chanting and recitation of the Holy Quran, which is the spiritual force behind the poetry and music of all Islamic peoples. The Persian language as we know it today was created during the early Islamic period and hence had a greater degree of freedom to be moulded by the spirit and form of the Holy Quran than even Arabic, which at least in the realm of poetry was already formed at the time of the Quranic revelation. This fact added to the poetic genius of the Persians is the reason for the remarkable richness of religious and mystical poetry in Persian. Persian poetry is not sacred art in a direct sense, but it is an inspired traditional art of an elevated order connected intimately with the Holy Quran. This is true especially of Persian



The sacred art of Islam in the domain of the plastic arts is more than anything else mosque architecture . . . Masjed-i-Shah dome, Isfahan.

Sufi poetry. It can be said, in fact, that if Arabic is the language of the “Word”—the language of God as He spoke through Gabriel to the Prophet of Islam—Persian is the language of the angels. It is the language of paradise, and the beauty of Persian poetry is a reminiscence of paradisaical joy. The rhyme and rhythm of Persian poetry reflects a “spiritual style” that relates it to the form of the Holy Quran.

In its suddenness, revelation is like lightning. But it can also be compared to the dropping of a stone in a pool of water that causes ripples to move out as concentric circles from the center. The descent of the Holy Quran with its poetic structure based on sharply defined rhythms and a very subtle rhyming pat-

tern caused ripples which reflected this genius for rhyme and rhythm in the other forms of Islamic literature, of which, after Arabic, the most important is certainly Persian, itself the mother of several other Islamic languages. Persian poetry in its rhyme and rhythm reflects the echo of the Holy Quran in the minds of the men who created this poetry. In its turn this poetry causes a reminiscence of this echo in the minds and souls of the men who read it and returns them to a state in which they participate in its paradisaical joy and beauty. Herein lies its alchemical effect. The person who enjoys this poetry or can create such poetry is still living potentially in the paradise which it creates through the grace of the Holy Quran. To appreciate Hafiz fully is to be already in the proximity of the Divine.

Those who no longer appreciate Persian poetry or who try to break its meters and rhyme patterns through what is called “new poetry,” (*shi’r-i naw*), have already fallen out of this paradise. They have experienced a “spiritual” fall which is the hidden cause of their insistence upon destroying the classical forms of Persian poetry. Those who claim that this style was fine for Hafiz and his “period” but not for this “period” again mistake their own subjective fall outside the spiritual universe of their tradition for a so-called objective state of things which simply does not exist. One wonders again, as in the case of architecture, why from Rudaki to Bahar and still among many leading poets today, it has been possible to preserve and develop the classical forms of Persian poetry, and why suddenly these forms now no longer correspond to the “realities of the times” for a certain number of people. One wonders why such people still allow themselves to breathe air, seeing that this air has been breathed throughout all ages and belongs to “out-moded” periods of history.

Be that as it may, what is fundamental to remember is that classical Persian poetry, especially in its Sufi form, is a traditional art of the highest value and of a spiritual and even therapeutic nature, and that its destruction by the “new poetry” is no less than the destruction of a poetry of celestial quality by a poetry that is purely terrestrial and often unintelligible. Some of the talented younger poets have written “new poetry” which has some earthly beauty, but this pales into insignificance before the supra-personal, celestial beauty which the very forms of classical poetry, not to speak of its symbolism and content, make possible.

As for music, the music of Persia has its origins in the music of the ancient Aryan peoples and is akin to the Greek music heard by Pythagoras. But during the Islamic period it grew in a distinct manner and in a more contemplative direction, not in spite of but because of Islam. By banning the social aspect of music, especially in cities where the inciting of passions caused by music can always lead to greater moral degradation than in the countryside, Islam turned classical music in an inward direction, as a contemplative art. The spiritual states evoked by classical Persian music are closely related to the states (*ahwal*) of the Sufis, and through Sufism to the spirit of the Holy Quran. In both its purely musical content as well as in the Sufi poetry with which it has always been intimately connected, Persian music represents a spiritual art of a high order, a powerful aid in the attainment of the contemplative states of Sufism. It is not accidental that the Sufis have cultivated the initiation sessions of music and even dance (*sama’*), and that one of the greatest Sufi masters and revealers of the esoteric meaning of the Holy Quran, Maulana Jalal al-Din Rumi, who founded a Sufi order known for its music and dancing (the Mawlawis), could say:

مطرب آغاريد نزد ترك مست
در حجاب نغمه اسرار الست

The musician began to play before the drunken Turk.


Behind the veil of melody the mysteries of the eternal covenant between God and Man.

Nor is it accidental that throughout the centuries most of the performers of Persian music, and also of the music of northern India, have been associated with Sufism. It is thus, by reason of the inexhaustible richness and depth of Persian music, that only the qualified can appreciate it. Only

those with some inner depth of their own can penetrate into its depths. Only those with a contemplative dimension can benefit from the liberating power of this music which cuts man from the fetters of material existence and enables the bird of the human soul to fly with joy and freedom in the infinite horizons of the sky of the spiritual world.

A type of traditional art that is peculiar to Shi'ism and found in Persia as well as adjacent regions of Anatolia, Iraq and the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent is the passion play or *ta'ziyah*, usually depicting different scenes and events of the tragedy of Karbela, although other themes have also been treated. This religious theatre is the closest art form in Islam to the liturgical and sacred theatre of other traditions. Sacred theatre is closely related to the mythological point of view, in which different divine powers become personified and engage in dramas of cosmic significance. The "abstract" character of Islam excludes such a possibility and thus theatre could not develop in the Islamic tradition as a sacred art. Nevertheless the *ta'ziyah* did develop as a religious art of power and beauty which has fulfilled certain religious needs of Shi'ism without its being essential to the ritual practices of Islam.

An essential character of the *ta'ziyah* that must always be remembered is that it can have efficacy and meaning only in the traditional context for which it was meant. The audience is as much a part of the play as the actors, and both participate with all their body and soul in the events of sacred history that are retold on the stage. A skeptical audience which because of lack of faith cannot participate wholeheartedly in the tragedy of Imam Husayn and his companions already



The miniature, which is intimately bound with book illustrations, is an "extension" of calligraphy and again a recapitulation of the states of paradise. . . . Iskander's Fight with the Dragon, miniature by Mohammed Zaman, dated 1675. (British Museum.)

destroys through its presence the spiritual climate. In an almost magical way the presence of an incongruent audience, one which no longer believes in the religious truths in question, destroys that unity between performer and onlooker that belongs to the very essence of the *ta'ziyah*. How much more would this climate be destroyed by directors and actors whose interest in these matters is purely external, people who have fallen enough out of their own tradition to consider it as "interesting."

The same can be said for the spiritual concert of the Sufis, the *sama*.⁷ The *sama* can be performed with a "closed" au-

dience where the members participate in the spiritual ambience created through the power of their own inner forces. To be a mere onlooker without faith at a session of *sama'* would turn it into something else.

In both cases we are faced with an important and basic principle related to the sacred, that is, to understand and fully appreciate the sacred in all its manifestations, including the artistic, man must believe in the sacred and participate in it. Otherwise the sacred hides itself behind an impenetrable veil which is in reality the veil that man's carnal soul—the *nafs* of the Sufis—draws around the immortal core of man's being, thus cutting it off from the vision of the sacred. In both the *ta'ziyah* and the *sama'* the ideal performance must of necessity include both the performers and the audience, who through the art are integrated in a union which transcends both of them, a union whose attainment is the goal of all sacred and traditional art.

Persian traditional art in general and sacred art in particular have left a heritage of unbelievable richness for the Persian people. Through their great artistic talent and refined taste the Persians have been able to create an art that is at once spiritual and sensuous, that reveals the beauty of this world as well as its fleeting nature, that reveals through the theophany of God in beautiful forms the transcendent nature of the source of this theophany. It is a heritage which is still a living reality for the vast majority of Persians and which is of universal value for the whole world, at a time when ugliness threatens to stifle the Spirit itself. The duty of the contemporary Persian is to know and understand this art and the

principles that underly it, and then to make it known to others. As for those who, because of a loss of understanding of these principles and of faith in the world-view that has created this art, can no longer follow its traditional forms and methods, it is incumbent upon them to realize at least their own shortcomings and not to hide their ignorance by a pride that kills. Integrity, of which everyone speaks today, demands that one does not destroy for others through one's "artistic" creations something which one has lost oneself. The artist with real talent and integrity will be one who instead of identifying himself completely with the West, with its fads and even its illnesses such as nihilism, will try to understand his own personality, which means also his own tradition and culture. He will be one who realizes in humility the grandeur of the tradition which alone can provide for him a center and an orientation. In surrendering himself and his talents to this tradition, he receives much more than he gives. A speck of dust and a moment of life are transformed through tradition into a star in the firmament, blessed with permanence and reflecting the eternity of God. The creative power of such an artist, far from being stifled, is freed from the fetters and limitations of his own subjective self, gaining a universality and power which would be impossible otherwise.


For the contemporary Persian artist as for all other elements of the classes that mould and give direction to society, the paramount task is self-knowledge and -cure of this abominable inferiority complex vis-à-vis the West, which is based on nothing more than ignorance of the tradition and culture of Persia as well as of the real nature of the modern West.

The vastly rich and fecund traditional and sacred art of Persia is one of the major means for bringing about a cure of this ignorance and for providing a center and direction for life, artistic and otherwise. Without it, individual effort will be one more noise added to the clamor and disorder that characterize our times. With it the creative power of the artist as well as the scholar and “thinker” can become like the ray of the sun that dispels the fog, a light that establishes order and elucidates

what would otherwise be opaque. It can become like the song of the bird, standing above the sound and clamor that fatigues and sickens the soul of man, to remind man of the peace, tranquillity and joy for which he was created and which he seeks at all times knowingly or unknowingly, but which he can only find when he gains an awareness of the sacred and accepts to surrender himself to the Will of Heaven.



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In Search of a Valid Myth

by Cecil A. F. Hourani

Arab unity as a political ideal patterned after Western models has failed. It may succeed if Arabs revitalize their multi-national, multi-cultural heritage

There exists a striking paradox in contemporary Arab politics today: on the one hand the idea of Arab unity has almost completely disappeared as an effective political force, and remains only as a phrase empty of serious intent; on the other hand the need for Arab unity, and the possibilities of achieving it, are greater today than ever before. The existing regimes in the Arab countries are attempting to solve their problems within the framework of political and administrative arrangements which do not correspond to either the needs or the conditions of progress of their populations, or to the changing pattern of the international scene and the emerging future. Most of these regimes are trying to enter modern life with methods and mentalities which are out of date, and circumscribed by political and administrative arrangements which they have inherited from the period of European domination, and which they have found convenient to their own purposes to preserve.

The explanation of this paradox is partly historical. The end of the Ottoman Empire removed Istanbul as the centre of power and decision, and no Arab center of power emerged to take its place in the Arab territories of the former state. The subjection of these territories to various forms of foreign tutelage and control had

as one of its main objectives precisely to prevent, or at least delay, the emergence of an Arab Istanbul. A united Arab State, with a central seat of authority, would have controlled one of the most vital strategic and economic areas in the world, and this did not suit the purposes of the European powers with interests in this area. When the administrative arrangements invented by these powers took root, they blossomed into states, and within the framework of these states special interests and the embryonic form of local nationalisms began to grow. When they finally emerged to full sovereignty and independence these new forces were strong enough to resist any movements or sentiments which hoped to rediscover the unity which had existed in Ottoman days. The new governing classes continued to pay lip-service to the idea of Arab unity as the ultimate goal of Arab nationalism; but in practical terms they were intent on reinforcing the statehood and sovereignty they had inherited.

The Arab League established in 1945 was the last attempt by a handful of elder Arab statesmen who had known and appreciated the unity which Ottoman rule had brought to set the course of Arab politics towards a new Arab unity. They hoped that a gradual surrender of sovereignty by the member states would result

in the establishment of a unitary state with a central seat of power which logically would have been Cairo. But they underestimated the extent to which the existing structures of power, privilege and interest had taken root. The first and most striking proof of the triumph of local over Arab nationalism, and also of the disastrous consequences of this triumph for Arab interests as a whole, was the defeat of the armies of seven Arab states by a handful of determined and united Zionists in Palestine in 1948.

This clear demonstration that a group of sovereign Arab states, however much they might attempt to "co-operate," were incapable of safeguarding the vital interests of the Arab community as a whole, brought about a second attempt to create a unitary Arab state. The United Arab Republic was conceived as the nucleus of this future state. While the Arab League was a union of sovereign states, the United Arab Republic went to the other extreme and fused two sovereignties into one. The union might have succeeded had there been a longer period in which the advantages of unity over sovereignty would have clearly demonstrated themselves. But the political vision of the union was too far ahead of the political realities, and the result of its breakdown was to consolidate still more those forces at work within the Arab countries striving to preserve and strengthen the status quo. Since the breakdown of the union between Egypt and Syria there has been no serious attempt to form an Arab union, and while it is true that some regimes and political movements still proclaim their theoretical adherence to the idea, Arab unity has in fact become in their minds a mirage: attractive so long as it is at a distance, but never to be approached too closely.

At the same time as the idea of Arab unity has receded from the minds of the regimes, its necessity has grown even greater. In 1948 seven Arab states and armies were unable to stand up to the challenge of Zionism in Palestine: today, while Zionism has gained statehood and the support of powerful forces in the outside world, there are 14 Arab states and armies even more disunited in their aims, methods, systems of government and political ideas. In point of fact, even the pretence of a united Arab effort against Israel has disappeared, and on the military, political and international levels the only reality is the confrontation of two states, Egypt and Israel. The Arab world as a whole is absent from the scene except as spectators at the sidelines. Deprived of the potential strength which an effective Arab union would have given it, we cannot be surprised or indignant if the Egyptian regime decides its policies in the light of the capacities and interests of Egypt alone.

If on the political level the fragmentation and disunity of the Arab world prevents it meeting effectively its most serious challenge in the shape of Israel, on the economic and social levels the consequences are just as grave. While some Arab states have vast and almost unimaginable wealth which has no relation to their human and social structures, others have been forced by poverty or overpopulation to a position of dependence on the outside world. Instead of a rational use of their resources, some of the oil-rich states actually prefer dependence on outside powers to the total independence which all the Arab states could enjoy if they were united. Thus some states out of necessity, and

others out of fear and suspicion of their Arab brothers, have bought their formal sovereign independence at the price of their real economic and social freedom, and some of them are actually helping to strengthen and bolster up societies and states which have been their greatest enemies. But the rational and far-sighted use of Arab resources demands not only a political structure which possesses a central seat of decision and power: it also demands a conception of a common Arab interest and a feeling of true community which are almost totally lacking not only in the minds of the regimes, but also in the minds of the politically conscious and intellectual classes throughout the Arab world.

The idea of an Arab nation, and of a state which would embody the interests and common welfare of that nation, has thus become a myth in which many Arabs still profess to believe, but which has no relation either to their contemporary life or to their vision of the future. But a myth need not be all pure fantasy and fairytale: there are valid myths which hold together the collective memory and imagination of a society or a people, and which constitute the subconscious ground for that community of interest which is the basis of all nationalism. The search for a valid myth is thus the most urgent task which confronts the Arab national movement if it is to survive the pressures which now threaten it: the forces of disintegration and fragmentation now rampant in the Arab world, and the pressures of other ideologies which have their own vision of human and political relationships.

The greatest weakness of Arab nationalism has always been that it has borrowed its philosophical concepts, its views

of history, and its vision of society from outside sources instead of from the authentic experience and real conditions of Arab life. In its earlier stages it was a reflection of European liberal nationalism, and in its later stages a reflection of European totalitarian nationalism. In both stages its vision of Arab history and of the nature of Arab society was a reflection of the European nation-state. But the European nation-state was quite different from the Islamic state, and in particular from the Ottoman state which was its most recent historical manifestation. In their reaction against certain features of the Ottoman state the liberal thinkers, whether Arab or Turk, fell into some of the worst aberrations of European nationalism.

The European nation-state did not represent a higher evolutionary form or a more progressive stage in political and social organization than the Islamic state as exemplified in the Ottoman Empire. On the contrary, the rise of the European nation-states destroyed a universal order and plunged Europe and a large part of the world into the most violent and bloody conflicts of modern history, as some of these states developed into empires and others into totalitarian societies. It was only the development of parliamentary and liberal systems of government and the concept of the supremacy of law which saved some of these states, and enabled them to survive the consequences of their own nature.

The attempt to establish the theory of Arab nationalism and to organize the political life of the emerging Arab communities on the pattern of the European nation-state is thus an error, since it is not true to the history of the Arabs or to the nature of their political society, and

does not correspond to the trend in Europe itself, as well as in the United States of America and the Soviet Union, towards a multi-national type of society in which social and economic factors take precedence over formal considerations of sovereignty, and even over deep-rooted historic national antagonisms. Arab society is already, and has always been, an open, multi-national and multi-racial society, and to attempt to fit it into the narrow closed framework of nation-states represents a reactionary move which is seriously impeding the progress of the Arab world towards a more modern life and a fuller participation in the contemporary world.

The hope, for example, entertained by some Arab nationalists that the unity of the Arab world could be brought about in the same way as the unification of Germany or Italy was achieved, was bound to be disappointed. The attempt to create a myth of an Arab race or of an ethnically-distinct Arab nation as the basis for the creation of a united Arab state was bound to create a resistance from all those groups and communities living in the Arab world which would have felt excluded from a purely Arab political structure defined in narrow ethnic or racial or even linguistic terms. An Arab unity based on the European pattern of nationalism could only have come into existence as a colonizing, oppressive and totalitarian state, and its life-span would have been bloody and short.

It was the perception of this truth that led certain nationalist leaders in the Arab world to attempt to create nation-states within the framework of territories which had had a long and fairly distinctive historical existence. Thus, for example, Habib Bourguiba's concept of the Tunisian nation was a distinctly European one, and the conflicts which have opposed his

regime to some other Arab states and to certain such political movements spring from his attempt to define the interests of Tunisia within a purely Tunisian framework, and thus to isolate that profoundly Arab country from the currents and crises in the Arab world. This attempt could only succeed, and then only partially, so long as Bourguiba's powerful personality dominated the Tunisian political scene, and it is significant that his waning influence has been accompanied by a marked return of Tunisia to the main stream of Arab life.

The attempt to create an Arab nation-state in any one of the historic entities of the Arab world, or in all of it, rests on a false view of Arab history and of Arab political and social institutions. When the European colonizers of the Arab world, or their Zionist successors, declared that there was no Arab nation, they were right in the sense that the Arab nation does not correspond to a European nation; but they were wrong when they concluded that therefore there could be no Arab state, because a state need not be formed by one nation, and national interests do not have to be defined in terms of a narrow, ethnic, linguistically-defined group. Unfortunately Arab nationalists themselves have fallen into the same error, and have tried to define the Arab state in narrow, exclusive terms, instead of in the open, inclusive, multi-national and multi-racial formula which is their true tradition.

The idea of an Arab State, as opposed to a Syrian, Libyan, Tunisian, or Iraqi state, must be based on a concept of Arab society which corresponds both to its historical character and to the needs of today and tomorrow. The great merit of Arab

society, and the quality which has enabled it to survive the vicissitudes of more than a thousand years, was precisely its open, non-exclusive, heterogeneous character: there was room in it for any community and any ethnic group. It was thus a universal society, and this formula corresponds to the trend of international life today, and to the needs of the Arab countries in particular.

The world is presently dominated by two great universal multi-national societies—the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.—and by a third universal society which is coming into existence—Europe. For the Arabs to retreat at this moment into the formula of small, closed and fragmented states would be a betrayal of their own history and of their own need, and would put them at a grave disadvantage in dealing with the outside world. The moment has therefore come to envisage, seriously and systematically, the formation of an Arab state which would give them that place in the world to which their

numbers, history, geographical situation and new-found wealth entitle them.

This is the great challenge which now faces the Arab intellectuals if they wish to remain members of a universal society and a universal culture. Unless Arab society can find its embodiment in an Arab State, the forces of disintegration and fragmentation already at work will split the Arab world and Arab society into small, insignificant and dependent states: life in these states will be petty and provincial, and this will be reflected in their cultural and intellectual horizons. The only choice which will lie open to the Arab intellectual will be to sink into the narrow provincialism of his mini-state, or to seek his salvation in a more vital, more universal, but foreign culture.


The goal of Arab nationalism—the creation of an Arab State—is thus not simply a response to the challenge of a powerful enemy, or an answer to the economic problems of the day, but a vital stage in the recreation of an Arab Man, if such a creature is to be more than a beautiful phrase in the mouths of our poets and philosophers.



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
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
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Big, bold, beautiful – the arch spans space as effortlessly as it spans the centuries in Lebanon



The Lebanese Arch

by Friedrich Ragette



What the sun, the sea and the mountains are to Lebanon—its strength, its beauty, its very life-blood, the arch is to Lebanese architecture. Indeed, the arch form is so well adapted to Lebanon's climate, temperament and availability of materials that it is often the dominant structural and esthetic element in many buildings, rather than merely a functional component subordinated to building design as a whole. Through the wide-open expanse of the arch, the Lebanese looks out proprietorially upon his sea and his mountains, is cheered by the sun that floods his interiors with warmth and light, and his frugal heart consoled by the thought that the stones that form its graceful lines come, more often than not, from boulders that must be cleared away before his land can be tilled.

The arch is older than Lebanon—perhaps as old as architecture itself (although the two words have, oddly enough, apparently unrelated origins). Babylonians, Assyrians, Etruscans and Romans used the arch extensively for surface structures, while the Egyptians and Greeks preferred to employ it only in subterranean works. It is significant that the arch first appears in areas, such as the flat lands of southern Mesopotamia, where neither stone nor good timber are available. In these regions man manufactured artificial stones—bricks—which were limited in size and, though capable of bearing great weight in compression, have little tensile strength and therefore cannot be used as a wood-substitute in spanning wide openings.

The arch thus represents a skillful solution to the problem of limitation of strength of materials. By definition, an arch is a structure of wedge-shaped blocks over an opening, so disposed as to hold together when supported only from the sides. The arch seemingly defies gravity by resolving vertical pressures into horizontal and diagonal thrust. In its simplest form, the arch assumes semicircular form, and consists of a succession of wedge-shaped blocks, or voussoirs. When the voussoirs are put in place, starting at opposite points on a horizontal plane, a temporary scaffolding must be used to support the upper voussoirs until the final central stone—aptly called the keystone, is placed to unite the two arch segments.


Even then, should the falsework be removed, the arch would collapse if provision for horizontal forces not be made by adding buttressing to absorb this lateral thrust. Arch and buttress always go together, for the arch works only under compression to which it opposes its balancing thrust. As the Arabic saying goes, “The arch never sleeps.”

There appears to be a much simpler way to span an opening: the straight, bridge-like lintel. The lintel doesn't produce horizontal thrust, but it is subject to bending stress. It is the solution of choice if the lintel is long enough to cover the span, strong enough to carry the load placed upon it, and light enough to be lifted into place upon its two upright supporting posts. But these can be severely limiting factors. Disregarding modern materials such as reinforced concrete, unavailable to previous cultures, about the only strong and permanent material of which lintels can be made is stone. If the aperture is wide, the stone spanning it must be long and therefore heavy, and proportionately difficult to move. Thus in


regions where there is no stone, or where a limited labor force was available, the alternative of the arch was the ancient engineer's answer to the problem.

As the pioneers who developed and extended the use of the arch were very much aware of its structural significance, they wanted to emphasize its structural function—that of spanning an opening—by appropriate design. The features of continuity and support were therefore stressed, while the disjunctive character of the arch made of individual segments of stone was suppressed, except for the solitary keystone. The Romans went so far as to give their arches the same profile as an architrave (the lintel), working the span as if it were a bent beam. They were similarly self-restrictive in departing but rarely from the pure semicircular shape, although pointed arches of varying types offer such important advantages as independence of height from span diameter and a reduced horizontal thrust. These virtues were appreciated by the Mesopotamians early in the history of the arch, and the pointed arch spread from that region westward to Syria and Palestine, eastward to Iran, and eventually northward to Anatolia.

When the Arabs swiftly conquered the Near East and North Africa in the seventh century, they encountered a technically advanced civilization with highly developed building techniques and a varied architecture rooted in deep traditions. The Arabs, as a nomadic people, had no such traditions. Their appreciation of their newly acquired architectural wealth was necessarily focused on its formal and decorative aspects. As nomadic people subject to the necessity of keeping their belongings transportable, they had devel-



Side entrance and courtyard a Beit ed-Din Palace of Emir Bechir al-Shihabi, ruler of Lebanon, 1788-1840. Small postern in studded iron door at left is designed to thwart would-be assailants, by admitting one person at a time—stooped—thus exposing his neck to the sword of the vigilant doorkeeper inside.



Pointed trefoil arch surmounting segmental arched doorway, at entrance to St. George's Church, Ehden, north Lebanon.

oped a preference for expressing their artistic skills in intricate decoration of everyday utensils, repeating and superposing patterns in ornamental and preferably geometric combinations. Metalwork and woodwork, pottery and weaving, all clearly demonstrated these characteristics.

When this approach to art was brought to bear upon the formal treatment of arches, the pointed shape was preferred to the plain semicircular, or the semicircular arch was changed to the horseshoe form. Both these types became trademarks of Arab architecture, and with increasing stress on decoration and ornateness further variations such as stilted and multifoil arches were introduced.

Along with these modifications of form, the parts of the arch were designed to obtain striking ornamental patterns rather than to express the function of the construction. The shaping and joining of the voussoirs became elaborate and complicated, decorative extensions were added, and imperceptibly the arch form was completely altered. Often the whole arch was made part of a framed panel, separating it visually from other parts of the building. Meticulous carving and inlay work, decorative plaster or tiling, color effects through the use of contrasting materials—these were the techniques for achieving the familiar arabesque effect.

Lebanese architecture was subject to all these influences, but it also had a local tradition of excellent stone masonry construction. The Lebanese builder, whose product was more exposed to rain and even snow than was the case in most other Arab lands, took pride in giving his buildings strength and durability by constructing with pure stone-cutting tech-

nique, almost eliminating the need for mortar. Such work demands great discipline and it fosters intimate knowledge of both material and structural methods. In traditional Lebanese arches, therefore, a remarkable subtlety in the application of decorative features can be discerned, and evident in the harmony of the final result is the respect with which the mason treats his materials and the construction principles involved.

The traditional Lebanese arch also exhibits a rich awareness of such values as proportion, rhythm and texture, which are expressed in delicate, studied arch forms, where pointed or horseshoe extensions are applied with noble restraint. Embellishments are, similarly, always in character with the material *stone*, and there is a delightful inventiveness, combined with discrimination, in the execution of decorations.

As a result of this healthy approach, we find a multitude of arch forms peacefully coexisting in Lebanon. This situation is in considerable contrast to the great architectural styles found elsewhere, in which the use of the arch is inevitably restricted to the exclusive use of one arch form. One cannot therefore speak of the Lebanese arch as such, but rather of the Lebanese *use* of the arch.

More remarkable even than the perfection of the individual arch designs is the combination of arches and their application to buildings. Unlike the tightly-knit Arab settlement which developed in contrast to the nomadic way of life, and where heat, dust and crowded conditions gave rise to the typical atrium-style house, with rooms opening on to a sheltered interior court but closed to the outside world, the Lebanese house as a rule is



Three different arch forms, combined in a single facade, in a mountain home at Moukhtara, Lebanon. From right: segmental, pointed trefoil, and pointed horseshoe arches.

isolated in a lush green environment, detached and secure, high above the valleys, nearly always enjoying a lovely view and a pleasant climate. In Lebanon there are neither social nor security requirements for closed courts; the rooms can open to all sides, and this has often been done even to the extent of totally replacing the outside walls by graceful arcades, open to the Mediterranean's balmy breezes. Thus arches became an important motif in the facades of Lebanese architec-

ture, and primarily responsible for their singular character.

In Lebanon, arches are applied over windows, doors and gateways. They are often incorporated into walls as relieving arches above lintels. And, of course, they are combined in arcades around courtyards or in exterior galleries. They appear as graceful coupled arches in important windows, and frame the large *liwan* openings which are typical of Arab architecture.

The most familiar feature of Lebanese architecture is not the single arch, but a grouping of three arches in the middle of the facade—the triple-arch motif. No artificial combination of arches merely for the sake of pleasing the eye, the triple arch is the natural result of the internal organization of space within the typical large Lebanese home. The triple arch is so prevalent in Lebanon that there has been a near-standardization in its size and proportions; yet it is only one of many combinations to be found among traditional dwellings in the mountainous countryside.

Modern times and modern building methods are hastening the perhaps inevitable extinction of the traditional Lebanese house and its happy proliferation of arches. Occasionally, an art lover with enthusiasm and the necessary ready cash rescues a delapidated mountain village house, and resuscitates it from its ruinous state. But such patience is usually required—to conclude the sale by negotiation with the many owners of shares in fragmented holdings, to comply with complex building codes, to find artisans capable of restoring the house to its origi-

nal condition—that only the very resolute can carry the job through. More often, community indifference and the inexorable economic demands of a society that places novelty and comfort above esthetics allows monuments to a departed tradition to slide into desuetude and eventual oblivion. Lost along with the structures themselves are the skilled techniques that built them; the art of handling masonry has disintegrated under the hammer blows of western industrialized construction methods. The arch, of course, survives, but ironically among the worst contemporary examples of Lebanese architecture are those incorporating modernized versions of arch forms.

As the world changes, architecture must change along with it. It cannot merely repeat formulas that were successful in the past, but must search out new forms to express new realities. The dwindling examples of the arch as employed in the halcyon days of Lebanese architecture are, fortunately, a constant reminder to architects in Lebanon that building may be not only functional, but durable, harmonious, inexpensive and beautiful, as well.



Shakespeare in the Arab World



*"My ear should catch your voice,
my eye your eye,
My tongue should catch your
tongue's sweet melody..."*

by Suheil B. Bushrui

Shakespeare's influence in modern Arabic literature can be traced in the newly developed art of the drama which the Arabs did not know until the end of the nineteenth century, and in the work of the writers and poets of the twentieth century.

Arabic drama, in the European sense of the word, was born in the Lebanon as a consequence of the influence of Italian, French and English cultures. Until the end of the nineteenth century the Arab world had been without any national drama in either the colloquial or the classical languages. Few people had any interest in drama, and those few consisted in the main of two or three cosmopolitan families in Beirut or Cairo—families with either an English or a French education. The mass of the people were only aware of the art of the *haki* or *muqallid* (حاكي أو مقلد), the imitator of dialect and of personal peculiarities, the recitations of the storyteller, *al-rawi* (الراوي), who related in public places and coffee-houses tales from the *Arabian Nights*, and the *maqama* (مقامة), which is a kind of dramatic anecdote. These various forms, which were mostly written and recited in the form of dialogue, are comparable to early Church drama in Europe, but can hardly be called drama in the real sense of the word. Apart from these and the shadow-play *khayal al-zill* (خيال الظل), the Arabs had nothing in the way of dramatic art. It would be correct to say that in the Arab world recitation took the place of representation and that there was no drama until the beginning of the twentieth century, when the impulse towards the representation of plays upon the stage came from Europe and through the translated works of European writers.

Shakespeare was among the first European writers to be translated into Arabic,

and has been one of the formative influences in shaping Arabic drama in its early stages. Despite this, and the fact that there is still considerable evidence of the influence of Shakespeare in modern Arabic poetic thought, the Arabic library lacks a standard Shakespeare edition and does not yet possess an Arabic *Complete Works of Shakespeare*.

Recently, however, the U.A.R. Cultural Council commissioned a group of expert translators to remedy this deficiency. An ambitious project under the general editorship of Taha Hussein was implemented and a few volumes have just been published. The worth of these translations can only be judged after the project is successfully completed.

Of Shakespeare's thirty-seven plays, the following were translated into Arabic during the first half of the twentieth century:

<i>Romeo and Juliet</i>	(1899)
<i>Macbeth</i>	(1900)
<i>Hamlet</i>	(1902)
<i>The Two Gentlemen of Verona</i>	(1905)
<i>Othello</i>	(1907)
<i>The Tempest</i>	(1909)
<i>A Midsummer Night's Dream</i>	(1911)
<i>Coriolanus</i>	(1912)
<i>Julius Caesar</i>	(1913)
<i>King Henry V</i>	(1913)
<i>The Merchant of Venice</i>	(1922)
<i>King Henry VIII</i>	(1925)
<i>Pericles, Prince of Tyre</i>	(1925)
<i>King Richard III</i>	(1927)
<i>King Lear</i>	(1927)
<i>Measure for Measure</i>	(1930)
<i>The Taming of the Shrew</i>	(1937)
<i>As You Like It</i>	(1944)
<i>Twelfth Night</i>	(1945)
<i>Antony and Cleopatra</i>	(1946)
<i>Richard II</i>	(1948)

Some of these have been translated more than once and by different writers and playwrights, and most of them have been produced several times in more than one Arab country. The most popular with Arab audiences, during the first three decades of this century, were *Hamlet*, *Julius Caesar*, *Macbeth*, *Othello* and *Romeo and Juliet*.

The very early adaptations and translations from Shakespeare were often crude, ridiculous and inaccurate. Orientalist scholar Curt Pruffer's reaction in 1911 to these early translations was that "The stiff, ridiculous Shakespeare translations do not show the least traces of the great British master. . . ."

Not only was the translator's command of English deficient, but at times he translated from French translations of Shakespeare because his French was better than his English. Some of the earlier renderers of Shakespeare into Arabic produced what amounted to adaptations rather than translations. Even Najib al-Haddad, who demonstrated an integrity rare among the early translators of Shakespeare, tried to "improve" *Romeo and Juliet* (which he translated as *Rumiya wa Juliyiyat aw Shuhada al gharam*—"Romeo and Juliet, or The Martyrs of Love") by slightly abbreviating the text, introducing certain additions and interpolating a few songs. *Hamlet*, translated by Tanyus 'Abduh as *Riwayat Hamlit*, appeared in 1902 with the omission of Act I, sc. i and further omissions, and cuts in the longer speeches.

When produced on the stage these plays must have had a very different effect on the audience from that of the genuine Shakespeare play. N. Barbour summarised the situation:

"It is difficult to form a clear idea of what these early performances were

like; but it is obvious that the very amateurish production, the frequent oriental songs and the changes to suit local taste must have resulted in something very different from the productions of Shakespeare that are current in England. . . ."

Shakespeare continued however to attract the attention of both playwrights and actors. No famous actor missed the opportunity of appearing, at least once, as a Shakespeare hero. Shaikh Salama Hijazi played the part of Romeo in Najib al-Haddad's translation of *Romeo and Juliet*; al-Qurdahi played Hamlet in a translation by Tanyus 'Abduh; while Jurj Abyad, a disciple of the great French actor Sylvain, appeared in several plays of Shakespeare in Khalil Mutran's translations, notably *Hamlet*, *Macbeth* and *Othello*. *The Tempest*, *The Taming of the Shrew* and *Julius Caesar* were also great favorites, the last appealing to the audience on account of Mark Antony's oration.

With an increase in the production of Shakespeare's plays in translation and in the output of translated plays, one would have expected an improvement in the work of the translators. But as late as 1922 the standard of translation was still unsatisfactory. Shakespeare's characters in the translated versions were reduced to mere puppets; the liveliness, loftiness and sweetness of Shakespeare's verse were replaced by archaic and obsolete words that sounded ridiculous and needed a number of footnotes to explain them; the many images and feelings that are brought together without effort and without discord in Shakespeare were lost to the reader in the labyrinth of a stilted and archaic style.

Shakespeare fascinated Khalil Mutran, and although Mutran's translations of

Shakespeare are, on the whole, inaccurate, crude and sometimes obscure, he contributed in no small measure to introducing Shakespeare to his generation. He translated the following plays into Arabic: *Hamlet*, *Richard III*, *Macbeth*, *Othello*, *Julius Caesar*, *The Tempest* and *The Merchant of Venice*. His translation of *The Merchant of Venice* (1922) was bitterly criticized by both Mikail Naimi and Ibrahim 'Abd al-Sadir al-Mazini. Like 'Abdul-Rahman Shukri, Mutran attempted to revolutionize Arabic poetry and began to experiment with new techniques learnt from both the French and the English poetic traditions.

An example of these translations is Khalil Mutran's rendering of Shakespeare's *Merchant of Venice*, translated as *Tajir al-Bunduqiyya* in 1922. Although this translation is a fairly late one and in many ways superior to those made between 1900 and 1920, it illustrates the defects of the Shakespeare translations in Arabic and the many problems that faced and still face the translators of Shakespeare in the Arab world.

Mutran seems to have translated the play from a French version of the English original, but he does not acknowledge the sources he used. Our suspicion that he has been using a French translation as his original text is strengthened when we find him translating "gentile" in the line (Act II, sc. vi):

Now, by my hood, a Gentile, and no Jew to mean "gentle" (in Arabic *latif لطيف* instead of the more correct *a'jami اعجمي*).

Although such mistranslations are in no way trivial, they are not as serious and absurd as the omissions and abbreviations that the translator chose to make. A considerable number of lines which are neither superfluous nor dispensable are omitted without any justification and a

number of speeches are either truncated or garbled. No justification can be found for the omission of the last four lines at the end of Act I, sc. iii:

ANTONIO:

The Hebrew will turn Christian: he grows kind.

BASSANIO:

I like not fair terms and a villain's mind.

ANTONIO:

Come on: in this there can be no dismay.

My ships come home a month before the day.

Often the translation lacks precision and accuracy. Not only does the translator change Shakespeare's meanings, but he strips Shakespeare's lines bare of their beauty and succinctness by either interfering with the original text or misreading it. In Act I, sc. i, for example, he omits the words "And when I ope my lips" from Gratiano's speech to Antonio:


As who should say, 'I am Sir Oracle,

And when I ope my lips, let no dog bark!'

Again in Act I, sc. ii we have a very interesting example of inaccurate translation of a word very carefully chosen by Shakespeare and put into the mouth of Portia, who uses it in describing one of her suitors, the Neopolitan Prince. Portia, in Shakespeare's play, says:

Ay, that's a colt indeed. . . .

For "colt" Mutran chooses the Arabic word *hayawan* (حيوان), which means "animal," rather than choosing the correct equivalent *muhr* (مهر). The translator here misses the whole point; what Shakespeare really aims at by using the word "colt" is to emphasize the immaturity of the Neopolitan Prince and his narrow world, for "he doth nothing but talk of his horse." If Shakespeare wanted to use "animal" he would have done so. Stran-



HAMLET: I did love you once.
OPHELIA: Indeed, my lord, you made me believe so.
HAMLET: You should not have believed me, for virtue cannot so
 inoculate our old stock but we shall relish of it.
 I loved you not.

Photographs are from the 1967 production of Hamlet by the Ba'albek Festival Theatrical Troupe, directed by Mounir Abu Dibs and performed at Byblos, Deir al-Kamar and Ba'albek, Lebanon, in a translation by the contemporary Lebanese poet Adonis.

ger still is the way Mutran translates Portia's description of yet another of her suitors, the French Lord, Monsieur Le Bon. Portia's words (Act I, sc. ii):

God made him, and therefore let him pass for a man...he hath a horse better than the Neopolitan's...He is every man in no man...

are rendered into Arabic

هكذا خلقه الله ولا اعتراض لي على وجود مثله
بين الرجال،
لكن ذلك الرجل أكرم حصاناً من النابلي ..
هو كل شيء ولكن لا شيء...

to mean:

God has created him thus, and I have no objection to the existence of a man like him amongst men. But that man is more generous in horse than the Neopolitan...He is everything but nothing.

Very often speeches are abbreviated to the point of unintelligibility and appear in the translated text completely mutilated, such as the Prince of Aragon's speech in Act II sc. ix beginning:

*And so I have addressed me. Fortune now
To my heart's hope!*

Two other unforgiveable omissions occur in Act IV; the first occurs in sc. i in Antonio's speech, where Antonio stipulates two conditions for Shylock's acquittal by the court:

Two things provided more...

In Mutran's translation the two conditions are reduced to one; Mutran's Antonio demands one thing only, that Shylock should "record a gift...unto his son Lorenzo and his daughter." The second is the omission of the whole of sc. ii of the same act.

We also find that some of the most striking and profound lines of Shakespeare seem to lose their quality when translated into Arabic. In Act I, sc. iii the line:

O, what a goodly outside falsehood hath!
is translated as:

ما أكثر الظواهر الخادعة التي تشبه الرذيلة بالفضيلة

O, how great in number are the deceptive manifestations that make vice look like virtue.

The rich suggestiveness of the original words and the clearer sense due to the structural economy of the lines disappear, reducing the blazing energy of Shakespeare's line into the weak vagueness of Mutran. By trying to explain what Shakespeare has implied, Mutran loses the effectiveness of this line.

A further obstacle in the way of the translators was the rich reservoir of European mythology in Shakespeare's plays. Most translators avoided mythological allusions, but when they tried to turn those they thought easy to translate they got into great difficulties. It is interesting, for example, to see how Mutran tried to overcome this difficulty with regard to the "golden fleece" as it occurs in Bassanio's speech in Act I, sc. i:

*Hang on her temples like a golden fleece,
Which makes her seat of Belmont Colchos'
strand,
And many Jasons come in quest of her.*

He begins by correctly translating "golden fleece" as *الجزارة الذهبية*, which is the literal meaning of the two words; but then he spoils it by attempting to explain the image by saying "for this is a golden chain with a story behind it."

Mutran, who is one of the leading Arabic poets of the twentieth century, tries at times to match Shakespeare's verse in *The Merchant of Venice*, which is translated partly in prose and partly in verse and in that respect is near the original; and at times he does indeed succeed in catching a faint echo of Shakespeare's verse. The following passage is an ex-

ample of his failure in turning verse into verse (Act II, Sc. vii):

The first, of gold, who this inscription bears—

'Who chooseth me shall gain what many men desire.'

The second, silver, which this promise carries,

'Who chooseth me shall get as much as he deserves.'

This third, dull lead, with warning all as blunt,

'Who chooseth me must give and hazard all he hath!'

and in the process he loses the meaning of the original passage:

من اصطفائي فقدماً...تمنت الناس وصلي
من انتقائي فاني...اهل له وهو اهلي
من ابتغائي فاعذر...بما هيمن لاجلي

Who chooseth me—in the past people have always desired me.

Who selects me deserves me and I him.

Who seeks me [should not mind] what he gives up for me.

Mutran and his fellow-translators did not realise that, as Pruffer says, "before anything can be created, either in the province of the drama or in Arabic literature in general, the modern writer must cease to work with forms, words, and metaphors of the language of nomadic desert tribes of 1,500 years ago." Gibran had already advocated this at the turn of the century and was the first to break with the past and begin to make use of the everyday language of the people. This problem of bilingualism (classical or literary Arabic and colloquial or everyday Arabic) has not yet been definitely resolved.

The translators of Shakespeare in the early years of the dramatic movement lacked not only the integrity so much desired in a translator, but also the equipment with which to perform their task efficiently—their English was poor and


their knowledge of English literature in general much poorer.

It was left to a later generation of Arab writers and poets to read Shakespeare with more care and understanding and to translate significant and famous passages from his plays. The early translators were mainly playwrights and were chiefly concerned with translating plays; for them Shakespeare was a dramatist first, a poet second. The later generation of poets could not think of Shakespeare except as a poet first and dramatist second.

It is necessary to explain that there was a rivalry between the French and the English systems of education in the Arab world at the beginning of this century; this rivalry was reflected in the various institutions of learning that England and France were very anxious to found on Arab soil. One of the direct results of the two kinds of education available to the Arabs was that modern Arabic literature was greatly influenced by the literatures of England and France. So we find that the new generation of Arab writers and poets is divided into two main groups: the first, influenced by English literature and the English poets and upholding the ideals of Romanticism; the second, influenced by French literature and the French poets and upholding the ideals of classicism. The most prominent representatives of the first group are Ibrahim 'Abd al-Qadir al-Mazini, 'Abd al-Rahman Shukri and 'Abbas Mahmud al-'Aqqad; of the second Taha Husain and Taufiq al-Hakim.

Most of the writers and poets who belonged to the first group had a good command of English and had had the opportunity of acquainting themselves with English literature. Al-Mazini and 'Abd al-Rahman Shukri attended the Teachers' Training College at Cairo,

HAMLET: You shall see anon how the murderer gets the love
 of Gonzago's wife.
OPHELIA: The king rises.
HAMLET: What, frightened with false fire!
QUEEN: How fares my lord?
POLONIUS: Give o'er the play.
KING: Give me some light. Away!



HAMLET: What is he whose grief bears such an emphasis?
 Whose phrase of sorrow conjures the wandering stars
 and makes them stand
 Like wonder-wounded bearers.
 This is I, Hamlet the Dane.



where a thorough and advanced course in English was taught. Al-Mazini taught English for a while in the schools after graduating, while 'Abd al-Rahman Shukri went to study at Sheffield University. Al-'Aqqad, on the other hand, educated himself in English and read voraciously, thus acquainting himself with the works of the English masters. These three belong, therefore, to a school which can rightly be called the "English School." They were guided in their efforts to bring about a literary revolution in Arabic literature by the ideas, critical concepts and artistic standards they had discovered in their reading of English literature. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that these three writers were united in their admiration of "the greatest poet," as one of them chose to call Shakespeare. And it is not surprising, either, to find that Al-'Aqqad's first volume of collected poems includes a translation of Shakespeare's *Venus and Adonis* (translated as "*Venus Over the Corpse of Adonis* — فينوس على جثة ادونيس).

In the quatrains which he chooses for translating this poem he is able to capture faintly the harmonious symphony of sound created by Shakespeare, and call back some of Shakespeare's voluptuous imagery in a pleasant Arabic style. The translation is not as great as the original; but in comparison with other translations from Shakespeare that had gone before it, it was a great step forward. We also find that in 1925 al-Mazini published his first collection of essays, in which he included a long essay on Shakespeare's *The Merchant of Venice*. Meanwhile 'Abd al-Rahman Shukri began to experiment with new forms of Arabic meter, and was greatly influenced in all that he did by Shakespeare's blank verse, discernible traces of which begin to appear in his

early poetry. There were others, as well, who studied Shakespeare, among them Ibrahim Naji, who was also greatly interested in D. H. Lawrence and translated Shelley's "Ode to the West Wind" into Arabic verse. Naji has left us some valuable translations from Shakespeare in manuscript form. Another Arab poet, Ahmad Zaki Abu Shadi, became interested in Shakespeare through the work of A. C. Bradley, who became Professor of Poetry at Oxford in 1901 and whose book *Shakespearian Tragedy* (1904) stimulated and fanned into flame Abu Shadi's imagination.

The year 1927 marks an important development in the history of the theatre in Egypt, for in that year Ahmad Shauqi, the poet laureate of Egypt and "The Prince of Poets," as he was called by the Arab poets of his time, wrote the first partly successful poetic drama in Arabic and thus introduced poetry into Arabic drama, which had so far chosen prose as the only medium of expression. This play was entitled *Masra' Kliyufatra* (*Cleopatra's Fall* مصرع كليوباترا) and shows some influence by Shakespeare's *Antony and Cleopatra*.

When one mentions Shauqi one can hardly forget Hafiz Ibrahim, Shauqi's contemporary and one of the greatest Arabic poets of the twentieth century. Hafiz was fascinated by *Macbeth*, from which he takes the "dagger scene" and renders it into immortal Arabic verse.

It is interesting to point out in this connection that, whereas attempts to translate whole plays have not met with great success, translations of passages or scenes or sonnets from Shakespeare have been very successful. This becomes very clear when we survey the literature that has been written in the Arab world since

the beginning of this century. We come across brilliant translations such as this very recent translation of one of Shakespeare's sonnets by Hussein Dabbagh:

هلا أقول بأن فتونك أشبه شيء بصيف جميل؟
 فأنت تفوقينه فتنة، ويزدان فيك لطيف اعتدال
 تهز الرياح زهور الربيع،
 وللصيف ضيف قصير المقام،
 وحيناً تحرق عين السماء،
 وتشحب حيناً كاهل السقام
 ولا بد يوماً لكل بهاء وداع البهائم
 فان لم يكن عرضاً موته، فشوط الحياة أسير الفناء
 على أن صيفك لن يذبل فذلك خلد لا للبل
 وما فيك من رونق ملكه اليه انتهى لا لكي يفصلا
 ولن يفخر الموت أن قد راك تجريرن خطوك في ظله
 فانت قصيدي الذي لن يزول:
 فما دام في الكون خلق يرون ويسري بهم نفس من
 حياة
 فذلك يحيا وتسري لنفسك منه الحياة

Shall I compare thee to a summer's day?
 Thou art more lovely and more temperate.
 Rough winds do shake the darling buds
 of May,
 And summer's lease hath all too short
 a date.
 Sometimes too hot the eye of heaven
 shines,
 And often is his gold complexion dimmed.
 And every fair from fair sometime
 declines,
 By chance or nature's changing course
 untrimmed.
 But thy eternal summer shall not fade,
 Nor lose possession of that fair thou
 owest,
 Nor shall Death brag thou wander'st
 in his shade
 When in eternal lines to time thou
 grow'st.
 So long as men can breathe, or eyes
 can see,
 So long lives this, and this gives life to
 thee.

Here in the Arabic version of the sonnet we find that the translator has actually

reproduced the complexity of metaphorical elaboration of the original and has even succeeded in recreating the rhythmic, rhetorical and structural elements of the poem. Never before has any translator attempted to make Shakespeare speak in Arabic so well; Mr. Dabbagh has done so and has been successful.

Shakespeare is gradually becoming an important force in shaping the intellectual and artistic life of some of the most talented Arabic poets. Echoes of Shakespeare can be found in Elias Abu Shabbakah's *Death Song* (اغنية الموت) found in his collection of poems entitled *Guitar* (قيثارة):

لك عندي وصية فاحفظها هي بعد الممات أن تنسيني
 وإذا هزك التذكر بالرغم وشاء الوداد أن تذكربني
 فخذني في الظلام قيثار وحي واقصدي القبر في ظلال السكون
 وانقرني نقرة عليه يسمعك انيننا كزفرتي وانيني

Literally translated these lines mean:

My will—which I want you to remember—is to forget me when I am dead. And if memories move you one day and your affection chooses to remind you of me, take the guitar of my inspiration into the dark night and go to my tomb in silence, and tap the guitar once; for it will let you hear a moaning sigh such as mine.

The poem seems to be written with Shakespeare's sonnet *No longer mourn for me when I am dead* in the poet's mind:

No longer mourn for me when I am
 dead
 Then you shall hear the surly sullen
 bell
 Give warning to the world that I am
 fled
 From this vile world, with vilest worms
 to dwell.
 Nay, if you read this line, remember not
 The hand that writ it; for I love you so
 That I in your sweet thoughts would
 be forgot
 If thinking on me then should make
 you woe.
 O, if, I say, you look upon this verse

When I perhaps compounded am with
 clay,
 Do not so much as my poor name
 rehearse,
 But let your love even with my life
 decay;
 Lest the wise world should look into
 your moan,
 And mock you with me after I am
 gone.

Or again, if we look at the following
 line in one of Yusuf Ghadub's
 poems in the collection entitled *The
 Deserted Cage* (القفص المهجور):

فاقضي العمر بنياناً وهدماً . واثبت ما بنى الانسان قبر
 I spend a lifetime building and destroy-
 ing,

But of all that man builds the grave
 alone endures.

we are reminded of the grave digger's
 words in Act V, sc. i in *Hamlet*:

Cudgel thy brains no more about it,
 for your dull ass will not mend his pace
 with beating, and when you are asked
 this question next, say "A gravemaker,"
 The houses that he makes last till
 Doomsday.

Further echoes of Shakespeare are
 repeatedly heard in the voice of the Arab
 poets of today. Shakespeare is still one
 of the most popular European poets in
 the Arab world. Some of his famous
 sayings have become as much a part of
 Arabic literature as they are of English
 literature; every Arab schoolboy has
 at one time or another during his school-
 days studied at least one of his sonnets or
 one or two speeches from his plays. In
 the United Arab Republic, plans have
 been made for translating the whole of
 Shakespeare into Arabic, and a special
 committee has been set up by the govern-
 ment to produce an accurate and complete
 translation.

Many Arabs will still feel inclined to
 agree with Mikail Naimi who said a
 quarter of a century ago:

لا يزال شكسبير كعبة نوح اليها وقبلة نصلي عليها .

"Shakespeare remains a Ka'ba to which
 we make pilgrimage and a Quibla to which
 we turn in prayer . . ."





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Reviews

JERUSALEM, KEY TO PEACE, by Evan M. Wilson.
The Middle East Institute, Washington, D. C., 1970.
\$ 5.95

On the wall of the gatehouse of *Bab-al-Khalil* (Hebron Gate)—better known to Europeans as Jaffa Gate—there was until June 1967 a decorative panel with crescent-and-star motif. The panel was shattered by the hammers of Israeli workman clearing away the two-decade old barriers at Jaffa Gate, which separated the Old City (or Jordanian-sector) from the New—or Israeli—Sector.

Compared to the disasters at Magharaba Quarter and then later at the *Zauwiya Abu Saud* and the peripheral areas between the upper reaches of *Bab el-Silsili* Street and the *Sherif* or old Jewish Quarter, where entire neighborhoods have simply disappeared, to recall that panel at *Bab el-Khalil* and mourn its loss may seem unbearably *outré*. But I mention it as a way of approaching this book by Evan M. Wilson, who retired from the U.S. Foreign Service in late 1967 after having served his last three years as Minister-Consul General at Jerusalem.

Influential pro-Israeli American Jews and their Israeli associates had decided in mid-June 1967 that this particular Minister-Consul General had to go. His flaw consisted in reporting to the State Department all of the steps (the *Bab el-Khalil* panel magnified a thousandfold by Israeli demolition crews and the suffering of the Arabs) that the Israelis were then taking in preparation for the annexation and eventual colonization of the Jordanian sector of Jerusalem.

Wilson reports how the Israelis evicted the more than a thousand residents from

the Magharaba Quarter on an hour's notice and then levelled their homes and mosques. He records the expulsion of 3,000 Arab residents from the City's Jewish Quarter, the widespread expropriation of land and the use of the "absentee" law to seize still more Arab property in Jerusalem.

Wilson reveals how the Israelis "discovered" their great post-war archeological find—the "Temple Scroll" (with a gun pointed at the Arab antique dealer who had hidden it away) and describes the Israeli seizure of the Palestine Museum.

Wilson also provides an eye-witness account of the extensive unofficial Israeli looting in Jerusalem and the destruction of Arab border villages during the first days of occupation, a time when too many of the Western correspondents who had rushed in to cover the war were too busy seeking synonyms for "miraculous victory" or "history's most humane occupation," either to notice or report these and other Israeli outrages.

It is on this grim level of public record that *Jerusalem, Key to Peace* is a valuable book, for the Zionist production of history proceeds at such speed that we may need all the documentation available to prove to somebody someday that the architect of the Dome of the Rock was not commissioned to do the job by Baron Rothschild.

Wilson's consular district consisted of

the two sectors of Jerusalem and (curiously) the Jordanian West Bank. He was independent of the American ambassadors at both Tel Aviv and Amman and reported directly to the Secretary of State.

Along with other career consular officers from countries which recognized Israel, members of the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization and some of the heads of ecclesiastical establishments, Wilson and his family were allowed an unlimited crossing privilege at the Mandelbaum Gate border point between the two sectors. It was a privilege Wilson and his wife exercised several times a day, since in performance of his duty he maintained "two homes, two offices, two sets of friends."

One feels that Wilson kept some sort of score-card of his personal judgments while writing this book and felt compelled to balance out each criticism of one side with words of praise or with a corresponding dig at some characteristic of the other side. This is probably an occupational syndrome for any sentimentally pro-Arab diplomat who has labored for years in the fields of the U.S. foreign service.

But if Wilson's personal accounts are somewhat dulled by tact and sentimentality in contrast to Von Horn's memoirs which are so yeasty, that does not diminish the importance of the unique position that Wilson occupied and has written about.

Thus the author was in a position to personally investigate and verify claims by both sides of pre-war desecration of religious sites. To anyone who followed the polemical line with which Israel tried to justify its annexation of the Jordanian sector, this was a significant issue.

After the June War tons of newsprint were devoted in the West to accounts of

how Jordanian soldiers and local contractors had personally expropriated Jewish tombstones from the ramshackle Mount of Olives cemetery and that the Jordanian authorities had cut a narrow service road through the cemetery itself. These incidents were certainly tasteless but they paled before the thoroughly unreported fact that almost the entire area of a large Moslem cemetery in the New City (*Mamillah*) had been bulldozed and converted in the fifties by the Israelis into a public park.

Several months after the war and following one of those periodic Israeli post-war "atrocities tours" of the Mount of Olives cemetery and the synagogue ruins in the Old City, I raised the question of the fate of the *Mamillah* cemetery at a press conference with Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Kolleck. The question appeared to embarrass Kolleck, but he said that while some graves had been transferred none had been desecrated. I had no evidence so I dropped the line of questioning and none of the exchange appeared in anyone's dispatch that day. Now the American Consulate in the New City is across the street from this Israeli park and Wilson is in a position to report how, in 1958, a predecessor of his informed Washington "that he had been witness to the bulldozing of Moslem tombs and the conversion of the greater part of the cemetery (which I remember well from earlier visits to the city) into a public park."

Wilson also notes that Old City synagogues were damaged in the 1948 fighting, and not maliciously blown up afterwards as the Israelis did not hesitate to imply when taking tourists on the "atrocities tour."

On the other hand, the contrastingly unorganized, personal atrocities by the

Arabs in those years (e.g., the tombstones incident) are of interest only as symptoms reflecting the overpowering sense of frustration experienced by any Palestinian or Jordanian whose patriotism had been soured by circumstances into a raging impotence.

Men who were denied, as the Palestinians consistently were, the opportunity to struggle for their homeland by their “own” governments, tended to resolve their tensions with the mindless verbal violence of that era’s conventional rhetoric (“throw the Jews into the sea”), or more rarely with personally symbolic acts like the tombstone desecrations. A small number of Palestinians mastered an understanding of the source of the tension and lived with that understanding by joining the clandestine parties and the then-underground fedayeen movement.

Wilson concedes that almost all of his Arab acquaintances were drawn from the conservative Jerusalem elite. And while he appreciated their grace and exquisite sense of hospitality, he notes with some annoyance that they lacked the broad conversational field of his friends on the other side who passed their hours in the Minister-Consul General’s presence with lofty talk of archeology, philosophy and theology. All his Arab friends ever talked to him about, Wilson complains, was the Palestine problem and “America’s nefarious role in setting up Israel.” He could not imagine that his own relationship to his Arab friends was of a fundamentally different nature than that of his relationship to Israelis. West of the armistice line Wilson was the official representative of the settlers’ contemporary partner in colonialism, and as we know from elementary social etiquette, it is vulgar to talk shop with a member of the firm on

social occasions—nor is there any pressing moral imperative to do so.

Wilson, who now serves as a director of American Near East Refugee Aid, Inc., has offered a few examples where the “overall performance” of American policy in the Middle East has convinced the Arabs that the U.S. was not abiding by its *policy of even-handedness*, and he grants that the partition of Palestine against the wishes of the majority was “a mistake.”

Consider that performance since partition: the expenditure of incredible public sums in direct financial, technical and military assistance to Israel; the toleration of extensive dual-national activities by American Zionists within both Israel and the U.S.; tax-free status for vast private donations to build up the Israeli state and army, and now to finance the occupation of still more Arab territory; the use of West Germany as a conduit for supplying arms to Israel and the decade-old activities of Pentagon planners preparing their contingency plans for eventual military intervention on behalf of Israel.

To this I would add rather than subtract what Wilson would describe as “positive American initiatives”: the Johnston Mission to organize regional use of River Jordan water; the Johnson Mission to resolve the Palestine refugee problem by a package of compensation, symbolic repatriation and Arab resettlement; U.S. military, technical and direct budgetary assistance to Jordan, and the subsidized sale of wheat to Egypt in the early sixties.

I would suggest that instead of two conflicting equations—of “mistakes” as opposed to “positive initiatives”—we are dealing with a many-sided and only seemingly contradictory strategy that has almost intuitively developed to encompass the strains of excessive pro-Zionist Jewish influence in American political life.

For example, when the United States first announced that it would sell Starfighter aircraft to Jordan prior to the June War, it required a statement from the Israeli leadership that it did not oppose this sale (the same money for one expensive Starfighter would, of course, otherwise inevitably have purchased three MiG fighters) before Congressional opposition to the deal could be stilled.

The initial goal of this strategy was to deflect attention away from the extensive American role in the partnership in order not to jeopardize economic and strategic interests in the region.

As an intermediate goal the United States has sought to defuse Arab-Israeli hostilities with tentative programs for limited regional cooperation, by encouraging official Arab repression of Palestinian guerrilla activity before and after the June War and, as a rule, by discouraging Israeli reprisal operations which have proved embarrassing to both the U.S. and weak Arab leaderships. Once the initial goal was no longer viable, the outbreak of serious conflict between Israel and an Arab state could not but expose the extent of partnership (as was the case in the aftermath of the 1967 war, but not the Suez war.) In June 1967 this second goal was partly sacrificed by expectations of forcing the third or long-range goal—the full integration of Israel into the regional community.

With the skills, potential capital (predominantly American) and already existing infrastructure, all that Israel lacks to become an industrial power is a large local market. Peaceful settlement and “regional cooperation” will provide that market. In return, Israeli economic domination and thus inevitable political influence in Arab capitals, coupled with its already

obvious military capability, will ensure that “secure investment climate” that has been America’s standing concern in Latin America. This visionary analogy of Israel relating to the Arab East as the U.S. relates to Latin America belongs first of all to Abba Eban.

The concept of “mistakes” and “positive initiatives” can not explain the role of the U.S. in the June War. Wilson makes no attempt to do so; off-handedly he repeats the conventional understanding of that war in American mass media: the Arabs thought they could win, and Israel had to strike first.

But Wilson was in Jerusalem at the time. He knew as well as any of the American foreign correspondents covering the crisis in late May from the Arab side that the Tiran Straits blockade was a paper blockade existing only in the pages of *Al-Ahram*; that the Egyptians were in *defensive* positions in the Sinai; that Jordan was making no serious efforts to prepare the Arab sector of Jerusalem for siege, much less as a base for any offensive; and that then-U.A.R. Vice-President Mohied-dine was to go to Washington as part of the formula to end the crisis.

What Wilson did not know then was that Pentagon computers and planners had already assured both Abba Eban and President Johnson that in any conceivable circumstances and regardless of who attacked first, Israel would destroy the Arab air forces within hours and achieve its objectives within a week. That most of the world believed the contrary, that Israel was in grave danger and the Arabs poised to attack, was neither an accident nor a “mistake”: it was a brilliantly executed stratagem by the architects of American policy.

The rise of the Palestinian fedayeen, however small in numbers and politically obscure at the time, was nevertheless a major factor in the decision by the Israelis early in April 1967 to set in motion events ultimately overshadowed by their own effect—the crisis with Egypt in late May and the June War.

That there is not even an attempt to discuss this movement and its goals except for an indirect dismissal by Wilson and by his waving the threat of U.S. military intervention, is an indication of the limits of this book and of the “pro-Arab” sentimental stance that informs it.

ABDULLAH SCHLEIFER

THE BRITISH IN THE MIDDLE EAST, by Sarah Searight. Athenium, New York, 1970, 215 pp., illustrations, maps, bibliography. \$ 12.50

Sarah Searight writes in the foreward of her book: “This is a study of the British who lived in or were associated with the Middle East between the middle of the sixteenth century and the outbreak of World War I. It is not a history of British political activities. During the period covered by this book Britain was interested politically in the Middle East only as an area through which the British travelled on their way to India and as a vital link in Anglo-Indian communications. I have tried to steer as clear of politics as possible except in so far as they are needed to provide a setting for describing individuals.”

Miss Searight’s book is a highly readable account, written with lucidity, of the British in the Middle East at a time when the sun never set on the British Empire. We travel with her through the Ottoman Empire and Persia, their largest towns being Constantinople, Aleppo, Cairo and Isfahan, “each of them of a size and splendour to rival, if not surpass, any European towns of the same period”. As for travelling in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, she writes: “To British travellers of the early seventeenth century, fear of the

Spanish Inquisition was as great as capture by Barbary pirates and almost certain slavery. . . . Travellers by land in Britain ran the same risks as in the Middle East: plague and robbery were commonplace in both areas, roads were uncomfortable everywhere and eastern khans were hardly less comfortable than the average roadside inn in remote parts of Britain.”

Miss Searight describes briefly how the Levant Company was founded in 1581, when “Queen Elizabeth granted Osborne, Staper and ten colleagues a seven-year monopoly in the Levant trade, thus establishing the Levant Company, otherwise known as the Turkey merchants.” The major exports to the Levant were woolen and cotton cloths. In return, “the Turkey merchants brought back to England raw cotton and silk, currants, dyes, wines, brass and silverware.”

British links with Persia are equally fascinating. Trade between England and Persia went, at first, through Russia and Syria. But by 1615, direct trade between the two countries was established on a regular basis. She relates the story of the glamorous Sherley brothers, Anthony

and Robert, “the first (unaccredited) English ambassadors to Persia.” The charms of Shiraz, “claimed as Paradise by all Persians” and the splendours of Isfahan, called “Nesf-i Jihan” (Half the World), with its mosques and palaces have, obviously, not been ignored. Some Persian gardens have also been described. Here is what Cartwright wrote (in 1611) about a garden in Tabriz: “a most beautiful and flourishing garden, large and spacious, replenished with sundry kinds of Trees and sweete smelling Plantes, and a thousand Fountaines and brooks, derived from a pretie River. . . .”

The second part of Miss Searight’s book covers the Middle East in the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries—until the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. “During the nineteenth century,” she writes, “the European powers were influenced primarily by the strategic importance of the Middle East across the path from Europe to the Far East, and used a variety of pretexts to interfere in the internal affairs of the area, particularly Egypt and the Levant.” There is more political history, obviously, in this second part of the book than there was in the first. Nevertheless, we read here about “a magnificent fancy dress ball” given at the British Embassy by Lord and Lady Stratford de Redcliffe and attended for the first time by the Sultan, and how “Levantine ladies and gentlemen” in Aleppo in the 1830s and 1840s assembled in the evenings and sat around on the divans, “speaking little and low—everyone smoking the narguilé. . . .” Also, during the second half of the century, telegraph lines linked India with Europe via Basra and the Gulf; and William d’Arcy obtained an oil concession from the Shah of Persia, where oil was struck in 1908.

Chapters 12 and 13 on travellers’ books, Archeological discoveries and antiquities are most informative and entertaining. “Travellers’ books,” writes Miss Searight, “gradually filled in the remarkably dim outline of the Middle East inherited from their mercantile predecessors.” Here we have the story of the travels and works of Alexander Kinglake (“*Eothen* excels all previous and most later books of travel”), Elliott Warburton (*Crescent and the Cross*), Edward Lane (*Manners and Customs of Modern Egyptians*—“the most complete picture of Egypt and its people ever published”), Gertrude Bell (*The Desert and the Sown*), John Lewis Burckhardt, Richard Burton, Edward Granville Browne and others.

There was another side to the archeological explorations in Egypt, in Iraq and in Palestine, amusing and commercially lucrative. “Forgers, diggers and dealers play into one another’s hands and drive a roaring trade. . . .” “The most successful forger,” adds Miss Searight, “on a rather larger scale than the inhabitants of Luxor, was Constantine Simonides, who specialised in forged manuscripts, ranging from cunieform and hieroglyphic papyri to poems by Aristotle.”

Finally, Miss Searight writes about the tourists of the nineteenth century—“their leisurely pace and infinite scope,” the artists in the Middle East and some of the contributions of the Middle East to nineteenth-century English literature. One of the most famous and self-centered of these tourists was Lady Hester Stanhope, so famous that “even today some will associate the Middle East more with Lady Hester than with any other of her more deserving contemporaries.”

In the field of paintings and sketches, apparently the French artists led the

way by "exploiting the magnificent scope for painting in Constantinople and its surroundings." They were followed by British artists and "a new class of professional topographical artist" who appeared towards the middle of the nineteenth century, famous among them being William Bartlett, David Roberts (*The Holy Land, Egypt and Nubia*) and John Frederick Lewis.

Miss Searight observes at the end of her book, and correctly so, that "the romantic attachment of the British to the Middle East did not survive their acquiring responsibilities in the area. . . ." that "terse journalese has superseded the lush flowing prose of previous observers and the Golden

Road to Samarkand is concrete-paved and may be comfortably trekked by car." In other words, "greater familiarity with the Middle East has thus destroyed its attractive remoteness, while the advance of scholarship has made it a specialist's subject. . . ; the amateur is out place."

A word must be said about the black and white pictures in the book, "the majority of which have never before been published." They are superb and admirably illustrate the theme of the text.

The British in the Middle East is a fascinating and delightfully entertaining book, easy to read, easy to enjoy and very difficult to forget.

ZEINE N. ZEINE

REPUBLICAN IRAQ : A Study in Iraqi Politics since the Revolution of 1958, by Majid Khadduri. London, Oxford University Press, 1969, 318 pp. \$ 8.50

Modern Iraq has not attracted many social scientists. Articles and books on the country rarely appear. For example, the bibliography of periodical literature reported quarterly in the *Middle East Journal* for the year 1969 lists approximately 895 items under the heading "history and politics, modern economic conditions, and social conditions." Of these only 19 items or two percent deal with Iraq. A closer look at these items reveals that the majority of them are in Arabic and deal basically with two subjects: oil and the Kurdish problem. There are various reasons which underlie this lack of interest in Iraq. Among other things, Iraq is a closed society and it is not easily accessible to Western scholars, especially in the last decade or so. It requires a lot of courage, patience and energy to get permission to conduct the

simplest research. Few scholars are willing to make such an investment. Also, Iraq is politically unstable, the political situation changes very fast and in different directions. Therefore, to arrive at any solid statement about the rate and direction of political development becomes rather difficult. Any conclusion has to be tentative and highly qualified and the threat of being outdated quickly is potentially very high. It is in this context that Khadduri's work, under review, is a welcome contribution. Unlike many authors who write an article or two on Iraq and forget it once and for all, Khadduri, in addition to his other interests, has made Iraq his life-long career. He has published several important works about Iraq both in Arabic and English since early 1930, when he was in Iraq, and later when he emigrated to the U.S.

His present work continues the modern political history of Iraq which he started in his first book, *Independent Iraq: 1932-1958*. The book, as the subtitle indicates, covers Iraqi politics between 1958 and 1968. It consists of 318 pages, divided into eleven chapters. Of these seven, or two-thirds of the book, deal with the period between the July 14, 1958 revolution and February 8, 1963. The rest of the book deals with the first Baathist period (February 8, 1963 to November 18, 1963) and the period of both Arifs (November 18, 1963 to July 17, 1968.) Basically, the author's thesis is that the 14th of July revolution, which ended the British-created and -backed monarchy and which set both domestic and foreign policies of Iraq in different and, at times, very opposite directions, is part of the revolutionary wind that has swept underdeveloped countries including the Arab countries, in their attempt to modernize by combining cultural elements derived from Western and socialist societies with Islamic culture and religious tradition. The July revolution of 1958 was more than a military coup as many Western observers contended. It was not an act of a few conspirators who found in their conspiratorial behavior an outlet for their frustrated desires and unfulfilled ambitions. The coup, Khadduri maintains—and rightly so, was the culmination of a whole complex of economic and social forces which were brewing for many years under the surface and which were suppressed by elderly politicians who lost touch with realities. Perhaps there is no better index of the significance and the importance of these forces than the enthusiasm the coup received from practically the whole body politic of Iraq. However, since the revolution of 1958 events in Iraq have proved beyond any shadow of doubt that to over-

throw a government is much easier an act than to sustain and maintain a stable, dynamic, representative government. Since 1958 Iraq has experienced four successful coups and no less than five which failed. Programs for economic and social development that were intended to eliminate social ills among the masses have been frustrated. The contest for power that ensued after the coup, the heterogeneity of the population which gave rise to the Kurdish rebellion and ethnic problems, and the flimsy and fragile bureaucracy which lacks competent and responsible experts, according to Khadduri, explain this state of political chaos.

Despite the importance of the book, it suffers from a number of theoretical and factual drawbacks. Theoretically, Khadduri criticizes the use of the new-middle-class, middle-class, or the three-classes model as a tool to understand the aspirations of the new elements who entered politics between the wars and after. For him, these are not very good analytical tools to understand Middle East politics—including Iraq's. Instead, he suggests the concept "new generation." He claims that this term is more helpful to grasp the subtleties of Middle East politics. To the reviewer this concept is equally confusing and ambiguous. The way Khadduri uses the concept indicates this very clearly. Khadduri did not define the concept in the same rigorous manner that social scientists wish to define their concepts. His usage seems to suggest that it is a wastebasket category to include all shades of opinion from right to left, and all ranges of ages from the twenties to the fifties. The only common denominator is their opposition to the monarchy. Such usage is not only methodologically unsound and confusing but theoretically unproductive in

the sense of generating and developing new hypotheses and insights. Further, the author seems to contradict himself when, in a number of places throughout the book, he uses concepts like "poor" and "middle-class" to describe the social background of the officers. In matters of fact, the book reports much erroneous and inexact information. Following are a few illustrations:

◎ "Qassim nominated Arif to the central organization in January 1959" (p. 25). In fact, it was in 1957.

◎ "Provincial governors (*mutasarrifs*) were replaced by army officers loyal to the new regime" (p. 70). Most of the new replacements were civilians. Even as late as 1960 there were only eight ex-officers, or 58 percent, out of 14 governors.

◎ "Qassim...formed a new cabinet on February 7, 1959" (p. 99). He did not form a new cabinet—he replaced the resigned members with new ones. Throughout his rule Qassim never resigned; now and then he replaced one minister by another.

◎ "Colonel Nazim al-Tabaqchali, commander of the second division in Kirkuk... (p. 107). He was a brigadier-general, as was Aziz al-Uqayli.

◎ "Michel Aflaq and Saleh al-Din al-Bayter received their education in France after World War II" (p. 115). They received their education in France early in the 1930's.

◎ "Aziz al-Hajj...distinguished himself as a writer and became the editor of *Ittihad al-Shab*, an organization of the Communist Party" (p. 119). He became the editor of *Sawt al-Ahrar* ("Voice of Free People").

◎ "Qassim...attended the celebration of a national day at the Embassy of the German Democratic Republic" (p. 129). He attended it at the consulate of the Ger-

man Democratic Republic because at that time Iraq did not have diplomatic relations on the ambassadorial level with the German Democratic Republic.

◎ "New medical schools were opened in 1958 in Mosul and Basra" (p. 154). A medical school was opened only in Mosul. Basra did not have a medical school until Arif's regime.

◎ "Ali Sa'adi returned to Iraq in March 1964 to form a new party" (p. 214). Sa'adi did not return to Iraq until almost the end of Arif's regime.

In addition to these theoretical and factual shortcomings, the author supplies us with very little background information on the organizers of the different coups. What he tells us does not add much to what is already known about them. Further, his claim that the 14 members of the central committee of the July 14, 1958 coup came from relatively poor families cannot be substantiated. Three came from families which owned land. The fathers of three others were military officers. One came from a well-known religious family, and the rest belong to lower-middle-class urban families in the professions or trades. Lastly, the author neither supplies us with a bibliography of recent work on Iraq nor does he cite in the main text the most recent work available in English on Iraq. Some pioneering works by Ahwadran, Dann, Smolansky and a few unpublished dissertations discuss the same issues that Khadduri discusses, and depend on primary Arabic resources and first-hand information.

Notwithstanding these and other shortcomings, Dr. Khadduri has provided us with a significant work much needed by specialists and people interested in the modern history of the Middle East in general and Iraq in particular.

AYAD AL-QAZZAZ

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On Record

The Continuing Israeli Violation of Arab Human Rights

In March 15, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights meeting in Geneva adopted a resolution condemning the violation of human rights by Israel in its Occupied Territories.

The resolution was adopted by a roll-call vote of

14 *in favor*: India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan, Poland, Turkey, Ukraine, Egypt, Tanzania and Yugoslavia;

14 *abstaining*: Austria, Chile, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Finland, France, Ghana, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Philippines, United Kingdom, Uruguay and Venezuela; and

2 *against*: Guatemala and the United States.

By the resolution, the Human Rights Commission:

condemns Israel's continued violations of human rights in the occupied territories, including policies aimed at changing the status of these territories;

condemns specifically Israel's

- ⊙ denial of the right of refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes,
- ⊙ practice of collective punishments,
- ⊙ deportation and expulsion of the citizens of occupied territories,
- ⊙ arbitrary arrest and detention of the citizens of occupied territories,
- ⊙ ill-treatment and torture of prisoners,
- ⊙ destruction and demolition of villages, town quarters and houses, and confiscation and expropriation of property,
- ⊙ evacuation and transfer of sections of the population of the occupied territories, and
- ⊙ transfer of parts of its own civilian population into the occupied territories;

strongly deplores Israel's policy of placing the Arab population in a state of repression, fear and deprivation, and

particularly deplores

- ⊙ requisition of hospitals and their transformation into police stations,
- ⊙ abrogation of the national laws and interference with the judicial system,
- ⊙ refusal to allow textbooks approved by the Director-General of UNESCO into schools in occupied territories, and Israel's insistence on forcing upon Arab school children an alien system of education;

calls upon Israel once again to comply with its obligations under the Geneva Convention to protect civilians in time of war;

again calls upon Israel to allow refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes;

once again calls upon Israel to heed and implement the many U.N. resolutions for safeguarding human rights in occupied territories;

reaffirms that all measures taken by Israel to colonize occupied territories, including occupied Jerusalem, are completely null and void;

declares that Israel's continued and increasing violations of human rights in occupied territories, and its deliberate and persistent refusal to abide by its legal obligations under the U. N. Charter, international law, and the Geneva Convention, indicate the necessity for collective action on the part of the international community.



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By the Numbers

The Arab World's Youth Explosion

In peace as in war, a nation's most precious natural resource is that without which all the rest would be worthless: people. The proportion of youth—especially healthy, educated youth—to total population is one of the best indices of the ability of a nation to convert its other resources into material comfort, cultural progress and military power. By this standard, the 19 countries of the Arab world, with their vast reserves of petroleum and arable land, must be reckoned a rising world power by the end of the twentieth century, for the population of the area as a whole is one of extreme youth destined to reach its productive zenith during the next 20 to 30 years.

At present the Arab world, as enumerated in Table 1, has a total population roughly half that of the USSR, inhabits an area as large as the United States, Mexico and Central America combined, and has a population density almost exactly the same as that of that North American land mass.

TABLE 1

ESTIMATE OF TOTAL POPULATION, DENSITY AND GROWTH RATE IN 1970

Country	Population Estimate on 1 Jan. 1970 (1,000)	Area (Sq. Kms)	Inhabitants per Sq. Km.	Annual Growth rate (%)
<i>Maghreb</i>	36,950	4,750,481	7.8	2.9
Algeria	14,357	2,381,741	6.0	2.9
Libya	1,904	1,759,540	1.1	3.7
Morocco	15,500	445,050	34.8	2.8
Tunisia	5,189	164,150	39.0	2.9
<i>U.A.R. & Sudan</i>	48,695	3,507,262	13.9	2.6
U.A.R.	33,306	1,001,449	33.3	2.5
Sudan	15,389	2,505,813	6.1	2.8
<i>North Middle-East</i>	21,651	740,359	29.2	3.0
Gaza	495	378	1309.5	3.0
Iraq	9,519	438,446	21.7	3.3
Jordan	2,238	90,185	24.8	3.1
Kuwait	648	16,000	40.5	7.5
Lebanon	2,614	10,170	257.0	2.8
Syria	6,137	185,180	33.2	3.0
<i>South Middle East</i>	12,876	3,048,729	4.2	2.7
Saudi Arabia	5,074	2,253,355	2.3	2.8
Bahrein	213	598	356.2	3.5
Muscat & Oman	601	212,379	2.8	2.5
Oman-Trucial States	200	77,700	2.6	7.5
Qatar	91	22,014	4.1	8.1
Yemen	5,400	195,000	27.7	2.2
South-Yemen	1,297	287,683	4.5	2.2
Total	120,172	12,046,831	10.0	2.8

Source: Data calculated by the United Nations Economic and Social Office in Beirut.

This average density is deceptive: much of the land is sparsely settled, and Arab populations are heavily concentrated in national capitals, where the ferment of urb-compacted youth produces a turbulence in political, social and educational institutions that can only intensify if their numbers double during the next generation, as indicated by *Hypothesis 1* of Table 2.

TABLE 2.

EVOLUTION OF ARAB YOUTH, 1970 TO 1990; TWO HYPOTHESES OF EVOLUTION

Age Groups	1970		1990				1990	
			<i>Hypothesis I: Constant fecundity, decreasing mortality.</i>		<i>Hypothesis II: Decreasing fecundity, decreasing mortality.</i>			
	<i>Absolute number (thousands)</i>	%	<i>Absolute number (thousands)</i>	%	<i>1970 Index of growth, base 100</i>	<i>Absolute number (thousands)</i>	%	<i>1970 Index of growth, base 100</i>
0- 3 years	18,513	15.4	37,900	16.1	205	20,451	11.2	109
4- 6 years	11,800	9.8	24,117	10.2	204	13,993	7.7	119
7-12 years	19,733	16.4	40,102	17.0	203	25,412	13.8	129
13-19 years	18,353	15.3	36,801	15.6	201	26,296	14.4	143
20-24 years	10,503	8.7	20,439	8.7	195	20,439	11.2	195
25 years & over	41,270	34.4	46,380	32.4	186	76,380	41.7	186
All ages	120,172	100.0	235,739	100.0	196	182,971	100.0	152

Source: Estimates by UNESOB - Population Unit.

There is every prospect, however, that the restiveness of the young will be at least partially contained by increased educational opportunities. As shown in Table 3, availability of schooling at primary and secondary levels has quite outstripped the rate of population growth. Not unexpectedly, the oil-producing states have made the most marked progress, with a rate of growth of 16% noted in primary schools in Saudi Arabia over the preceding year, followed by South Yemen with 11.4, Qatar with 11.2 and Kuwait with 10.5. A commensurate growth is recorded in female education; girls comprise between 20 and 45% of all students at primary levels, and between 8 and 41% at secondary level, with the exception of Yemen.

TABLE 3

ARAB PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION,

Country	Primary Classes (1967)				Secondary Classes (1967)			
	Both sexes	Male %	Female %	annual growth rate % 1966-67	Both sexes	Male %	Female %	Annual growth rate % 1966-67
<i>Maghreb</i>								
Algeria	1,485,390	62.1	37.9	8.0	116,077	69.5	30.5	4.9
Libya	247,500	70.5	29.5	10.1	34,300	86.9	13.1	15.7
Morocco	1,105,237	68.3	31.7	4.8	248,699	75.0	25.0	22.8
Tunisia	826,326	63.0	37.0	9.4	81,717	72.0	28.0	10.4
<i>UAR & Sudan</i>								
U.A.R.	3,471,334	61.4	38.6	4.2	925,922	68.9	31.1	13.1
Sudan	518,261	66.8	33.2	7.2	142,000	77.0	23.0	18.0
<i>North Middle East</i>								
Gaza
Iraq	991,000	70.7	29.3	3.9	246,000	76.6	23.4	8.8
Jordan	340,010	56.7	43.3	7.0	110,270	69.0	31.0	9.9
Kuwait	54,028	56.5	43.5	10.5	42,008	59.1	40.9	19.4
Lebanon	401,776	54.7	45.3	6.1	109,767	62.0	38.0	13.4
Syria	767,895	67.0	33.0	5.5	213,636	76.7	23.3	14.1
<i>South Middle East</i>								
Saudi Arabia	329,197	70.7	26.3	16.0	49,154	91.8	8.2	26.3
Bahrein	35,222	59.2	40.8	9.3	9,160	60.8	39.2	34.7
Muscat & Oman, Oman & Trucial States
Qatar	11,871	57.3	42.7	11.2	1,978	71.4	28.6	38.2
Yemen	66,830	93.1	6.9	1.7	2,718	99.2	0.8	13.7
South Yemen	56,267	79.9	20.1	11.4	17,659	78.4	21.6	12.7

Source: UNESCO Regional Center for Administration and Planning of Education in the Arab Countries, Beirut 1969.

More than 300,000 young men and women were receiving university-level education in the Arab world in 1966—the latest year for which full figures are available. The number today is substantially higher. As recorded in Table 4, the numbers studying abroad—mostly in the United States, England and France—are not only relatively high but, as in the cases of Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Arabian Gulf shaikhdoms, an overwhelming majority of university students. Acclimatization to foreign educational systems and to cultures which seem to offer more scope for their acquired talents, encourages students to remain abroad in greater numbers than Arab governments would like; but the brain drain has the positive effect of spurring governments to modernize and expand their own facilities to accommodate the educational elite hitherto lost, frequently for good.

TABLE 4
ARAB STUDENTS AT UNIVERSITY LEVEL 1966

Country	Total population 1966 (thousands)	Native Students			Foreign students	Native students
		Total	at home	abroad		
<i>per 1000 inhabitants</i>						
<i>Maghreb</i>						
Algeria	12,150	8,099	6,591	1,508	1,772	1
Libya	1,677	2,970	2,117	853	98	2
Morocco	13,451	9,445	6,971	2,474	763	1
Tunisia	4,470	8,667	5,565	3,102	506	2
<i>UAR & Sudan</i>						
U.A.R.	30,147	160,672	157,415	3,257	19,097	5
Sudan	13,940	10,224	7,753	2,471	353	1
<i>North Middle East</i>						
Gaza	440
Iraq	8,380	26,506	22,900	3,606	1,100	3
Jordan	2,040	22,579	4,253	18,326	156	11
Kuwait	501	1,452	389	1,063	29	3
Lebanon	2,460	14,681	11,286	3,395	12,189	6
Syria	5,400	32,186	24,576	7,610	7,144	6
<i>South Middle East</i>						
Saudi Arabia	4,600	2,423	1,510	1,913	383	1
Bahrein	193	286	26	260
Muscat & Oman,	} 565	}	}	}	}	}
Oman & Trucial States						
Qatar	71	6
Yemen	5,000	409
South-Yemen	1,146	298

Source: UNESCO Regional Center for Administration and Planning of Education in the Arab Countries, Beirut 1969.

The tremendous growth rates of Chart 5—reflecting a level of fertility of between 210 and 235 per 1,000, as opposed to that of industrialized Sweden, for example, with 70 per 1,000—comprises both a high birth rate (three times that of Sweden) and a sharply falling death rate, which seldom exceeds 20 per 1,000 and is frequently below that figure. The resulting natural growth rate (see Table 1) is thus, throughout the Arab world, in the close neighborhood of 3 percent, which rate leads to doubling of a population within a single generation of 20 to 25 years. Indications are that mortality rates will decline even further between 1970 and 1990.

TABLE 5
 ASIAN ARAB WORLD: FUTURE POPULATION GROWTH, 1970-90
 (Thousands)

	1970		1975		1980		1985		1990	
	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B
Bahrain										
Muscat & Oman,										
Qatar, Truc. Oman	1,105		1,290		1,519		1,796		2,132	
		1,105		1,290		1,475		1,644		1,784
Iraq	9,519		11,240		13,372		16,009		19,286	
		9,519		11,240		12,932		14,523		15,900
Jordan	2,238		2,642		3,141		3,765		4,533	
		2,238		2,642		3,011		3,372		3,710
Kuwait	648		769		918		1,102		1,327	
		648		769		891		1,009		1,107
Lebanon	2,614		3,034		3,549		4,174		4,933	
		2,614		3,034		3,453		3,887		4,330
Saudi Arabia	5,074		5,839		6,778		7,915		9,314	
		5,074		5,839		6,505		7,114		7,663
South Yemen	1,297		1,490		1,726		2,016		2,371	
		1,297		1,490		1,657		1,812		1,954
Syria	6,137		7,195		8,515		10,116		12,163	
		6,137		7,195		8,275		9,251		10,147
Yemen	5,400		6,169		7,104		8,253		9,649	
		5,400		6,169		6,824		7,422		7,952

A. constant fecundity, decreasing mortality

B. decreasing fecundity, decreasing mortality

In the Arab world today, 45% of the population is 14 and under (in Sweden, 21%). By the 1980's, this group will be the active segment of an Arab population that will number between 183 million and 235 million, depending on which growth hypothesis prevails. The huge resources of the Arab world, which are steadily coming under more direct Arab control, will be the raw material with which these 100 million young men and women will forge their future—whether a ploughshare for peaceful development or a sword for armed struggle the events of this decade—a decade not yet their own—will largely decide.



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
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
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
- (a) Speed up slightly so he won't go around too fast.
- (b) Decrease speed and move to the right
- (c) Get closer to the car in front so Vehicle«A» can pass both of you at the same time.

ANSWER


The correct answer is (b)

Your responsibility is to make it as safe as possible for the other vehicle to pass. You do that by decreasing your speed and moving to the right.


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CONTENTS

SUMMER, 1971

EDITOR'S NOTE	5
CONTRIBUTORS	9
RECENT AMERICAN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST <i>Harry N. Howard</i>	13
TOWARDS A CRITIQUE OF U.S. MIDDLE EAST POLICY <i>Michael C. Hudson</i>	25
THE DANGEROUS MIDDLE EAST DOUBLE STANDARD <i>Kennett Love</i>	31
PERCEPTIONS, POLITICIANS, AND FOREIGN POLICY: U.S. SENATORS AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM <i>Richard H. Pfaff</i>	39
PERSONAL POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT OF PALESTINIAN YOUTHS: A STUDY OF POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION IN A REVOLUTIONARY POLITY <i>Yasumasa Kuroda and Alice K. Kuroda</i>	51
REVIEWS	67

GUEST EDITOR, *Tareq Y. Ismael*
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
Editor's Note

Of the complex of forces, both internal and external, shaping Middle East politics, none is more potent than American foreign policy. The United States and the American people have been concerned with the Middle East almost since the foundation of the Republic, especially in the missionary-educational-philanthropic and commercial fields. Enduring politico-strategic interests developed in the post-World War II era. Although American interests in the area are wide-ranging, American policy is limited in its support of these interests through its partisanship of Israel. In the first article of this issue Professor Howard examines recent American policy in the Middle East and concludes that the United States appears to be groping uncertainly toward a more balanced and realistic assessment of American interests in the Middle East.

In the second article, Professor Hudson takes a more pessimistic view of recent American policy; the paper argues that the Middle East foreign policy bureaucracy in the Executive Branch of the Government has generally been underrated as an important influence in policy formation. It suggests that within this bureaucracy a consensus has arisen as to the characteristics and capabilities of the various actors involved in the Arab-Israeli struggle, and that this consensus finds the Arab side lacking in credibility and power. As the dominant ethos of American foreign policy is *realpolitik*, Arab claims are not likely to get a truly evenhanded hearing in Washington unless the Arabs demonstrate a real violence capability. Viewed in this context it is remarkable that the Rogers approach has been as "evenhanded" as it has, but this may be because the pro-Israeli "super-realists" do not see it threatening Israeli dominance in the area whether it succeeds or fails. Why do Americans accept so readily a policy that is actually detrimental to American interests in the Middle East. In the third article, Professor Love exposes several of the inviolable myths that underlie American policy and serve to rationalize it in terms of American interests. The fourth article by Professor Pfaff focusses more sharply on how assumptions and myths operate at the political level in support of a dysfunctional policy. He examines the strongly pro-Israeli disposition

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
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of U.S. Senators as a function of considerably more than “Jewish votes” or “Jewish money”.

Five other factors are analyzed: the biblical image of the Israelites, particularly in terms of their ancient conflict with Egypt; the perception of Israel as a democracy; “in-group” identity by dominant political and economic groups which has been extended to include American Jews; the high respect accorded the behavioral traits of the American Jewish community extended to Israel; and the fear of being branded an “anti-Semitic” if critical of Israel. The effect of these factors, concludes Professor Pfaff, is to establish parameters for U.S. policy towards Israel that the President can violate only at great political cost.

The final selection in this issue turns our attention to an important internal force in Middle East politics. Professor and Mrs. Kurado’s study is a preliminary report of a survey of Palestinian youths on several aspects of political socialization. The data for the present article is derived from a survey of Palestinian secondary school students in Jordan in 1970. What characterizes political activists among these students of Palestinian origin? Are variables normally associated with high political involvement in other countries also operative among Palestinians? Is there anything that characterizes political involvement patterns of Palestinian youths not shared by others? These are the questions to which the article is addressed. Several generalizations made from the data analyses include: The extent of Palestinian revolution is sufficiently radical to induce sons of lower social class backgrounds to an integral part of being a political activist. In many cases, Professor and Mrs. Kuroda find that sex difference acts as a key contingent condition in making certain factors such as religious difference, father’s occupation, war-death in family, and friendship pattern relevant factors to be taken into consideration in answering the question of what makes young Palestinians get involved in politics. For example, religious preference and war-death in family affect degree of political involvement among the girls to a large extent but much less so among the boys. On the other hand, father’s occupational background and friendship variables relate to the degree of political involvement among the boys but not among the girls. There are findings which suggest that a *Palestinian awakening* is definitely taking place among these students. Their joining of “Ashbal” and other commando units symbolizes such an awakening of their determination to carry out the liberation of their country by themselves rather than to stay in refugee camps to wait for the advent of Jeannie.

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Contributors



RAY L. CLEVELAND, Associate Professor of History at the University of Saskatchewan Regina Campus, was born in 1929 in Scottsbluff, Nebraska, attended Westmont College in California (B.A., 1951), and the Johns Hopkins University (Ph.D., 1958). He resigned from the research faculty of Johns Hopkins and from the associate editorship of the *Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research* in 1964 in order to return to Jordan, where he had previously spent a year (1955-56) in Jerusalem as a student archaeologist. After living in Jericho for two years engaged in research, he moved to Canada in 1966. Best known to scholars as author of a large archaeological publication, *An Ancient South Arabian Necropolis*, he was awarded an honorary Sc.D. by the University of the Pacific in December, 1970, for his contributions in the field of archaeology. He is also author of a textbook, the fifth edition of which is entitled *The Middle East and South Asia 1971*, as well as numerous articles on archaeology, linguistics, and contemporary affairs. One of his recent studies appears in the *Nonaligned Third World Annual, 1970*.



MICHAEL C. HUDSON is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of Middle East Studies Program at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. He received his B.A. from Swarthmore and his M.A. and Ph.D. from Yale. He taught at Swarthmore College and Brooklyn College of the City University of New York before coming to Johns Hopkins, and has been a visiting lecturer at Yale and the University of Pennsylvania. He has been a research associate at the Harvard Center for International Affairs and at the Yale World Data Analysis Program. His writings on Middle East politics include a book, *The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon*, (Random House, 1968), and articles on Lebanon, the Palestinian resistance movement, the foreign policy of the Arab states, and U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. He is co-author of the forthcoming revised edition of the *Yale World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* and is currently at work on comparative analysis of Middle Eastern political systems. He has carried out field research and made regular visits to the Middle East, the most recent of which was this summer.



HARRY N. HOWARD, (Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley, 1929), Adjunct Professor in the School of International Service, American University, Washington, D.C., and Associate Editor of the *Middle East Journal*, is a retired U.S. Foreign Service Officer with an impressive record of diplomatic experience. In addition, he served as Special Assistant to UNRWA Commissioner-General, 1962-63. He has also taught at the University of Oklahoma, Miami University and the University of Cincinnati, and served as visiting professor at Missouri, Indiana, Colorado, California and Columbia. His numerous publications include *The Partition of Turkey*, (1931, 1966), *The Problem of the Turkish Straits* (1947), *The United Nations and the Problems of Greece* (1947), *The King-Crane Commission*, (1963), and many articles!



YASUMASA KURODA is Acting Director of Peace Research, Associate Professor of Political Science, and Associate Political Scientist of the Social Science Research Institute at the University of Hawaii. He was born in Tokyo (1931), attended Waseda University there and completed his undergraduate work in sociology and graduate work in political science, receiving his Ph.D. from the University of Oregon in 1962. His postdoctorate work includes an N.S.F. sponsored summer study on welfare economics at Princeton University. He has taught at Montana State University, University of Southern California, and the University of California at Los Angeles prior to his coming to Hawaii. His major research activities center around political socialization, community politics, and peace research. He has published over two dozen articles on these topics mostly dealing with Japan and the United States in professional journals in Europe, Japan and North America. His book entitled *Community Power Structure and Political Change in Reed Town, Japan* will be published by the University of Hawaii Press in 1972. Currently, he is working on a monograph entitled *Palestinians Without Palestine: A Study of Political Socialization in a Revolutionary Polity* with Mrs. Alice K. Kuroda.



ALICE K. KURODA was born in Palestine and attended Montana State University (B.S. in history, 1962 and M.S. in sociology and statistics, 1963) and the University of Hawaii. She is President of Survey Research Consultant Service in Honolulu, has published several articles on attitudes, and was instrumental in constructing and translating the survey questionnaires upon which the article included in the present issue is based. She is co-authoring a book entitled *Palestinians Without Palestine: A Study of Political Socialization in a Revolutionary Polity* which reports on various aspects of the survey data not touched in the article appearing in the present issue.



KENNETT LOVE, Visiting Professor of Journalism, American University of Cairo, writes from a background of unique observation and reporting qualifications. For nine years he served as correspondent of the *New York Times*, first in the Mideast (1953-56), then London (until 1959), and finally at the United Nations in New York until 1962. Long intrigued by the 1956 aggression of England, France and Israel against Egypt, he began work on the subject as a Research Associate at Princeton University from 1964-67. Mr. Love had access to such sources as the private papers of former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the Egyptian Military Archives, Israeli Defense officials, and the library of the Assemblée Nationale, to cite but a few. His interviews run the spectrum from the late President Eisenhower to include such historical figures as Anthony Eden, Nasser, Pineau, Eban, and Ben Gurion. His book, *Suez: The Twice Fought War*, was published in 1969 and stands as a monumental piece of research yet an immensely readable and enjoyable account of Middle Eastern affairs.



RICHARD H. PFAFF, Professor of Political Science at the University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado, was born in 1925 in San Francisco, California and attended the University of California (Berkeley) where he received his B.A. (1950), M.A. (1956), and Ph.D. (1960). He studied at the American University of Beirut in the Arab Studies Program, 1954-1955. In 1962-63 Professor Pfaff was a Senior Fulbright Research Scholar in Iran, and in 1967-68 was Professor, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Economics, University of Istanbul, Istanbul, Turkey. During the summers of 1955, 1962, 1963, and 1967, Professor Pfaff traveled to Arab states in North Africa and the Middle East, as well as to Israel, under research grants provided by the University of Colorado's Council on Research and Creativity, as well as from the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1963). He is the author of *Jerusalem: Keystone of an Arab-Israeli Settlement*, as well as numerous articles in professional journals. One of his recent studies, «The Function of Arab Nationalism» appears in *Comparative Politics* (January, 1970). He is also an annual contributor to *Colliers Encyclopedia Yearbook*, covering events in Iran, plus the Arab states of Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, South Yemen, the Sudan, and the Sheikdoms of the Trucial Oman.



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Recent American Policy in the Middle East

HARRY HOWARD

While it is now an old story, it needs to be repeated from time to time that the United States has wide-reaching and long-term interests in the Middle East — interests which are, by no means, confined to the State of Israel.¹ Indeed, it is now fairly well recognized that, whatever the propaganda to the contrary, the “hard-nose” American interests in the Middle East lie distinctly elsewhere. As John Badeau has reminded us, from a realistic point of view, “the American connection with Israel is a liability, not an asset”.²

It is also evident from editorial comment in the American press and some even in the mass radio and television media that sentiment is changing somewhat in the United States, albeit slowly. The extent to which change in public opinion has affected government policy is problematical, although there are some indications that even that is beginning to grope somewhat, if uncertainly, toward a greater degree of “even-handedness” and realism based on the political realities in the Middle East, although ever mindful of those in American domestic politics.³ American policies and interests in the Middle East, in any event, were never quite identical, with those of Israel, as Prime Minister David Ben-Gourion wrote back in 1952.⁴ Despite occasional

conflicts of interest, however, the United States appeared, at least in many basic instances, almost automatically to side with Israel in fundamental aspects of the Arab-Israel conflict, and to be paralyzed politically during Congressional and Presidential campaigns.

Although much pressure has been brought to bear in the past in that direction — at least until August 1970 — the United States has never assumed any formal obligations or commitments relative to Israel, such as those with Greece and Turkey under NATO (1951), or with Iran under the Eisenhower Doctrine (1959).⁵ As the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported in April 1969, the source of the widely held view that the United States “is committed to the defense of Israel, even though we have no security treaty with that country” is “in fact nothing more than a long series of executive declarations.” Not one of these declarations “is based on a treaty ratified by the Senate.” The only treaty commitment the United States has in the Middle East (i.e., the area of the Arab-Israel conflict) is as “a signatory of the United Nations Charter, under which the United States is obligated to support and help implement any action which the United Nations may take.” It was not the position of the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee that the United States should not come to the support of Israel in the event of aggression, however, but that "should so significant an obligation be incurred, it ought to be the result of a treaty or other appropriate legislative action."⁶

In the area of conflict, it may be observed that the essence of American policy was summed up in the Tripartite Declaration, among France, the United Kingdom and the United States, of May 25, 1950, which indicated that the Three Powers would oppose any attempt forcibly to change the armistice demarcation lines (1949) and would seek to control the supply of arms to the contending parties. While the Declaration died in 1956, in so far as France and the United Kingdom were concerned, it remained a basic guideline for American policy in the area. But it should be kept in mind that American statements were statements of policy, not commitments to take particular actions in particular circumstances.⁷ While there was much loose talk by politicians and journalists during the 1968 Presidential campaign as to commitments to Israel as an "ally" of the United States, and ultimately, on December 28, 1968, it was agreed to send some 50 F-4 Phantom jet military aircraft to maintain "the military balance" in Israel's favor through superior air power, American policy, officially and publicly, remained as it had been expressly stated for years. The United States, it was said, desired to limit the Middle Eastern arms race, and it was committed to the peace, security and stability of all states in the area. Nevertheless, as an American diplomat with long experience in the area has remarked, formal commitments entirely aside, Israel is still the only state in the Middle East or elsewhere which has an "alliance" with the United States Congress. No other state in the world could send its Foreign Minister to the United States and summon forty members of Congress to hear the criticism of American foreign policy.

The climate of public opinion changes rather slowly. Public policy changes even more slowly. Neither the Kennedy nor the Johnson Administration made any fundamental change in the publicly expressed American policy or commitments in the Middle East, although there were much pressure and propaganda to bring about a special security arrangement between the United States and Israel. Secretary of State Dulles resisted this pressure during his term of office, as did President Kennedy during 1961-1963. President Kennedy, on April 3, 1963, spoke of his hope that the "military balance" would continue in the Middle East, and he observed on May 8 that the situation had not changed.⁸ The United States, he indicated, strongly opposed the use or threat of force and sought to limit "the spread of communism in the Middle East, which could, of course, destroy the independence of the people." In the event of aggression or preparation, whether direct or indirect, the United States would support "appropriate action" to prevent or to put a stop to such aggression, which, of course, had been "the policy which the United States had followed for sometime".

Whatever his shortcomings in implementation, President Johnson sounded much the same note from time to time, especially during and after the June 1967 blitzkrieg. He repeated the standard formula during the February 1964 visit of Prime Minister Eshkol and in August 1966 when President Shazar came to Washington.⁹ This was the policy set forth prior to, during and after the June conflict. It was repeated in President Johnson's statements of May 23, and June 19, 1967, and its essence was embodied in the resolution of the United Nations Security Council on November 22, 1967. But there was no commitment of United States military, naval or air forces, despite Israeli assertions as to the Sixth Fleet or the fantastic claims of American collusion with Israel in the attack on the United Arab Republic. These were all

statements of policy and not commitments to take particular actions in particular circumstances, as noted above.¹⁰

The problem of peace in the Middle East remained a primary concern of the United States, as it was of the other Great Powers, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France. At the very outset of his Administration, President Nixon, in January 1969, considered the Middle East “very explosive” and a “powder keg”, which required defusing, and he indicated his intention to take initiatives in new directions with new leadership.¹¹ While there was little in the way of new ideas, or of leadership and initiative, Mr. Nixon proposed to attack the problems along several fronts – with continued all-out support for Ambassador Gunnar V. Jarring’s United Nations mission, bilateral and four power discussions with France, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, talks with Israel and the Arab States, and consideration of long-range economic development in the Middle East. In the event of an agreed settlement he proposed, as did Secretary of State Dulles on August 26, 1955, the possibility of a major power guarantee. The President took this position evidently in the light of the basic American interest in the containment of the Arab-Israel conflict, which otherwise could very well involve “a confrontation between the nuclear powers, which we want to avoid.” Hopes for a formal settlement, evidently, rested on the possibility of a concerned program, based on the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967, although many questions were being raised as to whether that resolution offered quite the hope which it appeared to enshrine when it was adopted.

The United States presented proposals on October 28, 1969, to which the Soviet response was negative. On December 9, 1969, Secretary of State William P. Rogers stated the American position publicly, observing that there was “no area in the world today that is more important, because

it could easily again be the source of another conflagration.”¹² Continuation of the conflict would be “extremely dangerous”, and Mr. Rogers felt that the parties alone could not achieve a political settlement. The American position was based on recognition that (1) nations not directly involved could be helpful, although they could not make peace for those which were; (2) a durable peace must meet the legitimate concerns of both sides; (3) the only framework for a negotiated settlement was one in accordance with the entire text of the UN Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967; and (4) a protracted period of no war, no peace, recurrent violence, and a spreading chaos would not serve the interests of any nation, in or outside the Middle East. Mr. Rogers noted the Arab view that Israel would not withdraw from occupied territories and the Israeli belief that the Arab States were not ready “to live in peace with Israel.” Essentially American policy was to encourage the Arabs to accept a permanent peace based on a binding agreement and to urge Israel to withdraw from occupied territory when its territorial integrity was assured as envisaged by the Security Council Resolution. The United States, according to Mr. Rogers, supported all elements in the 1967 resolution, including the withdrawal of Israel forces, and favored a “lasting peace”, which required security both for Israel and the Arab States. The United States could not “accept unilateral actions by any party to decide the final status” of Jerusalem, which should be unified, with open access to all faiths and nationalities, with roles for both Israel and the Arabs in the civic, economic, and religious life of Jerusalem. Mr. Rogers also expressed an awareness of the new dimensions of the Arab refugee problem, of the new national consciousness among Palestinians and of the frustrations which were involved. New formulae had been discussed with the United Arab Republic, involving a binding agreement by Israel and the UAR, detailed provisions relating to security, and withdrawal of Israeli forces from Egyptian territory. While the Rogers statement was

well received in the United Kingdom and Western Europe, it was denounced by the Soviet Government, considered as a divisive and diversionary tactic in the Arab world. Israel accused the United States of "moralizing" and roundly condemned the statement.¹³

Meanwhile, the United Arab Republic had renounced the 1967 ceasefire on March 29, 1969, and the Israeli Government escalated the conflict in January 1970 with deep air raids inside Egyptian territory, even in the vicinity of Cairo itself, a move which prompted Premier Kosygin, on January 31, 1970, to warn the United States, "in all frankness," that if Israel continued on this course, the Soviet Union would be "forced to see to it that the Arab States have means at their disposal, with the help of which a due rebuff to the arrogant aggressor could be made." President Nixon, of course, rejected the Soviet view, indicated that he was using all his influence to continue the ceasefire, and observed that the United States favored limitation of arms shipments to the Middle East, and had always opposed steps which might draw the major powers into the conflict. As he indicated on January 25, 1970, the United States was carefully watching the balance in the area and would not hesitate "to provide arms to friendly states" as the need arose.¹⁴

President Nixon repeated the United States position in his Report of February 18, 1970 to the Congress.¹⁵ He called particular attention to the activity of the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean and the Middle East noting that the United States would "view any effort by the Soviet Union to seek predominance in the Middle East as a matter of grave concern." While the United States had pressed efforts to restore the ceasefire and had urged agreement on limitation of arms shipments, it would "maintain careful watch on the balance of military forces "and provide arms" to friendly states as the need arises". But balance was all too often interpreted in the

United States in terms of military superiority, especially in the air. On March 21 and 23, 1970, the President and the Secretary of State announced their decision as to further shipment of arms to Israel, along with a \$ 100,000,000 short-term credit to that country. The kind of balance which was in mind appears to have been illustrated when, in December 1970, Secretary of State Rogers requested "appropriation of \$ 500 million in military credits for Israel", along with \$ 30,000,000 in Grant military assistance for Jordan and \$ 5 million for Lebanon.¹⁶ President Nixon broadly defined the American goal in the Middle East in terms of a ceasefire, reduction of the flow of arms to the area, achievement of a political settlement of the complex issues, and maintaining a military balance.¹⁷ In turning down an Israeli request for an additional 125 to 150 military jet aircraft, over and above the 50 Phantom F-4 jets which President Johnson had pledged on December 28, 1968, Secretary of State Rogers held that Israel obviously had the air capacity to meet its current needs, and announced that the United States was now to make renewed diplomatic efforts to restore the ceasefire, to get Israel and the Arab States to reappraise their positions, and to engage the other major suppliers to the Middle East in early arms limitation talks.

But, as usual, the essence of the problem in the Middle East lay in the implementation of policy - in the policy of the deed, more than in the policy of words, declarations, statements and high-sounding rhetoric, however eloquent and significant the latter might be at times. Meanwhile, the scale of the conflict intensified and extended, especially after January 1970, and included all fronts, from the Suez Canal to Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, and involved increasing Israeli demands for further American military and economic assistance. While there were some signs of reluctance on the part of American policy-makers, whose estimates of the broad American interests in the Middle East, to say nothing of Israel's

military requirements, did not necessarily coincide with those of the Israeli Government, there appeared little question as to the direction and focus of American policy.¹⁸

As the situation in the Middle East grew more threatening during the Spring of 1970, the United States became more directly involved in efforts to bring about a renewal of the ceasefire, based on the Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967. President Nasser declared on May 1 that Arab-American relations were approaching a "crucial moment" and that any American move to insure "military superiority for Israel" would damage American interests in the Middle East "for decades and maybe hundreds of years to come." If the United States wanted peace, it would have to order "Israel to withdraw from Arab territory" or, if that proved impossible, to refrain from giving Israel further assistance, "as long as it occupies our Arab territory." President Nasser indicated that the USSR was assisting Egypt, not to "launch aggression", but to "liberate our occupied lands."

Partly in response to the Nasser remarks, on June 19, 1970, Secretary of State Rogers urged upon the UAR, as well as upon Israel and Jordan, that the most effective way to achieve a settlement would be for the parties to begin working out under Ambassador Jarring the detailed steps necessary to implement the resolution of November 22, 1967. Mr. Rogers proposed that Israel, Jordan and the UAR subscribe to the restoration of the ceasefire at least for a limited period and to agree to designate representatives for discussions with Mr. Jarring for the purpose of achieving agreement on a just and lasting peace. Evidently, he also pledged American support to Israel to maintain "the military balance."¹⁹ After a visit to the USSR, President Nasser accepted the proposal on July 23, and Jordan on July 26, while Israel reluctantly followed on August 4, and a 90-day ceasefire became effective on August 7.²⁰

Meanwhile, there was much silly talk in high places in the United States "expelling" the Soviet Union from the Middle East. President Nixon reiterated that, when the balance of power shifted where Israel was weaker, there would be war and therefore that it was in the American interest "to maintain the balance of power." He added that the Arabs had to recognize Israel's right to exist, and Israel had to withdraw to defensible borders -- sentiments which were repeated in a more reasonable and coherent statement on July 21.²¹

Talks were initiated with Ambassador Jarring on August 25, but Israel broke them off after one procedural session, on the charge that the UAR had violated the ceasefire by establishing new SAM-3 sites in the Suez Canal Zone.²² The talks were not renewed and there was much concern lest the conflict be resumed in November. Much against the wishes of the United States, the

UAR and its associates brought the situation in the Middle East into the Plenary Session of the UN General Assembly and, on November 4, 1970, by a vote of 57-16-39, a resolution was approved (Resolution 2628 XXV), which called for another three-month extension of the ceasefire and for unconditional renewal of the discussions under Ambassador Jarring.

But, while the ceasefire was extended, there was much delay in the discussions which were resumed only in January 1971. Israel insisted on direct negotiations leading to a binding agreement, and was very reluctant, to put it mildly, to give up any of the occupied territories in accordance with the 1967 resolution. On the other hand, the Arab States insisted on complete withdrawal from the occupied territories, although both sides appeared to desire to maintain the ceasefire. The United States appeared, for a while, to give unalloyed support to Israel and the USSR to the UAR, although neither wanted any escalation of the conflict. As the discussions were renewed. Israel, the UAR and Jordan all sent communications to Ambassador Jarring out-

lining their positions, which embodied no essential changes. Once more, however, there were serious questions as to the ceasefire beyond February 5, 1971 and as to any change in the positions of the contending parties. The ceasefire was extended for one month, until March 5, 1971, with the prospect that some "progress" might take place within that period. None was achieved, however, with the result that, although the ceasefire was not formally "renewed", in principle it remained informally in effect, since neither Israel nor the UAR evidently wanted to reopen the kind of fighting which had prevailed up to August 7, 1970.

Meanwhile, the United States became directly involved in the situation in Jordan as it appeared to deteriorate in September-October 1970, when renewed fighting occurred between fedayeen elements and the forces of the Jordan Government.²⁴ As the United States Government, rightly or wrongly, saw the problem, the crisis occurred when the Government of Jordan decided to re-establish full control of Amman in the face of serious fedayeen inroads. On September 18, a Syrian tank force, camouflaged as Palestinians, crossed into Jordan and took up positions, and was promptly attacked. The United States warned the Soviet Union "of the serious consequences which could arise if Syria did not withdraw." It dispatched the Sixth United States Fleet into the neighboring area and alerted airborne troops, while Israel began "precautionary military deployments." With a Syrian withdrawal, "the danger of a serious international confrontation dimmed."

Arab Foreign Ministers now sought to mediate in Jordan, and on September 22 a ceasefire was announced, and a further agreement between the fedayeen and the Government of Jordan was concluded on October 13, although there was sporadic fighting through the rest of 1970. Meanwhile, the United States considered the deterioration of the situation in Jordan as "the gravest threat to world peace since the Administration came into office". With the Soviet Union "so deeply involved in the

military operations of the UAR, and with firm United States support of the survival of Israel, the risk of great power confrontation would have been real indeed." The Nixon Administration felt that it had "no responsible choice but to prevent events from running away with the ability to control them." The United States, therefore, took a firm stand against Syrian intervention, and acted to stabilize, "but not to threaten, to discourage irresponsibility without accelerating the momentum of crisis."

With the formal end of the ceasefire, the United States sought continuance of peace discussions and, in that interest, Secretary of State Rogers visited the Middle East during May 4-8, when he had discussions in the UAR, Israel and Jordan. While there were some indications of "cautious optimism" and of clarifications of the issues involved, there were hardly any signs at all of concrete progress toward the opening of the Suez Canal, withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied Arab territories, or of formal settlement, largely because the UAR insisted on steps toward withdrawal and Israel refused to take such steps.²⁵ Assistant Secretary of State Joseph J. Sisco visited Israel again during July 28-August 6, 1971 in the interest of steps toward settlement, and engaged in "in depth discussion, exploratory in nature", during which he neither expected nor achieved "decisive breakthroughs", although he thought that a practical basis for future progress on an interim Suez Canal agreement could be achieved. Moreover he still considered an interim Suez Canal settlement the best way to assure that relative quiet would continue. The United States would continue its own effort to achieve an interim agreement because "it would constitute a practical test of peace that in time could help move matters toward an overall settlement in accordance with the November 1967 resolution of the U. N. Security Council."²⁶

Secretary of State Rogers sounded much the same note in his statement of October 4, 1971, when he presented a six-point program, centering on an interim agreement

between Egypt and Israel, in which more details were spelled out in the public position of the United States.²⁷ Having taken two major steps toward peaceful adjustment in the achievement of the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967 and of the cease-fire of August 7, 1970, which had now endured for almost fifteen months, in Mr. Rogers' view, it was now necessary to take a third major step in the elaboration of an interim Suez Canal agreement. An interim agreement would be merely a step toward "complete and full implementation of Resolution 242 within a reasonable period of time and not an end in itself." A cease-fire, in the interest of all, would entail agreement as to the "zone of withdrawal," raise the question of "an Egyptian presence" east of the Suez Canal, and present issues as to the "nature of supervisory arrangements" and "the use of the Suez Canal". The United States, he observed, had long held that the canal should be open to passage "for all nations without discrimination." Since the parties had asked the United States, it would continue its "determined effort to assist them in arriving at an interim agreement. The effort was imperative, in the Rogers' view, because there was "no more realistic and hopeful alternative to pursue." Both Arabs and Israelis, however, were skeptical concerning this approach.

Whether the effort would succeed was, of course, another matter. Much would depend on the political realities in the Middle East and upon those in the United States. Would the United States, fairly and squarely, face up to the complex problems of Arab and Palestinian nationalism in their impact on Israel, its policies and actions, especially in the occupied Arab territories? Would it face up to the problems in American domestic politics, especially when a Presidential election is approaching? As noted at the outset, American policy under the Nixon Administration appears to be groping, however uncertainly, toward a greater degree of balance in the Middle East. As the political fever in the United States already reached a high temperature, the Nixon Administration came under partisan attack by a number of De-

mocratic aspirants.²⁸ If, however, there are those who go all out for a one-sided policy in behalf of Israel, for whatever reason, there are others, like Senators Fulbright and Hatfield, who urge a more cautious and realistic policy on broad and long-standing American interests in the area.²⁹

There is very solid ground for basic criticism of American policy in the Middle East, both in the United States and abroad on the ground of bias, prejudice and partisanship and of failure to measure up in the problems of the Arab refugees, Jerusalem, and generally to serve American interests in the peace, security and more orderly development of the area. Yet if one observes the American scene, there is some ground for suggesting cautiously that change is occurring. The basic question arises as to whether American policy will be able to come to grips with explosive issues in time. Or will only disaster force the necessary changes in policy? The answer to that question, of course, lies in the future. But there should be a number of clues between now and 1972.



NOTES

1. See, for example, John A. Denovo, *American Interests and Policies in the Middle East* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota, 1963), 447 pp; David H. Finnie, *Pioneers East; The Early American Experience in the Middle East* (Cambridge, Harvard, 1967), 333 pp; Sydney N. Fisher, «Two Centuries of American Interest in Turkey,» *Festschrift for Frederick B. Artz* (Durham, N.C., Duke, 1964), 113-138; George Lenczowski, Editor, *United States Interests in the Middle East* (Washington, D.C., American Enterprise Institute, 1968), 132 pp; Robert Daniel, *American Philanthropy in the Near East* (Athens, Ohio University, 1971), 322 pp; Joseph L. Grabill, *Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East: Missionary Influence on American Policy, 1810-1927* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota, 1971), 395 pp.
2. John S. Badeau, *The American Approach to the Arab World* (New York, Harper and Row (for The Council on Foreign Relations), 1968), ch. 2, especially pp. 26 ff.
3. See, for example, the columns of Rowland Evans and Rovert Novak, *Washington Post*, September 8, October 1, 1971; Lawrence Mosher, *The National Observer*, May 18, 1970. For Zionist views see «Myths and Facts--1970», *Supplement to the Near East Report*, January 1970), 72 pp.
4. Harry N. Howard, «Conflicts of Interest,» Alan R. Taylor and Richard N. Tetlie, eds., *Palestine: A Search for Truth: Approaches to the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (Washington, D.C., Public Affairs Press, 1970), 217-239.
5. Harry N. Howard, «The U.S. in the Middle East Today,» *Current History*, Vol. 57, No. 335 (July 1969), 141-145, 174; «US Interest in the Middle East,» *Military Review*, Vol. 50, No. 1 (January 1970), 64-76.
6. See especially, *National Commitments*, Report (April 1969), of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 91st Congress, 1st Session, Report 91-129, pp. 26-27.
7. See United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings, U.S. Commitments to Foreign Powers*, 91st Congress, 1st Session (Washington, 1967), 50-51.
8. Department of State, *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents 1963* (Washington, D.C., USGPO, 1967), 580-581.
9. *Ibid*, 1964, pp. 703-704. Richard P. Stebbins, *Documents on American Foreign Relations 1966* (New York, Harper and Row, 1967), 172 ff; *A Select Chronology and Background Documents Relating to the Middle East* (First Revised Edition). Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 91st Congress, 1st Session (Washington, USGPO, 1969), 211-213, 241-243, 262-263.
10. The political imponderables as to commitments are well stated in *Near East Report*, a Zionist propaganda leaflet, Vol. XI, No. 17 (August 22, 1967): «We have always believed that the implementation of our assurances or commitments, call them what you will, would depend on the state of international and domestic opinion on the morning of the crisis....»

11. *A Select Chronology and Background Documents*, cited, 274-276.
12. Department of State, *United States Foreign Policy, 1969-1970: A Report of the Secretary of State* (Washington, D.C., USGPO, 1971), 409-412; *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace. A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States*. February 18, 1970 (Washington, D.C., USGPO, 1970), 77-83.
13. *New York Times*, December 13, 15, 1969; Embassy of Israel, Washington, D.C., *Policy Background: An Analysis of the U.S. Mideast Peace Plan*. December 24, 1969, 4 pp.
14. *New York Times*, February 5, 26, 1970 for texts of the Kosygin-Nixon exchange. See also *Washington Post*, February 26, 1970.
15. *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's*, cited, 77-83, See also J.C. Hurewitz, ed., *Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East* (New York, Praeger, 1969), Walter Laqueur, *The Struggle for the Middle East: The Soviet Union in the Mediterranean, 1958-1968* (New York, Macmillan, 1969), 360 pp.
16. *United States Foreign Policy, 1969-1970*, p. 428.
17. *Ibid*, 79-82. See also *New York Times*, March 22, 24, 1970, April 6, 1970; Department of State Press Release No. 100, March 23, 1970; Embassy of Israel, Washington, D.C., *Policy Background: The U.S. Response to Israel's Aircraft Needs--An Assessment*, March 26, 1970, 5 pp.
18. James B. Reston observed in *The New York Times*, March 8, 1970: «In the short run these Phantom Jets have power, but in the long run, power in the hands of two and one half million Israelis is an illusion against 70 million Arabs backed by the military power and expansionist determination of the Soviet Union.»
19. *United States Foreign Policy, 1969-1970*, p. 458. The American position was set forth publicly on June 25, 1970.
20. *New York Times*, July 24, 27, August 5, 8, 1970; Israel Embassy, Washington, D.C., *Policy Background: Israel's Acceptance of the U.S. Peace Initiative*, August 13, 1970, 8 pp.
21. Text in *New York Times*, July 22, 1970.
22. For documentation and summary see U.N. Doc. S/10070: Report by the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Special Representative to the Middle East. 4 January 1971, 15 pp. and Appendices. See also *United States Foreign Policy, 1969-1970, 71-79; U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace: A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States*, February 25, 1971 (Washington, D.C., USGPO, 1971), 121-134.
23. See *New York Times*, January 19, 21, 26 and February 3, 1971; U.N. Doc. A/8401/Add. 1: Introduction to the Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization. September 1971. Pp. 78-82.
24. *United States Foreign Policy, 1969-1970*, pp. 80-82; *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's* (1971), 127-128. For the possibility of joint Israeli-United States action, see *New York Times*, October 8, 1970. It should be observed that these events were preceded by the hijacking of three airliners in Jordan earlier in September.
25. See Kennett Love, «Election Fever and the Rogers Mission,» *Middle East International*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (July 1971), 6-9.

26. Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol. LXV, No. 1680 (September 6, 1970), 259-260.

27. The text may be found conveniently in *The New York Times*, October 5, 1971, See *New York Times* October 5-6 and *Washington Post*, October 6, 1971 for possibility that the United States was offering Israel arms, economic assistance and a guarantee for its agreement to the American program.

28. These included Senators George McGovern, Edmund Muskie, Hubert H. Humphrey and Henry M. Jackson. See especially the Jackson statement in *Congressional Record*, Vol. 117, No. 139 (September 23); Hubert H. Humphrey, *New York Times*, October 6, 1971.

29. See especially the Fulbright statements of August 24, 1970 (*Congressional Record*, Vol. 116, No. 147 (August 24, 1970) and April 4, 1971 *ibid.*, Vol. 117, No. 51 (April 14, 1971). For Senator Hatfield's statement of June 16, 1970 see *ibid.*, Vol. 116, No. 99 (June 16, 1970).

30. See, for example, Michael Fancher Jansen, *The United States and the Palestinian People* (Beirut, The Institute for Palestine Studies, 1970), 215 pp; Charles Yost, «Last Chance for Peace in the Middle East,» *Life*, Vol. 70, No. 13 (April 9, 1971), 4; Parker T. Hart, «Middle East Perspective,» *Foreign Service Journal* (April 1971), 4-14, 58. See also John Reddaway, «Strategy for a Long Haul,» *Middle East International*, No. 6 (September 1971), 2-4, for very trenchant critics of American policy and sound advice for the Arabs.



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Towards a Critique of U.S. Middle East Policy*

MICHAEL C. HUDSON

Since the war with Israel in 1967, the Arab world has developed a profound hostility toward the United States, and it has also been the scene of the Soviet Union's most impressive international advances since World War II. Yet it is widely believed in Washington that the Middle East has been a major success story in recent U.S. foreign policy. One cannot properly understand the logic of American policy in the Middle East crisis without appreciating the importance of the foreign policy bureaucracies and the assumptions that shape their decisions.

There is a widespread belief that U.S. policy toward the Middle East is shaped entirely by special affinity or interest groups such as the American Jewish community and the oil companies. The significance of the foreign policy bureaucracies themselves in policymaking has been underrated, perhaps because they are so obvious. Their role is especially crucial in Middle East policy. I refer to the senior officials in the State Department, Pentagon, Central Intelligence Agency, and the White House National Security Council. These men are more powerful than that mysterious element,

public opinion, and they are more independent of special interest and affinity groups than is generally supposed. If public opinion really were paramount, it is unlikely that America would be so unstinting in its support for Israel, for, as several recent polls have demonstrated, there is a distinct lack of interest and an unwillingness among Americans to support Israel unconditionally. And if the oil and banking interests dominated U.S. policy, as the Marxists argue, it is difficult to explain why America has adopted a position that jeopardizes those interests.

The influence of the American Jewish community as a special interest group can hardly be dismissed as unimportant. But judging from ill-tempered nervousness with which Israel has greeted American diplomatic efforts it would seem that American Jewry has not entirely succeeded in its aims. Furthermore, U.S. Jewish spokesmen have become more isolated and defensive since the June 1967 war. The supporters of Israel have been most successful in exerting their influence through the major parties, especially the democratic party, and their influence there is probably based more on their campaign contributions than on the ability to deliver votes. They have also been able to make their presence felt through the Congress, and yet key committees do serve as forums for articulate opponents of Israeli behavior like Senator Fulbright. Overt Zionist pressure on the White House has

*An Arabic version of this article appeared in *Al-Nahar* (Beirut), August 3, 5 and 6, 1971.

never been as strong as it was on the Truman administration in 1947 and 1948, although it enjoyed a certain renaissance during the Johnson regime. Pro-Israeli pressure on the State Department is constant, and it has probably caused the removal or retirement of certain allegedly "pro-Arab" senior officials from sensitive Middle East positions; nevertheless, officials have generally kept domestic politics from biasing their professional activities.

While it is highly unlikely that U.S. public opinion could become pro-Arab or that American Jewry would lose interest in Israel, the Arabs and the Israelis are fairly evenly matched in their ability to influence the foreign policy bureaucracy. Some American officials feel that there has been a significant improvement in the effectiveness of Arab diplomatic representation since the June war and that the development of a small pro-Palestinian lobby has been important.

Nevertheless, Israel has made gains at the expense of the Arabs within this foreign policy community over the period since 1957 when President Eisenhower forced the Israelis to evacuate the Sinai peninsula. To understand why it is necessary to analyze the framework of attitudes and assumptions - the consensus - through which the foreign policy bureaucracies interpret events and make decisions. Students of U.S. foreign policymaking have pointed out the importance of consensus in the bureaucracy. An "orthodox" outlook or approach develops - a body of attitudes and values, whose validity is often unexamined, in terms of which the analysts and advisors function. Analyzing this consensus obviously is difficult, and I must emphasize that my arguments are hypothetical rather than proven.

Israeli gains within the Middle East policy community have not occurred mainly through political pressure or by virtue of pro-Israeli sentiment as is usually supposed: the officials have resisted direct pressures,

and there is little discernible affection for Israel in the Washington foreign policy bureaucracies. Instead the gains have been scored on professional grounds, or more precisely speaking, in the domain of foreign policy analysis. Israel is now perceived as strategically useful. The Jewish state is seen by many "objective" American officials as strong, able to take care of itself, and yet inextricably linked to the United States.

On the other hand, the professionals' consensus about the Arab political systems is that they are weak and underdeveloped; and that the June war did nothing to change this assessment. There is little manifest ideological prejudice in this view: weakness is found in both "progressive" and "conservative" Arab regimes. In the foreign policy lexicon, Arab weakness means political instability, the inability to pursue a consistent policy, the possibility of deception, accident or stupidity that would prove embarrassing to the U.S. While the Arabs are perceived as a weak and uncertain factor the Israelis, whatever their faults, are seen as both strong and predictable. This low opinion of Arab political capabilities is perhaps exaggerated, but if in fact it is widely held in Washington, as I think it is, it has important consequences for U.S. political analysis: Arab threats and promises lack credibility. Whatever behavior the Arabs exhibit -- whether it be violence or moderation -- is likely to be interpreted as a sign of weakness, duplicity, or irrationality, and in any case it cannot be expected to persist. The appropriate American response to hostile Arab maneuvers, therefore, is to ignore them as long as possible.

In light of this tough-minded approach it is curious that there should be as widespread an acceptance of the Arab case, on moral grounds, as there is within American officialdom. It would be difficult to find many career officials that do not feel personally that the rights of the Palestinians have been grievously violated by Israel

with U.S. support. The activities of the Palestinian resistance movement, won for the Palestinians a surprising degree of respect and sympathy in policy circles and in the establishment media. But just as the foreign-policy professionals try to ignore political pressures they also bend over backwards to keep sentiment out of their analyses.

Implicit in the foregoing remarks is the principle that force counts. This is the basic tenet of the realist school of foreign policy. As America's world dominion has grown since World War II, the policymakers have become increasingly impressed -- if not obsessed -- with the efficacy of raw force. True, there is a growing revulsion inside the U.S. toward intervention, counterinsurgency, and the role of "world policemen" -- due in large part to the disastrous Vietnam policy. But this trend does not question the basic principle of force; in fact, it is all the more attractive to U.S. policymakers if the force can be exercised by some other party in our behalf. This is the meaning of the Nixon doctrine. So Washington still respects any state, regime, or movement that can win a war or do a great deal of "mischief". Thus Israel, and more recently Jordan, have improved their positions within the U.S. policy community by winning battles. Even the fedayeen began to make headway in the foreign policy bureaucracies through their demonstrations of power (despite the American aversion to "liberation movements" in general) until they suffered major defeats in Jordan. The delivery of a formidable Soviet air defense capability to Egypt after the Israeli deep-penetration raids of spring 1970 provoked a similar increase in respect for Egypt on the part of Washington.

Officials who advance ideas that do not fit the bureaucratic consensus in foreign policymaking are not taken seriously and their influence declines. In Vietnam

policymaking, we are told, it was "out of bounds" at one point for an official to advocate withdrawal, without losing his own credibility and future usefulness. In the Middle East situation, a line of argument that does not seem to get a serious hearing in the bureaucracy today is that which holds that the Soviet Union has made its remarkable gains primarily because of U.S. support for Israel. This argument does not fall "out of bounds" because it is incorrect -- indeed, only the most dogmatic supporters of Israel attempt to deny it -- but because it implies that U.S. support for Israel ought to be reduced, if not withdrawn entirely. The latter idea, in turn, is virtually unthinkable within the policy community for two reasons: (1) because it would mean no gains for the Soviet Union, and (2) because American domestic politics would not tolerate it. The first reason, strategic, is of course circular and the second one, political, is at least debatable.

At the most basic level the argument challenges the wisdom of the establishment of Israel itself. In 1947 and 1948 it was legitimate to discuss whether Israel's existence was in the U.S. interest; obviously such is not the case today: now the argument is whether a "greater Israel" is in the U.S. interest, and if so how much "greater?" In 1948 the American defense establishment, and especially the Navy, was among the strongest opponents of U.S. support for a Jewish state because it would alienate the Arabs and bring in the Russians, threatening the oil supplies necessary for our allies. Today, however, it is accepted at the highest levels that Israel is a bulwark against further Russian expansion in the Middle East. That Israel was the major cause of past Russian expansion is not forgotten; it is just regarded as irrelevant. It is a tragic irony that Israel has won acceptance in the U.S. foreign policy bureaucracies as an outpost, not of democracy, humanity, or progress, but of Western defenses in the post-containment era. Columnists such as Joseph Alsop and academics such as Nadav Safran may not have

convinced everybody in Washington but they have made it fashionable to argue that the new Prussia of the Middle East can be useful in policing Western interests. Indeed, some Kremlinologists go so far as to argue that unflinching U.S. support for Israel has become essential in maintaining stable relations between the U.S. and Russia; to do any less would only increase Soviet greed and possibly cause the Kremlin leaders to miscalculate the U.S. will to maintain its position in the Mediterranean. Needless to say, there are counterarguments; but I believe that they no longer get a serious hearing in the Middle East policy community.

If I have accurately portrayed the Middle East consensus in the foreign policy bureaucracy, it is remarkable that the Rogers-Sisco approach of an "evenhanded" solution has survived as long as it has. One reason for this is that it rests upon another element in U.S. foreign policy thinking which is neglected but not dead: the American liberal tradition. The liberal perspective is basically optimistic in that it foresees the possibility of harmony in international affairs through the application of reason and compromise. It holds that all problems are susceptible of solution. It was the philosophy (but not always the practice) of Thomas Jefferson and Woodrow Wilson and perhaps of President Eisenhower in the Suez-Sinai crisis of 1956-57. This is the logic of "evenhandedness". It is both possible and desirable that the critical interstate issues between Egypt and Israel be resolved through the mediation of honest brokers, and even that the more difficult problem of the rights of the Palestinian people be resolved through compromises.

The consensus I have attempted to portray, however, arises from a darker, more pessimistic interpretation of human and international behavior, associated with the names of Thucydides, Machiavelli, Metternich, and today Kissinger. This realpolitik position finds the Rogers initiatives naive and analytically unsatisfactory. Solu-

tions that do not reflect the true balance of power in the area are impossible and undesirable. Furthermore, the greater the preponderance of power in favor of Israel, the more stable and satisfactory will be the situation in terms of American interests.

How then can a foreign policy bureaucracy steeped in realpolitik support a Middle East posture so apparently naive? The answer would seem to be that for the "realists" it does not matter whether the Rogers approach succeeds or fails. If it succeeds, well and good: it will have legitimized Israel's existence and improved its security while preserving U.S. interests in the Arab world. If it fails, it will have served the even more important purpose of buying time for the solidification of the new status quo embodied in "Greater Israel". Given the predominance of the realpolitik perspective in the C.I.A., and the White House, the State Department's stance is relatively favorable to the Arabs. That it has persisted so long may only be because the influential realists in Washington (who "objectively" perceive Greater Israel's greater value to the U.S.) expect -- and perhaps hope -- that it will fail, and that it will fail slowly.

As long as Greater Israel is not seen as a serious liability to U.S. interests it is unlikely that the U.S. will insist upon more than a very token Israeli pullback in Sinai. I have tried to argue that the U.S. foreign policy "realists" place great weight on force and political capabilities in estimating a threat to U.S. interests. Furthermore, I have suggested that Washington has a low estimation of the Arab will and ability to exercise more than sporadic military and political pressure against Israel or U.S. interests in the Arab world. Conversely, relatively less consideration is given to issues of legality or morality. The Arabs are regarded as so weak that a great deal more Soviet aid would have to be delivered before Washington takes the Arab position more seriously. Unless serious consideration

is given to the possibility that more U.S. "evenhandedness" might lead to a normalization, if not an actual reduction, of Soviet influence in the area, it is likely that the Soviet presence will continue to cement the U.S.-Israel relationship.

Officials in Washington often declare that the U.S. will move when the time is ripe; the slow, very deliberate pace of U.S. diplomacy since the June war has been to encourage the development of a situation among the Arabs in which the "moderates" would "see the light of day". Has that time now arrived? With the appearance of moderation among the Egyptians, a move away from "extremism" in Syria, the temporary eclipse of the Palestinian resistance and the reassertion of control by the regime in Jordan, one might suppose that it had indeed arrived. But if my impression of the consensus in the Middle East policy community is correct, the chances that the U.S. will succeed in obtaining an Israeli pullback in the context of the 1967 U.N. Resolution are slim, because the very creation of a favorable situation for settlement makes the present status quo all the more attractive. The more likely a diplomatic settlement, the less the need for it. Furthermore, because the pro-Israeli "realists" are influential in the Middle East policy community, and because they feel that the benefits of a strong Israel are worth the costs of unhappiness among the Arabs, the obstacles facing Rogers are still more formidable. Finally, the extent to which the policymakers allow themselves to accept the proposition that Israel is a bulwark against Soviet expansion and a crucial element in keeping a stable balance of power will largely determine the degree of restraint that Washington imposes upon Tel Aviv.

On ethical grounds one can find little to favor in the policy of a great power that sanctions and supports the seizure of territory and the violation of political and human rights; and one may also deplore the very fact that it is considered "professionally" desirable in the field of foreign

affairs to suppress moral considerations because they impair "objective" analysis. But it is not my purpose here to pass moral judgement on the pro-Israeli realist consensus.

I believe, however, that these attitudes logically support a line of policy that strives for the depoliticization of the Middle East as a basic and long term objective. American policy seeks an end of ideology in the Middle East. It is easy to understand why a depoliticized Middle East should be favored: the small, Western-cultured elites ("progressive" as well as "conservative") can thus maintain policies of "moderation". What is more interesting is that this set of attitudes permits -- perhaps requires -- American analysts to think that depoliticization is a *realistic possibility*. For them to think otherwise would lead to a markedly different policy stance, other things equal: one through which the U.S. might come to terms with the developing political forces in the area. In the present framework, however, it would be difficult in Washington to take seriously the idea that the Arabs will offer effective opposition, either political or military, to the Israeli *fait accompli* and to the American exploitation of them to maintain its influence in the area.

Nothing would be more salutary for U.S. interests in the Middle East at the present time than a sober reexamination of the assumptions underlying American policy in this area. Such a reexamination requires not only a more profound comprehension of political behavior in the area itself but also a thorough study of how Washington makes Middle East policy.



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The Dangerous Middle East Double Standard*

KENNETT LOVE

“**T**he dangerous double standard in the Middle East.” It is something that you may be exempt from if you’ve had some experience or knowledge of that area. I know that my own introduction to the Middle East was made rather confusing by the almost unconscious double standard of judgment between the Arabs and the Israelis which prevails in this country more than any other. I think all of us have the basic double standard that consists of having one for other people and one for ourselves. And it can vary. When I am a pedestrian, I defy motorists; when I am a motorist, I curse pedestrians. We may think we have a single standard but we nearly always find an excuse for ourselves violating it.

A double standard is commonly based on self-interest. The problem with the double standard that affects our thinking and our policy in the Middle East is that it is not simply a matter of self-interest. Self-interest may be morally reprehensible but at least it is an understandable, even a practical motivation for a double standard. Our double standard in the Mideast has no such basis. It is oriented toward Israel’s interest or a false identification of Israel’s interests

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with our own, mostly at the expense of our own. We have been persuaded to look at and judge the conduct of Israel with one standard, an easy one, and the conduct of the Arabs with a different and harsher one.

One result is that the victims of the establishment of Israel, the Arabs of Palestine, are generally regarded by Americans as villains instead of victims. After the 1967 War, Isaac Deutscher likened the Zionists to a man who had to jump from a burning building to save his life. He fell on an innocent bystander - the Palestinian Arabs - whose arms and legs he broke. Deutscher said both parties should recognize that the Zionists were forced to flee from the Nazi holocaust, that their impact on the Palestinians was an accident, and that each should help the other. Instead, he wrote, the jumper feared the resentment of the one he had injured and beat him up at every subsequent encounter in order to forestall any possible revenge. In self-justification, the Zionists must view the Arabs not as victims but as villains. And they encourage us to do the same, not in our interest but theirs.

Any number of terms will illustrate what I mean by the double standard. Let us take a common term like “secure borders.” We hear a great deal about Israel’s need for secure borders. But one thing a land border has is two sides. Yet we never hear of Egypt’s need for secure borders although Israel has invaded Egypt three times - in 1949, 1956,

and 1967 — as against Egypt's single invasion of Israel under King Farouk in 1948. This question of secure borders has led, in almost every historical instance of a country being preoccupied with it, to a great deal of expansion. Russian expansion across Asia in the 19th century came of a constant quest for buffer zones so that her borders would be secure. Each buffer zone soon becomes a part of what is accepted as national territory. Then you need another buffer zone.

This is what Israel has done also, since Zionism was born in the 1890s. Balfour's promise of a national home for the Jews in Palestine turned out to require national borders and statehood. The conquests of 1948 and 1949 provided militarily better borders than the UN Partition Plan. But Israel did not consider them secure enough. Between wars she constantly encroached into the demilitarized zones. Through wars, culminating in 1967, Israel has grown fourfold. Yet we still hear of her need for secure borders.

Oddly enough, we never hear anything about Egypt's need for secure borders. By Israel's own criteria, secure borders for her mean vulnerable borders for Syria, Jordan, and Egypt.

We hear a lot of talk against permitting peace to be imposed on Israel. When they use the words, "imposed peace," people are thinking only of Great Powers imposing terms on Israel. In fact, it is Israel which has imposed war and is now seeking to impose peace entirely on her own terms on her Arab neighbors. Now about territorial integrity. Our only formal commitment in the Mideast is the Tripartite Declaration which we made with Britain and France on 25 May 1950 guaranteeing the territorial integrity of *all* the states in the area. There were to be no forcible changes of the borders. The British and French violated it in 1956 along with Israel but the *status quo ante* was restored. President Johnson reaffirmed the pledge just before the June War of 1967. Of course, Israel violated the

territorial integrity of Syria and Jordan and, once again, of Egypt in 1967 and is still doing so. President Johnson reaffirmed the pledge right after the June War and then forgot about it.

Thus, we have completely dishonored our only formal commitment in the Middle East. Along with that is our failure to back up the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 setting the terms for a peace settlement. The preamble to the UN Charter itself forbids territorial conquest. It is illegal by this international standard. We have gone to war twice since the Tripartite Declaration over truce line violations in Korea and Vietnam. But in Israel's case we apply a standard so different that we effectively abet her territorial violations although they flout our own formal guarantee.

We speak of the balance of power. Intelligence estimates published in the *New York Times* and other papers have always held Israel to be stronger than the Arabs at any given time. And of course the wars have all ended in remarkable Israeli victories. Yet we favor Israel over the Arabs in our arms sales. The arms race itself was begun by Israel in August 1954 with secret purchases from France. It did not become a race until September 1955 when the Egyptians, after a series of Israeli raids, tried to buy arms from us and finally bought them from the Russians. Since then both sides have been running in the arms race. Israel always says she needs arms for defense. Not so. Premier Ben Gurion summoned Moshe Dayan home from Paris in October 1955 to prepare Israel's conquest of Sinai — a full year before the ostensibly unexpected war of 1956.

We apply the word "defense" to Israel's military undertaking but not to Arab preparations. However, it is Israel not the Arabs whose military demeanor and strategy are characterized by a bold, aggressive spirit. Offense may be called the best defense; it is also the best offense. And I do not think history will swallow, as we do, the contention that Israel's wars were simply defensive.

By contrast, the Egyptians are fundamentally people who don't think of war except in terms of defending the Nile Valley. They aren't much for foreign expeditions. And yet the general image in this country of Arabs and Egyptians is of swarthy people with flashy teeth and knives under their robes—a stereotype of aggressiveness. We picture Israel always in terms of defending herself even while we sell her offensive arms like Phantom bombers that carried out deep penetration raids against Egyptian population centers early last year.

The double standard we have is particularly evident on the issue of recognition. The Arab refusal to recognize Israel has been condemned and complained of for 23 years. We overlook Israel's refusal to recognize the national entity of the Palestinian people. Mrs. Golda Meir has said on notable occasions concerning the question of negotiating with the Palestinians that there is no one to negotiate with. She goes so far as to say the Palestinians do not exist. Well, over two million of them say they do exist. And they are the main antagonists, the ones who have claims as valid and determined as Israel's to the land of Palestine or Israel.

On other acts of recognition we have also applied a double standard. When President Nasser recognized Mainland China in May 1956, that was the beginning of the end of good relations between the U.S. and Egypt. Shortly after that we withdrew our aid for the High Dam at Aswan; Nasser retaliated by nationalizing the Suez Canal Company, which gave a pretext for the war that Israel, Britain, and France were already planning against Egypt. By contrast, there was no outcry in this country when Israel recognized Communist China six years earlier in 1950, nor when our ally England recognized that nation in the same year.

Fear of Communism, which colors a great deal of our thinking on the Middle East, is based on false premises. Not a single Arab nation is or has gone Communist. We, ourselves, have stronger fromal ties to a Communist country than any Arab govern-

ment has; our relationship with Yugoslavia was formalized in the 1950s in the Balkan Pact. And actually we, ourselves, are the ones who pushed the Arabs toward reliance on the Russians for Great Power help. It began with Egypt's need for arms after Premier Ben Gurion came back from a period of retirement in the desert and launched a series of raids on Egyptian positions starting with the Gaza Raid on 28 February 1955. It was out of neglect of Egyptian requests for arms, our policy not to say Yes or No—actually an old Middle Eastern tactic—that forced Egypt to go to Russia for arms.

Now the only way that we can prevent the increase of Soviet influence in the Arab World is by ourselves conducting a policy of friendship toward the Arabs. It is our policy of partisanship for Israel which has pushed the Arabs into their friendship with the Eastern Bloc. Surely more of the same policy is going to have more of the same result. Yet we hear from Senator Henry Jackson and from people like White House adviser Henry Kissinger and George Ball the argument that Israel is the bulwark against Communism in the Mideast and that, therefore, we must support Israel against the Arabs. This is a complete reversal of the logic of events. I have no objection to friendship with Israel but our partisanship and support for Israel against the Arabs, who should equally receive our friendship under any but a double standard, is what has brought Russia into the Middle East. More support for an aggressive Israel which is occupying and colonizing a small empire of Arab homelands is sure to force the Arabs into ever greater reliance on the Soviet Union.

There are much older examples of the double standard. It goes back before the establishment of Israel. Remember President Wilson's famous endorsement of the principle of self-determination for all peoples? In the Mideast self-determination was written into every single British and

French mandate except the mandate for Palestine. The reason for this exception was that, in the Balfour Declaration, Britain had promised the Jews a national home in Palestine directly contrary to the wishes of the Arab Palestinians who then constituted over 90% of the population. Zionist immigration and colonization in Palestine did not reach significant proportions until it enjoyed the protection of British mandatory rule. Self-determination at any time during the three decades of the mandate would have meant independence and self-government for the Arabs and they would have halted large-scale Zionist immigration. So there was a double standard then – self-determination except when it interfered with Zionism.

Consider repatriation. To Israel it means the return of the Jews of the Diaspora to their Biblical Promised Land. The Jews refer to Palestine as the Promised Land and they do not claim it as their native land. It is the native land of the Palestinian Arabs. It was bitterly nicknamed “The Twice-Promised Land” when the British in World War I promised it first to the Arabs who lived there and then to the Zionist movement among Jews in Europe.

Repatriation or compensation is a right which the United Nations voted for the Palestinian Arabs and which it has revalidated every single year since the creation of Israel. Yet Israelis and some Americans say “If Israel allowed the Arabs to return to their homes, this would mean national suicide for Israel.” This is exactly what the Palestinians said during the years of Jewish immigration into Palestine: it means national suicide for people coming from abroad and establishing themselves as a majority in our homeland. They were right. Israel grew from a dream into a nation while Palestine crumbled away into a dream. National suicide, by our double standard is all right for Arabs but not for Israel.

Actions are said to speak louder than words. But America hears Israel’s agreeable words better than her disagreeable actions. Take the word “peace.” In the years

when I was first in the Mideast, Premier Ben Gurion would come out with a proposal for peace talks before virtually every major Israeli raid. It was so regular that whenever Ben Gurion spoke of peace Nasser would brace for an Israeli raid that same night. Indeed, at the outset of the 1956 War itself there were expressions of peaceful intent by the Israeli Government. Israel’s actions stand in stark contrast to her words. Whenever the choice between war and peace has come up in the last 23 years, it has been Israel that decided against peace.

In the early 1950s Premier Moshe Sharett and Nasser were in indirect contact through a number of people – General Burns of the UN Truce Supervision Organization, British Members of Parliament, French diplomats, and others. The drift was toward peace. Nasser was speaking openly of working toward this goal. After intervening years of Zionist propagandea, we have quite forgotten that Nasser talked and acted like the pacifist he was. We have never believed in either actions or words of peace by the Arabs, seeing that they have no reason to love the Israelis. But the Egyptians in the 1950s were willing to make peace for the purpose of getting on with their own revolution, their own development. They were willing to make peace over the heads of the Palestinians, They are still willing to make peace but no longer over the heads of the Palestinians.

The Palestinian National Movement can be thankful now that Ben Gurion aborted those trends toward peace when he returned to the government. His ordered raid on Gaza on 28 February 1955 was based on no provocation whatsoever. Mr. Moshe Sharett, who was Premier at the time, told me afterward that so far as he knew there had never been any valid reason given for that raid.

A corollary to having a double standard is equating as equal things which are not equal. The argument that the expulsion of the Arab refugees was offset by the migration of Jews from the Arab countries to Israel is not valid even in the most superficial sense. The Israelis refer to it as an ex-

change of population. Aside from the fact that the movement of Palestinians expelled from Israel was at least three times the number of Jews from the Arab World who moved to Israel, the motives for these migrations were totally different.

Christopher Sykes, in his book, *Crossroads to Israel*, summarizes as well as any study I have seen the reasons for the Arab flight from Palestine. It resulted from a deliberate Israeli policy to drive the Arabs out, a policy which still prevails. I have been to Israel and in the occupied territories twice since the 1967 War and I have seen how severe are the inducements for the Arabs to leave. Occupation policy is aimed at the objective: Territory, Yes; Arabs, No. If they can remove the Arabs from the land they control it will be so much easier to annex it formally and for good — and they show every indication of preferring territory to peace.

The Arabs were induced to leave Palestine, in many cases, by deliberate acts of terror such as the massacre of hundreds of villagers at Deir Yassin. And that was far from the only act of terror. The situation of the Jews in the Arab countries was not first class, but they had lived there for centuries and had lived better and suffered less prejudice and far less persecution than they had in the Christian world. They left their Arab homelands by notice; they were not driven out. The Jews of Iraq were allowed to take with them only the property they could carry, so I don't say any migration of whole communities is a good thing. All I am trying to do is point out that we should not, in a kind of reversal of a double standard, equate two quantities which are quite different. The Arab expulsion from Palestine is not equatable with the migration of Jews from Arab countries into Israel.

prevent a renewal of the 1956 War. Egypt accepted the presence of UNEF on Egyptian soil. Israel flatly refused it. So for ten years on the Egyptian side alone, UNEF constituted a moral screen along the border. It wasn't strong enough to block an invasion but it did set a line of blue uniformed troops across which any attack would be flying in the face of world opinion in a most flagrant way. Surely, since it was Egypt which had UNEF on her soil and Israel which refused it, it is obvious that Egypt was the country which felt the more threatened. For ten years, UNEF was an obstacle to Israel and a shield for Egypt.

In 1967 when trouble broke out between Israel and Syria, Israel made threats actually to invade Syria as far as Damascus and overthrow the government. This forced Egypt to face the prospect of implementing the Egyptian-Syrian defense pact or of revealing it to be just another worthless scrap of paper. The only way Egypt could honor its commitment to help Syria, and thereby maintain its credibility as an ally, was to ask the UN to withdraw the Emergency Force so that Egypt could jump on Israel if Israel jumped on Syria.

As the situation deteriorated rapidly, UNEF requested permission to withdraw directly across the border into Israel in order to get out faster. Israel refused. UNEF was not able to complete its withdrawal before Israel attacked Egypt. Israeli troops killed and wounded a number of Indians and Swedes in UNEF. Ever since 1967, we have heard a lot of flak against Egypt for asking UNEF to leave Egyptian territory. Nobody ever talks about Israel's rather cold-blooded refusal to let them escape through Israel from Israel's own long-planned invasion.

Our view of the policies of both sides toward the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) is another example of the double standard. UNEF was sent into Egypt to stand between two opposing sides and

The double standard is so pervasive in this country that most Americans are as unaware of their bias as fish are unaware of water. It overrides some of our most cherished attitudes. The United States likes to think of itself as opposed to colonialism.

Israel is nothing if not colonialist. One of the most effective and famous Zionist organizations was the Palestine Colonization Society. Zionism began in Russia, Germany, England — all great colonial powers. Nobody in Europe thought there was anything wrong with colonialism and the Zionists saw no reason to call colonization by any other name. Not in those days, at any rate. Israel now has driven out the original Arab inhabitants of Palestine. Israelis now live in the homes of the exiled Arabs, pluck their fruit trees, work their farms and factories, and bar their return. This is certainly colonialism. But colonialism is now a bad word; nobody calls Israeli colonialism what it is for fear of being accused of anti-Semitism. It is safer and more common to call our own government colonialist or neo-colonialist or Coca-Colonialist.

The same goes for “imperialism.” which means enlarging your own empire at the expense of foreign countries. General Dayan himself speaks of Israel’s new empire. It includes parts of four Arab nations and every inch of it was conquered by force of arms. But unlike Dayan, no American calls it an empire or speaks of Israel as imperialist.

By some outrageous quirk, Americans will apply the word “imperialist” to Egypt, whose once sovereign soil in Sinai makes up the bulk of Israel’s present empire. This is not merely a double standard, for Egypt has had foreign troops on her soil — British and Israeli occupation and UNEF troops — for the last 99 years except for four months in the summer and fall of 1956.

Racism is an ugly and controversial term. It is also a social and political evil which becomes curiously invisible to Americans when it is in Israel. For Zionism is unquestionably racist. We may have a certain sympathy for it, as we rightly have sympathy for the survivors of the holocaust in Europe, because it is defensive racism in the minds of many Jews, regardless of its effect on Arabs. It is nothing if not racist to decree that only Jews can immigrate to Israel and that people who have lived there for hundreds of years and whose claims to the land

are indisputable in actual law and custom cannot return to their own homes because they are not Jews. I will not discuss intra-Jewish racism here, the discrimination in Israel against the oriental Jews, the Sephardic community, who have become the Chicanos of Israel.

Theocracy is a handmaiden of racism. Our very Constitution puts us in opposition to theocracy. Yet how often do we voice or hear complaints about Israel’s theocracy? It would not be so bad to exempt Israel from criticism as a special case were it not that we hear a lot of critical talk about Islamic theocracy. In fact, Islamic law has been in the process of disappearing from the Arab World ever since World War II. Country after country has replaced Islamic law with modern secular law. By contrast, the courts of Israel are based upon Jewish religious law, to the distinct disadvantage of non-Jews. The racial issues of who is a Jew is a current matter before Israeli courts.

The double standard would not be possible if we were better and more honestly informed about the Middle East. The double standard is nourished by Zionist propaganda. Nobody besides the Zionists has any particular interest in making us see with a bias so pro-Israel and anti-Arab. They are, incidentally, aided in their propaganda financing by uncommon tax exemptions which constitute a kind of standard doubled and redoubled in Israel’s favor at our expense since, as taxpayers we share the cost of Zionist exemptions and thereby help pay for the propaganda that misleads us about our own national interests. The inequity of these tax exemptions is accepted along with the rest of the double standard at political levels in this country because both major parties bid against one another for the support of American Zionists. The rivalry is not merely for votes, although this is important because the urban centers are in states that have the largest number of electoral votes, but also for campaign contributions. Joseph Alsop, a whole-hearted supporter of Israel pointed out recently that a large part of the

campaign funds of both parties come from Zionist sympathetic Jewish contributions.

It is difficult to keep one's bearings with a double standard of vision. The disorientation in American thinking at both the policy making and public opinion levels is so pervasive that many people are unable to see the legitimate grievances that are the natural basis of Arab antagonism toward Israel. Being unable to see these, the only way they can account for what they call Arab intransigence is to dismiss the whole Arab race as irrational. Israeli intransigence, by the way, is usually called "tenacity."

As for honest versus dishonest mistakes, the Israelis and the Arabs are equally capable of both, but in this country Arab errors are treated as lies while Israeli fabrications are excused as errors.

When there is an air battle over the borders, press accounts usually say something to the effect that so many Russian MIG 17s or MIG 21s of the Syrian Air Force were repulsed by a number of Israeli planes with such-and-such losses. We rarely read the designation of the Israeli planes as American built Phantoms or the like but the Russian planes in the Arab air forces are nearly always identified.

Now the reason the double standard is so dangerous to us is that it leads us to see interests where they do not exist and to fail to see them where they do exist. Our real interests are as deftly hidden as the pea in a shell game. One of the things cited in claiming that the well-being of Israel is a vital interest of this country is that Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East. Despite reservations concerning the status of non-Jews in Israel, we can agree that Israel is indeed a democratic country. But democracy is certainly not a vital interest of our government on the record of its own policy. Spain, Yugoslavia, Saigon, Greece, Latin America — the list of regimes we support reveals not only no vital interest in, but not even a preference for, democracies.

Under what shell is our real interest in

the Suez Canal hidden? For over a century the whole world has been in favor of free transit through the Suez Canal. Most of the world still is, except for us and Israel. Since 1967 we have completely reversed ourselves. George Ball, in an article in the *New York Times* magazine last June, was the first pundit I know of to have argued that it was in our interest to keep the Suez Canal closed because the Russians would be able to use it if it were reopened and thereby do all kinds of sinister things like establish a naval presence in the Indian Ocean (which they already have done anyway) and become a power all down the Red Sea.

The Russians, on the record, were minor users of the Suez Canal before it was blocked. Their share of the tonnage was 4% against nearly 80% for the so-called Free World. It is like cutting off our heads to cure a headache to prescribe that it is in the national interest to keep the Suez Canal shut because of the minor benefits its reopening may give to Russia. Quite apart from the immense harm the blockage of the Canal does to our allies, it hurts us substantially because of the worldwide increase in tanker costs, which raises the cost of the oil we ship from Venezuela and from producing to consuming areas along our own coasts. It is strategically and commercially absurd to favor the continued closure of the Suez Canal when recent estimates put the cost for 1971 alone to the Free World upwards of \$5 billion.

Arab markets, Arab oil, Arab political influence at the United Nations and in the Third World certainly outweigh any practical interest that Israel can serve for us. Our payments balance with the Arab World is \$2 billion a year in our favor while Israel drains us of \$500 million a year. Our politicians talk a lot about maintaining our credibility by honoring our commitments to Israel. In fact, we have no formal commitment to Israel other than the Tripartite pledge to prevent territorial conquests. Our credibility in the Third World has already been badly damaged by our failure to honor that pledge as regards Arab territories.

Seeing interests where they do not exist and failing to see them where they do exist makes us react to false threats and fail to react to real threats. Secretary of State Rogers and President Nixon acknowledge that the Middle East situation is the most dangerous in the world. It was not in our interest to allow ourselves and Russia to be polarized on either side of this issue in 1967. But we did it and we continue to do it in pursuit of false interests. It was unrealistic to allow the double standard to lead us into tying our policy to an isolated state in the Middle East whose own short-sighted policies are injurious to our interest.

Israel herself is endangered by our unrealism because someday the mirages that mislead us are going to fade and then we are likely to leave Israel out on whatever limb

she has taken us out on at the time. However, I think there are signs of a healthy disengagement in these days and weeks, a recognition that our interests and Israel's are not identical, which they certainly are not. But Israel is not taking meekly our increasing reluctance to endorse her territorial objectives and her continued occupation of Arab territory. The *New York Times*, in a recent editorial, said with an absolutely straight face: "the risks of a real confrontation with Israel are great and Washington is extremely cautious about taking them." To such a ridiculous pass has the unrealism of the double standard brought us. Let us hope Washington will prove readier to risk a confrontation with Israel rather than with Russia when the chips are down.



Perceptions, Politicians, and Foreign Policy

The U.S. Senate and the Arab Israeli Conflict

RICHARD C. PFAFF

On June 1, 1970 a letter was sent to the Secretary of State of the United States Government requesting that the Administration supply Israel with 25 F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers, as well as some 100 Skyhawk fighter-bombers. Correspondence of this type is common within a democratic political system, whether originating with a concerned individual, or emanating from the office of a paid lobbyist seeking to advance the interests of his client. This particular letter was of a different type, however; for it had been signed by no less than 73 out of a total of 100 U.S. Senators. Included among the signers were Presidential hopefuls, or possibles, such as Edward Kennedy, Birch Bayh, Fred Harris, Henry Jackson, George McGovern, and Edmund Muskie from the Democratic Party, as well as such powerful Republican figures as Hugh Scott (Senate Minority Leader), Barry Goldwater, and Charles Percy.¹ Earlier, on May 23 a similar letter signed by seven Senators who are among those most opposed to our involvement in South Viet Nam had been forwarded to the White House.²

To even the most casual student of American politics this indication of pro-Israeli sentiment comes as no surprise. For a half century the U.S. Senate has recorded its position in this regard, beginning as early as 1922 with its support of the Joint Reso-

lution in favor of the Balfour Declaration.³ In more recent times, however, the confluence of three disparate phenomena appears to have deepened attitudinal dispositions within the U.S. Senate in favor of Israel. These are (1) the American difficulties in extricating itself from Southeast Asia without loss of diplomatic or military position; (2) the polarization of regional relations within the Middle East into an Arab bloc supported by Russia and an Israel supported by the United States; and (3) a growing identification of the American Jewish community with the "Ruling Establishment", howsoever defined. While data to support this interpretation of the strengthening of pro-Israeli sentiment within the U.S. Senate is limited and largely speculative, it may be argued that the heuristic value of the hypotheses presented below will lead to such data in future research.

What is a matter of public record is that Israel holds a special place for most U.S. Senators. Thus Senator Scott (Rep., Penn.), upon receiving the American Friendship Gold Medal from B'nai Zion on February 21, 1971 stated, "All of you know that I have long been enlisted in the struggle for a Jewish state - a Jewish state blessed by security and peace. I have battled on this front from the very beginning of my political career"⁴; or Senator Montoya (Dem., New Mexico) speaking before the U.S.

Senate, March 24, 1971, "Israel is the only democracy in that part of the world. She is also our only reliable ally;"⁵ or Senator Ribicoff (Dem., Conn.) in a speech criticizing the December 1969 Roger's plan, arguing that "Israel is blocking Soviet domination of the eastern Mediterranean and its expansion into the Indian Ocean;"⁶ or Senator Charles Percy (Rep., Ill.) upon his being honored December 9, 1970 as "Man of the Year" at the Israeli Bonds Annual Dinner when he said, "I have counseled steady consistent and unswerving support for Israel at the highest level of our government."⁷ Similar such declarations by dozens of other Senators may be found in the Congressional Record. But only the most unsophisticated observer of the American political system, or one inclined to favor a simplistic definition of the situation, would conclude that such pro-Israeli sympathies are merely a response to Jewish votes and/or Jewish money. Since both of these factors are important, although by no means definitive, a word on each should be made before further explication of the basis for the pro-Israeli attitude of the U.S. Senate is essayed.

There are more than five million Jews in the United States, although they constitute something less than 3% of the total U.S. population. Of this five million almost two million live in New York City, with sizeable concentrations of Jews in the suburbs of that city (ca. 450,000). Other Jewish communities are in Los Angeles (500,000), Philadelphia (330,000), Chicago (250,000), and Boston (185,000). In one major U.S. city, the Jewish population comprises almost one-half the total, namely, Miami, Florida. As may be seen by these figures the vast majority of the Jewish Community in America lives in urban areas and within a few, mostly eastern, states. In the majority of states, the Jewish community does not make up a politically significant percentage of the total community. Since there are two Senators from each state, irrespective of population, this means that most Senators are from states wherein the Jewish population represents a very small minority and could hardly be politically determinative.

Perhaps the most graphic case in this regard would be that of Democratic Senator Gale McGee of Wyoming, one of the most outspoken pro-Israeli senators, 1966 recipient of the "Torch of Liberty Award" given by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, and currently a member of both the Appropriations and Foreign Relations committees of the Senate. He is from a state where there are virtually no Jews. Insofar as almost all elections to the U.S. Senate are concerned, there simply is no "Jewish vote". But no political campaign manager is going to try to disprove the theory of any so-called "Jewish vote" on his candidate. And since there is no significant number of Arabs within the United States, the political price of being pro-Israeli approaches zero, while a contrary position "might" be costly. This may be noted if Presidential elections are taken into consideration. In 1960 President Kennedy defeated Richard Nixon by the margin of 112,827 out of more than 68,000,000 votes cast (the popular vote, of course, is not commensurate with the electoral vote in the United States). If Nixon had won the State of Illinois (lost by 8,858 votes out of total of 4,746,834), and the State of New Jersey (lost by 22,091 out of 2,748,739 total votes cast) or the State of New York (lost by 383,666 out of over 7,276,000 votes cast) he would have been President in 1960 instead of 1968. Nixon's close loss of 1960 was followed by an equally close victory in 1968 when out of a total popular vote of 73,211,562 votes cast, Nixon defeated Humphrey by only 510,315 votes. In this election, Nixon carried Pennsylvania by only 169,388 votes out of over 4.3 million and New Jersey by only a little more than 60,000 votes out of almost three million.

To politicians at all levels, close elections are to be avoided if at all possible; but if Jews do form a bloc, they constitute but one bloc out of dozens of diverse ethnic, religious, or racial groups that make up the American political mosaic and what particular mix of such groupings will produce the most effective political majority in any

particular election is the magic formula that all politicians seek to discover. Jews vote and therefore one may speak of a "Jewish vote". To ascribe to this vote the same solidarity, however, that one would expect to find with Lebanese clans is to misunderstand the socio-political character of the American political scene. Other factors may be equally directive of political behavior: income, familial background, education, and occupation, to name but a few.

As in the case of Jewish voting, the contributions of rich Jews to the campaign funds of politicians of both parties, but primarily of the Democratic Party, are considered significant variables in the American Political process. It would be foolish for any candidate to ignore this vital aspect of politics. One only has to note that a Denver Jewish community of less than 25,000 raised over \$700,000 in less than 24 hours for the State of Israel following the outbreak of the June 5th Arab-Israeli War.⁸ The millions gathered each year by one or another Jewish fundraising agency for the State of Israel or for some Jewish philanthropic society is a continuing demonstration of the enormous capacity of the American Jewish community to "tax the diaspora".⁹ But there is no convincing evidence to suggest that U.S. Senatorial candidates are "selling their souls" in some perfidious enactment of a Faustian drama.

It is the contention of this paper that a number of other factors help account for the strong pro-Israeli attitudes prevailing within the Senate. In this essay, five such factors are analysed. It is hoped that following this examination, the reasons why contemporary events have deepened pro-Israeli feelings in the Senate will become more apparent. The final section of the paper will take note of some of the policy implications of this attitudinal posture on the part of U.S. Senators.

It is a truism to suggest that man views reality through a set of images that may or may not reflect empirical reality, and that the images held by each individual constantly function to filter the product of sensory perception. But too often the point is overlooked that in the context of today's world, each individual is subjected to a barrage of information bits every day, with each piece of information striving to create new image patterns in the mind of the individual or to modify existing images. The resulting image matrix is extremely complex for each person. The propensity is to seek a simple explanation for complex phenomena so that the application of the individual's mental effort involves a minimum of energy expenditure. When this is coupled with the inability of individuals in key political roles to gather sufficient information within the time permitted for decision-making, it is readily understandable why such individuals prefer to hold attitudes that are shared by their decision-making colleagues. Then each individual may verify his own disposition by affirmation from his associates, with little strain to himself. As Kenneth Boulding has noted, each issue at the level of international relations generates its own "issue-elite" and that most people will accept the role of a "passive-majority" relative to that issue.¹⁰ Within the U.S. Senate, a similar disposition prevails. The following factors appear to create an image matrix for Senators that makes it relatively easy for most of them to "go along" with the pro-Israeli issue-elite within that legislative body, or to subscribe to the "definition of the situation" suggested by outside sources which reinforces the position of the pro-Israeli issue-elite within the Senate, itself.

1. The biblical images of Israel updated. There are only two Jews in the Senate (92d Senate, First Session), Ribicoff of Connecticut and Javits of New York. But every other Senator has been exposed to biblical stories dealing with the ancient Israelites. To virtually all of these Senators, modern Israel is the extension of biblical Israel, an image construction that pro-

Israeli elements are anxious to further. Once the modern setting is linked with the biblical past, then the scenario of yesteryear finds contemporary application. The Israelites are led out of bondage from Egypt by Moses who receives the Ten Commandments in the Sinai Peninsula. The conflict between Israel and Egypt is not one of recent vintage; it becomes an image extension of an older confrontation. Since the Israelites are cast in the role of the "good guys" in the biblical version, the propensity is to continue this interpretation.

Even more common in this regard is the comparison of modern Israel with David and the several Arab states with Goliath. Tiny Israel with only about three million is cast into conflict with a Goliath of 100 million Arabs. Thus Senator Montoya said March 24, 1971 on the floor of the Senate, "It is a little hard to believe that David is the real aggressor against Goliath."¹¹

2. Israel perceived as a flourishing democracy. While the United States supports non-democracy, as well as democratic countries, throughout the world, the fact that Israel is a democracy, with more than one political party, with periodic elections, with vigorous election campaigns, and with civilians clearly in control of the military, endears that Middle Eastern state to many Senators who see in Israel an extension of their own democratic ideology. In this context, Israel is perceived as a "bastion" of democracy in a sea of authoritarianism, and is, as Presidential hopeful Senator Henry Jackson put it, "serving in the front-line of Western defense in the Middle East."¹² In fact, it is this point that was cited by the Senators sponsoring the May 23rd letter sent to the President, contending that Israel had requested military equipment to "defend her freedom" and, unlike regimes in Southeast Asia, was a democratic nation.¹³ And in August of 1971 Senator Humphrey stated firmly that there must be no hesitation on the part of the Administration concerning the delivery of supersonic planes to Israel "so as to permit her to maintain her defence posture - a posture which is defending our national self-interest as well."¹⁴

This Senatorial image of Israeli democracy is in close conformity with the image associated with the United States, at least in the early days: a hard-working, forward-looking, pioneering, egalitarian, independent country, displaying just the right amount of audacity, arrogance, and aggressiveness to enable it to survive in a hostile political and economic environment until it could overcome its immaturity. In such a setting, the question of who has the "right" to Palestine is bypassed and a perception of Israel as a land of social and economic democracy is allowed to come to the fore. What American is not aware that the prime minister of Israel was once a school teacher in the United States? Or that women enjoy the full panoply of civil and political rights within Israel while the Jewish state's neighbors are only now breaking the fetters that kept women in various forms of servitude for centuries.

Furthermore, the Israeli farmer is portrayed - or was before 1967 - as one striving to defend his hearth, driving his tractor with one arm while cradling his Uzi machine pistol in the other. To the Senator, this image of the Israeli farmer is only the modern analog to the 19th century American pioneer who ventured out West to the frontier to defend his hearth with a rifle in one hand, while driving his plow with the other.

These images of the egalitarian nature of Israeli society are further reinforced by the widespread manifestation of equality within the military, even to the extent of drafting women right along with men. The casual attention given within the military with regard to first name identification of officers by enlisted personnel, saluting, matters of dress, etc, are additional items that bear on this point.

Whether in the realm of politics, economics, or in social relations, the Israelis give the impression of being an egalitarian society. While difficult questions may be raised with regard to the racial character of Israel, or to the problem of the oriental Jew's assimilation into a society dominated by the Ashkenazim culture, the important

point to consider here is that they seldom are brought to the attention of the Senators and even when this occurs (as, for example, before Senate Committee Hearings), these particular considerations are not allowed to obfuscate the more positive image-building perception alluded to above.

3. *Israelis are "our kind of people"*. No other attitude appears to be more pronounced within the U.S. Senate, as well as throughout the general population than that which links the Israeli community to the West in general, and the United States in particular. Both Israel and the United States are perceived to be culturally united by a common outlook, one marked by the scientific-exploratory, engineering-manipulative, perspective of reality. The nexus between the two societies is science and technology with a common scientific tradition dating from Chaim Weizmann through Albert Einstein to the complex scientific projects that tie Israeli research facilities, including the Israeli atomic reactors at Dimona, to American scientific facilities. And cultural affinities abound in the world of music, art, medicine, and dress, as well. Derogatory comments suggesting that Israel is the only state in the United States with its own foreign policy, or that New York State may only have one Senator in order that Israel may be properly represented by its own Senator (i.e. Javits), reveal a measure of truth in that the State of Israel is not so alien a polity that one cannot make it part of the United States even when the intent is derogatory!

Once the U.S. Senator comes to this conclusion, then a host of psychological considerations function to reinforce this identification of Israel as part of the Western / American cultural framework. Milton J. Rosenberg has noted in his study on American foreign policy that an attitude consists of both affective and cognitive features, with the affective core of the attitude "simply the person's habitual positive or negative evaluative orientation toward the attitude object".¹⁵ Once such an attitude has crystallized, then any contrary evidence

generates problems of cognitive dissonance, with the strong tendency of almost all individuals to modify their attitude toward the presumed image of their peers.¹⁶ Thus, if one comes to the conclusion that Israel is a democracy, then he cannot perceive of Israel as an aggressor state: for all real democracies are peace-loving by ideological postulation. In this situation, Israel comes out as the defender in the 1967 War, and American concern is directed toward assisting the Jewish state to better "defend" herself. Therefore, when the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act was amended July 14, 1968, the President was informed that it was the sense of the Congress that "such steps as may be necessary" be taken to provide Israel "with an adequate deterrent force capable of preventing *future Arab aggression*" (*underlining added*).¹⁷ The more the individual Senator articulates his agreement with this interpretation, the more his own ego is involved. In brief, Israel is culturally a Western state. As a Western state and as a democracy, certain behavioral traits may be imputed to that country as logical derivatives of this situation. When the overt behavior of the Jewish state is contrary to the "expectations" of the observer (as was the case with Great Britain, France, and Israel in 1956) and the individual's threshold of intolerance for inconsistency is passed, then the individual may be expected to attempt a restatement of the objective situation whereby the inconsistency is removed. As de Rivera notes, following Leon Festinger, if the dissonance is high, "a person will distort reality to provide new arguments for a decision made on quite different grounds."¹⁸ Thus the Arab-Israeli conflict is perceived by the Senate as part of a larger struggle between the West and the Communist world; but one "fundamentally different" from the conflict in South Viet Nam. So the "doves" on Viet Nam, including some Democratic Presidential hopefuls in the Senate, become "hawks" when they turn to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

This inclusion of Israel as part of the "We" group has been strengthened in recent years

by the Soviet naval build-up in the eastern Mediterranean, and by the sizeable amounts of military supplies that have been shipped to Syria and Iraq from the Soviet Union, and by the overt presence of Soviet military forces in Egypt, a development that culminated in the 15-year Treaty of Friendship that was concluded between Moscow and Cairo, May 27, 1971. At the same time, the United States has lost its airbase in Libya, finds most ports east of Naples unfriendly, if not closed, to American naval units of the Sixth Fleet, and is the constant brunt of verbal attacks from Arab states ranging from Algeria to the Republic of South Yemen. In brief, Israel is "pushed" towards the United States; while the Arab world opens the door for the Soviet Union. Given the difficulties facing America in Southeast Asia, this polarization within the Middle East seems to generate two developments within the U.S. Senate: First, it appears to affirm the fact that Israel is doing by herself what South Viet Nam could not do without the assistance of 500,000 American troops; while second, it strengthens perceptions that identify Israel as a "doer", a "winner", a political system that can "go it alone" and one that is willing to pay cash for its arms (even if the money originally comes from the United States anyway). For the U.S. Senator, the important consideration is that Israel is not asking for grants but for aid that does not involve tax burdens - this is then compared to the unbelievable \$200 billion adventure incurred by the U.S. in Southeast Asia.

4. The Jewish Community as an American Subgroup. The United States has long been known as a great "melting pot", with diverse ethnic, religious, and cultural groups merged into a single society with common subscription to a set of norms and behavioral characteristics that mark the genre "American", while still allowing each subgroup to continue the expression of its cultural uniqueness. The phrase "*e pluribus unum*" is a basic feature of the American myth-system. For many groups the myth has been part of reality; but only in recent

years have certain groups, particularly the black, Mexican-American (chicano). and oriental, been given an opportunity to enter the mainstream of American economic and political history. For the Jewish community, this assimilation has already taken place, with members of that community fully established in every realm of the American society. The great emphasis members of the Jewish community place upon education and performance, the strongly achievement-oriented nature of their work ethic, their over-representation in the academic and professional fields, and their tight family life has generated a positive image relative to that subgroup on the part of other constituent groups within the American social matrix that has still to be accorded blacks, chicanos, or orientals.

At the same time, virtually every American associates Israel very closely with his image of the Jewish community, itself. The tendency then, is for almost all Americans, including U.S. Senators, to extend the image they hold of the Jewish community in America to the State of Israel, itself. In so doing they grant to the Israeli society the precise behavioral patterns presumed to characterize the Jewish community in the United States. This extension is made easier, of course, by the close cultural and financial links maintained by the American Jewish community on its own part with Israel.

In this situation, those Senators that identify the conflict in Southeast Asia as part of a continuing struggle on the part of the "Free World" to stem the tide of communism and who re-interpret the Arab-Israeli conflict to fit into this framework find both the Jewish community in America and the State of Israel members of the "We" side of a dichotomy which places the Communists, revolutionaries, etc. on the other side of that dichotomy. Senators McGee of Wyoming, Dole of Kansas, and Jackson of Washington appear to be representatives of this position. So long as the American Jewish community generates a positive image among the general population and so long as Israel's own actions do not function to counter the effects of this "Jewish" image, one may

expect that the nexus of the internal group with the external group will generate favorable attitudes toward Israel and operate to strengthen existing propensities.

5. *Jews and the Attraction-Rejection Syndrome.* Notwithstanding what has been said before with regard to the positive image held of the American Jew by most non-Jewish Americans, there is an obverse side to this image cluster too. Naturally, data to support this negative imagery is scarce with respect to the general population and non-existent for the U.S. Senate. It is, of course, beyond the scope of this paper to ask whether such sentiments are the result of latent anti-Semitism, envy because of the differential achievements of the Jewish community, or a product of Jewish ethno-centric behavior. What is beyond doubt is that such negative imagery exists. Ironically, the negative imagery also functions to strengthen attitudinal dispositions in favor of Israel, at least among the general population. One may assume that this trend operates within the U.S. Senate too. This is the fear of being branded "anti-Semitic" when taking a position that is unfavorable toward Israel. With the American Jewish community carefully monitoring all that is said or printed with regard to either Israel or the Jew in America, with the holocaust of Nazi Germany still generating guilt feelings among the non-Jewish community, and with other minority groups in America over-sensitive to any manifestations of ethnic discrimination, the tendency is to scrupulously avoid any statements or actions that might be considered "anti-Israel" and, by reverse extension, anti-Semitic. It is interesting that within the U.S. Senate there is not a single person who is vocally anti-Israel. although one may find innumerable examples of statements severely criticizing even our staunchest allies in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Even Senator Fulbright, by no means an unqualified supporter of Israel. is guarded in his evaluation of what our foreign policy should be toward that Jewish state.²⁰

The existence of highly favorable attitudes towards Israel within the Senate is of little value unless there is a connection between such attitudinal dispositions and the actual formulation and implementation of U.S. foreign policy toward the Jewish state. A number of scholars who specialize in the area of American foreign policy have come to the conclusion that the impact of Congress on most foreign-policy matters is comparatively minor, with the President the primary locus of power in this area.²¹ But Congress does form a very significant arena within the framework of which a major amount of "visibility" may be given to an issue of national significance. Thus the key role of the "Hearings" conducted by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, or comparable other functional committees of legislative body. Moreover, there is the key factor of having power to approve appropriations needed in support of a particular foreign policy. While the Senate enjoys the constitutional power to advise and consent on treaties, as well as the power to approve appointments, given the complex operation of the American political process with its trade-offs and log-rolling techniques, these prerogatives are less important than the continual "political cost" that the Senate may assign to each foreign policy position taken by the President. The President, in turn, is constantly forced to evaluate his policy preferences in terms of the support or lack of support he will sustain by continuing or modifying that policy position. In brief, each policy position carries with it "political cost", which in some cases may even be negative. When policy carries negative cost, this means that the President enjoys widespread support concerning the policy position taken, and even should he modify that policy to a limited extent, he would not engender undesired "positive" political cost. If one traces recent American policy toward Israel relative to that country's request for jet aircraft, the particular role of the Senate in this regard will be brought out.

Following the passage of the 1968 amend-

ment to the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, negotiations for the sale of jets to Israel were started on October 9, 1968. Three months later the U.S. approved the sale of 50 Phantom jets to Israel.²² One year later Israel made another request to purchase jets. In response to this request, Secretary of State Rogers in a speech delivered December 9, 1969 called for a "balanced" approach to a Middle East settlement and deferred action on the Israeli application.²³ On December 24, every member of Congress received a 10-page criticism of the Rogers' speech prepared by the Israeli Embassy in Washington. Then following the January 9, 1970 announcement by France that 110 jets were to be sold by that government to Libya, Zionist and other pro-Israeli pressure groups in the American capital increased their efforts to persuade the United States to grant Israel's request. To demonstrate the widespread political support these groups enjoyed, the presidents of over 500 (five hundred) Jewish organizations convened together in a "National Emergency Conference on Peace in the Middle East" January 24-26. During this period, delegates from this conference visited Congressmen and Senators from their states urging that Israel's request be granted. One result of their efforts was a string of Resolutions coming out of Congress in favor of the Israeli request.²⁴ By contrast, the Rogers' speech, in the words of Senator Fulbright, was received by a "silence" ... (that was) deafening.²⁵ In fact, speeches supporting the Israeli position at this time were given in the Senate by Senators Talmadge, Case, Goodell, Dodd, Williams, Ribicoff, Schweiker, Young, Gore, Eagleton, Boyh, Proxmire, Ellender, Javits, Montoya, Harris, McCarthy, and Randolph.²⁶ As the list indicates, the support of the Israeli position was totally bipartisan.

Nevertheless, on March 21, 1970 President Nixon turned down the Israeli request "on an interim basis".²⁷ This action was followed by the letters alluded to in the beginning of this paper. Then, on November 18, 1970 President Nixon requested \$ 500,000,000 from the Congress under the

provisions of the Defense Procurement Act to provide Israel with credits to help her finance the purchase of needed military equipment, including jet aircraft and advanced electronic equipment. While some F-4's and other military hardware was subsequently shipped to Israel, the flow of arms to that state was again terminated at the end of June, 1971, prompting Senators to call once more for the President to resume arms shipments to Israel.²⁸

Now the conclusion to bear in mind here is that while the direct power of the Senate is limited, this legislative body is a powerful consensus-building organization. When outside interests enjoy an opportunity to work with the Senate on any particular foreign policy issue that does not mobilize countervailing forces, then the President may be made acutely aware that positive political cost is involved if the undesired foreign policy is not modified or discontinued.

Since the general public is indifferent, or only episodically interested, in foreign policy issues,²⁹ and since Senators are unwilling to perform the role of "instructed delegates" on behalf of constituents within their respective states,³⁰ then the informational input that can be brought to bear on any particular Senator works with telling effect. In this respect, Israel enjoys a definite advantage, informational inputs - from whatever source - can reinforce prevailing dispositions, but only with great difficulty can such information overcome established attitudinal dispositions. On January 7, 1970, for example, Senator Scott said that he "always found the Near East Report most helpful in reaching judgments on American policy in the Near East. It is one of the best newsletters published in Washington dealing with foreign policy."³¹ What is significant about that statement is that the newsletter is markedly pro-Israeli and its editor, I.L. Kenen, is a registered lobbyist in Washington and serves as an officer of the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee.³² But the capacity of Mr. Kenen to influence Senator Scott is very much related to the attitudinal dispositions held by Senator Scott before he entered the Senate.

From what has been stated so far, it is clear that pro-Israeli forces can successfully function to reinforce prevailing attitudes, particularly since countervailing political forces are virtually non-existent. The resulting configuration of attitudes that are held by Senators, in turn, establishes policy parameters within the context of which there exists options to the President that do not carry that political cast. But once a policy is articulated that generates cognitive inconsistency with attitudes that are ego-linked with Senators, then a measure of political cost is involved. What, then, does this mean when applied specifically to the Arab-Israeli conflict? It appears that the following conclusions may be postulated:

1. The United States is firmly committed to the perpetuation of the State of Israel in the most secure and extended fashion possible consistent with maintaining some peace and stability in the area. Given the constellation of political factors at play within the United States, there is no reasonable way in which a shift in this policy may be brought about. It is the one constant of American foreign policy towards the Middle East. Arguments based on the "facts" or on "moral rectitude" are as effective in reversing this position as the Kings Men and the the Kings Horses in the children's nursery rhyme.

2. American foreign policy in the Middle East is not autonomous from the Israel-American Jew subgroup nexus. Any action taken - or not taken - in this part of the world will be measured against this fact.

3. Since political systems do not articulate foreign policy to maximize their national interests, but their perception of those interests, the need on the part of the Arab world to strengthen its imagery within the United States is patent. Strident declarations of "injustice" at the hands of the American "imperialists" do not appear, however, to be too successful in this regard.

If the situation appears hopeless to the Arab who sincerely wants to see a detente between the United States and the Arab world, this paper will give him little comfort.

There is an expression currently popular on American college campuses - "tell it like it is". When applied to the topic of this paper, it boils down to this: The Arab world may achieve close relations with the United States, but not in violation of the second point listed above. Thus, the price of a detente with America is Israel. If the Arab does not choose to pay the price, and the American cannot pay the price of allowing Israel to go under, then the future pattern of Arab-American relations appears to be bleak, at best. The U.S. Senate is not the cause of this condition; it is only a reflection of it.



NOTES

1. For the text of this letter, see *Congressional Quarterly*, June 5, 1970, p. 1475.

2. *Ibid.* The seven Senators were Cranston (California), Eagleton (Missouri), Goodell (New York), Hart (Michigan), Hughes (Iowa), McGovern (South Dakota), and Young (Ohio).

3. U.S. Senate, 67th Congress, Second Session, Public Resolution 73, dated June 30, 1922. Another congressional resolution, this one dated January 27, 1944, after reaffirming the position taken in the 1922 resolution, continued by saying:

«Resolved, that the United States shall use its good offices and take appropriate measures to the end that the doors of Palestine shall be opened for free entry of Jews into that country, and that there shall be full opportunity for colonization, so that the Jewish people may ultimately reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth.»

U.S. Government Printing Office, the Jewish National Home in Palestine, 78th Congress, Second Session, 1944; W.A. Williams, *America and the Middle East* (New York, 1958), p. 41.

4. U.S. Senate, 92d Congress, First Session, *Congressional Record*, February 24, 1971, S1896.

5. *Ibid.* March 24, 1971, S3805.

6. *Ibid.* March 8, 1971, S2623.

7. *Ibid.* February 17, 1971, S1429.

8. *Denver Post*, June 12, 1967.

9. According to a report by Lawrence Mosher in the *National Observer*, May 18, 1970, the world Zionist movement «taxed the diaspora» to the tune of some \$4 billion in the period 1947-67 and garnered another \$730 million subsequent to the 1967 conflict, of which more than \$500 million came from the United States. For an early account of Zionist fund-raising efforts, see Samuel Halperin, «Ideology or Philanthropy? The Politics of Zionist Fund-Raising» *Western Political Quarterly* XIII (December, 1960), 950-73.

10. Kenneth Boulding, «National Images and International Systems» in *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, James N. Rosenau, ed. (New York, 1961), p. 392.

11. U.S. Senate, 92d Congress, First Session, *Congressional Record*, March 24, 1971, S3805: This same sentiment was stated earlier on March 21 in the *Los Angeles Herald-Examiner* in an

editorial by William Randolph Hearst, jr. who wrote, «Little Israel, coming on like little David of the Old Testament, with its aerial slingshot thoroughly trounced the burnoosed Arab Goliath (i.e. in 1967).»

12. As cited in an article by Ray Vickers in the *Wall Street Journal*, February 12, 1970.

13. *Congressional Quarterly*, June 5, 1970, p. 1475.

14. *Near East Report*, September 1, 1971.

15. In *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy*, James Rosenau, ed. (New York, 1967), p. 143.

16. Rosenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 147 states, «individuals bound together in personal or role relationships are driven toward attitudinal convergence on issues in which they share an interest». If inconsistency is introduced the individual formally, or emotionally, subordinate is likely to alter his attitude toward that of the other person, or persons. Given the amount of factual information needed for each foreign policy decision, the average Senator is likely to defer to those either experts in the area of intensely involved as members of an issue-elite. See also in this regard James Robinson, *Congress and Foreign Policy Making: A Study in Legislative Influence and Initiative* (Homewood, Ill., 1962) and Joseph H. de Rivera, *The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy* (Columbus, Ohio, 1968). On the matter of dissonance, see Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Stanford, Calif., 1962).

17. The full text reads: «It is the sense of the Congress that the President should take such steps as may be necessary, as soon as practicable after the date of enactment of this section to negotiate an agreement with the Government of Israel providing for the sale by the United States of such number of supersonic planes as may be necessary to provide Israel with an adequate deterrent force capable of preventing future Arab aggression by offsetting sophisticated weapons received by the Arab states and to replace losses suffered by Israel in the 1967 conflict.» United States Senate, 91st Congress, First Session, Committee on Foreign Relations. *A Select Chronology and Background Documents Relating to the Middle East* (First revised edition), document 46.

18. de Rivera, *op. cit.*; p. 125.

19. The phrase is from the seven-Senator May 23d letter addressed to the President.

20. Senator Fulbright did not join his fellow Senators in signing either the May 23d or the June

1st letter discussed above. In fact, he called for Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Areas, possible internationalization of Jerusalem, and the settlement of the Palestine refugee problem. But he also called for a United States guarantee of Israeli security through a bilateral treaty, admitting that U.S. interests were linked to Israel «by the bonds of culture and sentiment». *Congressional Quarterly*, August 28, 1970, p. 2133.

21. Particularly valuable here is James A. Robinson, *Congress and Foreign Policy-Making*, (Homewood, III., 1967); James Rosenau, op. cit.; James Rosenau, ed. *National Leadership and Foreign Policy* (Princeton, 1963); and David N. Farnsworth's monograph, *The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations* (Urbana, III., 1961). The latter book contains a useful bibliography concerning this topic.

22. At the rate of 4 per month.

23. This summary of events is based on information contained in *Congressional Quarterly*, March 27, 1970, p. 880ff.

24. One such resolution, introduced by Senator Tydings (Maryland) and Case (New Jersey) was signed by 67 Senators.

25. As quoted in *Near East Report*, May 11, 1970.

26. Excerpts of these speeches may be found in *Near East Report*, May 11, 1970.

27. The reasoning was as follows: Israel, as of March 1970, had 800 qualified pilots to man some 300 aircraft. Moreover, the refueling period in Israel was 7 minutes. Finally, Israeli aircraft are kept in top condition by well-trained maintenance crews enabling Israeli pilots to mount 4 sorties per day, twice the U.S. rate in Viet Nam!

Egypt, by contrast, had 400 aircraft on that date, but only 250 qualified pilots. Many of the Egyptian planes, more over, were not operational because of faulty maintenance performance. Finally, because of poorly trained ground crews in Egypt, the turnabout time for Egyptian planes is over 40 minutes. A rough comparison, given the data above, made the Israeli air force about twelve times more effective than the Egyptian air force as of that date.

28. Thus Senator Bahy urged the «immediate resumption of Phantom deliveries to Israel,» *Near East Report*, September 22, 1971.

29. «...the general public is extremely uninformed on the details of foreign policy issues, is often unaware of the very existence of many of these issues, and is basically uninterested in them,»

Milton J. Rosenberg, op. cit., p. 149; Gabriel Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York, 1950); James N. Rosenau, *National Leadership and Foreign Policy*, p. 27.

30. See Warren E. Miller & Donald E. Stokes, «Constituency Influence in Congress,» *American Political Science Review* LVII (March, 1963), p. 56 for empirical verification of Congressional aversion to perceiving one's role as that of «instructed delegate.»

31. *Near East Report*, January 7, 1970. Congressman Jonathan B. Bingham in this issue went even further, stating that, «in my work in the Congress and especially the Foreign Affairs Committee, I rely heavily on the *Near East Report* for information and wise comment on developments in the Middle East. While deeply committed to the cause of Israel; the *Report* is remarkably objective and never shrill. It is the best publication in its field.»

32. *The National Observer*, May 18, 1970.

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Personal Political Involvement of Palestinian Youths

*A study of political socialization
in a revolutionary polity*

YASUMASA KURODA AND ALICE A. KURODA

Man is indeed a political animal, but some are more political than others. Palestinians in recent years have become more political than they used to be as manifested by the rebirth of Palestinian nationalism, largely caused by the commando activities. How do Palestinian children grow up to be such highly politicized individuals? How do they grow up to be interested in politics when they do not have a country with which they can positively identify in the sense that children in other parts of the world can? It is natural for an American to grow up to be an American citizen. But it is not "natural" for a Palestinian to become a Palestinian in the sense that others do because Palestine as a nation state does not exist in the ordinary sense. The Palestinian case represents a unique situation where refugees have remained in refugee status for a very long period of time. Thus, it appears that an inquiry into the question of how Palestinian youths learn to engage in activities that affect the scope of governmental action in such countries as Jordan and Israel is of interest not only to those who are concerned with Palestinian affairs

but also to the students of a comparative study of political participation or involvement ¹

This is a preliminary report of a survey of Palestinian youths on various facets of the political socialization process or the process by which a person from birth onward learns to become political. What characterizes political activists among high school students of Palestinian origin? Are variables normally associated with high political involvement in other countries also operative among Palestinians? Is there anything that characterizes political involvement patterns of Palestinian youths not shared by others? These are the questions to which this paper is addressed.

The data for the present article is derived from a survey of Palestinian students in Jordan in 1970. Circumstances under which Palestinian youths make their living and receive their schooling were and are such that a probability sampling of the subjects is an impossibility. The lack of valid aggregate data to check with in assessing the validity of sampling adds to the existing difficulties

in conducting any ideal empirical survey. What we have here is a sample of 234 Palestinian students consisting largely of 10th graders. They come from two different schools consisting of young people from slightly different backgrounds. Approximately 20 percent of the total sample respondents are girls while Christians constitute 13 percent of the entire group. Most of them are between ages 15 and 16. The majority of them (80%) come from families who had moved to the East bank of the Jordan River following the 1948 war. Somewhat over one-half of them stated that their immediate family members or close relatives had been killed in the continuing war with Israel. The majority of their fathers (80%) are reportedly literate, and roughly one-half of the fathers are either regularly or irregularly employed, while others had no jobs to speak of.

In spite of their unfamiliarity with the standard survey questionnaire pre-coded for IBM analysis, most of the questionnaires were filled out quite well by our subjects with of course some exceptions, as expected in any survey. Many took time to answer open-ended questions, where they were asked to state their own views. Some even thanked us for our interest in their problems.

The first part of the present article will present a report on the results of attempts to construct a scale on personal political involvement followed by the presentation of factors that affect the extent of political involvement and characterization of political activities.

As a preliminary step toward the construction of a scale on political involvement or participation, a factor analysis of portions of the data consisting of 47 variables and 77 respondents was carried out. The remaining respondents (157) had failed to respond to one or more questions selected for multivariate statistical analyses. The rest of the questions in the survey questionnaire were not amenable to quantitative analysis. The classical factor analysis model, using varimax rotation, yielded nine rotat-

ed factors which accounted for 53.6 percent of the total variance in the data.² The sixth factor or dimension which accounted for 4.7 percent of the total variance is named the "political involvement" dimension for it loaded extremely on the following variables: commando membership (-.537), political interest (-.627), political aspiration (-.709) and sex (-.463).

These variables are, thus, singled out to cluster together independently from other patterns or factors. Being a member of a Palestinian commando unit is an integral part of being politically active in the Palestinian youth political culture, as it existed in the spring of 1970. The sex variable was left out in our attempt to construct a scale so as to maintain the same level of the variables included in the scale construction. The remaining three variables tap several components of attitude and behavior, i.e., political interest represents an *affective* component of the attitude while political aspiration is a *cognitive* aspect of the attitude. Commando membership indicates a *behavioral* aspect of the respondents.

To be more specific, three questions asked and response categories provided for in the survey questionnaire are as follows (figures in parentheses indicate the number of respondents):

1. How interested are you in politics?
 - 1) Very much (137)
 - 2) Somewhat (66)
 - 3) Not interested (13)
 - 4) Not at all interested (2)
 - NA (Not Ascertainable) (16)
2. Would you like to be involved in politics when you grow up?
 - 1) Yes, I would (109)
 - 2) Yes, but only indirectly (78)
 - 3) No, (9)
 - NA (38)
3. Are you a member of any Palestinian commando unit?

- 1) Yes (73)
- 2) No (154)
- 3) NA (7)

Several attempts to construct a scale through the use of the BMD canned program failed to produce a sufficiently high coefficient of reproducibility. Subsequently, a counter-sorter was used to construct a scalogram which yielded a .93 coefficient of reproducibility and .63 and .88 coefficients of item and subject scalability respectively.³

If a respondent were positive in response to all three questions included above, he is very interested in politics, plans to be involved in political activities when he grows up, and is a member of a commando unit at the present. This is the most politicized group. The second group is composed of all those who responded positively to the first two questions but not on the commando membership. In other words, he or she is very much interested in politics and plans to be directly involved in politics in the future but is not presently involved in any commando activities. The third group consists of all those who are very much interested in politics but those who would rather not be involved in any politics either now or the future. The last group includes all those who responded negatively to the questions.

For the purpose of the data analyses to follow, a decision was made to collapse the first two categories or groups who will hereafter be referred to as "*activists*" and the last two categories into one which will be referred to as "*non-activists*". Thus, the activists are those who are not only interested (affectivity) in politics but also have political aspirations (cognitive). Some are already actively engaged (activity-behavioral) in the highest level of political activity for this age group among the Palestinians, i.e., commando activities. Non-activists are those who might have a keen interest in politics but not to the extent of being involved in politics either now or in the

future. Thus, this attitudinal scale on personal political involvement taps three different aspects of attitude, namely affectivity, cognitive, and behavioral.

Thus, 219 respondents (the remaining respondents had failed to respond to two or three questions used to construct the scale) were dichotomized into the *activists* group consisting of 120 and the non-activists group composed of 90 respondents. Thirty-seven respondents who had failed to answer one of the above questions asked in the survey questionnaire were assumed to have committed an "error" and were processed accordingly to be included in the data analysis.⁴

The task of the article, then, is to ascertain the question of what makes 120 respondents politically active and 90 respondents politically inactive.

Several different sets of variables will be related to the Personal Political Involvement Scale (PPI hereafter). The first variable is sex, followed by family background variables, consisting of religion, father's regular occupation, and war-death in family; socialization agency variable, and sociological variables, composed of club membership and friendship.

SEX: The world of politics seems to remain predominantly man's domain in spite of the emergence of a few women political figures in the world and the "women's lib" movement increasingly becoming popular in much of the world.⁵ Table 1 presents the relationship between sex difference and the degree of political involvement among the Palestinian students. Sixty-one percent of boys are activists (which means 39 percent of boys are classified as non-activists) vis-a-vis only 35% percent of girls. Both the Chi-square test as well as the Gamma value indicate that there is a statistically significant relationship between these two variables. Boys are almost two times as likely to be involved in politics in comparison with girls. In such areas of political behavior as voting, education is said to be a factor affect-

TABLE 1: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SEX AND PPI

(Percent of Activists)

Sex	Activists	Total N	X ²	Gamma
Boys	61%	164	df = 1, X ² = 10.211	-.473
Girls	36%	53	P < .005	

ting the extent of voting participation in such political cultures as that of North America. Education cannot be a factor here since they are all in the same school. The difference found in our data between girls and boys, however, is not as great as what one would expect in a country where women do not have the right to vote. Obviously voting is not the only way to participate in politics as was so dramatically illustrated by Leila Khaled's highjacking activities.

Indeed, one-third of the girls expect to be politically active when they grow up. Even when we consider that the girls who attend high school do not represent a cross-section of the population, this finding suggests a departure from the traditional Arab political culture in whose history women's active role in politics and war had remained exceptional rather than the rule. Our findings suggest that women's active participation in Palestinian politics will not be limited to a few women but in the future will involve many women. If these girls were to be given opportunities to be politically active wherever they might be, certainly ought to anticipate the massive participation of women in Palestinian political movements.

Because of an earlier finding that sex as a variable cluster together with the three other variables from which the PPI scale was formed, we shall control on sex whenever we attempt to relate independent variables to the PPI. A factor which continues to play a significant part in the life of Palestinians is religion.

RELIGION: Whether one likes it or not, religion is mixed up with politics to a large

extent in most political cultures in the world, including such modern nation states as the United States and the Soviet Union, with the notable exception of a few countries such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, where one's religion makes no difference at all to one's political activities.⁶ Are Christians more politically active than Moslems or *vice-versa*?

Entries in Table 2 indicate that Moslems are more likely to be involved in politics than Christians, although the difference is less pronounced among boys than among girls. In other words, religious difference makes less difference to boys than to girls as far as their political involvement is concerned. Only 18 percent of Christian girls are activists while 41 percent of Moslem girls are activists. The percentage difference narrows down to only 7 percent among the boys. Boys are interested in politics irrespective of religious affiliation, but religion does make a difference in inducing girls to take on active roles in politics.

A possible reason for Christian girls' shying away from the world of active politics may lie in their minority status among an overwhelming Moslem population. Their lives may be centered more around their families than is the case with Moslem girls. The fact that they constitute a minority (girls in politics) within a minority (Christians) might be a factor alienating them from aspiring to assume active political roles.

FATHER'S REGULAR OCCUPATION: It has been a well accepted hypothesis in many parts of the non-Communist world that the higher the social status of a person the higher the degree of one's political invol-

TABLE 2: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RELIGION AND PPI BY SEX

Religion	(Percent of Activists)			Gamma
	Activists	Total N	X ²	
<i>Boys</i>				
Moslems	63%	144	df = 1, X ² = 1.179	-.264
Christians	50%	18	Not Significant	
<i>Girls</i>				
Moslems	41%	42	df = 1, X ² = 1.884	-.507
Christians	18%	11	Not Significant	
<i>Combined</i>				
Moslems	58%	186	df = 1, X ² = 4.115	-.388
Christians	38%	29	P < .05	

TABLE 3: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FATHER'S OCCUPATION AND PPI

Occupation	(Percent of Activists)	
	Activists	Total N
Government employees, officials, etc.	41%	17
Teacher	40	5
Engineer or highly skilled technician	40	5
Any other professional	33	6
Proprietor, manager	52	35
Peddler (Salesman)	67	3
Commando	64	11
Skilled worker	56	23
Semi-skilled worker, mechanic, truck driver	71	17
Farmer	67	6
Unskilled worker, construction helper, road repairman	55	40
Any other occupation	0	2
No father, etc.	44	9
NA	62	42

vement. Recruitment into active political involvement is a function of the political structure of a nation-state. Revolutionary society is characterized by the emergence of hitherto powerless elements as the ruling class. Our attempts to relate parents' literacy to the PPI of children failed to produce any statistically significant relationship, which suggests that boys and girls are induced to play active political roles irrespective of their family's social status. An attempt to relate the father's occupation to their children's political involvement produced interesting findings, as shown in Table 3 and Table 4.

Inasmuch as nearly one half of the respondents' fathers are not continuously employed, we asked them to tell us their father's regular occupation. Sixty-two out of 234 respondents failed to provide us with sufficiently clear answers to enable us to code their responses, but the remaining (about 3/4) respondents did give us a detailed description of their father's regular or main occupation. Looking through the percentages of activists from different occupational backgrounds, we noted that the professional families tend to produce fewer

political activists than do non-professional families. Subsequently, we collapsed the first four categories into one and the rest into another group to be named "professional" and "non-professional" respectively. The data was run again with this new occupational classification and with sex held constant. The results are shown in Table 4.

The father's occupation apparently affects boys more than it does girls. In fact, it makes no difference among the girls; it does among the boys. Non-professional families produce more politically active boys than professional families. This finding implies that Palestinian political culture is somehow encouraging boys of non-professional backgrounds to be politically active. Such a political culture can hardly be called a traditional political culture. Indeed, the Palestinian entity characterized by their change in status from that of refugees to commandos certainly has brought about a significant change in its political culture. Palestinian political culture is a revolutionary one, in which young boys from lower SES (socio-economic status) backgrounds (non-professional) are encouraged to play

TABLE 4: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FATHER'S OCCUPATION AND PPI BY SEX

Occupation	(Percent of Activists)			
	Activists	Total N	X ²	Gamma
<i>Boys</i>				
Professional	46%	22	df = 1, X ² = 2.995	.386
Non-Professional	65%	98	P < .10	
<i>Girls</i>				
Professional	27%	11	df = 1, X ² = .241	
Non-Professional	35%	34	Not Significant	.185
<i>Combined</i>				
Professional	39%	33	df = 1, X ² = 3.513	.352
Non-Professional	58%	132	P < .10	

active political roles more than those from professional family backgrounds and one in which young girls are induced to play active political roles irrespective of their family backgrounds. Our finding that boys from non-professional family backgrounds are more likely to be involved in politics suggests even further that the extent of departure from the traditional political culture goes beyond the point of inducing everyone regardless of one's background to participate in politics and reaching the point of motivating hitherto politically inactive non-professional and particularly unskilled workers' sons to be politically active.

WAR-DEATH IN FAMILY: One of the facts of life is death, which often affects one's process of growing up. How does the death of one's father or someone close to one in the war with Israel affect the degree of one's political involvement? It was reported earlier in another paper dealing with the same survey that such a death increases the student's probability of joining a commando unit by 100 percent,⁷ i.e., those respondents who have lost a family member in the war with Israel are twice as likely to join a commando unit. Since being a

commando is an integral part of being politically active, it was hypothesized that the war-death in one's family induces him to be politically active. Entries in Table 5 which present the relationship between these two variables with sex held constant indicate that the hypothesis is acceptable, except that the relationship between these variables attenuates among the boys as evidenced by the low Gamma and Chi-square values, while the relationship is much more pronounced among the girls. In other words, the war-death seems to make a significant impact on girls as far as their political involvement is concerned but not among the boys. Boys are interested in politics irrespective of any war-death.

Our finding that war-death affects the extent of the PPI among the girls may be attributable to a hypothesis that girls are more family-oriented and are affected more by what happens in families. And certainly a war-death is an event that strikes one's feelings and particularly that of girls, in whose life emotion is said to play a more significant part than in boys.

KEY POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION AGENCIES: The key agency of political

TABLE 5: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WAR-DEATH AND PPI BY SEX
(Percent of Activists)

War-Death	Activists	Total N	X ²	Gamma
<i>Boys</i>				
Yes	64%	103	df = 1, X ² = 1.160	-.180
No	55%	56	Not Significant	
<i>Girls</i>				
Yes	56%	16	df = 1, X ² = 3.873	-.539
No	28%	36	P < .05	
<i>Combined</i>				
Yes	63%	119	df = 1, X ² = 7.143	-.359
No	45%	92	P < .01	

TABLE 6: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KEY POLITICAL
SOCIALIZATION AGENCIES AND PPI
(Percent of Activists)

Agencies	Activists	Total N	Chi-Square test
Parents	50%	145	df = 2, X ² = 5.500, P < .025
Teachers	69	39	
Friends	65	17	

socialization or the person or group from young Palestinians depend upon for their advice is of importance. A question in the questionnaire asked, "Suppose you have an important matter to decide, whose advice do you consider most important to you?" We provided them with three choices: "My parents," "My teacher," and "My friend." A great majority of them preferred their parents, of course. But there were 39 who preferred their teacher and 17 who chose a friend. When this variable was run against the PPI, we find that activists are more likely to depend on their teachers and friends for their advice than non-activists. This suggests that political activists are more likely to have looked away from their parents to other agencies, i.e., teachers and friends for authority figures. The number of cases involved was too small to examine the relationship between these two variables with sex held constant.

FRIENDSHIP: Politics necessarily involve human interaction within the context of groups in society. Sociability has been proved to be related to at least limited aspects of political activities.⁸ The proposition is that the more sociable the person the more likely he is to be involved in politics. We asked our respondents to tell us how many friends they had. Originally, we provided them with four alternative answers, i.e., "many friends," "only some friends," "a few friends," and "no friends." Since over one-half of them said that they had "many" friends, we have collapsed the remaining categories into one and referred to them as

simply the "few" friends group, as shown in Table 7.

Entries in Table 7 show that there is no statistically significant relationship between having "many" friends and the PPI. However, when sex is held constant, we see that there is a statistically significant relationship between the two original variables among the boys, whereas there is no relationship between them among the girls. In other words, whether or not sociability or friendship contributes to the extent of one's political involvement is contingent upon one's sex, boys are more likely to be interested in politics if they feel they have "many" friends, while girls are involved in politics regardless of whether or not they feel they have many friends or not.

Now, why so? It could be that girls who are more home-bound become interested in politics for other reasons than through interactions with many friends as boys do. Boys may naturally become stimulated into playing active political roles through their associations with their friends, who are active.

CLUB-MEMBERSHIP: From what we learned from the relationship between friendship and the PPI, one would speculate that the same hypothesis might be applicable on the relationship between club membership and the PPI. Those with a greater need for friendship would likely belong to some club or organization through which psychological needs are satisfied. And that appears to be the case to a large extent, as entries in Table

TABLE 7: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FRIENDSHIP AND PPI BY SEX

(Percent of Activists)

Friends	Activists	Total N	X ²	Gamma
<i>Boys</i>				
Many	67%	97	df = 1, X ² = 5.612	-.376
Few	48%	60	P < .05	
<i>Girls</i>				
Many	35%	34	df = 1, X ² = .066	-.077
Few	39%	18	Not Significant	
<i>Both</i>				
Many	59%	131	df = 1, X ² = 3.306	-.255
Few	46%	78	P < .10	

TABLE 8: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CLUB-MEMBERSHIP AND PPI BY SEX

(Percent of Activists)

Club-membership	Activists	Total N	X ²	Gamma
<i>Boys</i>				
Joiners	76%	56	df = 1, X ² = 7.759	-.470
Non-Joiners	54%	103	P < .01	
<i>Girls</i>				
Joiners	50%	8	df = 1, X ² = .739	-.318
Non-Joiners	34%	44	Not Significant	
<i>Combined</i>				
Joiners	73%	64	df = 1, X ² = 11.431	-.495
Non-Joiners	48%	147	P < .001	

8 indicate, although there are some differences.

As one sees from the column reporting on the total number of cases, boys are more likely to join clubs than girls. This may be due to the fact that boys are still given first priority in doing whatever they may wish to do within a family. To belong to any club would mean at least some expenses to one's family. Girls, consequently, perhaps spend more time among family members. One must keep in mind here that family plays a very significant role in one's life in Palestinian culture and much of one's social activity centers around the family, rather than around individuals. Consequently, one's affectivity needs often may be met within one's association with members of one's own family, including one's extended family system. Thus, the desire to belong to some club, such as a commando unit, may suggest something other than a desire to belong to some group. Joiners or those who belong to some club are definitely more likely to be involved in politics irrespective of sex, although the relationship is somewhat attenuated among the girls. A reason for a rather low Chi-square value for the girls' case is that the Chi-square test is to a large extent a function of the N or number of individuals involved. In this sense, a Gamma score gives us a better indicator of how closely related the two variables are, as indicated by a .318 Gamma value. The same reason is given to explain why the relationship is indicated to be strongest between the two variables when boys and girls are combined, since the total number of cases involved is larger, Joiners tend to get more involved in politics than non-joiners everywhere. Apparently in order to be effective, one must join groups in order to enhance one's political opportunity. However, we also know that in most societies where this is true, there is a positive relationship between social status and the number of organizations to which one belongs. The higher the social status of a person, the more organizations one belongs to. Since we are dealing with boys of high school age, these hypotheses

cannot be applied. But it is interesting to note that whereas social class background as measured by father's occupation has no relationship to the extent of girls' political involvement, there is an inverse relationship between father's occupation and the PPI among the boys.

In order to ascertain the relationship of father's occupation, club-membership and the PPI, Table 9 was constructed to show the relationship of club membership and the PPI, father's occupation being held constant. The partial relationship between the two original variables nearly disappears among those whose fathers are professionals, whereas the partial relationship is more pronounced among those from a non-professional family background as manifested in the Chi-square value ($X^2 = 10.822$, $P = .001$) and Gamma value of .647. In other words, joiners are highly politicized only if they are from non-professional, less well-to-do family backgrounds. Thus, the relevance of club membership to the PPI is definitely contingent upon the father's occupation. Those students from professional family backgrounds are less likely to be activists, and club membership makes no difference to their becoming interested in politics.

Keeping in mind that these students may not represent cross-sections of the Palestinians of the same age in the sense that not all Palestinian youths attend secondary school (high school,) one can increase political interest among young Palestinians, particularly among those from non-professional family backgrounds, by encouraging them to join some clubs. An implication of our finding in this regard is that systematic attempts to organize groups among these boys and girls may prove to be a fruitful way to encourage them to play active political roles in the future. Obviously this is not a new technique. It is a technique used by various agencies of political socialization to influence youngsters everywhere. What is new and important, however, is that this technique seems to be most useful among those Palestinian boys and girls who

TABLE 9: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CLUB-MEMBERSHIP
AND PPI BY FATHER'S OCCUPATION
(Percent of Activists)

Club-membership	Activists	Total N	X ²	Gamma
<i>Professional</i>				
Joiners	46%	13	X ² = .164, df = 1	-.148
Non-Joiners	39%	18	Not Significant	
<i>Non-Professional</i>				
Joiners	82%	34	X ² = 10.822, df = 1	-.647
Non-Joiners	50%	96	P < .001	

are from non-professional family backgrounds.

SENSE OF POLITICAL EFFICACY: The feeling that one's own ability to affect the scope of the government has been termed the sense of political efficacy.⁹ Numerous studies have shown how the sense of political efficacy relates to political participation. Those who feel efficacious in influencing the scope of government activities tend to actively participate in politics in many politically stable countries, such as Japan and the United States. An earlier report using the quantitative data used for factor analysis and other quantitative analyses reported that there is little relationship between the PPI items and six items on the sense of political efficacy scale included in our survey. The maximum canonical variate between these two sets of variables was only .263 which means only 7 percent of the variance in one set of the variables can be explained by another set. This finding was limited, in the sense that the data contained only 77 out of 234 respondents. Consequently, an attempt was made to relate the six items on the sense of political efficacy to the PPI by using all cases through the cross-tabulation technique.¹⁰

The results yielded no statistically significant relationship between these six items

and the PPI. There is some traceable tendency on the part of activists to either agree or disagree strongly while the non-activists tend to give neutral answers.¹¹

What we find among the Palestinians is then that those who are playing gladiatorial roles in politics do not necessarily feel that they are capable of affecting government decisional outcomes. We would, thus, hypothesize that activists must feel frustrated and discouraged, which appears to fit with the reality of Palestinians in Jordan. Apparently, the government of Jordan considers it impossible to let another government be created within her territory, even if it is in an incipient state of growth. Under such circumstances as these, it is no wonder that there is no normal positive association between the sense of political efficacy and political involvement.

Before we discuss the substantive and theoretical implications of our findings we would like to make a note of one methodological consideration which led us to present the survey data in the way described in the present article. A question that comes to some readers might be why we did not continue to use the quantitative data consisting of 47 variables on 77 respondents. We employed the quantitative

data as an exploratory step toward the data analysis reported here so as not to waste excessive computer time relating one variable against another ad infinitum. The reason is that we lose too many respondents by eliminating those who fail to respond to every question in the questionnaire and those items which cannot be quantified. Thus, we may lose much of the information we have already gathered only for the purpose of employing powerful statistics with the hope of producing something new and of theoretical significance. Instead, we opted for qualitative data analysis by using all the data we could in order to make a full use of the information gathered by using the results of quantitative analyses as an exploratory tool in the search for relevant variables for our concern, namely the PPI.

To summarize our findings briefly, we find that activists are more likely to be boys than girls, family background variables, i.e., religion, father's occupation, and war-death in the family affects the various extent of political involvement among the girls and the boys. Boys are more likely to be involved in active politics if they feel they have "many" friends, while no such relationship exists among the girls. And joiners are more likely to be involved in active politics irrespective of sex except that the relationship appears stronger among the boys. No statistically significant relationships are found between the six items on the sense of political efficacy and the PPI. There are several generalizations and models of political participation one could generate from these findings. First, we shall point out a few unique aspects of political involvement we found among the Palestinian youths.

1. At least among our respondents, who were enrolled in secondary (high) schools at the time of our survey in 1970, there is evidence to suggest that young Palestinians are motivated to become directly involved in politics irrespective of one's family background, particularly among the girls. We find no relationship between the degree of parent's literacy and their children's PPI. Palestinian political culture encourages and

induces boys and girls to take on active political roles, without much regard to family backgrounds or status. Among the boys, it is significant to point out that those from non-professional backgrounds are more likely to be involved in active politics than those from professional family backgrounds. There must have been a discontinuity between generations among Palestinians as far as political aspirations are concerned. The extent of Palestinian revolution is sufficiently radical to induce sons of lower S.E.S. backgrounds to be involved in politics. In the future Palestinian society, religion may continue to make some meaningful difference in attracting people to assume active political roles, but if our finding has any predictive validity we will see a society which recruits its political activists irrespective of class differences. We must be aware of whether or not aspiring political activists will be able to play the role they wish to play as depending largely upon the future of Palestine entity. Even if they aspire to play active roles, circumstances may prevent them from assuming these roles.

Our finding is in accord with the aspirations of many revolutionary leaders such as those of Dr. George Habash, as far as this aspect of the Palestinian political entity is concerned. It is the Palestinian boys of lower occupational backgrounds who are more highly motivated to play active political roles. Furthermore, our finding is in conformity with Professor Sharabi's finding that commando members are not recruited from only educated segments of the Palestinian society, as myth has it, but they come from various sectors of the society.¹²

2. The second feature that separates political involvement patterns of Palestinian youths from those of other stable countries is that being a member of a commando unit is an integral part of being a political activist; this was uncovered by factor analysis reported in section 2. What is of further interest is that only 15 out of 234 respondents gave a negative response to the question of "If your answer is negative (Are you a member of any Palestinian commando unit?), would you like to become a member

of the Palestinian commando if you had a chance? ” It appears as if Palestinian commandos are not only supported by these youths but nearly everyone, (including girls) wants to become members of some commando unit. There are several other questions which dealt with commando activities not reported here, which indicate that commandos are very well supported by these young Palestinians. Limited space for the present article prevents us from presenting full evidence from the survey. We expect to present a more comprehensive report in a book-length manuscript in preparation at the present.

3. Third feature of the present study to be pointed out here is that there is a need to view a significant event as an agent of political socialization or at least as a key stimulus which makes an individual become an agent of one's own political socialization process. The death of a family member or close relatives appears to have stimulated particularly girls to become interested in political activities. It has been reported that the battle of Karameh induced many Palestinians to join commando units. They were not forced to join but perhaps they felt they could find a meaningful life in commando activities.

Students of political socialization have not paid systematic attention to events as a key to the puzzle of how a child becomes interested in politics. The Vietnam war may have acted as a key agent of political socialization among American youths, making so many of them gladiators and not simply observers of the American political scene.

4. Fourth feature of our findings is that we failed to find any meaningful relationship between the sense of political efficacy items and the PPI among the Palestinian youths. A positive relationship normally exists between these two variables. The lack of a positive relationship suggests the nature of the political participation of Palestinians in Jordan.

5. In most cases, we find that sex difference acts as a key contingent condition in making certain factors such as religious

difference, father's occupation, war-death in family, and friendship pattern relevant factors to be taken into consideration in answering the question of what makes young Palestinians get involved in politics. Religious preference and war-death in family affect degree of political involvement among the girls to a large extent but much less so among the boys. On the other hand, father's occupational background and friendship relate to the PPI among the boys but not among the girls. Only in the case of the club membership variable, we note that sex did not act as a contingent condition.

The importance of sex as a variable affecting the degree of political involvement was anticipated as a result of the exploratory factor analysis reported in section 2. Although the role differentiation based upon sex continues to be prevalent in Palestinian political culture, it should be noted that there are girl members of the commando and many more would join the commando if they were given an opportunity. This is a departure from the passive role Arab women have played in traditional Arab society.

Needless to say that other parts of the findings such as the relationship found between club membership or friendship and the PPI are in accord with findings in other countries.

A model of political participation patterns among the Palestinian youths one can infer is that it is revolutionary in several ways. First, the Palestinian political culture has successfully induced young boys and girls of varied family backgrounds and particularly young boys from lower SES to aspire toward gladiatorial roles in the future. Second, being a member of a commando unit is an integral part of being politically active. Third, girls who in the past had played no roles to speak of have shown decisive interest in becoming politically active. Fourth, as is the case with so many attempted revolutions and revolutions which have taken place in the history of mankind, those who participate in the process of revolution do not always feel as effective in their efforts

as they would like and in fact that may be a cause of their aspiration to assume active roles in politics.

Events such as the death of someone dear to these young girls in the continuing war with Israel stimulate them to become politicized and the fact that nearly one-third of them anticipate taking an active part in the future of Palestinian polity suggests that a Palestinian awakening is definitely taking place among these students. Perhaps their joining of "Ashbal" and other commando units symbolizes such an awakening of their determination to carry out the liberation of their country by themselves rather than to stay in refugee camps to wait for the advent of Jeannie.



NOTES

An exploratory survey upon which the present article is based was made possible through the financial aid of the University of Hawaii's Research Council (1968 - 1970), for which we are grateful. Appreciation is also due to those who helped to administer the questionnaires in Jordan, who will remain anonymous here, all 234 students who participated in the survey, and several individuals who assisted us in various stages of completing the study: Miss Karen Essene, Mrs. Freda Hellinger, Mrs. Mitzi Loftus, and Mr. Charles Wall.

1. Perhaps the two most comprehensive works done on political participation to date are: Robert E. Lane, *Political Life: Why People Get Involved in Politics*. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1959 and Lester W. Milbrath, *Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics?* Chicago: Rand McNally and Company. 1965.

2. For more detail, see Yasumasa Kuroda, «Young Palestinian Commandos in Political Socialization Perspective» delivered at the 28th International Congress of Orientalists in Canberra, Australia (January, 1971). A larger manuscript of book length on the survey data is in progress at this time. A full scale treatment of the data is given in the forthcoming work tentatively entitled *Palestinians without Palestine*.

3. Herbert Menzel, «A New Coefficient for Scalogram Analysis,» *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 258-280.

4. Whether or not adding of this group of persons who had failed to respond to one out of the three items made any difference in the results of the data analyses was tested; it proved to make no serious statistically significant differences.

5. Lester Milbrath, *op. cit.*, see pp. 135 and the references therein.

6. Japan, for example, had a Christian Socialist prime minister and Catholic Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in recent decades. This is significant in the sense that the total population of Christians had never exceeded over one percent of the total population of Japan since the advent of Christianity in the 16th century. Furthermore, this is more remarkable in view of the fact that about two-thirds of the people profess to have no religion today.

7. An earlier finding reported that those who had a member of the immediate family or a close relative killed in the war with Israel were twice as likely to join commando units than those without the same experience. Yasumasa Kuroda, «Young Palestinian Commandos in Political Socialization Perspective,» *op. cit.*

8. see, e.g., Yasumasa Kuroda, «Sociability and Political Involvement,» *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 11, No. 2, May, 1965, pp. 133-147; Lester W. Milbrath, «Predispositions toward Political Contention,» *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 13, No. 1, March, 1960, pp. 5-18; Lester W. Milbrath and Walter Klein, «Personality Correlates of Political Participation,» *Acta Sociologica*, Vol. 6, fasc. 1 - 2, 1962, pp. 523-66.

9. The sense of political efficacy scale was first developed at the Survey Research Center, University of Michigan. See Angus Campbell, Phillip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes, *The American Voter*. New York: Wiley, 1960.

10. Items included are:

1. My family does not have any say about how the government is run.
2. Our government cares much about our feelings on important matters.
3. What the government does happens regardless of what we ordinary people do.
4. Government officials care much about what people like my family feel.
5. I know that government officials would listen to people like my family if we had something to say.
6. The government is run by a few big men

who could not care less about ordinary people like us.

11. The results of data tabulation are not shown here, for there are no significant results to be shown. Consequently, they are not presented so as not to take up space. If any reader is interested in the results, he may write to us for more information. Also, we expect to make a more detailed report on this part of the survey as well as other aspects in the book-length manuscript now under preparation entitled *Palestinian without Palestine*.

12. Hisham Sharabi, *Palestine Guerrillas: Their Credibility and Effectiveness*, Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1970.

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Reviews

THE REVIEWING OF A BOOK: CASE STUDY OF *THE ISRAEL-ARAB READER*

The number of books relating to the colonial state of Israel and its clash with the indigenous society of its geographical region has been extremely large. Unfortunately, most of these publications have merely contributed to the obscuration of the primary issues of the conflict. The superabundance of books has occasioned a matching volume of reviews and notices, and because the time, care, and competence required for a useful evaluation have seldom coincided in a single reviewer, these have done little to clarify the view. In fact, these notices and reviews have frequently misled readers as to the character and merit of the publications under review.

As an illustration of the generally unsatisfactory way in which books on the conflict surrounding the intrusive state have been treated, a case study is here presented of *The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict*. This anthology was edited by Walter Laqueur, a political commentator noted for his zeal and prolificacy in pursuing Cold-War themes. Laqueur, who holds academic posts in both England and the United States, has gained in certain circles a reputation as a "Middle East expert." The Reader is a curious collection of speeches, essays, excerpts, and official statements dating from 1882 to 1968. The 42 pieces of Parts I-III are numbered as "documents", though several of them do not differ in nature from the 15 items of Part IV which are simply headed, "Views and Comments". The volume was published in early 1969 in New York by the Citadel Press and in London by Weidenfeld & Nicholson, while an inexpensive paperback edition was issued the same year by Bantam Books. An enlarged Bantam edition, published in the middle of 1970, contained 15 additional

readings; their tendentious selection conveyed the impression—quite at variance with reality—that the conflict is one of law and order (the Israeli side) versus unstable and revolutionary elements (Arabs and Western radicals). It is, however, only the first edition of the *Reader* which is the subject of this brief study.

Easily the most naive appraisal of this little anthology appeared in the issue for January 19, 1970, of *Action*, the bi-weekly newspaper of the Action Committee on American-Arab Relations. The editors took at face value the claim of the sub-title to being a "documentary history." They described it as containing "all the important documents from the beginnings of Zionism and Arab nationalism in 1862 (sic!) to the present" and as providing "a complete background" of the conflict, while further expressing their surprise that Bantam Books "had the courage to publish it" and that "the Zionist pressure groups in the U.S. allowed it to be circulated."

Action asserted that the "documents clearly show the Zionist conspiracy to establish a pure Jewish state in Palestine over the repeated objections of every bipartisan commission established to study the problem." Certainly much of the experience of *Action's* editors had to be read into the jumble of disjointed excerpts to see anything clearly, and it is a serious question whether any typical English-speaking reader, given his biases and preconditioning could see a conspiracy even dimly from the amputated passages torn from historical context and thrown at him *en masse*.

Action had apparently not noticed that the background of "documents" in effect formed a build-up to a final opinion essay

by Laqueur himself. This was hardly placed in that position out of modesty, for editors do not normally include their own articles in anthologies and even more rarely give themselves the last word. Average readers, furthermore, would not recognize Laqueur's analysis as being superficial and misleading and would likely be impressed with his subtle hint that Israel should be left to handle the situation according to its own wisdom and by its own superior force. *Action's* declaration that if this volume had a widespread circulation "American public opinion would dramatically turn to the Arab side" is something less than realistic.

Although Laqueur's collection of readings presents Zionist and Israeli arguments considerably more effectively than any opposing points of view, *The American Zionist*, February, 1969, p. 26, was not so enthralled with the volume as *Action*. *The American Zionist* seemed apprehensive about the selection and the editor's "objectivity" which prevented him from laying out any concrete proposals for "peace". We may be sure that the reviewer would have liked seeing the political and demographic goals of the Zionist ideology specified in those concrete proposals. He complained that an article directly answering Hal Draper's "The Origin of the Middle East Crisis" (a doctrinaire socialist harangue with as much vagary as insight which condemned both Zionism and Arab governments for their reactionary chauvinism) was omitted.

Like *Action*, the reviewer in *The American Zionist* accepted the notion that the collection "tells the story of a continuing crisis" --whereas in fact it only reflects bits and pieces of the story. The *Zionist* review does, however, realize that "Eighty years of conflict are revealed, but also eighty years of Zionist aspiration," i.e. the Zionist message is given a sympathetic presentation, while not a single serious anti-Zionist view, either Jewish or non-Jewish, is represented. Given this flaw in the selection, one should not be surprised that *The American Zionist* granted that Laqueur "is well qualified for his chosen

task." All in all, there is no violation of the principle that book reviews usually tell as much about the reviewer as about the publication under review—if not more.

The Congress Bi-Weekly: A Review of Jewish Congress, made the rather obvious assessment that "the strength of the *Reader* lies in its parts, rather than the whole." It noted specifically that Part III ("Israel and the Arab World 1948-1967") was "somewhat disorienting in its sequences. The suggestion was also made that the excerpts from "Nasser, Haykal and Shukeiry... may startle American readers unfamiliar with the Arab style, rhetoric, and conceptualization of their Israeli predicament." One suspects that the reviewer was laboring under some discriminatory preconception, for as far as style and rhetoric are concerned, these selections have no essential differences from the speech of Israeli General Rabin given in Part IV. The realistic conceptualization of the Israeli threat could only startle those who have been conditioned by misconceptions of the most unrealistic sort. Of the erroneous Israeli conceptualization of their role there is no mention, perhaps because it does not startle American readers. At any rate, the reviewer in the *Congress Bi-Weekly* cogently pointed out that in seeing much quoted sentences in context will reveal to the reader that "the digested and edited fragments of Arab opinion served up (in the American news) media convey only uncertain hints as to the character of the original article."

The *Library Journal*, May 1, 1969, gave a one-paragraph notice, written by David Shavit of the University of Massachusetts Library. One wonders what qualifications he possesses for judging all 42 "documents" in Parts I-III to be "significant" for the "Arab-Israeli conflict." The second piece, for example, is of questionable relevance to the conflict. It is an excerpt in translation from *Réveil de la Nation Arabe dans l'Asie Turque..*, published in 1905 by Negib Azouri, an expatriate Syrian Christian living in Paris. Its inclusion was apparently in deference to the misconception that Zionism would have had no conflict with a native

population in Palestine except for the rise of secular Arab nationalism...

Certainly there was no intrinsic significance for the conflict in the exchange of the Amir Faisal with Zionist leaders; they neither encouraged Zionist colonization nor native opposition. Divorced from their historical context, Faisal's statements later served in Zionist propaganda, though with what effect is a moot question. The German memorandum on the meeting between Amin Husseini and Hitler is likewise of no significance, except as it has been used by Zionists to establish a fictional link between Arabs and Nazis and build up the myth that Arab hostility to Zionism has roots in anti-Jewish prejudices.

The Saturday Review, May 17, 1969, p. 32, gave a modest paragraph to Laqueur's *Reader*, which it described as a reference work which "should be grabbed immediately by anyone who takes a serious interest in the Middle East." In view of serious omissions, discussed below, one wonders if the collection could really be considered a reference work, as such a collection should contain all the main documents on the topic.

The fatal error in *The Saturday Review's* notice was to say that "Laqueur furnishes helpful context for his selections." That he certainly did not do. In fact, his occasional brief editorial comments often mislead as to the historical context of the selections. For instance, in his remarks prefacing the recommendations of the King-Crane Commission, rather than putting the commission's inquiry into the general framework of President Wilson's thinking, specifically the principle of self-determination for the non-Turkish parts of the Ottoman Empire (as in the Fourteen Points), Laqueur associates the commission with the sympathies of Howard Bliss for "the Arab cause."

Laqueur's ability to mislead as to the historical context of the selections is exemplified in his introduction (pp. 168-169) to the speeches by the late President Abdul Nasser and an editorial in *al-Ahram*. "The Arab-Israeli conflict again escalated with the Egyptian decision in mid-May, 1967 to con-

centrate troops in Sinai and the announcement that the Straits of Tiran would be closed to Israeli shipping." There was no mention of the events leading to the decisions, namely Israeli threats to take large-scale military action against Syria and Israeli radio broadcasts in Arabic warning against the closing of the Gulf of Aqaba, broadcasts which served as a challenge to the Egyptian government as they raised public opinion in favor of closing the Straits of Tiran.

The 1967 confrontation plainly did not originate in the first instance over Suez and Aqaba (issues which Laqueur also gives prominence on p. 124), but grew out of tensions between Syria and Israel over Israel's continuing encroachment on demilitarized zones and Israel's insistence on holding the Syrian government entirely responsible for the Syrian-based guerrilla activities of Palestinians exiled by the colonial state. The debatable point is what unusual factor or factors in the Israeli-Syrian tensions gave such alarm in Cairo that military reinforcements were sent to Sinai at a time when the Egyptian army was bogged down in Yemen and did not want war with Israel. One factor must have been the threatening speeches made by Israeli leaders during the first two weeks of May, coupled with reports of Syrian and Soviet origin of unusual military activities in Israel. In any case, Laqueur ignores the situation which set off the chain of events leading to Israel's invasion of three neighboring states — and that situation must be understood to include a three-fold Israeli motivation for not avoiding a "war" for which it would seem that Arab states were responsible: military, ideological and economic. The Israeli leadership was supremely confident that their forces could quickly occupy strategic territory, their Zionist ideology compelled them to "restore" *Eretz Yisrael*, and they knew from experience that war would bring in enormous foreign contributions to help a sagging economy, as well as give them control of the lucrative tourist trade of Jerusalem, Bethlehem and other sites up until then belonging to Jordan. The "documents" chosen by Laqueur do not

tell the real story, nor did he correct this deficiency with a short paragraph.

Laqueur's prefatory paragraph to Part I, "from the first stirrings of the Jewish and Arab national movements to 1917," at the very outset places the conflict into terms of an inappropriate antithesis, representing it as a struggle between two comparable nationalistic movements. The more valid perspective in which to see that period is as the rise of a program of European colonization, similar to those in vogue in the late 19th century in Africa, aimed at intrusion into an area where a native population was exconced, reasonably satisfied with its own way of life, and deeply attached to its familiar landscapes. That there was "no specific Arab Palestinian national consciousness" was irrelevant as far as the principle of the Zionist plan for colonization was concerned. Though lacking the technical ability to express in practical terms their resistance, the Palestine Arabs did not lack motivation even without nationalism in its European sense. The presence or lack of Palestinian or Arab nationalism neither contributed toward the conflict nor minimized it. Arab nationalism did not appreciably alter the course of the conflict, certainly not until after World War II when some Palestinians began looking in earnest to Arab nationalism as the leverage for gaining aid from other Arab states. As far as the majority of Palestinians have been concerned, it would be correct to say that the conflict has created national identity. Rural Palestinians, the majority, have only wanted the right to live in their villages and tilling their soil and grazing their flocks on ancestral lands. The Zionist program threatened them economically and culturally and was therefore opposed. No political doctrine has been a major issue with them. No further examples should be required to dispose of *The Saturday Review's* assertion that "Laqueur furnishes helpful context for his selections." The only redeeming feature of this review was in pointing out that he reserved the last word in his anthology for himself.

Harry N. Howard, book review editor of *The Middle East Journal*, offers a notice

(spring, 1969, p. 248) of Laqueur's anthology in conjunction with another collection, *The Arab-Israeli Impasse*, edited by Majdia D. Khadduri. This latter volume, which contains opinion essays and analyses written by various scholars and experts in Britain and the United States, Howard describes as seeking "more to explain the Arab position," while he describes the aim of the anthology by Laqueur as "to provide a better understanding of the Arab-Israeli conflict." The implication seems to be that the one collection is objective, while the other tends to be partisan. What should have been noted was that the Khadduri volume contains a much better balance of opinion on some of the same issues as covered in Part IV of the Laqueur volume. Further careful comparison reveals that in his selection Laqueur was apparently shy of essays which persuasively represented interpretations differing from his own or from other pro-Israeli positions. The Khadduri volume provides some of the critical analysis which is lacking in the Laqueur volume, analysis which is essential for understanding the "original sources" of the Laqueur volume. The principle overlooked by Howard is that interpretative essays are of greater value in understanding the historical episode than are a small selection of documents. Thus to say that the Laqueur volume "provided more by way of documentation" is not to the point, especially as Laqueur is not ostensibly presenting a thesis requiring documentation but readings which are imprudently assumed capable of speaking for themselves.

I.F. Stone's review article of *Le conflit israélo-arabe* is not particularly profound, as Howard described it, but simply a journalist's style of recounting ideas which have been circulating among well-qualified specialists. A critical review might have suggested that the placing of the attack on it by Syrkin immediately following appeared to be Laqueur's technique for discrediting it. The same procedure also occurred in placing a long speech by Abba Eban after the Childers selection; "The Other Exodus." The unfortunate casual reader would have no

way of knowing that Syrkin's and Eban's pieces contain gross misuse of evidence and faulty interpretation, because they are not followed by readings in answer to their clever, but unsound, arguments. In spite of its many weaknesses, none of them noted by Howard, he recommended Laqueur's anthology for the reference shelves of serious observers.

In a brief review in *International Affairs* (London), January, 1970, p. 176, Ann Williams suggests that to criticize the selection in the *Reader* is only to cavil. Regretably she failed to recognize the several insignificant pieces included or to take cognizance of the far more serious omissions. A 1951 Security Council resolution on the passage of ships through the Suez Canal is given, though it is not of paramount importance to the conflict—unless use of the Suez Canal was a major factor in Israel's decision to launch attacks on Egyptian territory in either 1956 or 1967 (and this is not likely to judge from public statements). However, though the fact of Israel's exiling Palestinians from their homeland has contributed decisively to the conflict, there is no trace of any of the numerous United Nations resolutions providing the displaced persons the choice between repatriation and compensation?

Another example of significant omission relates to Childers' "The Other Exodus," which caused much consternation among British Zionists after being published in the *Spectator*, May 12, 1961. The thesis of that article was that Israeli actions were mainly responsible for the flight of Palestine Arabs from their homes during 1948. In his introductory paragraph to this article reprinted in his anthology, Laqueur inaptly states that the article "provoked a great deal of controversy."

That statement would only leave the unwary reader to infer that Childers' thesis was questionable, if not worse. The "controversy" published over a period of months in subsequent issues of the *Spectator*, if reproduced in the *Reader*, would have helped understand the problem far more than the speech of Eban, which in deceptive

rhetoric and skillful turns of phrases appears to refute Childers entirely. The *Spectator* correspondence was the only occasion in which free discussion of this controversy was allowed space in a major English-language periodical anywhere, but Laqueur omitted this highly informative discussion. Further omissions, some even more serious are mentioned in a review discussed below.

Objections to the selection are more than trivial, and the critical reviewer must demur to their arrangement and the false hints as to context. One may hope further that Ann Williams was wrong in predicting that the volume would receive the approval of "university teachers in their present enthusiasm for leading their students to the water of original sources." The *Reader* provides a poor supply.

After these uncritical notices and reviews, one is relieved to find that the *Times Literary Supplement*, 4.9.69, page 972, points out, without waste of words, that "the method is faulty, as a moment's consideration will show. The situation in the Middle East, as in so many other places, is an outcome of military and economic forces, with their political consequences. Documents sometimes accompany these but they rarely explain them fully." As to the conclusion of Laqueur's own final article, i.e. that a solution to the conflict is half reached when it is given little attention in newspapers, the *TLS* judgement is harsh, but fair; "In so experienced a writer, such political naivety is surprising."

Christopher Gandy, in the *Royal Central Asian Journal*, October, 1969, pp. 302-303, also provided a succinct critical review. "The claim on the jacket of Dr. Laqueur's book, that it presents the 'essential documents' behind the Arab-Israeli conflict, is exaggerated, nor can it be called... a documentary history." Gandy listed, among the preeminently important episodes in the conflict passed over entirely, "the Arab revolt of 1936," anti-British Zionist atrocities at the end of the Mandate, "pressures by the Zionists on the United States Government and by the latter on others to secure partition, the murder of the United Nations

Mediator,” the three-nation invasion of Egypt in 1956, and the 1967 debates at the United Nations. Gandy adds that “Of the documents included, the *soi-disant* Faisal-Weizmann agreement of 1919 should have been accompanied by a correct translation of King Faisal’s reservation..., his memorandum to H.M.G. of January 4, 1919, and his interview with the *Jewish Chronicle* of October 3, 1919—for all of which see Mr. Tibawi’s valuable article in the (*Royal Central Asian*) *Journal* for June 1969.”

Gandy also saw what Ann Williams did not, namely that the most important “original sources” were omitted in the *Reader*: “It is surprising to find nothing from British and American state archives...,” while in another connection mentioning Arab statements made at the United Nations. He indicated, in addition, that it was misleading of Laqueur to oppose polished speeches by Israeli spokesmen at the UN with speeches by President Abdul Nasser designed for internal consumption: “Was it fair... to include over 40 pages of speeches made in Egypt by President Nasser, while only representing official Israeli views by mellifluous speeches made in the U.S.A. (except for one jingoistic piece by a former Israeli Chief of Staff)? Here again, U.N. debates, interviews with Western journalists and the archives of Western governments might have been drawn upon to give a more balanced picture of the thinking of Arab governments.” He could well have had in mind speeches made by Arab delegates before the Security Council in which they promised not to open hos-

tilities and asked Israel to make the same commitment. These were at least as significant as Golda Meir’s address to the General Assembly in 1962 in which a call for Arab surrender to military realities was cast in the guise of “A Call for Disarmament.” Even after 1967 Laqueur did not realize how little similarity there was between the image Israel projected at the UN and its role in the real world at the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea.

In summary, then, *The Israel-Arab Reader* suffered from the limitations inherent in any anthology. This was brought to the fore by the editor’s intention of having it serve a purpose for which an anthology is not suited. The selection, furthermore, is subject to very serious criticism, owing to lack of balance and lack of representative serious opinion, while attempts to place the readings in historical perspective were often unsuccessful. The volume should not have been recommended for the uses mentioned in several of the reviews. It is too incomplete to be of any value for reference, and too unbalanced in selection to be used satisfactorily as a reading book for students. Most of reviews and notices failed to recognize the serious defects of the volume. That the majority of reviewers approved of the book is not in itself of serious consequence; the significance of the fact lies rather in its being typical of the wholesale approval of unsatisfactory works concerning one of the most serious human and political problems of the third quarter of the 20th century.

RAY L. CLEVELAND

SOCIAL MOBILITY AND POLITICAL CHANGE, by Joan Davies. London, Pall Mall Press, Ltd., 1970, 130 pp., 50p.

An interesting facet in the study of government and politics today is the number of new works dealing with the problem of political change. Moreover, one fascinating aspect of the literature is the attempt to break out of ethnocentric patterns cast in the Western tradition. Within this context Professor Davies' book demonstrates both strength and weaknesses. A contribution is made in that the more substantial works on social change are synthesized within the confines of the concept of social mobility and its impact on the political system. The theoretical relationship between the differentiation of a society and political changes is traced through classical theorists such as Tocqueville, Marx, Weber, Durkheim and Michels, followed by more contemporary sociologists and political scientists, e.g., Germani, Eisenstadt, and Almond. What follows is the usual model in which differentiation and social mobility alter political structures and, consequently, the nature of politics. Industrialization and the growth of a middle class mean the movement of large segments of the populace from the periphery to the center of the political process. An array of structures--political parties, interest groups, and voluntary associations--provide the vehicles through which a participation populace identifies with the larger society. The end product, in good sociological terms, is integration as the individual's perception of his "role" is in accord with existing circumstances. Standard problems which muddy the waters for such a model are also covered. The Negro in the United States, for example, views "roles" collectively for his entire race, but no equality of roles is accepted by the remainder of the society. Likewise there arises the possibility of a radical po-

litical position being taken by the "new" working class of industrial societies because of the desire for "work control". These incompatible role situations intensify conflict, and implicitly, if not explicitly, the author seems to feel solutions lie in the altering of social structures.

In this vein I believe the book comes up short. As sociologists have depicted change in the Western context, the relationship between social mobility and political change, in fact, may be one of cause-effect. Does this mean, however, that other areas of the world will necessarily experience the same sequential development? Can conflict in all societies be explained within the framework of roles as defined through social mobility and the corresponding effect on political relationship? This form of analysis is limited in that it does not account for possibility of the political variable being independent. Scholars are questioning the use of restricted models based upon Western experience. Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, David Apter, *Politics of Modernization*, to name but two, and even Eisenstadt. (I believe Professor Davies has missed a significant point by not dealing with Eisenstadt's "breakdowns".) The point is that, in a transitional situation, politics and government in many cases become significant variables, determining the extent of differentiation and social mobility. A book dealing with political change and social mobility should note such points, especially since it is a part of the series, "Key Concepts in Political Science," presumably to be used by students at many levels.

Obviously, the intellectual leap between social mobility and political change is a vast one. The author, in this case, has done a creditable job of synthesizing a number

of important works which deal with the problem from one vantage point. If, however, the inevitable path during change leads to integration and stability, only half the job has been accomplished. Disintegration, "breakdowns" and "decay" are also very much a part of political change.

In such a case, does social mobility alter political structures and politics, or would the performance of the political system alter social mobility?

MARK DICKERSON

*Assistant Professor of Political Science
The University of Calgary*

LAWYERS, THE RULE OF LAW AND LIBERALISM IN MODERN EGYPT, by Farhat J. Ziadeh. Stanford University, Stanford, California: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1968, xi, 177 pp., \$7.00.

In this book Ziadeh utilizes original sources fairly extensively in tracing the development of the Egyptian legal system since the latter nineteenth century. Because his primary concern is the liberal thrust of the Egyptian legal profession, he also spends some time on the ideas of individual legal reformers. Although Ziadeh's approach is almost exclusively descriptive, the book is well written and would be useful to the student who needs an introductory survey of major Egyptian legal institutions prior to the 1952 revolution. As aids to the reader, Ziadeh has provided a glossary of Arabic terms, a five and a half page bibliography of works in several languages, and an index.

In Ziadeh's opinion the key catalytic development in the modernization of the Egyptian legal system was the establishment of the mixed courts in 1876. These courts approached being truly catalytic agents in that, in addition to stimulating change, they included a majority of European judges and originally their bar was exclusively European. The Egyptians were quick to adapt to European approaches to the law, however, and it was not long before Egyptian lawyers trained in the European style had established a bar association and national courts. From 1876 until their abolishment in the 1950's, the traditional, religiously based courts were generally on the defensive against the encroachments made by the movement for greater rationalization and

secularization of the Egyptian legal system. In this regard, the Egyptian bar became quite an active force for legal reform, although their efforts were not sufficient to enable their colleagues on the courts to achieve the independence necessary for a consistent implementation of the impartial rule of law.

In terms of the political effectiveness of the bar, the organizational and educational advantages of the Egyptian lawyers appear to have been diluted considerably by the limited nature of their liberalism. One would expect lawyers to be instrumental in rationalizing the hodge-podge of traditional and modern courts in Egypt and given their educational backgrounds, they naturally rose to leadership positions in the nationalist movement. But, except for achievements on behalf of women's rights, their role in implementing fundamental democratic economic or social reform was minor. Despite reformist agitation by some members of the bar, it was in fact the post-1952 revolutionary regime representing the military that eliminated the religiously based courts and that abolished the *waqf* law, one of the chief legal protections of vested property rights.

The liberalism with which Ziadeh deals is confined to the reforms involved in establishing "a rule of law, an independent judiciary, and a viable legal system and profession" and in this respect he reflects

the narrow reform views of most lawyers, whether Egyptian or European. Because legal training inculcates one with the paramount importance of the law, lawyers tend to see reform in terms of tinkering with legal systems. Ziadeh's extended discussions of intricate and specific proposals and counterproposals are indicative of the things that legally shaped minds think important. Such legalistic activity, framed as it was in terms of European concepts, undoubtedly moved the legal profession away from the indigenous needs of the masses after independence. In addition, the limited reformist attitudes of the legal profession were rein-

forced by the fact, noted briefly by Ziadeh, that many lawyers received large retainers for their representation of the interests of the wealthy. For those dedicated to the rule of law, the sad truth appears to be that the Egyptian lawyers, while instrumental in legal reform, could not develop sufficient identification with the masses to act as political agents of thorough reform and thus remained at the mercy of those who could.

ROBERT HEINEMAN

*Chairman, Department of Political Science
Alfred University.*

PERSIAN KINGSHIP IN TRANSITION, by E.A. Bayne. American Universities Field Staff, Inc., 1968, pp. 288, \$ 7.50.

E.A. Bayne's *Persian Kingship in Transition* is an important book and one which has suffered from a paucity of reviews.

Mr. Bayne first went to Iran as the Loan Officer for the Middle East of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and it was in 1948 that he had his first interview with the Shah of Iran. Later, in his career as economic adviser to the Iranian prime minister, as consultant on Middle Eastern affairs for the U.S. Department of State, and finally as director of the A.U.F.S. Center for Mediterranean Studies, Mr. Bayne was able to remain in close touch with the Iranian Court (he personally knew every prime minister after 1948), and the conversations with the Shah continued. This book, then, is at once a narration and commentary on a series of dialogues between the Shah and Mr. Bayne which lasted for more than 20 years. No other foreigner has had this unique opportunity. A reigning Monarch's view of himself and his realm is seldom made available to the world with such candour but this is exactly what Mr. Bayne's book has produced. The fact that the book itself builds upon earlier reports of Mr. Bayne from the

field as well as an earlier publication, "Four Ways of Politics," in no way detracts from the importance of the present study.

Persian Kingship in Transition consists of three parts and appendices. Part I begins with an account of the Shah's meeting with the High Economic Council of his government and ends with the Shah's candid account of his use of the symbols of parliamentary democracy. In between are brief chapters on the religious dialectic, (Algar's *Religion and State in Iran* is a first-rate study), the Shah's sense of Mission (described in his own biography, *Mission for My Country*), The Devine Right (see the reviewer's "Divine Right of Persian Kings," *Journal of Indian History* XLV, 134, 1967) and one entitled very ambiguously "Intellectuals and Treason" in which the Tudeh party is grouped with political science and student activists as presenting a problem in politics. The best chapter, in the opinion of the reviewer, is the last entitled "Ideology and Power". Here the Shah describes himself clearly in terms of his relations with the enlarging middle class, the changes taking place in the loci of power in Iran, and his intentions with regard to the reform program.

Part II is more personal--on the Shah's side--as the nature of his kingship is explored through dialogue. There is no doubt, in this recounting, that the Shah is in fact, a reigning monarch who knows his own power. The Mossadegh period tested the young man severely and, it is to the Shah's great credit that he turned that difficult experience into a positive program looking toward modernization. His father, Shah Reza, in his old age retreated increasingly into unreality as his more negative personal qualities came to the fore and the affairs of state suffered. But the present monarch is clearly more aware, more inclined toward learning and experimentation, more positive in his kingship, than one would normally expect of a monarch who had ruled over a quarter of a century--and this appears in the two chapters titled "Power in Hand" and "Monarchy in Management." There is also in Part II some consideration of the strains of present foreign policy.

Part III of Mr. Bayne's book is in a sense a postscript (although there is, in fact, a short postscript as well). It deals to some extent with his role of leader, but is largely an account of the more personal aspects of the Shah's life. The appendices number

six and there is a bibliography of English language works on Iran.

Today, as has rightly been pointed out in Professor Ismael's recent study (*Governments and Politics of the Contemporary Middle East*) the burgeoning success story of Iran is to be approached with some caution. While growth and change are proceeding rapidly in some areas, they are lagging behind in others. Mr. Bayne has made no attempt at systematic analysis of these areas of greatest inequity. He might, perhaps, have failed to fully present the seriousness of problems that exist in the present-day political structure of Iran. On the other hand, the Shah of Iran is a sophisticated modern who has shown tremendous capacity for growth in his lifetime and who therefore is not apt to dwell on the problems and negative aspects of his reign. Further, one can ask, as was done years ago in the revealing Eckermann's *Conversations with Goethe*, who was interviewing whom--the great man, or the narrator. Nevertheless this is a revealing study of a powerful contemporary ruler and of those we have very few.

E. BURKE INLOW

*Professor of Political Science
The University of Calgary*

THE POLITICAL AWAKENING IN THE MIDDLE EAST, George Lenczowski, editor. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice - Hall, Inc., 1970. The Global History Series, L.S. Stavrianos, editor, ix - 180 pp., Biblio., Paper, \$2.45.

Part of a series of such books edited for Prentice-Hall by area specialists, *The Political Awakening in the Middle East* is aimed at the college trade. It is a fairly comprehensive survey, given its limited length, of writings concerning the rise of the Arabs, Turks, and Persians to political awareness. The readings cover the subject from the early Ottoman reforms to the events of the mid-1960s.


Professor Lenczowski's introductory notes for each chapter are excellent, and the readings are well chosen. The selections halt at 1967, however, and the Palestinian

movement is therefore ignored. The "New Left" in the Arab world is not represented here, so that the radical Arab nationalism covered in Chapter VI seems something of a misnomer. Similarly, in that chapter, three selections from the Qassim regime are given as against one from post-Qassim Iraq, and none from the post-Aref period. It is the unfortunate fate of books about the Middle East that they are rapidly overtaken by events, but this is a sound collection within the limits of its coverage.

GLENN A. KNIGHT

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
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
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


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CONTENTS	Nos. 3 and 4, Vol. XLVII	AUTUMN AND WINTER, 1971
EDITOR'S NOTE		5
CONTRIBUTORS		11
SOME MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT THE NAHDA <i>A. L. Tibawi</i>		15
CONTEMPORARY ARAB IDEOLOGIES <i>George N. Atiyeh</i>		23
THE ARAB WORLD AFTER NASSER <i>R. H. Dekmejian</i>		37
THE SUEZ CANAL CLOSURE: ITS COST FOR THE UNITED STATES <i>Ragaei El Mallakh</i>		47
PROBLEMS OF URBAN POLITICS IN CANADA AND THE MIDDLE EAST: A COMPARATIVE STUDY <i>S. Drabek</i>		53
THE REPATRIATION OF ARAB ELITES <i>Michael W. Suleiman</i>		71
TUNISIAN EDUCATION: SEEDS OF REVOLUTION? <i>Malcolm H. Kerr</i>		83
REVOLUTION IN DHOFAR, SULTANATE OF OMAN <i>Ray L. Cleveland</i>		93
IRAN: THE POLITICS OF REFORM <i>E. Burke Inlow</i>		103
DOCUMENTS		115
REVIEWS		127

GUEST EDITOR, *Tareq Y. Ismael*
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Editor's Note

The theme of this issue is "The Middle East Today." The articles compiled here examine the divergent trends in education, revolution, war, ideology, etc., occurring in the area. The diversity of the articles reflects the nature and complexity of the Middle East today. We tend to understand these trends as being initiated by the Arab literary renaissance that occurred in the 19th Century and subsequently gave birth to Arab nationalism. The first article, "Some Misconceptions about the Nahda" by Dr. A. L. Tibawi, critically examines some of the popular myths regarding the Arab renaissance.

Dr. George N. Atiyeh, in "Contemporary Arab Ideologies," surveys religionist and nationalist ideologies, and Marxism and the New Left. He finds that Arab nationalist aims remain the dominant political force in the area. He concludes, however, that Arab ideologies "are still mostly visionary theories" that have failed to solve the problems of Arab society.

One of the most dramatic features of the last two decades was the emergence and ascension to dominance in Middle East politics of Gamal Abd al-Nasir. It is tautological to point out President Nasir's impact on the area. What impact has his death had; what influences remain, and what has changed? These are the questions that Professor R. H. Dekmejian addresses himself to in his article "The Arab World After Nasser."

The Suez Canal, one of the most important waterways in the world—for the last century—particularly to the economies of the Western nations—has now been closed for almost five years. Since its opening in 1869 the Canal has served as, and was considered, a vital link in Western transportation. Has its long-term closure proven to be the catastrophe to the lines of transport that Western states anticipated? In his article, "The Suez Canal Closure: Its Costs for the United States," Professor Ragaei El Mallakh assesses the economic burden of the Canal's closure and its significance to the Western World.

Increasing urbanization creates problems in both developed

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nations such as Canada and developing nations such as Lebanon. The brunt of these problems confronts the existing local government structures. In the face of increased urbanization, the local governments of cities such as Ottawa, Canada and Beirut, Lebanon play different roles because of historical and administrative factors. In "Problems of Urban Politics in Canada and the Middle East: A Comparative Study," Professor S. Drabek compares the different roles played as Ottawa and Beirut face increased urbanization. Local government in Canada has emphasized local autonomy while in Lebanon the emphasis is on administrative centralization by the national government. He concludes that Canadian local government has adopted its organizational structure to meet the demands of urbanization, whereas in Lebanon the need for national cohesion overshadows any immediate institutional realignment in this particular area.

Tens of thousands of the best educated have left their Arab homeland to settle permanently or temporarily in foreign countries. In "The Repatriation of Arab Elites," Professor Michael Suleiman's article provides suggestions which, if carried out, will alleviate the brain-drain problem and help repatriate some of the Arab elites now abroad. Among the measures suggested are the removal of certain unpleasant and harmful conditions in the Arab world such as unjustified persecution and harassment, discrimination in favor of non-Arab professionals, favoritism toward relatives or people with a *wasta*, and emphasis on formalism instead of creativity and excellence. It is also suggested that employment or liaison offices be opened in the West in order to facilitate the return of Arab professionals. Other incentives are "exchange" and scholarship programs, the upgrading of national universities, the establishment of centers of excellence in the Arab world, etc. Cost estimates are provided.

The rapid expansion of education has been one of the most salient aspects of modernization in the Middle East. The educational sector has expanded more rapidly than any other sector in Middle East society. While education is a necessary adjunct of modernization, however, by outpacing growth and development in other areas to provide useful channels for educated and skilled young men armed with high expectations, this expansion is in fact sowing the seeds of conflict. Professor Malcolm H. Kerr studies the expansion of mass education in Tunisia, in "Tunisian Education: Seeds of Revolution?" and analyzes the developing atmosphere of "anxiety and, in some instances, outright alienation."



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Revolution has been the keynote of Arab politics for the last twenty years. Until recently, however, the Arabian Peninsula has remained fairly quiet amidst all the turbulence of the area. In his article, "Revolution in Dhofar, Sultanate of Oman," Professor Ray L. Cleveland describes the traditional origin of the Dhofari revolution and its subsequent transformation into "a people's war of liberation."

In the final article, "Iran: The Politics of Reform," Professor Inlow presents the thesis that the reform movement in Iran, beginning with the constitutional crisis of 1906 and continuing to the present day, has been essentially one of constitutional interpretation fought out in the political arena between the forces represented by the Majlis and those of the Shahs.



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Contributors

A. L. TIBAWI was educated at the Arab College in Jerusalem, the American University of Beirut (B.A. in history) and the University of London (Ph.D. in education). He served as chief education officer in Palestine, and went to London to study the English educational system before the disaster of 1948. Since then he devoted himself to study, research and teaching at the University of London Institute of Education except for three years at Harvard. In 1962 the University of London conferred upon him the degree of D.Lit. in recognition of his works on Middle East History and Education. He has several works in Arabic. Apart from numerous articles and reviews in learned journals, his works in English include four monographs and the following books:

Arab Education in Mandatory Palestine,
British Interests in Palestine 1800-1901,
American Interests in Syria 1800-1901,
A Modern History of Syria including Lebanon and Palestine.

He has now in press *Islamic Education — Its Traditions and Modernisation into the Arab National Systems.*

GEORGE N. ATIYEH, born in Amioun, Lebanon, 1923. Graduated from American University of Beirut, B.A. 1948; M.A. 1950; and from the University of Chicago, 1954 Ph.D. in Oriental languages and literature. Taught at the University of Puerto Rico from 1954 to 1967—courses in Humanities in general and Arabic culture in particular.

Chairman of the Department of Humanities at the University of Puerto Rico from 1961 to 1967; Head of The Near East Section, Library of Congress, July 1967 until present; and part-time lecturer, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C.

Author of *Three Historical Essays*, Beirut, 1956 and *al-Kindi, the Philosopher of the Arabs*, Pakistan, Islamic Research Institute, 1966. Co-authored in *Medieval Political Philosophy*, New York, Glenco Press, 1963, and *La Filosofia Contemporanea*, San Juan, University of Puerto Rico Press, 1962. Editor of *Historia*, University of Puerto Rico historical review, 1959-1967.

Published articles and essays in several publications.

RICHARD H. DEKMEJIAN, Associate Professor of Political Science, State University of New York at Binghamton, Binghamton, New York. Ph.D. Columbia University. Author of *Egypt Under Nasir* (State University of New York Press, 1971) and numerous articles in *Orbis*, *Soviet Studies*, *Middle Eastern Studies* and *Comparative Studies in Society and History*.

RAGAEI EL MALLAKH is Professor of Economics and Chairman of African and Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Colorado, Boulder. He is a former economic consultant to the World Bank and author of *Economic Development and Regional Cooperation: Kuwait*, (University of Chicago Press, 1968). This paper, in an expanded form, was presented to Fifth Annual Middle East Studies Association of North America meeting, November, 1971.

S. DRABEK, educated at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario and the University of Toronto, is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Calgary. He has also worked for both the Canadian federal government and the Province of Ontario. His areas of interest are regional and urban government. Professor Drabek is also the author of "Towards a Model of Urban Government" in *Urbanization and Urban Life in Alberta*.

DR. MICHAEL SULEIMAN was born in Tiberias, Palestine, and received his higher education in the United States. A University of Wisconsin Ph.D., he is presently Associate Professor of Political Science at Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas. He has written on Arab-American relations, the Palestine question, and Lebanese politics for various professional journals, and is the author of *Political Parties in Lebanon*. He is currently engaged in a study of the political attitudes and behavior of Arab intelligentsia at home and abroad.

MALCOLM H. KERR, Professor of Political Science, University of California at Los Angeles and President of the Middle East Studies Association of North America. Born in Beirut, Lebanon, October 8, 1931, he

received his A.B. from Princeton University in 1953; his M.A. from the American University of Beirut, 1955; his Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies, 1958.

He taught at Harvard and the American University of Beirut.

He has published widely in a number of scholarly journals in Europe, America, and the Arab world. Among his publications are:

Islamic Reform (1966)

The Arab Cold War, 3rd edition (1971)

Lebanon in the Last Years of Federalism, 1840-1868 (1959)

and Egypt Under Nasser

RAY L. CLEVELAND, Associate Professor of History at the University of Saskatchewan Regina Campus, was born in 1929 in Scottsbluff, Nebraska, attended Westmont College in California (B.A., 1951), and the Johns Hopkins University (Ph.D., 1958). He resigned from the research faculty of Johns Hopkins and from the associate editorship of the *Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research* in 1964 in order to return to Jordan, where he had previously spent a year (1955-56) in Jerusalem as a student archaeologist. After living in Jericho for two years engaged in research, he moved to Canada in 1966. Best known to scholars as author of a large archaeological publications, *An Ancient South Arabian Necropolis*, he was awarded an honorary Sc.D. by the University of the Pacific in December, 1970, for his contributions in the field of archaeology. He is also author of a textbook, the fifth edition of which is entitled *The Middle East and South Asia 1971*, as well as numerous articles on archaeology, linguistics, and contemporary affairs. One of his recent studies appears in the *Nonaligned Third World Annual*, 1970.

E. BURKE INLOW has been Professor of Political Science at the University of Calgary since 1961. He has also taught at Princeton University and at Vanderbilt University.

Professor Inlow holds the A.B. degree from Washington State University, the M.A. degree from the University of California (Berkeley) and the Ph.D. from the Johns Hopkins University.

Professor Inlow was with the Military Assistance Program of the U.S. Department of Defence from 1956 to 1961 during which time

he travelled extensively in the Middle East. His publications relating to that area have appeared in the *Journal of Indian History, Law Asia* and the *Osgoode Hall Law Journal*. He is a member of the British Institute of Persian Studies and the Royal Central Asian Society. During the academic year, 1970-71, he was in Iran on sabbatical leave.

ROBERT A. HEINEMAN, Gannett Associate Professor and Chairman of Political Science at Alfred University, Alfred, N. Y., was born in 1939 in Pekin, Illinois. He received his B.A. (1961) from Bradley University, Peoria, Illinois, and his M.A. (1963) and Ph.D. (1966) in Government from The American University, Washington, D.C. He has taught at Eastern Washington State College, Cheney, Washington, and at Bradley University. He has published in several social science journals in the areas of theory and political processes. His most recent article was "Primitive Culture and the Individual: The Case of Sub-Saharan Africa" in *The Journal of Developing Areas* (October 1969). Additionally, he has reviewed for a number of social science journals.

SOME MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT THE NAHDA

A. L. Tibawi

(I)

The Arabic literary renaissance in the nineteenth century is still an obscure aspect of modern Arab history, despite—indeed because of—a number of works purporting to clarify it. I propose to identify a few of the current assumptions, to point out their origin and to suggest correctives. I will confine the enquiry to geographical Syria which includes Lebanon and Palestine.

It is necessary first to define the term "literary renaissance", and I can do no better than quote the concise words of an eminent scholar which serve both as a working definition and as a bold statement of the main assumption. "In the middle of the nineteenth century", he writes, "a literary renaissance (the so-called *nahḍa* movement) took place, beginning in Lebanon, spreading to Egypt and thence to other parts of the Arab world."¹ According to this scholar "the publication of reliable texts of the golden age writers" was among the main manifestations of the movement.

If this is so the claim of precedence for Lebanon does not, as we shall soon see, bear examination. But this claim is usually associated with three other assumptions, equally untenable. The first is concerning the credit assigned to foreign schools, par-

ticularly the Protestant missionary schools sponsored by the Americans. The second is regarding the honour given to the foreign printing presses, particularly the American press in Beirut. The third is respecting the assertion that the renaissance was promoted more by the native Christian element than the Islamic.²

How did this myth originate? Briefly its promoters were not surprisingly Lebanese Christians, educated in foreign schools, and writing mostly in foreign languages. On the whole they tend to idealise the valuable but small contributions of Lebanon and minimise the role of the rest of the Arab world, particularly the undoubted precedence of Egypt in the fields concerned, namely the establishment of modern schools and the printing in Arabic of classical texts as well as translated works in arts and sciences. The confusion was aggravated after the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 and the migration to Cairo of gifted Lebanese who became shining stars in journalism and modern literary production. It was also aggravated after the establishment of the Syrian Protestant College (now well-known as the American University of Beirut) in 1866 where for some fifteen years Arabic was the sole medium of instruction and where the textbooks written or translated by its teachers were printed partly at

*Revised text of a lecture given at the Middle East Centre, the University of Cambridge, England.

the American missionary press in Beirut. This is the basis of a fantastic claim that the Americans at Beirut were agents of the "rediscovery" of the Arabic literary heritage (as if this was ever lost), and the later and equally fantastic claim that they inspired the first stirrings of the Arab national movement.

These are in broad outlines the assumptions and claims. Are they based on fact? Let us first consider the contribution of the printing press to the renaissance. Long before the American (and Jesuit) presses were established in Beirut, initially to print exclusively religious literature with no universal appeal even to all Christians let alone Muslims, Arabic books on literary and other subjects were printed in Istanbul from the beginning of the nineteenth century. From 1820 more varied books in Arabic, both classical and translated from foreign languages, were printed at Būlāq near Cairo. Much of this product was sent to Syria including Lebanon and Palestine during the Egyptian occupation in the 1830s.

It was by a fortunate accident that I discovered in the Egyptian archives cumulative lists of Arabic books printed in Cairo and supplied in 1839 to, among other centres, Aleppo, Damascus, Latakia, Tripoli, Jaffa and Gaza.¹ The lists tell a most illuminating story and provide a more accurate evidence of the availability of books than the surmises of even the most acute foreign observers who often stressed the lack of books. The lists in question include books on science, medicine, theology, mysticism, language, history, geography and travel. They were ordered not only by civil servants, physicians, chemists and army officers, but also by religious functionaries, members of cumulative councils, notables, teachers and private individuals of all communities, Christians, Muslims and others.

This was about a generation before the Syrian Protestant College required and adapted much of the Egyptian product especially in medicine, the physical sciences and mathematics. Until the college began to print such textbooks at the American press, the missionary agency concentrated on the usual religious literature and an Arabic translation of the Bible. It printed, in addition, some half a dozen textbooks for the American mission schools, and these were, according to missionary sources, an Arabic grammar for beginners and similar textbooks on arithmetic, geometry and geography. The higher textbooks used at the college were partly printed at the American press and partly at native presses. But there was not a single Arabic classical text, literary, scientific or philosophical among them. The credit for editing and publishing such texts must be shared between native scholars in Egypt and European orientalists.

It is important to note that, in contrast to an almost complete lack of interest in the classics at Beirut, Cairo had printed, among other standard works, al-Ghazālī's *Ihyā'*, Asfahānī's *Aghāni*, al-Maidānī's *Anthāl* and Ibn Khaldūn's *Muqaddimah*. There is no evidence of a comparable interest in Beirut during the same period, except a poor edition of al-Mutanabbī's *Dīwān* by Butrus al-Bustani, and a more superior one by Khalīl al-Yāziji, son of Nāṣīf, who completed his father's work on the text. But neither the American nor the Catholic presses, to judge from their extant catalogues, can boast of having revived any of the standard Arabic texts up to the turn of the century. Exit therefore the claim of any foreign missionary agency having discovered or "rediscovered" the Arabic literary heritage.

As to foreign missionary schools let us first understand their exact character and

professed aims. In particular an American missionary school was, to start with, no more than a native teacher (Christian Arab) paid by the mission to teach the elements as native schools taught them plus the Protestant version of the Bible. The aim was to propagate a sectarian faith, and education was a mere instrument of achieving this object. Thus the teacher was a prospective convert to Protestantism and the school-room was a centre for preaching and distribution of missionary tracts.

No doubt the standards were gradually improved, but the aim remained the same, even when as the apex of the missionary schools the Syrian Protestant College was established. Its medical department was much stronger than the literary department. A perusal of the catalogues, which often included the questions set for examinations, reveals that the standards were quite elementary. There was nothing in the curriculum related to political or economic ideas. Arabic was taught largely as grammar, rhetoric and poetry, but not literature as such. So far as can be discovered none of the teachers, native or American, edited any Arabic classic.

This picture remained true up to the turn of the century. But it is often forgotten that native Christian schools existed, particularly in Lebanon, long before the arrival of Protestant missionaries. There were also native presses in convents performing in a primitive fashion the local need for the duplication of devotional works. There was also the traditional Islamic school system based on the *kuttāb* and the *madrasab* which catered for some of the needs of the majority. In the second half of the nineteenth century modern Ottoman state schools were gradually established. These were legally open to all irrespective of religion. But their worst aspect from the Christian Arab

point of view was that after the primary stage they taught through the medium of Turkish. Hence the superiority, again from the Christian Arab point of view, of the mission schools which taught through the medium of Arabic and provided suitable textbooks in that language. Hence also the practical boycott of the state schools by the Christian Arab elements who depended on their own native schools or mission schools.

(II)

Few writers are more responsible for constructing a fanciful picture of the early origins of Arabic literary revival and Arab national consciousness than the late George Antonius. He is a superb advocate, and his treatment of Anglo-Arab relations during the First World War and of the post-war Arab struggle for independence from British and French control is as brilliant as it is masterly. But his handling of the antecedents in the nineteenth century requires drastic revision. The very first sentence of his first chapter is erroneous when he gives the credit for the establishment of a literary society in Beirut in 1847 to the American.⁴

I have shown, on the basis of a report by the secretary of this society, discovered in missionary archives preserved at Harvard University, that it met for the first time in December 1845 or January 1846, that it owed its origin to native initiative, and that there were only two American missionaries among its fourteen original members.⁵

A more daring assertion by Antonius is that during the Egyptian occupation of Syria "a state school system" was established "aimed deliberately at awakening Arab national consciousness among the pupils." We

are told that primary schools were established "all over Syria" as well as "large colleges" in Damascus, Aleppo and Antioch.

I have seen no evidence in the Egyptian archives to indicate the establishment of a state system of education or of the opening of primary schools or that the awakening of Arab national consciousness was the aim of the schools actually established. These were three in number with a total of about one thousand pupils. The purpose of these schools was not to foster Arab nationalism but to produce literate army officers following the introduction of conscription in Syria. The pupils were dressed in military uniform, taught by army officers and were enlisted as soon as they could read, write and reckon. The three schools were of such secondary importance that in a financial stringency in 1838 the commander-in-chief offered to abolish them.⁶

Antonius is also responsible for dramatising the function of the Syrian Scientific Society (al-Jam'iyah as-Sūriyya al-Ilmiyya) established in 1868 as a development of the society of 1846. "At a secret gathering", he wrote, "of certain members [of the society] the Arab national movement may be said to have uttered its first cry." This refers to a poem now ascribed to Khalil al-Yāziji, but contemporaries including the Lebanese Christian Salīm Sarkis assigned its authorship to a noted Muslim shaikh he did not name, probably as a protective measure against the Turkish censor.⁷ The first hemistich of the opening line of the poem is the epigraph for Antonius's book: *Awake ye Arabs and Recover.*

The tenor of the argument is that next to the American missionaries the Lebanese Christians were responsible for the Arab awakening. To accept this thesis is to ignore

the prior and more fundamental awakening among the Syrian Muslims who from the end of the Egyptian occupation continued to mourn the diminished rule of the *Shari'ah* following the adoption of measures dictated to Turkey by European pressure. The Syrian Muslim mourned not less genuinely the neglect of the Arabic language by their Turkish rulers. Thus while sharing with their Christian brethren a romantic enthusiasm for past Arab glory and a practical love of the mother tongue, some Syrian Arab Muslims began to entertain vague aspirations of reviving Islam under an Arab caliph.

"It is worthy of remark", wrote a British consul in 1858 from Aleppo, "that the hatred felt by the Arab population of this part of Syria for the Turkish troops and officials in general, whom they regard as degenerate Mohammedans, is little less violent than their fanaticism against the [European] Christians. The Mussulman population of northern Syria hope for a separation from the Ottoman Empire and the formation of a new Arabian state under the sovereignty of the Sharif of Mecca."

But perhaps the most fantastic of Antonius's distortions is concerning the revolutionary placards circulated anonymously in 1880. To his American and Lebanese Christian prejudices, Antonius now adds a third in favour of his father-in-law, Fāris Nimr, who said nothing about the subject for nearly sixty years despite the fact that he was a co-editor of a monthly and a daily. When he spoke to his son-in-law he was over eighty. Antonius was the first to discover the three surviving copies of the placards in the Public Record Office in London. But he published only summaries thereof with some twists to suit his thesis.

I have published the full Arabic texts and English translations, and after careful

examination of their content, language and certain contemporary evidence came to conclusions different from those advanced by Antonius.⁹ I have questioned, for example, the likelihood that even educated Christians in the second half of the nineteenth century would have troubled themselves with the fate of the Caliphate or the *Shari'ah*, the administration of Islamic religious foundations (*Awqaf*) or the terms of military service in the Turkish army which affected only the Muslims. British and French consuls who promptly reported on the episode record that a strong current of opinion ascribed the placards to Muslims who used some Christians as decoys. Confirmation of this is to be found in the measures taken by the Turkish authorities. While a handful of individual Christians were arrested the severest punishment fell on the Muslim community. Not only was their Benevolent Society (*Jam'iyyat al-Maqāsid al-Khairiyya*) in Beirut prescribed as the presumed source of trouble, but the notables of the community were made to sign guarantees that the mischief would not be allowed to reoccur.¹⁰

As to the assertion that Fāris Nimr was a protagonist of Syrian Arab "independence" in 1880, and indeed one of the writers of the placards, it is interesting to compare it with another assertion made thirty-five years later in 1915 by Sir Mark Sykes. This assertion also quotes Fāris Nimr that he desired British protectorate over "Damascus-Palestine" and that he had not "the slightest hope of an independent Syria holding together for a day."

(III)

Another very able writer who tends to idealise Lebanon and to propagate its claim to pre-eminence in the modern Arab renaissance is Mr. Albert Hourani. He writes

in such admirable English style and his presentation is so persuasive that it is very difficult to resist the appeal of his words. Only by close attention to his details and occasional check of his references that he is revealed as another Lebanese whose patriotism surpasses his historical accuracy.

In an article which dealt mainly with the eighteenth century he wrote vaguely of "the revival of culture" among the Christian Arabs in Syria and Lebanon. In particular he mentioned the rise of educated priests who graduated from seminaries in Lebanon. The efforts of Jibril (Germanos) Farhāt, later Maronite archbishop in Aleppo, to pursue the study of Arabic sciences with a Muslim shaikh is dramatised with great exaggeration. "In that moment", says Mr. Hourani, "modern Arabic literature was born."¹¹ I ventured to question this statement and its author felt the need to qualify it. Thus when the article appeared in a book a single word was inserted to make the phrase even more misleading. It now reads: "in that moment modern Christian Arabic literature was born."¹²

Another assertion, reminiscent of Antonius, relates the rise of Arab nationalism to education. "In the nineteenth century, we are told, "the European idea of nationalism began to spread, partly through schools, books and travel, and partly through the example of successful European nationalism." The second means of communication obviously presupposes the operation of the first which is essentially educational. But we have yet to learn, from this writer and those who write in the same vein, what schools, native or foreign, did or could under Turkish vigilance foster Arab nationalism. We have also yet to learn what exactly were the books, in Arabic or foreign language, that provided sources of inspiration. Until we hear specific re-

plies to these fundamental questions we may dismiss such speculations as lacking factual basis.

Lebanese patriots in our time have endowed their small portion of the Syrian fatherland with almost every virtue, little realising that at least by implication they were underestimating their Muslim brethren in the process. Worse still they glorify oppressive rulers and forget the misery of the ruled. This state of affairs before 1860 is represented as autonomy or even sovereignty. Whatever it was, the beneficiaries were the rulers not the people. Mr. Hourani tells us that "Lebanon was an oasis of order amid the chaos." This is too lyrical to be true. Such order as there was proceeded from the subservience of the native rulers to the Turkish and Egyptian governments, to playing one community against the other, to resorting to the murder of opponents and to sucking the blood of the people. A contemporary eye-witness testifies that Bashīr Shihāb exacted the *mīrī* tax five or six times a year with such severity that "many peasants were obliged to sell their furniture to defray the taxes."¹³ Such was the oasis of order!

I wrote an appreciation of Mr. Hourani's remarkable book on Arabic thought with a gentle hint that its author was too great a scholar not to recognise that the book has serious shortcomings. More acquaintance with the book led me to conclude that it is distinguished more by felicity of expression than profundity of scholarship or factual accuracy. Indeed its flights of fancy and imaginative portraitures seem to me often to have a relation to fact only as has poetry. Thus a writer has only to be Syrian, or better still Lebanese, and Mr. Hourani will confer on him a first class honours degree in Greats and then proceed to read in his scribbles advanced principles

of philosophy, politics and economics. I will give concrete examples.

We are told, categorically, and without any qualification, that the Lebanese trio Naṣīf al-Yāziji, Fāris Shidyāq and Buṭrus al-Bustāni, were "the founders of the literary renaissance of the Arabs." (p. 56) As to Yāziji the verdict is equally sweeping: "almost all the Arabic writers of the century were directly or indirectly his pupils." (p. 95) Need one say that both statements are absurdly false? But it is amusing to recall that Yāziji was employed as a teacher of Arabic for a year at the Syrian Protestant College and the appointment was not renewed because, learned as Yāziji was, he could not, as President Daniel Bliss wrote, inspire his pupils!¹⁴

Francis Marrash is another of Mr. Hourani's idols. We are told that he propounded "the advanced [European] thought of the time" in a little book called *Ghābat al-Haqq* published in 1881. But the book, through the device of dialogue, is more about moral than political ideas. It is written in rugged prose, often obscure, sometimes colloquial and rather grammatically erratic. According to Mr. Hourani the book revolves round the question of how to establish "the kingdom of civilization and freedom." It is difficult to read so much in the book. This phrase itself is not on the page cited. But Mr. Hourani must have missed the significance of a reference on page 37 which he cites to "the kingdom whose laws are derived from the infallible book"—a possible allusion to the Ottoman Empire and the Qur'an.

We are told further that Marrash defined civilization as "a law which guides man towards the perfection of his natural and moral conditions", and that the Arabs needed next to schools "a love of country free from religious considerations." But

there is no reference on the two pages cited to "the Arabs", nor to love of country, nor again to divorcing it from religious considerations. The most liberal interpretation of, and the freest translation from, the original Arabic cannot yield Mr. Hourani's quotations.¹⁵ I had therefore to conclude that either he was quoting from another source or he had some strange illusions. The trouble is that there are other quotations from other Arabic authors in Mr. Hourani's book which are equally puzzling in that they lack connection with their supposed parents.

(IV)

It is now necessary to add a brief note on the true character of the educational and literary awakening that became increasingly evident from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards. We may safely dismiss the fiction that the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt in 1798 and the brief incursion into southern Syria was the herald of the renaissance, marking the close of medieval times in the Near East.

There is really no perceptible point at which we can say that the old world changed into a new world. The stream of history flows relentlessly and all barriers across it can only be artificial. For some decades before 1798 the movement variously described as reform, modernisation or renaissance was under faltering away. And long after 1798 "medieval" ideas held undisputed sway and their supremacy was not fundamentally in question. The reform, modernisation or renaissance was historically initiated by native and internal forces. Only its more obvious and later development was in response to or as a result of foreign and external influence.

Enough illustrations have been given

above of partisan or uncritical presentation that have hitherto obscured the whole movement. By some it is ascribed exclusively to Protestant or more particularly American missionary effort; by others to Catholic missions; by most to Christians to the exclusion of Muslims; but by none to a combination of native development and foreign aid. Very few indeed recognise that the influence of foreign missions was confined to the Christian minorities to the exclusion of the Muslim majority.

At any rate Syria was not a country rescued from the fetters of ignorance by foreign missions. As already mentioned native Christian schools existed before the arrival of the foreigners who for decades did little more than build on native foundations with native personnel. Traditional Muslim schools were beyond the reach of foreign Christian Missions. They were in due course modernised or superseded by modern schools established by the Islamic government of the land.

Nor was the influence of foreign schools on the Syrian and Lebanese Christians such as to always alienate them or revolutionise their outlook, even those who became Protestant or Catholic. A few examples must suffice. Buṭrus al-Bustāni was converted by the Americans but he became disenchanted with their sectarian approach to education and left them to establish an inter-denominational school (*wataniyya*) based on religious freedom. His literary work was devoted to the service of education and the Arabic language within the framework of the Ottoman system which he loyally supported.

Fāris Shidyāq too became a Protestant convert from the Maronite Church, but he outwitted both the American and English missionaries. After working for them as a translator and editor he embraced Islam

and finally settled in Istanbul where in 1860 he established the newspaper *al-Jawā'ib* and published linguistic works and edited some classical texts. He may have been an opportunist, but his loyalty to the Ottoman system was beyond question.

Ya'qūb Ṣarrūf, well-known as editor with Fāris Nīmīr of the influential monthly *al-Muqata'af*, was educated at the Syrian Protestant College, but he never became a Protestant. Like Bustānī and several other educated Lebanese he saw Syrian and Lebanese advancement in cooperation with the Ottoman Turks in the application of the official reforms.¹⁶

This was also the general spirit among educated Muslims down to the turn of the century. They shared with their Christian brethren the aim of seeking reform not fomenting revolution. Both Christians and Muslims were anxious by all means at their disposal to promote the Arabic language.

Religious tolerance and common love of the common mother tongue were leading the two communities to a closer association which is now termed as national consciousness. I am of the opinion that this national consciousness received definite expression only in the first two decades of this century. Earlier expressions were fitful with no sustained effort behind them.

I would like to end on a personal note. The late George Antonius had a hand, while acting director of education in Jerusalem, in my selection for a university scholarship, and I always remember him with gratitude. With Mr. Albert Hourani there is mutual respect but we agree to differ. If I criticise a benefactor who is dead and an old friend who is happily active in university teaching, my excuse is a classical one—I love truth more than both.

A. L. Tibawi

NOTES

(1) A. F. L. Beeston, *The Arabic Language Today* (London 1970), p. 15.

(2) For an examination of these claims see A. L. Tibawi, *Modern History of Syria* (London, 1969), pp. 140-147.

(3) National Historical Archives, 'Ābidīn Palace, Cairo. Maḥfazah 257 letter with enclosures no. 204 dated 24 Jumāda II, 1255 from Sharīf Pasha. For titles of the books see my *American Interests in Syria 1800-1901* (Oxford, 1966), p. 70.

(4) George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* (London, 1938), p. 13 cf. p. 51.

(5) St. Antony's Papers (*Middle Eastern Affairs*), no. 3 (1963), p. 161.

(6) A. J. Rustum, *A Calendar of the State Papers of the Royal Archives of Egypt Relating to the Affairs of Syria* (Beirut, 1940) IV, p. 231.

(7) *Sirr Mamlakah* (Cairo, 1895), p. 73.

(8) Public Record Office (London), F. O.

78/1389 despatch No. 20 'confidential' dated 31 July 1858.

(9) *Revue de l'académie arabe de Damas*, vol. XL/4 (1967), pp. 775-793; *Religion in the Middle East* (ed. A. J. Arberry, vol. II, pp. 564-569; *Modern History of Syria*, pp. 163-167.

(10) See for example the French report in *Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères: Turquie (Beyrouth)*, XXIII, No. 48.

(11) *Studia Islamica*, vol. VIII (1952), p. 113.

(12) *A Vision of History* (Beirut, 1961), p. 61.

(13) J. L. Purckhardt, *Travels in Syria and the Holy Land* (London, 1822), p. 188; cf. 169, 184.


(14) Annual Report (1867) seen through courtesy of President Norman Burns.

(15) cf. *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age* (Oxford, 1962), pp. 247-8 and *Ghabat al-Haqq*, pp. 11, 15, 37, 73.

(16) *Al-Muqata'af*, vol. IX (1884-85), p. 449.

Contemporary Arab Ideologies

George N. Atiyeh



Any student of the Middle East cannot but take notice of the momentous changes taking place there. The social structure is being drastically reconstructed, old values and traditions are being uprooted, new directions are being searched for, and new bases for international relations are being established. The changes while not yet deep enough, are definitely conditioned by the many ideologies that have appeared in that region of the World.

By stretching the meaning of ideology a little one may safely state that the tone of modern politics in the Middle East in general and the Arab World in particular has been set by ideological aspirations and struggles. In the Arab World when the struggle for political independence was still going on ideologies played a basic role in that they sought to reinterpret history and create pride in the past, and consequently confidence in the future. At the present moment ideologies seem to have added a

new dimension to the meaning of independence. It is no longer that they seek political independence, which they have got, but also independence from what is commonly referred to as neo-colonialism, which manifests itself in a variety of ways and uses a variety of means to achieve its goals. Furthermore recent ideologies are seeking to reconstruct society, redefine the relations among social groups, establish new divisions of labor and introduce social justice.

Whatever else its function happens to be, an ideology plays the role of a reform agenda to solve the ills of society. A comprehensive ideology usually brings to its aid a philosophy of history for the purpose of explaining its envisioned reforms and to legitimize its actions and values. This is not always the case in the Arab World. Most Arab ideologies have been platforms for reform, and those that have not been so suffer from a "feasibility gap", for when aims are set too high, the strategy for action is paralyzed. For any ideology to succeed in achieving its goals a set of conditions must be met, such as appropriate circumstances, involvement of the masses, and the potentiality for realizing objectives. This does not mean that an ideology, when the situation requires it, should not seek radical or drastic changes; it only means an ideology becomes a fantasy if it does not have a chance to change what is potential into actuality.

In the Arab World, there are three broad categories of ideologies. Depending on the type of solution offered for the ills of society, these may be categorized as religious, political or technical, — the last being the least developed. Only a small minority of visionary scientists and social scientists envision a highly technical society. The little progress in technology that has been achieved so far testifies to this undisputed

reality. Of course, technology might be looked upon as a monster leading to the obliterating of the values of a society and the elimination of characteristics peculiar to that society, but the question remains whether it is still possible to do without technology. Certainly this is a question that we cannot answer here.

The major currents of thought or political action until recently were concerned with two basic problems—the question of identity and the place of religion in society. In the Arab World these two problems are inseparable. A third problem, relating to the quality of life, appeared on the ideological scene with significant strength only after the doctrinaire parties had gained strength and the socialist literature had been disseminated everywhere.

All ideological currents fall under one or other of three classes: religious fundamentalism, nationalism and Marxism.

Under the first class, one finds various religiously oriented groups best represented by the Muslim Brethren (al-Ikhwān al-Muṣlīmūn). Under the second class the nationalist ideologies show a variety of tendencies, the principal ones being Pan-Arabism, regionalism and localism. Under the third class one may place the Communists and the different Marxists including the small new-left groups that have acquired prominence since the June War of 1967.

Any classification of ideologies is bound to simplify their complex nature and relationships. All Arab ideologies display a variation in emphasis, in degrees of intensity and in the wide spectrum of attitudes from extreme conservatism to extreme liberalism. The Religionists are naturally on the right, and the Marxists on the left, while the Nationalists fill in the whole range of

attitudes in between. The Religionists stress the Islamic identity and the belief in the sufficiency of the Qoran and the Sunnah to resolve all the problems facing the Arab World and humanity in general. They meet the extreme left of the Marxists in opposition to nationalism, but the moderates among them accommodate themselves to Arab nationalism. On the other hand, the Religionists together with the Arab Nationalists oppose the West politically and at times its Christian heritage, but they both find a common ground with Christianity in their stand against atheistic Communism.

The Arab Nationalists, who in actuality hold in their hands the destiny of most of the Arab World, are still searching most intensively for self-identification and direction. It is true that most of them have arrived at the realization that mere conviction is not enough. Having power in their hands, they have to choose between unity and dispersion, right and left, conservatism and liberalism, capitalism and socialism, democracy and authoritarianism, East and West. As of now the balance seems to be on the side of socialism, militarism and the East. Socialism, it would seem, strikes directly at the psychological needs of the Arabs for self-assertion and reform. Both Arab Nationalism and Islamism have created their own versions of socialism. It is my impression, however, that the Arabs are not sure, and at best undecided, as to whether the road of socialism is leading them to salvation. Russia and the East may be their models now, but the benefits accruing from the adoption of Western models of economy and technology, abhorrence of atheism, and pride stop them from completely embracing Communism or Socialism as they are understood in the West. In fact, this may be the reason for the inability to effectuate the radical changes in society which most ideologies call for.

Furthermore, for the majority of the Muslim Arabs it is still extremely important to maintain a semblance of Islamic legitimation for their actions, but given the erosion of Islam and religion in general as a way of life, the Arabs seemingly resort to untenable accommodations between the contradicting realities of traditionalism and modernism, eclecticism and absolute radicalism. Perhaps this is the reason why the most important characteristic of Arab ideologies has been their indecisiveness. We need not emphasize the fact that too many politicians use ideologies for their personal advancement as a causal factor. We can see that the indecisiveness of ideologies is best reflected in the wide gap between aspirations and realities and between the governing elites and the people. Ideologies with their Utopian aims might be logically consistent, internally coherent, nobly inspired, and universally appealing, and yet they have not sunk deep roots in the Arab World, and until they do, indecisiveness shall remain their outstanding characteristic.

What then are these ideologies and what can we say about their nature and present status? Since it is impossible in a short essay to examine them all, we shall take only the most representative groups of the three classes mentioned above.

1. *The Religionist Ideologies*

By religionist ideology we mean a fundamentalist loyalty, usually given to religious doctrine, which is placed above whatever attachment an individual might have to secular, political or economic institutions.

At present after the set-back suffered by the Muslim Brotherhood, adherents of fundamentalist ideology have not been able to reorganize and form a political association, but they still exist in the form of small local organizations which hold similar ideals

and exert pressure either through publications, direct political involvement or physical and violent interference against the activities of those who do not share their views. However, the fundamentalist thinking is best represented by *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn* (the Muslim Brethren Association), now defunct as a party system, whose ideals, objectives and to a certain extent methodology are very much alive.

The essential ideology of the *Ikhwān* starts from the conception of Islām as a *Nizām* (order), i.e., a religion and a state. What is most characteristic of the ideology is the attempt to interpret a pristine Islam in accordance with present-day political life. In this order Islam comprises and regulates all human affairs and does not shrink from new problems and necessary reforms. Its total concept goes beyond the confines of a specific time, locality, society or class.

The *Ikhwān's* main objective was to create an authentically Muslim state. This objective is supposed to be achieved through stages, bringing first all Arabs and then all other Muslim peoples into one state. The state would have at its head a caliph, although not all agree that this is still possible. Until the one all-inclusive Islamic state is achieved, a plurality of states is permissible. The leader of the state is to be elected by the community and be responsible to it. The community is to act through qualified representatives elected by it (*ahl al-shūrā*) and the representatives would elect the leader, have control over his acts, and legislate in cooperation with him. Every person in authority is required to act in consultation with his subordinates, and it is the duty of every citizen to offer his advice to those in authority. The function of the state is to see to it that the laws of Islam are properly observed, to send out and support missionaries to present Islam to other

nations and peoples, and to fight constantly, with arms, if need be, for justice and the common good of humanity.

God as creator and maintainer of the Universe has given man a Sacred Law whose sources are the Qoran and the Sunnah. These should be the only arbiters of truth and justice. It is therefore incumbent upon all Muslims to obey this Law and not the positive laws made by man. This can be achieved by having as a model prophet and the ancestors (*salaf*). All philosophizing and jurisprudence become superfluous when the prophet and his companions are the models. The Qoran is alone sufficient for the establishment and carrying out of just government. What the Muslims need nowadays, according to the late 'Abd al-Qadir 'Udah, one of the best theoreticians of the Muslim Brethren, is the government envisioned by the *Ikhwān*. It is not theocratic because the ruler receives his power from the community and not from God. Neither is it democratic because it is based on religion, nor is it dictatorial because the community as the investor of power in the ruler has the right to take it away from him whenever and if he abuses it

The economic system visualized by the *Ikhwān* is based on the Islamic doctrine of God's ownership. God, having created Heaven and Earth, is naturally the owner of everything. A person may acquire a property legally and exploit it financially or otherwise, in accordance with the Sacred Law, but his legal hold on it is not absolute. The community, being the sole representative of God on earth, when the public interest so requires, may confiscate the property and use it in the interest of the general welfare. The taxes in the society shall be the *zakāt* (usually translated as almsgiving) as provided for by the Sacred Law, and all profit making from money (*riba*)

shall be prohibited. Two of the intellectual leaders of the *Ikhwān*, the Syrian Mustafa al-Sibā'i and the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb, systematized the *Ikhwān's* economic doctrine into what was termed Islamic Socialism. Both attempted to combine the advantages of capitalism and Communism while keeping the aims of the Islamic system intact. It is the spiritual welfare derived from the establishment of Islamic Socialism that both sought and not only mere economic advantages. The social and economic program of the *Ikhwān*, flexible in many ways, stood in sharp contrast to their inflexible religious objectives.

The Muslim Brethren attitude of exalting the excellences of Islam and their opposition to the colonial status of most of the Muslim states led them to seek the freedom of all Muslim countries from Western domination and Western ways of life. The *Ikhwān* planned to re-Islamize Egyptian life in all fields including dress, greetings, use of foreign languages, hours of work and rest, the calendar, and recreation, not to mention the abolition of the legal codes based on European codes. In this Islamized society, they maintained that minorities will have equal rights—presumably political—except in religious affairs, so long as they conducted themselves peaceably and loyally towards the Muslims among whom they lived.

The violent history of the Muslim Brethren and the appeal of the Nasserite reforms dealt a mortal blow to this ideology in organizational terms, but the ideals are still very much alive. All Arab countries have their Muslim Brethren in one form or another.

2. *The Nationalist Ideologies*

At present time nationalism is the strongest driving force in the political life of the

Arab World. Chronologically speaking nationalism as an ideology is a new phenomenon in the Middle East as a whole. Patriotism may have existed in different forms, but nationalism is very recent as a philosophical conception of a political system whereby the nation is defined and the ties of its members to each other and to itself are determined. One may look at the history of the nationalism movement in the Arab World as a constant attempt to seek such a philosophical definition. Even in its early stages when getting rid of the colonialist powers was the main objective of Arab nationalism, the search for a definition was going on. This took the form of a search for an identity, an answer to the existential question, "Who Am I?"

To this basic question many answers were given reflecting the unsettled social and political situation of the Arabs. Three main currents within the nationalist movement may be discerned: Pan-Arabism, regionalism and localism. This classification may be criticized on the basis that Arab Nationalism is now concerned less with unity and identity and more with social development. However, there is—except in the case of the Marxist—a direct relation between the attitude of an ideology towards the problems of unity and identity and the type of social reform practiced or envisioned by the ideologies. This does not mean that certain non Pan-Arabist ideologies—for example the Kurdish nationalist movement and others—may not or are not socialistically oriented. It only means that the majority of the regionalist and localist ideologies at the present moment are less concerned with social development and usually tend to be leaning towards the right.

a. *Pan-Arabism*

The ideal of Pan-Arabism is to be found

expressed in many documents and in a variety of ways which testifies to its vitality as a feeling and as a concern. But perhaps the best representatives of this ideology are the Arab Ba'th (Resurrection) Socialist Party, Nasserism and the National Liberation Movement in Algeria. All three have common features with small variations, and all have the same ultimate goal of Arab unity and incorporate socialism as a basic ingredient of their ideology. However, unlike Ba'th and Nasserism, the Algerian brand of socialism is tailored to the peculiar situation of that nation, and does not seek as a political movement to extend beyond that country's borders.

When the Ba'th Party was first founded in the early 1940s, it was responding to a desire, already strong, to formulate into a political system the aspirations of the Arabs in general and the Syrians, in particular, for a united Arab state and for social justice. The originality of the Ba'th was not in discovering these aspirations but in giving them a theoretical foundation. The Ba'th's ideology is best set forth in the constitution of the party. It envisions a united Arab society encompassing all Arabs from Morocco to Iraq in which social justice will prevail through distribution of wealth and nationalization of industries, limitation of land and industrial ownership. The two aspects of Arab nationalism and socialism are inseparable in the ideology of the Ba'th. The Ba'th's nationalism gives a dominant place to the state in spite of the fact that freedom together with unity and socialism are the elements in the party's motto. The Ba'th ideology assumes an interesting attitude towards the relation between Arab nationalism and Islam in that it considers Islam as one aspect, albeit the major one, of Arab culture. Without Islam there would have been no Arab nation, but unlike the ideology of religionist groups it

calls for secularization of the state and society.

The Ba'th is opposed to Communism as an ideology. According to Michel Aflaq, one of the founders, Communism is unsuited to the Arab World because it does not give weight to the individual, nor does it recognize the right to private property. Communism is also based on the class struggle, which Aflaq rejects. However, rejection of Communism did not mean refusal to cooperate with Communism. Recently discussions have been going on in the Syrian hierarchy of the Ba'th to create a national block of all the progressive forces, including the Communists, under the umbrella of the Syrian Ba'th.

Nasserism does not really differ much from Ba'thism as an ideology. Like al-Ba'th, it believes in Arab unity and socialism and it follows a secular approach. However, there are basic and essential differences on emphasis. Nasser's Arabism focuses on the concept of Egypt as lying at the heart of three circles: the Arab World, Africa and the Islamic World. Secularism is of a much milder nature in Nasserism than it is in Ba'thism. There are also differences arising from the historical genesis of each movement. Nasserism started as a military revolution to end corruption in Egypt and set in motion an agrarian reform, whereas al-Ba'th took the reverse course. It was born as an intellectual scheme, educational in approach, and moved from there into material politics. There is also a difference in procedures, the Ba'th believing in a kind of party democracy in the form of "collective leadership" while Nasserism has been authoritarian in that all final decisions are made by one man. All these differences surfaced after the merger of Egypt and Syria into the United Arab Republic and were in part responsible for the split that

came only three years after the union was effected.

The *Charter of National Action* (al-Mithāq), proposed by President Nasser to the members of the National Congress of Popular Forces on May 21, 1962 after the withdrawal of Syria from the United Arab Republic, represents in all its aspects the doctrines of Nasserism and marks a turning point in its history. Of its ten sections, only two dealt with Arab unity and foreign policy. The eight others were entirely devoted to domestic affairs, thus confirming the priority of the economic and social aspects over the political.

The *Charter* pays tribute in its first article to the Egyptian people and asserts the legitimate rights of the masses, their will for revolutionary change, and their unshakeable faith in God. It also states the necessity for a revolution to bring about freedom in socialism and unity. A criticism, then, of the "democracy of reaction" is made, which Nasser described as "formal constitutional trappings lacking popular support and progressivism, the two basic qualities of true democracy". Political democracy is inseparable from social democracy in that it is impossible to achieve political democracy where one class dominates all the others. The *Charter* goes further to explain that the class struggle, while it cannot be denied, should be ended peacefully within the framework of national unity by opening the way for democratic interactions between the various elements of the working population—the peasants, the workers, the soldiers, the intellectuals—and national capitalism. This type of harmonious relations between the members of society where each "level", not class, has its natural position and function, is called in a recent article "integrative society" where the class struggle is defused within

the framework of national integration.

The *Charter* offers socialism as the solution to the problem of progress; however it is a special kind of socialism, officially called "cooperativist — democratic socialism" and popularly known as "Arab socialism", thus underlining the Arab sensitivity to the question of independence, and implying that it is an end in itself and not a first step towards Communism. There are other qualifications of Arab socialism, namely, the belief in God and the rejection of the economic interpretation of history.

In its 9th article, the *Charter* discusses Arab unity but in terms of the Syrian experience. The "unity of aims", rather than complete unity, is thought to be the first objective of Arab nationalism; and partial unity, which has been lately embodied in the Federation of Arab Republics, is considered an advance toward unity. But complete unity should not come until the ideology of Arab nationalism has eliminated all other ideologies.

b. *Regionalism and Localism*

What are these other ideologies? The reference of the *Charter*, most likely, is to the Ba'ath and Communist ideologies, which compete with Nasserism on a Pan-Arab level. However, Nasser might have had in mind the numerous small parties found in each Arab country reflecting a wide gamut of interests and aspirations. These ideologies usually look at Arab unity and socialism from the point of view of their local circumstances. Their effect is usually very limited and their organization loose.

By regionalism is meant the concept of the Arab World as being made up of four large units: al-Maghrib or Northwest Africa, the Nile Valley, the Fertile Crescent, and the Arabian Peninsula. The re-

gionalists believe that each one of these units is a natural unit and that political unity should be limited to these units, each of which constitute a nation by itself. The localists on the other hand believe that the present *status quo* is natural; therefore there is no such thing as one Arab nation. Each Arab country is a nation by itself and owes its first loyalty to itself.

The only organized party in the Arab World which has adopted a regionalist approach and has branches outside its home-base—Lebanon—is the Syrian Social Nationalist Party. The other groups which believe in the regionalist approach are not organized in a movement permanently working towards that goal. They reflect an aspiration or a realization that it is more logical to work towards Arab unity through a unification of the basic geographical and cultural units. This aspiration is documented in the constitutions of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, but the clearest expression of it is in the Tunisian constitution. So far this ideology has had no theoretician. Allâl al-Fâsi of Morocco, leader of al-Istiqlal Party, perhaps is the closest to being its spokesman.

The SSNP considers the Fertile Crescent, or Greater Syria, to be such a national unit and has constantly worked towards its unity although for tactical reasons it has magnified the Party's Arabism in Syria and its acceptance of a Lebanese entity in Lebanon.

The basic ideology of the SSNP is that Syria is for the Syrians, who constitute a complete nation within the region known as the Syrian Fertile Crescent, or Greater Syria (the terms are not interchangeable). It includes present day Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine (Israel and the West Bank) Iraq, Kuwait, the Sinai Peninsula and the Island of Cyprus, the District of Alexandretta

(now Hatay in Turkey). The unity of the Syrian nation is manifest in the vital interaction between its parts and the interdependence of these parts with each other from economic and social as well as strategic considerations.

Furthermore, the Party has drafted a reform program based on the separation of religion and state. According to this program a politico-religious bond constitutes a serious threat to the existence of nations and their interests. Such a bond furthermore denigrates the value of the individual as an integral member of the state. The state, the political expression of the nation, is all embracing. A citizen cannot realize his complete potential outside the nation. He is an integral part of it and derives his freedom from placing himself at its service. The motto of the party reflecting this ideology became: freedom, duty, discipline and force.

The economic reform principles of the Party are based on the abolishing of feudalism and the organization of the economy on the basis of the principle of production, the protection of the right to work, and the interests of the nation and the state.

As to relations with the rest of the Arab World, the Party platform calls for the creation of an Arab Front led by Greater Syria. This is called "real Arabism" because it is based on what appeared to be real and feasible. Arab Nationalism is "false Arabism" since it is based on an illusion. They added, however, that if the real interests of Syria were to be found in unity, they would not oppose it.

The history of the party is dotted with many ups and downs in the form of persecutions, attempts at gaining power by force, internal divisions and a negative popularity. Nonetheless, as the only coherent

secularist school of thought, its reasons for opposition to a comprehensive Arab unity had to be taken into consideration. As an ideological force against Communism, the party was the only movement in Lebanon and Syria able to face up to the challenge and to build its membership on non-sectarian bases even though it appealed more to the minorities both Christian and Muslim; its economic program seemed at the time of its inception both feasible and desirable.

Whatever the ideological strength of the Party, its failure to come to power, its lack of popular support and its image as a rightist force, together with the popularity of revolutionary thought and of socialism, caused the leadership of the Party to undergo self-examination. A congress was held in 1969 in which the Party reorganized on a more democratic basis and adopted a leftist label, which one of the leading newspapers in Lebanon described as "unfitting" for the role of the Party. The Communist answer to this *apertura alla sinistra* of the Party was a biting sarcasm. *Al-Tariq*, the Communist monthly stated that the rightist nature and history of the SSNP are so much a part of it that no amount of leftist veneer would make it otherwise.

The localist ideologies are rather limited to a few countries, most eminent of which is Lebanon, Egypt and Tunisia. The common denominator between the SSNP and the localists is the rejection of the existence of one Arab nation and of extending the historical roots of nationhood to the pre-Islamic period. Egyptian nationalism bases "Egyptianness" on the ancient as well as the Islamic heritage of Egypt and on the continuity and uniqueness of Egyptian life and history. Lebanese nationalism, best represented by the Phalangist Party (*al-Katā'ib*), stresses the formative role of the

Phoenicians and their civilizational role as inventors of the alphabet and carriers of Middle Eastern Civilization to many parts of the world, especially Europe.

A similar trend is found in Tunisia within the ruling Neo-Destour Party. The Party's official position is to work towards a Maghrib unity, but it has no clear position as to what its relation to Arab unity should be. Its secularizing approach also lends itself to the placing of Tunisia under a light different from that of Arab Nationalism, which is inseparable from Islamism. In an article entitled "Arabization and Tunisification" published in his periodical *al-Fikr*, Muhammad Mzali, once Minister of Culture, states. "We understand the Arab nation to be a congregation (*confluent*) of nations and a cooperation conducive to unity. But since the time of the Prophet (Muhammad)—peace be on him—until today in spite of the unity of belief, the unity of language, there are only countries and regions each having its own specific character. It is important to note that unity is made by diversity and not by the victory of a school over another, neither by exploitation or domination."

There are other trends inspired by the local interests of ethnic minorities, such as the Kurdish Democratic Party in Iraq, and the Popular Movement in Morocco representing primarily the Berber rural elements, but space does not allow us to discuss them. On the whole, regionalism and localism manifest themselves in different ways. They have in common their disavowal of the existence of one Arab nation and therefore each trend seeks self-determination on the merits of its particular situation. Because of Arab Nationalism's anti-Western attitude, the localists seem to favor cooperation with the West primarily to defend their own interests. The Arab nationalists refer

disparagingly to these trends as *Shu'ūbiyah* (other people).

3. *Marxism and the New Left*

Socialist ideas have existed on a minimal scale in the Middle East during the 19th and early 20th centuries. They were rejected mainly because they were linked with irreligious ideologies. Between the two World Wars, a few Communist groups were in existence, but Communist literature became more readily available and Communist thinking more familiar. Only in Iraq did intellectuals, influenced by British Fabianism, play a certain role in alliance with some Communists. They became engaged in a military conspiracy in 1936 which took the government for a short period.

After the triumph of the Allies in World War II, Soviet books and films invaded the whole of the Middle East and the small Communist Parties began to enjoy certain popularity in Turkey, Iran, Egypt, Lebanon and Syria until the objectives of the international policy of the USSR clashed with the national interests of the area. In the Arab countries, the decision of the USSR in 1947 in favor of the partition of Palestine destroyed the standing of the Communist Party. On the other hand, the creation of the State of Israel and the support it received from the West increased the anti-Western feeling already existing in Arab Nationalism. This was conducive to their looking for new political and social systems. Socialism became so popular that, as we have seen, even the religionists laid claim to it and so did the Nationalists establishing their brand of socialism in the forms described above.

The Communist ideology in the Middle East varied from one country to another. The only constant has been to follow the

Moscow instructions until the rift with Peking occurred and left the Communists everywhere divided into hardliner Stalinists and moderates supporting coexistence with capitalism. The Lebanese Communist Party is a typical example of this. In its early days the Party stressed the original communization of the land and urged the distribution of property and income among the workers in accordance with the amount of work they did. Beginning in the mid-1930s the Lebanese Communists began to shift their emphasis from domestic to international politics. In the process, they were willing to compromise on their socialistic program in exchange for support for the Soviet Union and its Allies. Thus in the Party's 1943-44 Congress, the Communists merely stressed Syrian and Lebanese independence, constitutional and democratic rights, and social reform. In order to achieve this, Western, particularly American imperialism, they declared should be combatted and defeated. Once this is accomplished, the Lebanese would freely give up any cooperation with the West and turn to the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc instead. Yet, despite outward appearances to the contrary, the Lebanese Communists never really fought against "imperialism". Their concern all along has been to defend the Communist interests as they are viewed at the particular time. Their attitude to Arab unity testifies to this fact. Thus, according to them there was no Arab "nation" as such until it suddenly came into being in 1955-56 after the arms deal with Nasser. The Communist's most eminent leader in the Arab World, Khaled Bakdash, concluded in 1939 that there was no Arab nation, since there is no common economic life between the countries of the Arab World. He further proceeded to discredit common language and unity of aims as sufficient elements in the formation of

a nation, and stated his final conclusion that each country in the Arab World had its own national characteristics. This same Bakdash stated later, "The ambition of the Arab countries for unity is not the product of transitory circumstances or the consequences of propaganda spread by a party or a group of people. Rather, it is a reflection of a realistic need and the consequence of historical evolution independent of any sentiments and wills." When negotiations between Syria and Egypt were being conducted in 1958, the Lebanese Communist Party began to champion a federation instead of an outright union.

Communist attitudes today remain the same although the Communists began lately to downplay the question of the nationality of Lebanon and allied themselves with other leftist forces: The Arab Nationalists Movement, the Progressive Socialist Party led by the Lebanese deputy Kamal Jumblit and the Lebanese branch of the Ba'ath Party.

From January 7 to 10, 1972, the Party held a public congress to which representatives from other Communist Parties were invited as were representatives of the "progressive parties" in Lebanon and the Palestine Liberation Organization. This was possible because the new Lebanese government of President Franjeh sanctified a decision taken at the end of President's Helu term to lift the ban on all prohibited parties including the Communists and the SSNP. The Third Congress, the first of its kind in the Arab World as a Communist public congress signals a turning away from secrecy and the call for revolution to a more moderate policy and cooperation with the existing systems. It remains to be seen whether this is not another one of the Party's tactics to serve the interests of the Soviets now trying to woo Lebanon.

The Party's communiqué at the end of

the Third Congress stated that the Communists are working for the triumph of socialism in Lebanon and the removal of the "capitalist band" from their seat of power. Democracy in Lebanon according to them is a democracy of the bourgeoisie. The Party also criticized all the "progressive" Arab regimes but made a scathing attack on the Sudanese government for the persecution of the Communist Party in October 1971. They also criticized the spread of anti-communist feelings now growing in the ranks of the *Fedayeen*. Regarding Arab unity, the Party's communiqué came out in its support, and described it as "the product of the real existence of evolution in the Arab World and of the historical ties between its parts." Arab unity is "an expression of all the popular groups desiring social and economic progress and inclining more and more towards socialism" "These groups have become the basic element determining the evolution of the Arab World towards socialism and unity. The rise of progressive Arab states and the consolidation and deepening of the anti-capitalist trends therein set the most appropriate basis for the establishment of an Arab unity on socialistic basis" "The Socialist system [meaning the Communist] is the only system capable of doing away with all the divisive forces among the people such as capitalist and class exploitation, confessionalism, tribalism and discrimination against nationalist minorities. It is the only system which can make the people one family with equal duties and responsibilities, a family which will close ranks with other brotherly Arab peoples in the battle against imperialism, Zionism and reaction, and with the struggling peoples of the World in the Battles for liberation, progress, socialism and peace."

The Communists are strong in Syria, where they have had representation in the

government on different occasions. In Iraq, they enjoyed their peak during the Kassim regime. In Egypt they are strong among the intellectuals but the only place they have enjoyed labor union support is in the Sudan where in spite of their recent persecution they might be still strong. The labor unions in the Arab World included many Communists in their ranks but on the whole they were not dominated by them nor did they obey their wishes. Of course the Communists tried to make use of the labor grievances to further their own political aims.

Except in Lebanon, the Communist parties of the Middle East operate clandestinely or semi-clandestinely. They are tolerated in some countries of the Arab World in order not to displease the Soviet Union, but in the religious minded states such as Libya and Saudi Arabia, Communism is anathema at the present time. In order to keep their preferential position, the Soviets have accepted that the Arab governments do not accord the Communist Parties a legal status. But in the event the Soviets stay for an extended period, it would seem, they will not remain satisfied with this arrangement.

Professor Hisham Sharabi of Georgetown University in his book *Nationalism and Revolution in the Arab World* nominates the revolutionary and socialistic aspects of Nasserism, Ba'thism and the Algerian Front of National Liberation as newleftist. This is true to the extent that they do not consider Communism to be the solution to their problems. The three movements have also in common with the new-leftists the use of Marxist terminology and an ideological solidarity with the Liberation movements. They differ, on the other hand, on many things not the least of which is nationalism. The new-left orients itself on

the guidelines of scientific socialism only and is opposed totally to all bourgeoisie thinking, petite bourgeoisie and all alliances. The small groups of new-leftists that are found now in Lebanon, Morocco and among the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (and its offshoot the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine) criticize both the Ba'th and Nasserism as being organized forms of the nationalistic petite bourgeoisie and are solely a continuation of the ideology of Islamic modernism and secular nationalism. All that the Ba'th and Nasserism did was to spread the privileges of the economically founded classes onto the petite bourgeoisie, which had taken over a state apparatus that became the sole support of its political rule.

Whatever their criticism may be, the only political organizations with new-leftist orientations are the two Palestinian resistance movements. Besides the spectacular activities of the PFLP and PDFLP in hijacking airplanes, all other activities of the new-leftists were limited to the publication of a great number of books and articles showing the dismay of the new-leftist Arab intellectuals at the failure of the Arab nationalist movement to meet the challenges of Israel and to raise the Arab masses from the social and economic misery in which they find themselves. The new-leftists are very critical of the Arab Communist parties accusing them of deviating from Marxism and serving the interests of Moscow.

Conclusion

The numerous ideologies existent in the Middle East in general and the Arab World in particular are still mostly visionary theories, none of which have been put in practice except for some of the socialistic and economic aspects of Nasserism and Ba'thism. But the limited success of these two movements has not been followed by

the putting into practice of the rest of their lofty ideals. Arab Nationalist aims, together with the Religionists aims, are still the greatest driving political forces, but so far they have remained mostly in the realm of aspirations. They have been expressed in different forms and have assumed a variety of positions, but in terms of achievements and of solving the ills of the Arab World they have fallen far too short from their aims. In spite of the formation of the Federation of Arab Republics, the future of Arab unity and socialism is still and will remain for sometime in the balance. The unity of the Fertile Crescent as envisioned by the SSNP looks to be impossible and so are the aims of Communism.

We have not discussed democracy and liberalism in the Western sense because they have almost disappeared from the ideological arena of the Middle East.

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NOTES

(1) The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not reflect in any way the opinions of the Library of Congress.



R. H. Dekmejian

Much has changed in Egypt and the Middle East since the sudden death of Gamal Abd al-Nasir; a great deal has remained the same. The present article proposes to analyze Egyptian, Arab and Middle Eastern politics since September 1970 and tentatively identify the abiding and transitory aspects of Nasir's influence.

Clearly, the most suitable place to begin is Egypt, the epicenter of Nasirism. Despite the great shock of President Nasir's death, the transfer of power was swift and orderly. The elite did not lose its cohesiveness, at least not initially. In accordance with Egypt's provisional constitution, Vice-President Anwar al-Sadat became acting president until elections could be held. His long association with Nasir, no less than his position as vice-president were instrumental in according Sadat the initial legitimacy that new rulers usually lack. The legitimacy transfer was finalized by Sadat's

election with 85% of the votes cast by over six million Egyptians on October 15, 1970. Although this fell short of Nasir's usual tally of 99.5%, it still constituted a strong endorsement for his successor.

The twin themes of the new president were to maintain revolutionary continuity and to pursue the struggle against Israel. Initially, Sadat did little that would signal a departure from Nasirite precedents. His first cabinet (October 1970) consisted mostly of carryovers from Nasir's last government. One major exception was Muhammad Hassanayn Haykal, who resigned as Minister of National Guidance and returned to the full-time editorship of *Al-Abram*. An unexpected development was the appointment of ex-Foreign Minister, Dr. Mahmud Fawzi, as Premier and Presidential Advisor. This, coupled with Abd al-Muhsin Abu al-Nur's appointment as ASU Secretary General, indicated Sadat's reluctance to follow Nasir's practice of keeping supreme control of both party (Secretary General) and government (Premier). Sadat's action represented a substantial redistribution of power; it also meant a major delegation of responsibility to a collective leadership which included not only Sadat and Fawzi but the remaining five members of the ASU Supreme Executive, two of which—Ali Sabri and Husayn al-Shari'i—were also Vice-Presidents. All of this seemed natural since Sadat could not become a Nasir overnight; he had to share power with personalities with whom he had served under Nasir. In such a context, Sadat was no more than *primus inter pares*—first among equals. Even after his election as ASU President by the National Congress on November 12, 1970, Sadat's position in the party remained tenuous as later developments would indicate.

Internal Policy

The choice of Dr. Fawzi, Egypt's first civilian premier since September 1952, indicated special governmental concern with domestic problems. Fawzi viewed the internal front as reinforcing the fighting front; clearly it was the duty of the new government to assure domestic stability before the inevitable diplomatic and/or military showdown with Israel. The cabinet decreed a reduction in prices of basic consumer items including tea, sugar, paraffin, radios, refrigerators, pullovers and blankets. On November 18, 1970, a new reconstructed cabinet was formed under Dr. Fawzi for the stated purpose of increasing internal effectiveness and cooperation at a time of external peril. The Premier emphasized the need for reforms in health, education and politics—what he called the "evolution toward democracy."

In structure, the November 1970 cabinet resembled the layered cabinets often employed by Abd al-Nasir in the sixties. Under this system various ministries were grouped into sectors headed by four Deputy Prime Ministers. Thus, all service ministries were grouped in one sector; agricultural production, foreign affairs and general industrial development were placed in three respective sectors. Within these sectors, ministries would operate under individual ministers on a day-to-day basis, leaving the Deputy Premier free to concentrate on general policy affecting the whole sector.

Two other policies were promulgated to widen the support base of the new regime. In February 1971, the government returned previously sequestered land to 800 owners. Perhaps more important was the freeing of political prisoners—most of them Muslim Brethren—which Nasir regarded as confirmed foes of his regime. Both measures were designed to unite and strengthen the home front, or at least minimize dissension.

Foreign Policy

In view of Egypt's weakness with respect to Israel, Sadat's policy aimed toward bringing world diplomatic pressure upon the Jewish state to effect a complete withdrawal from Arab territory. To this end a diplomatic offensive was opened in December 1970 as the President dispatched a dozen top aides to world capitals to present the Egyptian point of view on peace-making. These spokesmen followed Foreign Minister Mahmud Riyad's example of skillfully advancing a forthright but non-belligerent line not only to maximize international support, but ultimately, to bring decisive US pressure on Israel to withdraw. Riyad's mottos were "moderation" and "flexibility,"¹ especially as he dealt with France, Italy, Britain and other Common Market countries. Both Anglo-Egyptian and Franco-Egyptian relations continued to improve as a result of increasing British and French sympathy with Egypt's position vis a vis Israel.² It was repeatedly stated that a similar normalization in US-Egyptian ties would be forthcoming as soon as American pressure would budge the Israelis from Arab territory.

By early 1971, having been exasperated by Ambassador Jarring's abortive mission, Egyptian foreign policy once again shifted toward seeking a settlement imposed by the Big Four or in its absence, to force a show-down at the UN through an overwhelming anti-Israeli vote. While many Egyptians and Arabs had given up hope of forceful American diplomacy against Israel, there were indications that throughout 1971 Sadat, Haykal and Riyad continued to believe in such a possibility. What especially disturbed Haykal was the danger of international polarization in the Middle East with local states permanently embroiled in the bi-polar Soviet-American conflict. According to Haykal, given the background and outlook

of President Nixon's Special Advisor for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Henry Kissinger, he was unfit to shape US policy in the Middle East. But regardless of Haykal's views on Kissinger, he was posing a fundamental question that has confounded Egyptian and Arab policy-makers for decades, especially since 1967: do American leaders perceive the need to preserve US interests in the Arab orbit? If so, why have the last two administrations disregarded American interests by their excessive zeal in support of Israel?

Many observers would answer these questions in terms of American domestic politics; and there is no evidence that Sadat, Haykal and their Arab supporters are unaware of the realities of US electoral politics. Nevertheless, to accept this explanation or any other is both painful and disconcerting to the present Egyptian leadership. After all, it is psychologically difficult for any leader to admit to being accorded a lower magnitude of importance to him and his country by a superpower like the US. At the mass level, there has always been a pervasive feeling that American presidents have never taken the Arabs seriously, at least since 1945. This feeling has become a part of popular belief even in pro-American Arab countries such as Lebanon. Since the landing of US Marines in 1958, the Lebanese prided themselves on the security of American protection against any state. The Israeli raids on Beirut International Airport in 1968 and repeated anti-guerilla incursions in the south abruptly ended this delusion.

The Arabs, perception of American attitudes and policy may not be entirely in accord with reality. But international action is based on perceptions of reality rather than on reality itself. Given the present political determinants of US policy-making it is unlikely that the Arab perception will

significantly change. Right or wrong the Arabs feel that they have the land, the oil, the strategic location—all the attributes of international importance—yet they are not taken notice of sufficiently, especially in comparison with Israel. Significantly, this attitude feeds and nourishes the existing Arab sense of inferiority and inadequacy which re-emerged after the defeat of June 1967. This was precisely the feeling Abd al-Nasir tried in vain to eradicate during his lifetime by forcing the world, especially the West, to take note of the Arabs. His brilliant exploits of the fifties shocked the Western Allies and the Arab world began to acquire new importance in the international political system—a development that made Nasir the hero of the Arab masses for a decade and a half.

Not having achieved Nasir's victories, the present Egyptian leadership has had to rely on a mix of persuasion and threats to accord the Arab side a greater weight in dealing with the US and Israel. Thus, the Arab aim has been to counter what they consider a subtle propaganda effort by pro-Israeli groups to reduce in American minds the strategic, political and economic importance of the Arab countries. More specifically, the unmistakable message that comes through official and unofficial statements is for the US not to write-off Egypt (and other pro-Soviet Arab states) as permanently wedded to the Soviet bloc economically, militarily, and ideologically—a common tendency among many American politicians. Thus, regardless of the new Soviet-Egyptian treaty (July 1971), Sadat has sought to give evidence of being a free agent in inter-Arab and international politics. There were even hints that beyond re-establishing close US-Egyptian relations, an American-backed Israeli withdrawal would salvage a substantial part of American interests and influence in Arab coun-

tries which had been lost after June 1967. As to the growing Soviet presence in Egypt, the government has asserted that it will decrease in direct proportion to withdrawal of the Israeli threat. Finally, like his predecessor, Sadat has declared his hope for a political solution but has reiterated his readiness to risk war in case diplomacy fails to achieve the evacuation of all Arab territory. His first major step to spur a negotiated settlement came when he extended the ceasefire with Israel (for 30 days, until March 7, 1971) and proposed reopening the Suez Canal if a partial Israeli pullback could be accomplished. Sadat went on to guarantee free passage through the Tiran Straits and the Suez Canal to permit an international force at Sharm al-Shaykh and possibly sign a peace treaty based on the UN November 1967 resolution. Sadat's two conditions were total Israeli withdrawal and a "just" solution to the Palestinian problem.

Arab and Islamic Policy

In his attempt to create as large a united Arab front as possible against Israel, Sadat was carrying out a policy laid down by Nasir himself after the June War at Khartoum where a mutual rapprochement had been effected for the Arab common interest. This policy resulted in Egyptian withdrawal from the Yaman and Libyan-Saudi reimbursement for Canal tolls which had been lost since June 1967. Sadat continued Nasir's policy and succeeded in establishing good relations with every Arab state except Iraq—the strange isolationism and paranoia of Iraq's Ba'athist regime coupled with its growing concern for Iranian enmity, preempted any chance of Egyptian-Iraqi cooperation, especially in regard to creating an integrated Eastern Front against Israel. Relations with the Maghrib states of Morocco and Algeria continued to improve

and after six years of strained relations, Egypt and Tunisia exchanged ambassadors in Jan. 1971. More significantly, Sadat achieved a close relationship with King Faysal of Sa'udi Arabia, who visited Egypt late in June 1971. Indeed, alignment with this most traditional of anti-communist states of the Arab orbit could accord Egypt more respectability in American eyes thereby increasing pressure for an Israeli withdrawal. Simultaneously, there came a bold rapprochement with Iran, whose Shah had been a frequent foe and critic of Abd al-Nasir. Sadat's brief visit to the pro-American Shah in October 1971 constituted an unprecedented step emphasizing Islamic solidarity in contrast to Nasir's propensity to strive for Pan-Arab action.

Ideology in Flux

The utility and reality of Pan-Arab nationalism came under questioning soon after the June 1967 war both in Egypt and the larger Arab orbit. The defeat of 1967 had the effect of shattering the dynamism that the Arabist movement had displayed in the late fifties and early sixties. Nasir's death was equally demoralizing to a movement that relied heavily on the charismatic leader. Yet as long as Israel's occupation continued, most Arab governments in the *Mashriq* would consider it internally and externally suicidal to disclaim adherence to Arabism. Furthermore, changing national creeds could not be accomplished overnight without grave risks. Thus, in the post-war period, ideological change occurred at the micro-level, centering on important shifts of emphasis. In Egypt one could discern a subtle re-emergence of Egyptian nationalism, which had been dormant since the rise of Abd al-Nasir in the mid-fifties.³ The Egyptians' sense of aloneness against Israel, no less than the troubles brought about by inter-Arab politics, caused a turn-

ing inward to rediscover a by-gone identity. The writings of such symbols of Egyptian nationalism as Taha Husayn and Tawfiq al-Hakim regained their credibility as the official press reminded the masses "not to forget the pharaonic past, since this is a part of Egypt's personality, as are the Arabic language and the Islamic religion."⁴ Haykal went a step further and criticized the past policy of historiographical censorship concerning pharaonic origins.⁵ However, the question of defining the nature of the Egyptian personality was too important to be left unresolved; hence Haykal's new formulation:⁶

- I. Name (Ism) — The Egyptian people
- II. Family (Usrah) — The Arab nation
- III. Race (Jins) — A mixture of several cultures, the most important being that of early Egypt in the Nile valley
- IV. Address (Inwan) — Between Asia and Africa, where the White and Red Seas meet

Clearly, this constituted a more balanced view of Egypt's historical identity.

With Jordan's suppression of the Palestinian guerillas in mid-1970 and Iraq's virtual withdrawal from the Eastern Front, Egypt's disappointment with Arabism prompted Haykal to warn the Arabs of Egypt's great "potential" for secession from the Arab orbit.⁷ Both Sadat and Haykal repeatedly deplored the breakup of the Eastern Front; it was generally felt that Egypt would have to fight alone in a renewed conflict without substantive aid from other Arab states.⁸ But the debate on the two types of nationalism—*wataniyyah* vs. *gawmiyyah*—persisted in the Arab world with no final resolution in sight. Only in According to the Party, Greater Syria in-

one major aspect did Pan-Arab political theory become political practice—the Federation of United Arab Republics.

The plans for this unity scheme were developed by Abd al-Nasir soon after the 1969 military revolutions in the Sudan and Libya and the subsequent changes in Syria's Ba'ath Party. The new generation of Arab military leaders that emerged—Ja'far al-Nimayri, Mu'ammar Qaddafi and Hafiz al-Asad—were the ideological disciples of Nasir, and as such propagators of Arab unity. The challenge posed by Israel's continued occupation of Arab lands further contributed to unity schemes. But many obstacles remained in the way of unification. In oil-rich Libya there was the fear of Egyptianization; in Syria and Egypt, certain unpleasant memories of the 1958 union scheme persisted; in the Sudan, the civil strife in the south, rightist and leftist challenges and elite ideological cleavages caused General Nimayri to postpone joining the new federation. Perhaps more significant was the situation of "the nucleus state," Egypt itself.

Given the centrality of Nasir's person to the Arab unity effort, his death left a leadership void that may prove disastrous to the movement. Lacking his predecessor's power base and charismatic following, President Sadat's progress toward Arab unity could not be too precipitate. Indeed, it was precisely the federation issue that provided one of the main policy questions in the power struggles of April-May 1971. Two other key problems in the power struggle were Sadat's policy toward Israel and the United States, and his role vs. the Arab Socialist Union.

Signs of strain in the Egyptian leadership were indicated by the increasing evidence of major disagreements in the officially controlled press. The focus of these attacks

was none other than *Al-Abram's* Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal who had retained his stature, despite the death of his friend, Abd al-Nasir. During January-March 1971, Haykal's running feud with the ASU intensified as he was attacked for writing demoralizing articles on Egyptian military weakness *vis a vis* the Israelis.⁹ Haykal, who had always resisted ASU control of his newspaper, criticized the organization as being ineffective—a characterization which brought a heated defense from Vice-President Ali Sabri who stressed the ASU's control function in a centralized state.¹⁰ More significant perhaps was growing ASU opposition to Sadat's reliance on American help to regain their occupied territories. However, instead of attacking the President himself, the ASU's leadership singled out Haykal who had advocated a line of approach similar to Sadat's. Haykal's hopes of bringing US pressure against Israel were labelled a "mirage" since Egypt was not prepared to pay the price of altering its present socialist system.¹¹ While the ASU leadership was not advocating an openly pro-Soviet policy, it was clear that they strongly disapproved of Sadat's overtures toward the United States.

The Passing of an Elite

Less than a year after Nasir's death his successors were in great disagreement and disarray. Despite his popular election, Sadat was not master of his house. As *primus inter pares* he had to share substantial power with his colleagues in the ASU Supreme Executive Committee. In April 1971, Ali Sabri and his majority faction in the SEC challenged Sadat's federation scheme; finally the power struggle had been joined. On his side Sabri had the ASU's political apparatus (vanguard) and almost all the major personalities of the regime including the War Minister, Gen. Muhammad Fawzi and

Interior Minister Sha'rawi Guma'a. Witnessing the strength of his opposition in the ASU, Sadat moved decisively to marshal support from the remaining centers of power—the military, the security services and the masses. Sabri's resignation on May 2, just two days before Secretary of State Roger's arrival, may have been designed to provoke a governmental crisis that would lead to Sadat's resignation or subjugation to ASU's will. Eventually, the other members of the Sabri faction did tender their resignations (May 13) but their undecisiveness, timidity and lack of army and popular support all combined to assure their downfall. Sadat moved quickly to consolidate his power by appointing trusted aides to key posts.

A total of 91 officials were brought to trial in August and September 1971; most received jail sentences and a few were acquitted. In addition to being charged with high treason, the defendants were denounced for their role in rigging elections and running a police state. New elections were ordered for the ASU and the National Assembly, secret police tapes were publicly burned and Sadat pledged an atmosphere of "full liberty and democracy." On Sept. 1, 1971, after an endorsement referendum, Egypt joined the Federation of Arab Republics and Sadat renamed his country the Egyptian Arab Republic instead of United Arab Republic. Cairo was chosen as the Federation's capital and Sadat was named as Council head. It is too early to say how successful the Federation will be as a bulwark against Israel and as an instrument promoting Arab unity.

After his spectacular victory in May 1971, Sadat was no more first among equals but master of his own house. While very successful in preserving power, he had also increased the burden of his responsibilities

especially in dealing with Israel. In the very process of power struggle, however, Sadat also substantially changed the composition of the leadership—an elite which had had wide influence in Egypt and the Arab world. The core of this elite mostly included second-string Free Officers and other officer-technocrats, all of which became associated with the Presidency under Nasir during their careers since the 1952 Revolution. Sabri himself, ambitious, intelligent, militant, was the first of these men to emerge from the shadows of the presidential bureaucracy after the mid-fifties to assume top positions. Others included Abd al-Muhsin Abu al-Nur, Sha'rawi Guma'a, Sami Sharaf, Muhammad Fa'iq, Hilmi al-Sa'id, Sa'ad al-Din Zayid, Ahmad Kamil, Amin al-Huwaydi, and Kamal Badir. These were the men who were the wielders of power—economic, political, organizational, military—from their privileged sanctuaries at the Presidency. Most of them were loyal to Nasir, but to no one else. They had been too close to the source of power as the power brokers of the Nasirite era and it was difficult for them to accommodate themselves to the new situation under Sadat. It was no mere accident that all ten of these ex-officers were among the figures of the anti-Sadat clique, along with such key ASU civilian *apparatchiki* as Dia' al-Din Dawud, Kamal Hinnawi, Labib Shuqayr, and Ali Sayyid Ali. However, the purge of these key bureaucrats should not be taken to mean a purposeful liquidation of the Nasirite faithful; they were purged because they opposed the new President—one who was determined to exercise his executive powers to the fullest with or without ASU approval. Another group of lesser known officials from Nasir's presidential staff continue to work in the high reaches of Sadat's government. These include: Hafiz Isma'il, Hasan Tuhami, Muhammad

Ibrahim Hasan Salim, Mamduh Salim, Muhammad Ahmad Muhammad, Muhammad al-La'ithi Nasif, Hasan Sabri al-Khuli, and Ahmad Muhammad Iffat.

The Arab Orbit: Problems and Prospects

The purge of the Sabri group aroused misgivings among Soviet leaders concerning their continuing role and influence in Egypt and the Arab world. Sabri's departure caused Soviet concern not only because the Vice-President was known as a pro-Soviet politician but more importantly because of his anti-Americanism. Ideology played little role, if any, since neither Sabri nor any of his colleagues were communists. In this context Soviet President Podgorny's visit (May 1971) was necessary to assuage mutual suspicions and reaffirm unity against Israel and the West. The 15-year treaty that Podgorny and Sadat signed brought the two parties closer than before although the Egyptians seem to be determined to have a free hand in most areas of policy-making.

More vigorous was the Soviet reaction to the massacre of the Sudanese communist party when it was implicated in the abortive coup d'état against General Nimayri on July 19, 1971. This was a clear-cut case of Arab nationalism in deadly conflict with Arab communism—a conflict won by the nationalists with Egyptian and Libyan assistance. As to the Soviet Union, this main supporter of the Arabs against Israel found itself unable either to bolster the pro-Communist Sudanese government or prevent its liquidation after Gen. Nimayri's successful counter-coup.

For the Arabs the events in the Sudan had a sobering effect. Speaking for Libya's Qaddafi and Syria's Asad, Sadat declared that the Federation of United Arab Republic "was born with teeth" and judging from

Nimayri's success in the Sudan the "teeth are very sharp."¹² However elated, the Arab leaders remained bitter and suspicious of the Soviets. The official press recalled Nasir's confrontation with Khrushchev on communist subversion (1959-60) and the Soviets were severely criticized. Nevertheless, as Haykal pointed out, the mass execution of Sudanese communists was a serious mistake. There was a feeling, especially in Egypt, that the anti-Soviet manifestations may have gone too far and that it was in the Arab interest to effect a quick rapprochement;¹³ hence President Sadat's visit to Moscow in October 1971.

But as the year drew to a close Sadat had been singularly unsuccessful in his efforts toward the US and Israel; he had also failed to prevail upon Jordan's King Husayn to curtail the liquidation of the Palestinian guerilla forces. The assassination in Cairo of Wasfi al-Tal, the Jordanian Premier, was another manifestation of the Palestinian's desperation.

Clearly Sadat's reluctance to go to war was motivated by the continuing disparity between Israeli and Egyptian power, as well as the unwillingness of the USSR to support such an effort at the present time. Thus, despite student strikes (Jan. 1972) and army pressures, he has postponed the day of reckoning with the hope of effecting a non-military solution through American diplomatic help. As Haykal has repeatedly asserted, Egyptian and Arab diplomacy should strive for a solution patterned after the Sinai War of 1956.¹⁴ However, it should be realized that the conditions of 1956 cannot be recreated—the scenario lacks a charismatic Nasir and a popular Eisenhower who distrusted Israel and whose electoral victory was a foregone conclusion. Even if President Nixon is prepared to pressure the Israeli away from the canal, he probably

will not do so until after his own re-election.

Beyond the Arabs' Israeli problem there are other dynamic processes going on that may prove to be more abiding than the Arab-Israeli conflict. The first of these forces, common especially to intellectuals, is alienation from Arabism and the existing political elites of the Arab world. The process of alienation began after the 1967 Arab defeat, which acted as its catalyst. Having found Arabism wanting, these intellectuals either looked for a radical-leftist alternative or became cynical alienates seeking to divorce themselves from the Arab cause. These developments are likely to continue as long as the present nationalist leaders (Sadat, et. al.) are unable to bring the conflict with Israel to an "honorable"

conclusion—i.e., no territorial concession and satisfaction to Palestinian aspirations. In the absence of such a solution, further radicalization is a real possibility despite the deep Islamic religiosity of Arab society. Thus future confrontations between Arab nationalism and communism may well be won by the latter.

While Arabism may be losing ground among the intellectual elite, Arabization (*isti'rab*) still constitutes the most dynamic force in Africa next to Islamization. Reports of Mauritanian aspirations to enter the Arab League and evidence from the *Maghrib* indicate the vitality and pervasiveness of the Arabization process—a reality that may be more significant than the Arab-Israeli conflict in terms of the Middle Eastern political scene.

NOTES

(1) *Arab Report and Record*, 1-15 January 1971, p. 41.

(2) *Al-Abram*, 29 January 1971.

(3) R. Hra'ir Dekmejian, *Egypt Under Nasir* (Albany, N.Y., 1971), pp. 265-66.

(4) Amin Iskandar, "Al-Bahth an al-Shakhsiyyah al-Misriyyah," (The Search for the Egyptian Personality), *Al-Jumburiyyah*, 24 October 1968. One writer had gone as far as to argue that historically the notion of Arab unity and nationalism had been vague among the Egyptian leadership and people and that Arab nationalism did not have strong roots in Egypt. See, Abd al-Mun'im Muhammad Badr, *Al-Thaurah al-Arabriyyah al-Ishtirakiyyah* (The Arab Socialist Revolution), (Cairo, 1967), pp. 317-8.

(5) Muhammad Hassanayn Haykal, "An al-Tajribah An al-Dimuqratiyyah fi Zamanina," (On Experience in Democracy in Our Times),

Al-Abram, 15 December 1968.

(6) *Ibid.*

(7) *Al-Abram*, 2 August 1970.

(8) See Abd al-Hadi Nasif in *Al-Jumburiyyah*, 18 March 1971.

(9) *Ibid.*; and *Al-Abram*, 5 March 1971.

(10) See, interview with Ali Sabri in *Al-Abram*, 6 March 1971.

(11) See Dia' al Din-Dawud in *Al-Jumburiyyah*, 22 April 1971.

(12) *Arab Report and Record*, 16-3 July 1971, p. 391.

(13) *Al-Abram*, 6 August 1971 and *Al-Abram*, 27 August 1971.

(14) *Al-Abram*, 5 March 1971 and *Al-Abram*, 26 March 1971.

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
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the suez canal closure:
its cost for the united states

Ragaei El Mallakh

Possibly man's most vital waterway, the Suez Canal, has played an impressive role in Western development for the last hundred years. Yet today the Canal is completely unused for international trade and transport. Its disuse extracts a direct cost from almost every nation in the world. The purpose of this study is to evaluate the price tag of the Canal's closure, with some efforts to assess the unpublicized economic burden on the United States and its Allies/Western powers.

When world attention fixes on the Mid-

dle East, political analyses often slight the economic dimension of the problem. One crucial example is the assumption, widely disseminated, that the Suez Canal is no longer a vital transport link. Some insist that only the USSR would gain if the waterway were to be reopened. This revival of Cold War simplicity vis-à-vis the Canal closure overlooks some basic economic and political realities and, in a sense, lulls the public in the West into a sense of false security. In the view of Senator J. William Fulbright this kind of thinking leads to

the assumption that the USSR has "an insidious design in wishing to reopen the Suez Canal—something which used to be considered a good thing, before the geopoliticians came along."¹

The energy crisis facing the United States in particular and the spiraling prices for oil products borne by consumers everywhere are not divorced from the Canal's disuse. There are distinct lessons to be learned from today's energy picture and the need for a policy reappraisal is indicated. Despite the Canal's closure, oil has been moving but with higher, yet not prohibitively higher prices. The straws which broke the camel's back were the break in the Trans-Arabian pipeline (Tapline) connecting the Saudi Arabian peninsula fields with Mediterranean outlets through Syria and the reduction in Libyan output. The former raised a direct demand for tanker transport to handle crude otherwise moved overland; the latter brought increased Arabian Gulf production to meet Western oil needs which again must use seaborne transport around Africa's Cape of Good Hope. Thus, tanker demand resulted by the end of 1970, in a leap in spot tanker rates from the Gulf to six times the level existing before June 1967.

Common sense and self-interest dictate that some cost estimate be made of the Canal's closure as well as determining who actually pays. Some comforting conclusions were issued early in 1970 by the U.S. Department of Interior in its study, *Middle East Petroleum Emergency of 1967*, which held,

...the international oil industry is learning to live without the Suez Canal. Oil is finding its way around the Cape ... on schedule

and in quantities sufficient to support normal economic activity, at acceptable cost, in Europe ...²

and, one might add, in the United States and the remainder of the oil consuming Free World. But at what point does the cost become unacceptable?

Four costs can be delineated: (1) that associated with increased mileage in transport from the oil producers on the Arabian Gulf to Europe and North America; (2) higher tanker rates throughout the world; (3) increased freight costs for dry cargo resulting from the added mileage of the Cape voyage which consumes greater time per vessel per trip thereby applying demand pressure to the freighter fleet; and (4) price increases in oil won on the basis of locational advantage which would not have been realized had the Canal remained open. This latter factor set off something of a chain reaction on the order of "keeping up with the Joneses" among the oil producing countries. A peripheral cost label might be attached to the recent posted crude price increases for Arabian Gulf producers, which are not premised on proximity to markets but conditioned by price levels which, in turn, were affected by hikes in transport costs.

Under prevailing conditions and for one year only, a direct cost to the West and Japan can be approximated at \$3.4 billion for 1971, as seen in Table I, with the U.S. portion about one-third of the total. Involved is the \$1.1 billion covering Arabian Gulf to Europe and North America oil trade in additional cost through spot tanker or short-term charter rate increases which accounts for about 15 or 20 per cent of total tanker rates as most crude is transported by oil company owned tonnage

and/or under medium or long-term charter. Moreover, \$732 million approximates the cost of rising spot tanker rates on the remaining seaborne oil transport. Added into the cost estimate is at least a \$217 million rise in general cargo and \$810 million derived from the price increases for North and West African and Venezuelan crude based upon locational advantage in proximity to Europe and North America. Price negotiations in March 1971 between Mediterranean sources of crude oil and companies ended in a price hike of which about \$500 million was based specifically on locational advantage. Although there might be some question as to how directly the Canal's closure can be linked with the impressive price increases arrived at in Teheran in mid-February 1971, it is clear the waterway's disuse applied tremendous adverse pressure in meeting world oil demand.³ Beginning with a \$1 billion plus rise for 1971, by 1975 the payments will have escalated to almost \$12 billion.

A word about the criteria used for citing these costs. Included as costs were those increases which ultimately are borne by the general international consumer of oil products and non-oil but sea transported commodities. It can always be said that one man's gain is another's loss, i.e., tanker and freighter owners are benefiting, while those who ship must pay higher prices. And, while not solely responsible, what might be called Suez Canal-triggered dislocations are adding to international inflationary pressures, always present, but now in a period of upswing.

There are some costs which may, in part, have been influenced indirectly by the Canal's blockage. The November 1970 price hike in domestic U.S. crude oil, the second in two years, reflects both inflationary pres-

sure in labor and drilling costs in the United States and world petroleum conditions, in which the Canal's closure plays a negative role, thus placing an added burden on the American consumer. The total 1969 and 1970 rise of 40c per barrel will cost an additional \$1.6 billion a year. Moreover, the competitive advantage of cheap imported crude oil is being lost due to increased transport costs and this potential saving is disappearing.

The cost may well increase for the American public. The Department of Interior estimates that excess domestic productive capacity in U.S. oil is rapidly dwindling and may be gone before 1973. The United States must then increasingly depend on foreign sources to meet oil needs and the price per imported barrel will then have more of a direct bearing on the cost of petroleum products at home. All in all, the Suez Canal closure through 1971, directly and indirectly, cost the U.S., Japan, and the West almost \$5 billion, an amount almost equal to what is spent by the American Federal Government in education or more than double that allocated for the entire United States foreign aid program.

Reopening the Canal would release the pressure on tanker transport. With the waterway in operation, neither of the two developments which precipitated the recent oil crisis would have had any noticeable effect; Libyan production cuts or Tapline disruption could have been taken in strike by the Canal and tankers. Specifically, it has been estimated that a reopening of the Canal would reduce the demand for tonnage by some 900 T-2 equivalents.⁴ The Libyan and Tapline occurrence in the supply pattern of crude oil increased the demand for tonnage by upwards of 600 T-2 equivalents.⁵

As economic considerations alone seldom determine a policy line, a final political ramification of the Canal's reopening deserves clarification. The Western world most certainly would benefit by resumption of normal Canal traffic of which 93 per cent is of Free World transits. The 7 per cent of Communist bloc usage scarcely balances, much less overcomes, the advantages accruing to the United States, Europe, and the developing nations from the waterway's resumed operation.

In this aspect, it would be fallacious to think of the Canal only in terms of movement of petroleum. While most of the traffic utilizing the waterway in recent years has been of tankers (representing 73 per cent of total Canal dues), some 66 million tons of dry cargo transited in 1966.⁹ With the increase in world trade of about 10.4 per cent annually based upon the last half decade average, the Canal could have been expected to move 108.3 million tons of dry cargo in 1971. If a conservative figure of \$2 per ton increase is assumed to cover the longer voyage around the Cape, an additional cost of about \$216.6 million could be computed for 1971 alone. Moreover, the extended time per voyage cuts into the freighter fleet and applied a demand pressure above and beyond that arising from expected annual increases in trade. When one considers total dry cargo and oil products transiting the Canal, it is noteworthy that the United States ranked fourth in total transiting commodities in 1966, after Italy, the United Kingdom, and France. Actually, the U.S. portion increased 17 per cent from 1965 to 1966. Of the ten largest volume Canal users, nine were Western European countries and the United States, accounting for just over 76 per cent of the 1966 total. Interestingly, the Russian share for the same year was only four per

cent.⁹

In the near chronic U.S. balance of payments difficulties, trade has been an increasingly important factor. The Indian subcontinent, affluent Arabian Gulf states, and East Africa all fall into the developing nations category where American goods compete with products of other nations in capturing a share of these burgeoning markets, particularly in capital equipment and certain surplus agricultural commodities. Notably, with India, Pakistan, the Arab countries of the Gulf and Iran, the United States has about a \$1 billion favorable trade balance with these nations. However, with the Canal's closure, the U.S. competitive edge has been lessened with an advantage now for such Asian countries as Japan and China which are affected by increased general freight rates but not by the greater distance requirements resulting from routing changes.

Given this set of conditions and apparent responses to the immediate and/or indirect consequences of the Suez Canal's disuse, it might be helpful to turn to a closer examination of the many factors which form a linkage between the functioning of the waterway and the national interests of the United States.

Energy Demand Versus Supply and Accessibility

The Canal's future usefulness is closely and basically related to two factors: (1) demand for Arabian Gulf oil specifically and oil generally within the energy market, and (2) the competitiveness of the Canal with alternative routes and its ability to respond to the growing size of tankers

By the beginning of the 1970's, the

TABLE I
ESTIMATED ANNUAL COST OF THE SUEZ CANAL CLOSURE, 1971^{a/}
(in millions of dollars)

A.	Increased price of Mediterranean, West African, and Venezuelan crude oil (locational advantage basis)	1,310.
	Increases, mid-1967 through 1970	810.
	Mediterranean increase negotiated spring 1971	500. ^{b/}
B.	Direct cost of increased tanker rates (spot tankers only), Gulf to Western Europe-North America	1,100.
C.	Direct cost of rising tanker rates affecting remaining seaborne oil transport (spot tankers only) c/	732.
	Gulf to Japan	340.
	Caribbean to North America	74.
	Caribbean to Europe	30.
	West Africa to Europe-North America	85.
	North Africa to Europe-North America	100.
	Southeast Asia to Japan	36.
	East Mediterranean to Europe	37.
	U.S. Gulf to U.S. East Coast	30.
D.	General cargo freight increase	217.
	A through D = direct international cost	<u>3,359.</u>
E.	Peripheral cost, increase in posted price of Gulf crude resulting from demand situation	1,599.
	Mid-1967 through 1970, Gulf producers	399.
	1971 Teheran agreement	1,200.
	TOTAL, A through E	4,958.

Sources: *The Energy Supply Problem* (New York, the American Petroleum Institute, 1970), pp. 17-18; Wilson M. Laird, Director, Office of Oil and Gas, U.S. Department of the Interior, speech before the annual meeting of the Midcontinent Oil and Gas Association, Dallas, Texas, October 1970, p. 3; U.S. Department of Interior, *Middle East Petroleum Emergency of 1967*, Vol. 1, p. 2; Cabinet Task Force on Oil Import Control, *The Oil Import Question* (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1970), p. 247; Thomas R. Stauffer, "Who Needs the Suez Canal?" *MidEast*, (Washington, D.C., October 1970), Vol. X, No. 5, p. 20.

a/ Based upon 1971 estimates of oil movement, freighter and tanker rates as of the beginning of 1971. The overall estimate remains conservative as the oil freight increases are for the initial shipment of crude only, excluding re-allocations.

b/ Estimate as of March 1971 based upon a volume of 300 million metric tons per year. Included is the freight premium caused directly by the Canal closure of 25c per barrel, totalling about \$200 million for Libya alone.

c/ Total 1971 volume of crude oil for these categories estimated at 914 million metric tons. The greatest impact of reopening the Canal would be reflected in spot and short term (up to one year) charters. The net effect of reduced tonnage requirement and subsequent reduction in the spot and short term charter cost by about 50 per cent is projected to reduce the total weighted average of all tonnage (spot, short, long term, and owned) by about 26 Worldscale points.

United States and particularly Western Europe are starting to recognize that their prospects for industrial growth are largely linked with the accessibility of Middle Eastern oil. Nowhere has this relationship been more clearly emphasized than in studies by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), a grouping of 22 Western nations, including the U.S. and major European countries, and Japan, that is, the so-called advanced or developed states. OECD studies predict that oil and gas will hold the greatest share of the total energy market over the next decade or two. Equally important is the stress these multinational studies placed on the vital need of reopening the Suez Canal to regain the shorter and more efficient access to the world's major petroleum reserves and to avoid a continuation of the rising tanker rates which leaped sixfold from the pre-June 1967 level by the end of 1970.⁹

United States demand for energy, already the world's highest, is expected to increase some 56 per cent over the next decade; thus, we should note the sources which will meet this demand.¹⁰ Early in the 1960's, much was made of the place of nuclear power generation, a spinoff from the somewhat glamorous impetus of the atomic age. Yet even in the United States, where nuclear power generation was first implemented on a production level, the most optimistic forecasts give that kind of energy source a share of less than ten per cent of the total energy supply by 1980. A number of obstacles have cropped up which have inhibited a speedy development of this energy source, including higher facility costs than originally envisaged, environmental and ecological drawbacks such as thermal pollution, and technological snags. The slowdown is evident in declining orders for nuclear plants, seven in 1969, down from 37 in 1967.¹¹

Coal, the oldest utilized fossil fuel, has been undergoing a revival, largely as a result of the unfulfilled expectations of nuclear energy. This spurt of activity will not bring a condition of constant increase in demand for coal, for the most part because of the more stringent pollution, labor, and safety standards now being instituted in the coal fields. The most prominent negative factor mitigating against greater use of coal is the high level of sulfur contained in most coal mined in regions east of the Mississippi River which are nearer to major industrial consumption centers. Expansion of the low-sulfur mines in the West, where almost two-thirds of this type of coal is located in the U.S., to help meet the "energy crisis" would involve staggering logistical problems.

Since the need continues for power generation in the United States and neither coal nor natural gas will be able sufficiently to take up the slack in needed output to maintain and expand the level of power and energy demands, oil will come increasingly to the fore, particularly in residual or heavy fuel oil. In 1968, Alaska experienced another form of gold rush with the discovery of a sizeable petroleum bearing region along its Northern Slope. Initial publicity touted this new source of crude oil as a panacea for United States oil woes. The passage of time, however, has brought a more realistic assessment of the Alaskan oil scene.

Secretary of Interior Morton shelved the January 13, 1971 preliminary Department recommendation for construction of the 800 mile Trans-Alaskan pipeline in light of debate on ecological disruption resulting from such construction and from native land claims. Even if construction had begun at once, commercial production and functioning pipeline transport could have been ac-

tuated by 1975 at the earliest. There would be, as well, greater tanker demand to move Alaskan oil to the eastern seaboard. The extent of Alaskan reserves is debatable, although a generally accepted evaluation places them as equivalent to the level of total United States demand for a three-year period. This ties in with the picture of spare productive capacity, a touchstone of the 1959 definition of national security.¹² Proved U.S. crude oil reserves in 1960 were approximately equal to 13 times production; by the beginning of 1970, reserves had fallen to nine times the output of the preceding year.¹³ At the end of the 1960's, slightly less than one-quarter of American oil needs were met through imports; by the mid-1970's over one-third of the total supply could emanate from abroad. Even with the eventual addition of two million barrels of Alaskan oil per day, the end of this decade may see slightly less than one-half of U.S. oil needs satisfied by imports. For this reason alone, the factors involved in the smooth flow of oil internationally are of basic import to the United States.

The most obvious sources of "secure" foreign oil are Canada and Venezuela. Almost half of Canadian production is exported to the U.S., yet simultaneously, Canada imports about half of the oil it consumes. This elucidates a logistic problem similar to that faced in the United States: most Canadian oil production is centered in the western provinces while the industrialized consumption markets are located in the East. Canada has no trans-continental pipeline and, at present, production is near its maximum (as opposed to expected reserves yet to be developed), as are transport and delivery systems. Canada, because of its locational advantage, international petroleum dislocations and demand, reflected the U.S. price rise by a 25c per barrel increase on crude oil near

the end of 1970. Another difficulty confronting expanded United States reliance on Canada is beginning to emerge from an upsurge of Canadian national sentiment in regard to both domestic conservation and guidelines on future development.

As with Canada, Venezuela has long been considered a secure source of supply, yet there are increasing questions and logistic obstacles concerning Venezuelan oil. That nation's output is approximately 3.7 million barrels per day, placing it third after Iran and Saudi Arabia among the members of the international oil exporting club. Over half of Venezuelan exports is destined for the U.S. Because of its high sulfur content, oil from this source is less desirable owing to its pollutant potential. Until recent petroleum dislocations, Venezuela's high production cost, about three times that for Middle Eastern oil, had reduced its competitiveness with Arabian Gulf sources. Given the present proved reserves of 15 billion barrels and production of 3.7 million barrels per day in 1970, even with new discoveries the ability of Venezuela to increase output and exports substantially is limited and will probably remain static at an average of 3.5 to 4 million barrels per day for this decade. Additionally, enactment of a new tax law hiked the assessment on companies operating in Venezuela from 52 to 60 per cent, thereby altering unilaterally reference prices in oil exports. This will introduce an element of insecurity *vis-a-vis* price as the level could be changed at will by that government.¹⁴ These cost increases will most likely be passed on to the ultimate consumer in the form of higher prices or Venezuelan crude oil may be priced out of the market.

A very real cost, overwhelmingly to the United States, is the rise in spot tanker rates affecting transport from the Carib-

bean. The pre-1968 freight cost for Caribbean oil (considered a short-haul run) delivered to the Northwest part of the U.S. was \$1.68 per ton; by mid-1970 the cost reached \$5.11 per ton. Even using these two standards on the amount of 1971 projected exports from the Caribbean to the United States indicate an increase freight cost of \$93.3 million for the spot tankers

In conclusion, there are some long-standing and often-repeated ideas about the Western hemisphere's ability (United States, Canada, Venezuela) to respond to abrupt changes in the level of Eastern hemisphere oil flow, even to the extent of meeting Western European petroleum demand, as was done in 1956 and for a short time in 1967. While North and South American sources could still perform this function (barely), the cost has been rising steadily and rapidly toward the prohibitive level. In recent years, the pinch has become one of logistics and transport. These obstacles can be circumvented for a short period under crisis conditions but in a medium or long-term situation, the possibility of costs reaching the prohibitive point is raised along with the imposition of an eventual ceiling on what Western hemisphere petroleum sources may export due to domestic requirements, national security, and conservation policies.

The United States has, as well, some direct and indirect economic and political interests in the European scene. Economically, U.S. companies are heavily involved in European industry and commerce. Obviously, the activities of American firms in Europe play a positive role in the United States balance of payments situation. Politically, the U.S. commitment to NATO is both extensive and of long-standing. The well-being of the European allies is felt to be a significant element in the American

and so-called Free World position internationally within the politico-economic and military spheres. Thus, turning to Europe, the implications for the following statistics are clear.

Within the total Western European energy demand, oil accounted for 58 per cent in 1970 and is projected to increase its share to almost 70 per cent by the end of this decade. Some 85 per cent of Europe's petroleum imports is earmarked for industry and home heating, unlike North America which has, until now, used 50 per cent for the transport sector. The smooth functioning and expansion of industrial power in Europe is, therefore, closely linked to a sufficiency of reasonably priced oil.

Turning to Europe's adequate access to oil and the cost factor, nearly half (46 per cent) of European oil imports emanates from the Arabian Gulf area and over one-third (34 per cent) from North Africa. It is projected that the volume of Arabian Gulf oil to Europe will increase from the 1970 level of approximately 300 million tons per year to about 425 million tons annually by mid-1970. As with the Alaska finds for the U.S., the North Sea discoveries of natural gas, initially reported sweeping, will still have little effect on the pattern of European oil and consumption, with forecasts for North Sea production by 1975 contributing less than five per cent of total estimated European oil demand for that year.

The Supertanker Issue

A repeatedly advanced argument for the decreasing value of the Suez Canal is that the shift toward supertankers seriously limits the waterway's ability to transit vessels of such huge size. If the Canal is reopened without any improvement, merely

restored to its dimensions of pre-June 1967, tankers of 60,000 tons fully loaded and supertankers of up to 150,000 tons in ballast can transit. In the latter case, a substantial economy is realized in distance and time as it shortens one leg of the round trip. Moreover, some larger vessels economically can use the Canal partially loaded. Considering that the average tonnage of ships being constructed in 1968 at 138,000 dwt, most of the existing tanker traffic can utilize the Canal in some form.¹⁵ Transiting the waterway cuts almost by half the time per voyage consumed by the Cape route and saves about 9,500 miles round trip between the Arabian Gulf and Europe or North America.

Throughout the decade of the 1960's, tanker size increased, as did the economies of scale offered by them. But keeping in step with this trend has been the improvement program for the Canal which, if carried out on schedule, would have allowed the passage of fully loaded 250,000 ton supertankers by the early 1970's. Of the existing tanker fleet as of 30 June 1970, only eight vessels would fall into this 250,000-plus ton category. A striking element is the concentration on vessels ordered in the 200,000 to 250,000 dwt range which, with a reopened and improved Suez Canal, could transit fully loaded; the 250,000 to 300,000 dwt tankers could similarly use the waterway either partially loaded or in ballast.¹⁶

Detractors of the Canal's transport role seem to visualize the waterway in static terms yet see the trend toward ever greater tankers as dynamic and open-ended. It was estimated that of the 253 tankers of over 100,000 dwt to be constructed by 1974, 149 would be able to transit the Canal fully loaded, contingent upon improvements in the Nasser Program. There are only nine

ordered ships exceeding 300,000 dwt which could not transit the Canal while 95 under construction could transit economically partially loaded or in ballast.

One might query what limitations exist on the ultimate supertanker size? Aside from the man-made waterways, natural channels and shipping lanes are sometimes physically restricted, such as the English Channel and Asia's Straits of Malacca. Second, the loading, offloading and storage requirements of ports involve heavy capitalization. As of 1970, about a dozen ports are equipped to receive tankers of over 200,000 dwt.¹⁷ Such port expansion will necessitate higher harbor dues, a cost which must figure into overall operations and which is passed on eventually to the consuming public. Supertankers presently in use are not always functioning at maximum efficiency.¹⁸

A third factor which tends to mitigate against excessive supertanker size is that, in an increasingly pollution conscious world, the Torre Canyon incident ushered in an era of concern over oil spills resulting from tanker accidents. The greater the tanker's carrying volume, the greater the potential catastrophe. Yet a fourth drawback is the capital investment and risk involved in loss, as reflected in the recent doubling of insurance rates for huge tankers. Construction costs for these vessels are spiraling, almost 50 per cent increase on average of those tankers on order for delivery in 1973-1974 over those delivered in 1970.¹⁹

Finally, with the Suez Canal being reopened sooner or later, both the companies ordering tankers and the shipbuilders themselves must consider the economies to be derived from using the Canal. For that reason, the 250,000 dwt appears to have been selected as a guideline by many oil

companies in placing orders for tankers.²⁰ While, generally speaking, the larger the tanker, the lower the per ton freight cost, there is a point around the 250,000 dwt beyond which further reductions in the per ton freight cost do not substantially materialize. In fact, costs may, under existing systems, even increase somewhat.²¹

Illusions and Realities

There are some misconceptions and assumptions concerning the Canal so generally held, widely publicized, and almost cherished as to make them myths. Because of the 1967 Mideast conflict, the Canal has become an element of political rhetoric and propaganda which has tended to distort still further certain basic facts. Popular journals touched on many of the issues involved in the U.S. energy crisis, specifically during 1970 and 1971, yet often failed even to mention the Canal's closure as a contributing factor.²² Moreover, when the Canal is discussed, often the terms of reference include the idea that the principal "losers" due to its closure are Egypt and the USSR, the latter supposedly eager to reopen the waterway in order to hasten its penetration into the Indian Ocean. This one-sided approach does a disservice, implying to those in the U.S. specifically and the West in general that any Free World losses are negligible compared with the deprivations to the Soviet Union. If an evaluation is made, combining actual economic and political elements in balance, then quite clearly the United States and Western Europe belong to the "loser league," as should all nations which bear the added costs of transport in their trade and increases in the price of oil-based energy. Egypt, it may be recalled, is being almost fully compensated for its annual losses in Canal dues by crisis aid in hard currency

from some of its Arab neighbors, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya.²³ Recently, some objective and respected commentators with a sound knowledge of the Middle East and American interests and involvements in that region have been acknowledging that the U.S. and Europe, i.e., the West, would be the greatest gainers in reopening the waterway.²⁴

Much speculation and talk are heard with reference to the military consequences of reopening the Canal. For some time, the unquestioned assumption was that the Russian fleet presently is contained within the Mediterranean and that an operating Canal would allow Soviet spillout into the area east of Suez. However, there are a growing number of indications that this stand has not been adequately thought through to its actual logical conclusion. First, military experts acknowledge that the USSR must be reckoned a world naval power, already having a presence in the Indian Ocean as well as elsewhere. Second, with the Suez Canal closed, all fleets are bottled up in the Mediterranean, NATO, U.S., and Russian alike. An implication of this situation might be drawn from the December 1971 Indo-Pakistan hostilities. The United States could and did dispatch its Indian Ocean naval force to the coast off East Pakistan. The American Sixth Fleet remained locked in the Mediterranean as the closed Canal precluded the only means of swift transfer to the Indian Ocean area. In fact, the Soviet political victory came through its diplomatic maneuvering in the Indo-Pakistan dispute, not USSR naval or military presence near the Indian subcontinent. And finally, rumors in the information media that the Department of Defense does not support resumed functioning of the Canal go unconfirmed in light of recent statements from high Defense officials that in their judgment there are no objec-

tions to reopening the Canal.²⁵

A second, frequently heard misconception is the diminished future importance of the Canal, almost its obsolescence, based upon the ability to move trade through other routes and by other methods. Such a journalistic judgment concludes, "The United States, it turns out, needs it [Canal] hardly at all."²⁶ The preceding pages have shown that the world is living without the Canal, but the relevant question is: to what limits are increased costs, which could be partially alleviated with the waterway's reopening, to be borne by the international community? Another set of misconceptions was nicely summed up in this manner:

One thing for certain—if the Canal should ever be reopened, . . . the lucrative oil cargoes . . . will be almost negligible. In the intervening time, . . . pipelines have been planned and are even being constructed to transport oil from the Middle East directly into the Mediterranean, and more important, the tanker world has turned to building seagoing giants that never will be able to use the Canal.²⁷

The trends in the tanker field have been discussed earlier and despite this gloomy prognostication of the tanker and pipeline threats, it should be recalled that the Suez Canal Authority has been particularly active in carrying out improvement projects on the waterway.²⁸ The most farsighted undertaking, the Nasser Program, scheduled expansion in three stages; the first portion begun in 1959 was completed in 1963, allowing passage of 60,000 ton vessels. The second stage, financed largely through a loan from the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, enabled the canal to

transit tankers with 40 feet maximum draught as well as providing for improvements to the Port Fuad shipyards and modernization of Port Said.²⁹ Actual work on the dual-phased third stage began in February of 1967. The second phase, scheduled for completion in 1975, would have enabled passage of 250,000 ton fully loaded supertankers. Had not Israeli military operations begun on June 5, 1967, with the subsequent blockage and closure of the Canal, there is every reason to believe the Suez Canal Authority, on the basis of past performance, would have met its improvement schedule of the Nasser Program on time.

As for the pipeline threat, the proposed Suez pipeline would be supplementary and complementary to the Canal rather than competitive with it. The 24-inch, 210 mile long Suez-Mediterranean (Sumed) line would link Suez on the Red Sea to Alexandria on the Mediterranean. A preliminary contract was awarded in 1969 to the French Socea group with construction expected to begin in 1971. It should come into operation at 80 per cent of initial capacity of 1 million barrels per day before the end of 1972.³⁰ The pipeline would coordinate oil movement with the Canal on two bases: (1) to take care of overrun when and if the maximum number of vessels able to transit is reached,³¹ and (2) mammoth tankers of over 250,000 dwt (or over 60,000 dwt until the Canal improvement plan has been implemented) could offload at Suez with other tankers onloading at Alexandria, thereby utilizing Mediterranean and Gulf fleets most efficiently in making shorthauls. Moreover, Alexandria is becoming a major Mediterranean oil center in its own right due to Egyptian oil and gas production in the Western Desert, gas discoveries offshore in the Nile delta, and an expanding refinery system located there.

Actual physical reopening of the Canal can be effected in a relatively short time (two to four months) and at low cost, about \$25 million.³² Despite partial compensation for Canal losses and the charge that Egypt wishes to keep the waterway closed for political pressure, actions since 1967 would indicate the opposite. In January 1968, an attempt was made to survey the northern section of the Canal but was halted due to Israeli fire.³³ A number of Egyptian proposals have been advanced to arrange at least clearing the Canal preparatory to reopening. The economic factor to keep in mind here is the high opportunity costs which accompany each delay in reopening the Suez Canal. Not only is the cost likely to be affected by inflationary pressures, but the burden to worldwide oil consumers based on higher crude oil and freight bills is likely to continue, possibly even expand. This latter conclusion is derived from the growing international energy needs; oil's share in the total energy market will be increasing in the next decade and for the U.S., rising to almost half of the total American energy market.

A second price hike in two years was announced for domestic U.S. oil in November 1970. This reflects a number of elements: (1) United States inflationary pressure, (2) known natural gas reserves have declined and production has failed to keep abreast of demand increases bringing, in turn, a greater use of residual of fuel oil to take up the slack. This led to (3) increased demand for oil which could not be met by cheaper foreign imports under prevailing conditions. One may ask, where does the Suez Canal come into the picture of rising U.S. crude oil prices? It is not a direct or even an immediate factor, but the waterway's closure touched off a series of events including (1) initial increased tanker demand in 1967, (2) increased desirability

of North African, specifically Libyan, crude for European and North American markets which enabled demands for higher posted prices by North African producers which were met by the operating companies, (3) interruption of Tapline in 1970 applied further pressure on the tanker fleet to move additional crude from the Arabian Gulf, bringing soaring freight costs which did not drop back to earlier levels upon resumption of the pipeline's functions, and (4) once the Libyan posted price increase was won, other producing nations followed suit, e.g., Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and even Venezuela and Nigeria.³⁴

The magnitude of Mideast Gulf reserves (62 per cent of the world total, rising to 70 per cent if North Africa is included), U.S. proved reserves of about 38 billion barrels (Saudi Arabia alone has 112 billion barrels), and projected rising energy demand of the United States over the coming decade, lead to the assumption that the United States will have to import greater quantities of oil despite development of the Alaskan fields. Thus, factors weighing in the level of non-U.S. crude prices and in the cost per barrel delivered to American ports (specifically, freight costs) should be given sufficient attention, both in the more specialized trade journals as well as within the mass information media. That Middle Eastern oil and the Suez Canal exist within the present political tensions of that region should not diminish the willingness nor the need to recognize, discern, and point out certain implications for the U.S. economy. In fact, the Suez Canal, super-tankers, present pipelines as well as the Suez line, all means will be needed to move the quantities of oil required by the United States, Europe, and Japan for the 1970's, let alone the 1980's. Even if freight and crude posted prices cannot be rolled back with a normalization and expansion of oil

transport through the resumed functioning of the Suez Canal, the cost spiral might be halted.

During the 1970 oil logistics crisis, a lesson stood out clearly: the world petroleum apparatus (flow, transport, and stability of prices) can muddle along despite the Suez Canal's closure so long as all other components remain operative; but one or two disruptions in the supply or transport picture thereafter can bring gigantic repercussions. If the thesis can be accepted that the Canal's closure is extracting an economic cost from practically every nation in the world, a cost which finds its way to the average consumer, why has there been little concerned effort by the U.S. government to seek the waterway's reopening.³⁵ Obviously, the taking of sides politically on the Mideast conflict has a lot to do with it. Since 1967, Israel has occupied Egypt's Sinai to the east bank of the Canal. Although the United States supported the United Nations resolution of November 22, 1967, outlining the elements for a Middle East settlement,

the Administration has been slow to take a more neutral stand in pushing for its implementation.³⁶ A step toward facilitating a peace would be the studious application of a single standard to all sides in the Mideast situation.

Yet perhaps the most crucial factor, for United States interests abroad as well as for domestic relations between the Government and the American public, would be a governmental initiative to present its citizenry with a clear and objective delineation of the drift of U.S. national economic interests as a result of the Mideast imbroglio and the impact such single issues as the Suez Canal's closure has had and may have on the economy. If, with adequate knowledge of what a continuation of this policy will cost, both financially and politically, the U.S. Administration opts to retain its existing position, presumably supported by a majority of an informed public, then the consequences will be foreseen and must be accepted.



NOTES

(1) *Congressional Record*, August 24, 1970, p. S14030.

(2) U.S. Department of the Interior, *The Middle East Petroleum Emergency of 1967*, Vol. I, p. 1.

(3) One State Department expert, in speaking informally, clearly attributed the Teheran price developments to the Suez Canal closure.

(4) The T-2 equivalent has a capacity of 16,600 dwt and a speed of 14.5 knots, with a four days' port time per round trip, 345 operating days per year, cargo density of 7.4 barrels per long ton (32° API gravity).

(5) *Middle East Economy Survey*, Supplement, 13 November 1970, p. 4.

(6) United Arab Republic, Suez Canal Authority, *Suez Canal Report 1966*, p. 112.

(7) Thomas R. Stauffer, "Who Needs the Suez Canal?" *MidEast*, October 1970, p. 31.

(8) *Suez Canal Report 1966*, p. 113.

(9) This plight was recently covered succinctly by C.L. Sulzberger, "Oil for the Lamps of Europe," *The New York Times*, November 20, 1970.

(10) *U.S. News and World Report*, August 24, 1970, p. 27.

(11) Lawrence A. Mayer, "Why the U.S. Is in an 'Energy Crisis,'" *Fortune*, November 1970, p. 76.

(12) Ragaei El Mallakh, *Some Dimensions of Middle East Oil: The Producing Countries and the United States* (American-Arab Association for Commerce and Industry, Inc., March 1970), offers a discussion of the various definitions and aspects of U.S. national security and the question of petroleum needs and imports. Even the most enthusiastic boosters of rapid development of Alaskan oil note that with 1 million barrels per day from that source by 1975, the U.S. will still require imports on the order of 4 million barrels per day.

(13) *The Energy Supply Question* (A staff paper by the Committee on Public Affairs of the American Petroleum Institute, December 1970), p. 22.

(14) *Wall Street Journal*, December 10, 1970. This legislation, enacted before the close of 1970, will result in an additional \$180 million a year increase in payments to the government and in higher overall costs and prices for Venezuelan oil.

(15) *Middle East Petroleum Emergency of 1967*, p. 9, and *Petroleum Intelligence Weekly*, September 2, 1968.

(16) *Petroleum Press Service*, October 1970, p. 363.

(17) *Ibid.*

(18) *Ibid.* A study of some 107 Gulf to Europe voyages showed only slightly less than one-third were on the basis of optimum one loading and one offloading ports.

(19) *Ibid.*

(20) Examples being those ordered by Shell and Esso, *Business Week*, April 6, 1969, pp. 121-2.

(21) United Arab Republic, Suez Canal Authority, *The Suez Canal: Present Conditions and Future Prospects*. January 1970, p. 23.

(22) Such cases were the articles in the wide circulation journal *U.S. News and World Report*, August 24, and November 9, 1970.

(23) Since October 1967, payments of \$266 million annually have been made to Egypt from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Libya, which continue to the present. In 1966, Canal revenue was about \$250 million; however, had the Canal remained open, the dues would have risen yearly and would have surpassed the \$266 million level.

(24) John C. Campbell, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict: An American Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1970, particularly pages 66-69. See also certain testimony in *The Middle East, 1971*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Near East, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 92nd Congress, First Session (Washington, D.C., 1971). Concerning European interests, C. L. Sulzberger, *op. cit.*, noted: "Thus, in the end, both the prosperity and by inference the national security of this enormously important half-continent [Western Europe] are coming under a potential shadow. Already oil freight rates from the Persian Gulf are more than six times what they were in early 1967 All these reasons help explain a gradually detectable shift in European policy on the Arab-Israeli confrontation and a mounting determination to get some kind of settlement in order to assure the free, cheaper flow of oil."

(25) Among chief proponents of this theory on the Russian drive into the Indian Ocean are columnist Joseph Alsop and Alvin J. Cottrell, "Implications of reopening the canal for the area east and south of Suez," *New Middle East*, July 1971, pp. 29-32.

(26) Alfred Friendly, "Role of Suez Ebbs," *The Washington Post*, February 16, 1969; Peregrine Fellowes, "The Suez Canal: Highway or dead end?" *New Middle East*, June 1971, pp. 26-8, offers a somewhat similar view.

(27) Helen Bentley, "Shippers Learn to Live Without the Suez Canal," *Baltimore Sun*, June 5, 1969.

(28) The Authority took over management of the waterway following the 26 July 1956 nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. The prophecy that Egypt could not maintain and run the waterway has gone unfulfilled. For a résumé of the period following the management change, see Ragaï El Mallakh, and Carl McGuire, "The Economics of the Suez Canal Under U.A.R. Management," *The Middle East Journal*, spring 1960.

(29) Detail on this loan in Ragaï El Mallakh, *Economic Development and Regional Cooperation: Kuwait* (University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 199-200. The Nasser Program was explained by Mashur Ahmed Mashur, Director of the Suez Canal Authority, in *The Egyptian Gazette*, July 23, 1970.

(30) *New York Times*, December 20, 1970; *Middle East Economic Survey*, December 18, 1970, p. 4; *Middle East Economic Digest*, January 1, 1971, p. 1. Among the first companies contracted to use the pipeline are Mobil, Shell, Standard Oil of Indiana, British Petroleum, and Compagnie Française des Pétroles. Even with its initial carrying, in 1972, Sumed would immediately rank second in capacity among Mideast pipelines. With expansion to its eventual capacity of 1.4 million barrels per day, it would take over first place, followed by the Iraqi pipeline, Tapline, and the Elath-Ashkelon line.

(31) The Suez Canal Authority improvement projects have kept well ahead of the saturation level; in 1966, an additional 3,750 vessels could have transited before reaching the 25,000 ship maximum, *The Suez Canal: Present Conditions and Future Prospects*, p. 19.

(32) *New York Times*, November 25, 1970.

(33) *Christian Science Monitor*, November 21, 1970.

(34) Ten major producing countries, members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries or OPEC (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Venezuela, Abu Dhabi, Qatar, Indonesia, Libya, and Algeria) won greater revenues in the 1971 Teheran agreement between the companies and this vital core of producers (representing almost 60 per cent of Free World output). Among OPEC's guidelines, adopted in December 1970 at the Caracas conference, is a formula for calculating differentials in posted prices depending upon the quality of oil and also on the distance of producing countries to markets, *Christian Science Monitor*, January 20, 1971.

(35) Stauffer, *op. cit.*, p. 33, offers the judgment: "Nevertheless, the fate of the Canal and Europe's hope of lower oil prices are dependent upon whether the Israelis relinquish the territories which they conquered along the Canal. Aside from the military advantage of holding the eastern bank of the Canal the Israelis are quite as reluctant to allow the Egyptians to collect transit dues from the Canal as they are reluctant to lose the profits from their own pipeline."

(36) Withdrawal of occupying forces is one of the basic elements in the United Nations plan on the precept of the inadmissibility of territorial expansion through force of arms.

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PROBLEMS OF URBAN POLITICS IN CANADA & THE MIDDLE-EAST: A Comparative Study

S. Drabek

migration of people into the cities has created serious strains. A larger population requires proper planning for the orderly expansion of the city and uses of land; it necessitates urban renewal for the older part of the city; it compounds the problems of providing health care and proper sewage facilities; and finally it demands more roadways or alternate forms of transportation. Each of these problems ultimately affects the national political system.

But the problems may be even greater for the city located in a developing country. Urbanization adds new intensity to an already growing list of problems which any new country must face and solve.¹ Moreover, the urban migration in newly developing countries consists mostly of former rural residents who lack familiarity with urban forms of governments and who therefore lack the potential for developing, immediately, any participation in urban government.²

A national political system consists of an arrangement of roles so that each level of government fulfills the functions allotted to it. This implies some form of decentralization of power and functions to a local government. The broad division of functions will vary from country to country according to the objectives with which the system was established and the stage of

I

Increasing urbanization has become a dominant feature of the present world. The

development reached by a particular country or area of the country.³

The question then becomes one of organizing local government, especially urban government, to meet the demands of urbanization. Urban governments in developing countries face the dilemma of having to solve problems without adequate financing. In turn this lack of financing may mean even greater problems—for example—proper provision for health care. However, the priorities of newly developing countries are such that the development of national identity and national goals comes first and this usually means an emphasis, in political terms, on the national government. Urban government, then, may serve merely to foster this emphasis.

Just what is the institutional role of local government in the pattern of relationships that comprise a national system?⁴ For purposes of comparative analysis, this paper will focus on Beirut, Lebanon and Ottawa, Canada as examples of how two countries—one a developing nation and the other a more developed Western nation—have organized their local government systems, especially the urban governments, to meet the demands of urbanization.

Both cities, Beirut and Ottawa, are the capitals of their respective countries; both contain populations of diverse ethnic and religious origin and both reflect the process of urbanization on a dramatic scale.⁵ Moreover, both play a vital role in the national political system, in terms of political activities. Beirut was chosen as a representative of an urban Middle Eastern city because of the source material available and because of its strategic position as the crossroads, more or less, of the area. Beirut also represents an old urban area that is still in the process of developing while Ottawa represents a young city which has developed

rapidly over a short span of time. The next two sections describe the local governments of Ottawa and Beirut and the structural role of local government in Canada and Lebanon. A following section analyzes these structural roles and their importance in terms of the country in question. The analysis includes a review of how successful local government has been in adapting to the problems raised by the process of urbanization.

II

In the Canadian federal system local government rates as the most junior government in terms of rank. Provincial governments (such as Ontario, in which Ottawa is located) have complete jurisdiction over the local authorities. This means that the province may decentralize whatever powers or responsibilities it sees fit and in whatever way it sees fit to the local level.⁶ On the other hand, the provinces also have the power to abolish local authorities.

This decentralization occurs because of the tradition of local autonomy in Canada which demands some form of local government to look after the needs of town or city in such matters as roads, policing and land use. Local autonomy also provides for elected councils which determine policy in relation to these matters and which raise revenues to meet these demands. This latter point, in particular, ensures autonomy at local levels.⁷

Thus, decentralization indicates that a city government such as Ottawa has the responsibility for such matters as roads and streets within its boundaries, housing and zoning regulations, welfare services, water and sewage lines, and urban redevelopment. To look after these functions the organizational structure of the city of Ottawa con-

sists of political and administrative bodies. The latter implement the policies determined by the former. The political structure consists of a mayor, four controllers and twenty-two aldermen all popularly elected on a non-partisan basis. Both the mayor and controllers are elected on a city-wide basis while the aldermen are elected from wards (arbitrarily defined elective units). The four controllers and the mayor constitute the executive committee⁸ of the municipality while the aldermen, with the addition of the executive, constitute the counterpart of a parliament or a legislature. Ottawa's local government also has the power to raise money by means of property taxation in order to meet its expenditure responsibilities.

However, as the population figures indicate,⁹ the urban regions of Ottawa and Beirut cover much more geographic area than the political demarcated unit of the city. Urbanization has caused the growth of suburbs and the extension of settlement in such a way that urban problems really become regional problems. One method used by the city of Ottawa (with the consent of the province of Ontario) to solve this problem was to annex the surrounding areas. But this move affected the strong underlying currents of local autonomy and created a territorially huge city-state. Some other way, then, had to be found to solve the problems of expanding urbanization while maintaining some semblance of local autonomy.

Using its legal and constitutional powers the province of Ontario imposed a solution in the form of a new *level* of government—a regional form—called The Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton. This new level of government encompassed a larger territorial area which included not only the city of Ottawa itself, but also its suburbs,

some of which retained their individual identities, and some surrounding rural areas—in other words, a region. However, what must be remembered at this point is the fact that the new form of government resulted from intervention by the senior level of government, the province.

In terms of functions, the new municipality was given the responsibility for regional planning, regional transportation, arterial roads, water and sewage works, and welfare services. Financially, this regional government does have powers to establish a budget for its estimated expenditures and collect this amount by a levy on each of the member municipalities.

Policy for the new government originates with a council composed of thirty members; sixteen represent the city of Ottawa, the largest municipality in the regional unit, and fourteen represent the other constituent suburbs and rural municipalities. All these representatives, however, are not directly elected to the regional council. Representation is based on a complicated process involving election to office in a constituent political unit.¹⁰ Ottawa's representation on the regional council consists of the mayor, the four controllers and eleven aldermen. Thus another feature of the regional municipality is a form of indirect representation—representation of the city itself rather than of the city as a part of the region. Moreover the first Chairman of the Regional Council was an appointee of the provincial government which indicates some desire on its part to guide the initial stages of the development of this form of government.

III

The local government structure in Lebanon follows a different pattern than that

in Canada. Here historical development, including foreign domination and settlement patterns, influenced political development. Local government development in Lebanon owes much to the historical influence of the Ottomans and the French. Generally speaking it appears that the French influence has had the most lasting affect.¹¹

The Lebanese political system consists of three levels of government with the national government the most dominant and the other two—the provinces and local government—in very subservient roles. Centralization is the operative word and it strongly influences the administrative and political existence of local government organization.¹² This factor of centralization can readily be seen in the power of the national Ministry of the Interior over all local governments. Indeed, the Ministry has a distinct unit dealing with Local Government. Such matters as administration, finance, planning and approval of work projects are subject to the agreement of the Ministry of the Interior. In effect, this means that Lebanese local government acts as a mere agent of the national government

Other factors have also contributed to the development of such a highly centralized system. The very geographic nature of the country and the existence, in reality, of only one large urban area contributes to the dominating influence of the national government. Even the confessional nature of Lebanese politics has some influence since the national government happens to be a better arena in which to make the necessary important trade-offs than is the local level.¹³ Additional contributing factors include a national distrust of government on the part of the Lebanese, a lack of demand for forms of local autonomy and, finally, the emphasis on national development. Emphasis on this latter factor

naturally means that local government has to be fitted into a scheme of priorities which emphasize national development problems. Some movements were made in the direction of decentralizing powers from the Ministry of Interior¹⁴ but the decentralization appeared to be merely from one national government official in Beirut to others in the field.

Where, then, does the city of Beirut fit into the total governmental structure? In addition to having a local government in its own right, Beirut is also one of the five provinces (*muhafadats*) or administrative regions of the nation. This gives it decided special status but whether it assists Beirut in matters of local affairs is another matter. First of all it is difficult to separate the city from the province in some respects. For example the governor of the Province of Beirut is also the mayor of the City of Beirut, and the Province of Beirut has no regional council as do the other *muhafadats* but its place seems to be taken by the city council of Beirut. This council is popularly elected, but the seats are proportionally distributed amongst the sects living in the city—the Sunni Moslems, Maronites and Greek Orthodox.

In his duplicate role the governor-mayor of Beirut is, in reality, a representative of the national government even at the local government level. He owes his appointment to the national government (which is made by either the President or the Minister of the Interior) and his duties, in terms of priorities, seem to emphasize the aspects of the maintenance of law and order and the protection of property and civil rights which are really his provincial responsibilities. On the other hand, the Beirut governor-mayor carries out his municipal authority in conjunction with "the deliberations of the Council."¹⁵ Thus the Beirut *muhafiz*

(governor-mayor) is the chief executive of the city while the Council has deliberative powers. The powers of the council cover all municipal matters but they are watered down by a political system which requires, in many instances, the review of council decisions by the national government—specifically the Ministry of Interior. Decisions regarding such matters as the municipal budget, taxes, planning, zoning, building and road projects, all require the approval of the Ministry of the Interior before implementation.¹⁶ These constrictions on the power of the Beirut municipal council indicate the lack of local autonomy in the Lebanese political system and stress the decided pattern of centralization. The appointive nature of the mayor's position only serves to emphasize the fact of national government control of the political system. Finally, being the capital city (and hence the show-case of the nation) of a centralized system of government ensures that the problems of local affairs in Beirut will receive the close scrutiny of the national government.

IV

Local government may be described as a method of allocating resources in such a way that the resultant organization efficiently handles specific issues of the total political system.

As evidenced by Ottawa, the institutional role of Canadian local government seems to fit the classical theory of the reasons for this form of government, that is, local participation in a government responsive to the needs of a definitive locality and on-the-spot administration of tasks which in turn relieves the pressure on the senior levels of government. But the evidence also indicates that the previous *ad hoc* political and administrative approaches, which allowed

the free development of suburban communities surrounding a large city did not work. The problems of urbanization necessitated a new approach. In this respect, the provincial government imposed a solution based on a larger territorial unit. This new level of government constitutes another level of government in the organizational scheme.¹⁷ Moreover, the factor of local autonomy becomes somewhat muted when it is realized, first, that the chairman of the regional council is an appointee of the provincial government and second, that representation on the council does not occur through direct election.

Local government in Lebanon, on the other hand, continues its previous historical pattern in spite of the pressures of urbanization in the Beirut area. Several factors contribute to the maintenance of the status quo. The size and geography of Lebanon necessitate different approaches than those in Canada. The problems of urbanization are the same everywhere but they become more acute in a city such as Beirut which is the magnet for the whole of the country. However the basic factor remains that the political structure in Lebanon lends itself to the present centralized and *ad hoc* approach to urbanization.

Much has been written of the confessional nature of Lebanese politics and the consequent necessity for a balanced political system.¹⁸ Since the national government is the most powerful, the various ethnic and religious groups feel that it is the best arena in which to settle the most important political and administrative issues including those of a local nature. The weakness of the local government system, in other words, contributes to the maintenance of the delicate balance on the national scene. By having national standards and a nationally controlled administration

for local matters, the possibility of regional conflict is lessened. This factor looms large in any country where national unity is fragile.

One study on local government and decentralization posits the hypothesis that national unity seems to be a precondition for the devolution of powers to a local government.¹⁹ If this is so, then it may be argued that the Lebanese political system does not lend itself readily to any autonomous and comprehensive local government structure. Basically the problem seems to be one of integrating all sections of the population into the national life.²⁰ It should be noted that Canadian local governments as evidenced by Ottawa have a relative degree of autonomy in that they make political and administrative decisions and raise taxes with little provincial oversight. On the other hand because of historical, geographical and religious factors the local government of Beirut faces a comprehensive review of all its actions.²¹

Urban forms of government now face the universal complaint that they cannot handle the demands of increasing urbanization. Two solutions to this problem have found favour: one, consolidation into larger units, and, two, increased intervention, in one form or another, (i.e. financing) of the senior levels of government in local affairs. Canada seems to be using both approaches with regional government being an example of the first and the newly established Ministry of State for Urban Affairs at the national level as an example of the latter approach.²² Because of historical impact and the diversified nature of

the population, Beirut has been a large unit which has always had government intervention in its affairs.

The role of Canadian local government provides for public participation in deciding policy on matters of a local nature. It expedites decision-making on local matters, trains people in the art of self-government and allows programs to be administered according to wishes of the local residents. These statements apply equally to the new regional form of government. While the old basic unit of local government has not been successful in the face of the challenging demands of urbanization, the new regional form may allow more flexibility in this area. If this does not succeed, then the shadow of federal or provincial take-over of urban policies looms large.

Lebanese local government projects the image of a very weak organization. Its role as a government is minimal and its decisions subject to continual review. The prevailing attitude in Lebanon seems to favour this state of affairs since the national government, in view of the confessional nature of politics, seems to be the best and only method of meeting the problems of urbanization. In this instance the national government is in a better position to deal with these problems, *but only if it wants to*.

Urbanization has created problems national in scope. Canadian local government has adapted its organizational structure in an effort to deal with the problems of urbanization. In Lebanon, local government and the problems of urbanization are but two factors among many in a country trying to maintain national cohesion.

NOTES

(1) David E. Lilienthal, *Metropolitan Area Problems*, 5 (May-June 1962), p. 5.

(2) Gerald Breese, *Urbanization in Newly Developing Countries* (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 1966), pp. 4-5.

(3) H. Maddick, *Democracy Decentralisation and Development* (Asia Publishing House: Bombay 1963), p. 109.

(4) F. Sherwood, "Devolution as a Problem of Organizational Strategy" in R. T. Daland (ed.) *Comparative Urban Research* (Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, Calif. 1969), p. 60.

(5) The population of Greater Beirut is 893,000. See Le Ministère du Plan — Direction Centrale de la Statistique — *Recueil de Statistiques Libanaises* #6 Année. 1970. Beirut itself is listed as having 450,000 people. Ottawa according to the 1971 *Canada Year Book* had a metropolitan population of 527,000. The city itself had a population of roughly 300,000 people. T. Y. Ismael, in his book, *The Governments and Politics of the Contemporary Middle East* (Dorsey: Homewood, Ill., 1970) estimates Beirut had a population of 200,000 in the 1940's (p. 21). Ottawa in the 1940's had a population of 155,000. Greater Ottawa 215,000.

(6) Sec. 92 British North America Act. Since there are ten provinces, the approach to local government may vary from province to province.

(7) Daland, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

(8) The responsibilities of this executive committee include the city budget, appointment of administrative hands and the letting of tenders for projects.

(9) See footnote 5 *supra*.

(10) In the case of the city of Ottawa, the representatives include the mayor, the four controllers and the eleven aldermen who led the voting in their respective wards. Representatives of the other units may include the mayor or

reeve or an alderman depending upon the number of representatives the unit is allowed.

(11) See W. Hardy Wickwar "Patterns and Problems of Local Administration in the Middle East," *Middle East Journal* (Vol. 12, No. 3, 1958), p. 250.

(12) G. Grassmuck and K. Salibi, *Reformed Administration in Lebanon* (Beirut: AUB Press, 1964), p. 49.

(13) For some detailed analyses of Lebanese politics see L. Binder (ed.), *Politics in Lebanon* (John Wiley & Sons, New York), *passim*.

(14) I. E. Bashir, *Planned Administrative Changes in Lebanon* (Beirut: AUB Press, 1966), p. 130.

(15) See Emile Yanni, *Physionomies du Liban, les Mubafazats (Beyrouth)*, Les Conférences du Cénacle XV Année, No. 1-2, 1961.

(16) *Ibid.*

(17) Another proposal for the Ottawa region revolves around a National Capital Region idea similar to that of Washington, D.C. or Canberra, Australia.

(18) Binder, *op. cit.* also M. W. Suleiman "Lebanon" in Tareq Y. Ismael, *Governments and Politics of the Contemporary Middle East* (Dorsey Press, Homewood, Ill., 1970).


(19) Paulo Reis Veira, "Toward a Theory of Decentralization: A Comparative View of Forty-Five Countries (unpublished, Ph.D. dissertation, U. of Southern California) as quoted in R. T. Daland, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

(20) Binder, p. 260.

(21) Grassmuck and Salibi, p. 49.

(22) It should be noted that this Ministry is, at the present time, only a research and advisory body but its existence portends increasing federal involvement in urban affairs.







نحْ فقط نطير مباشرة إلى ٥ مُدن رئيسية في المملكة العربية السعودية

نحن فقط نقدم رحلات مباشرة بطائراتنا الفعالة الحديثة من تدروت الى خمس مدن رئيسية في المملكة العربية السعودية: الرياض، جدة، المدينة المنورة، الظهران، تبوك. تذوق الطعام الشهى واستمتع بالرحلة التامة على متن طائراتنا محاطا بكمونا العربي الاصيل من قسطنطينياتنا، كما نقدم بخدمة ركابنا خبرة تزيد عن ٢٥ عاما من الخدمة الممتازة وافضل الطيارين كفاءة وخبرة ومهارة.



للحجز افضل بوكيل سفرياتك او :
الخطوط الجوية العربية السعودية

ميدان رياض الصالح - عمارة شاكر وعويبي - تلغرافون ٢٢٦٨٠٠/١/٢/٤
يرجى عدم شحن رضائناك معلومات أي رحلة من رحلاتنا



the repatriation of arab elites

Michael W. Suleiman

Estimates vary widely as to the number of Arab professionals who have chosen to reside permanently or temporarily outside the Arab homeland. There is general agreement, however, that the figure is in the tens of thousands and that the group constitutes many of the best educated of Arab elites (Tables 1 and 2).

TABLE 1
Immigrants Admitted to U.S. from Arab Countries
Years Ended June 30, 1960-1969

Country	1960- 1969	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
Iraq	5,436	304	256	314	426	381	279	657	1071	540	1208
Jordan (including Arab Palestine)	11,701	536	658	771	752	726	702	1325	1604	2010	2617
Lebanon	6,195	511	498	406	448	410	430	535	752	892	1313
Syria	3,804	207	191	245	226	244	255	333	555	644	904
Morocco	3,556	355	276	274	282	303	280	298	457	442	589
U. A. R. (Egypt)	13,126	854	452	384	760	828	1429	1181	1703	2124	3411
TOTAL	43,818	2767	2331	2394	2894	2892	3375	4329	6142	6652	10,042

Source: Adapted from the 1969 *Annual Report, Immigration and Naturalization Service* (Washington, D.C.), p. 64.

TABLE 2
Immigrants Admitted to the U.S. from Arab Countries by Major Occupation Groups
Year Ended June 30, 1969

Country	No. Admitted	Professional, technical & kindred workers	Farmers & farm managers	Managers, officials & proprietors	Clerical & kindred workers	Sales workers	Craftsmen, foremen & kindred workers	Operatives & kindred workers	Private household workers	Service workers except private household	Farm laborers foremen	Laborers, except farm & mine	Housewives children & others with no occupation or occupation not reported	Professional & managerial (Cols 1 & 3) as % of total
Iraq	1208	178	4	38	60	19	61	21	15	16	—	20	776	18%
Jordan (including Arab Palestine)	2617	222	45	104	65	47	183	66	8	34	23	40	1780	12.4 %
Lebanon	1313	156	12	59	44	21	104	49	12	38	11	16	791	16.4 %
Syria	904	148	—	32	25	13	111	39	6	15	7	9	499	20%
Morocco	589	57	—	19	52	8	46	17	4	38	—	9	339	13%
U.A.R. (Egypt)	3411	1365	3	110	209	48	94	65	15	33	3	14	1452	43.2 %
Total = 10,042	2126	64	362	455	156	599	257	60	174	44	108	5637		

Source: Adapted from the 1969 *Annual Report of Immigration and Naturalization Service* (Washington, D.C.), p. 49.

More specifically, Tables 1 and 2 show the number of Arab immigrants to the United States for the years 1960-1969, and a breakdown of the 1969 figures to indicate the major occupation groups. It is clear from Table 2 that the problem with regard to Egypt is particularly critical in that over 40% of the immigrants belong to the professional or managerial class. More generally, however, brain drain is a problem of major proportions to the whole Arab world. The question is how to alleviate if not eliminate this problem.

A good way to approach the question of how to bring back Arab expatriates is to investigate the main reasons which have induced them to remain abroad. In my opinion, three major factors may be cited. Though the order of importance varies from individual to individual, the following rank-ordering is probably acceptable to the great majority. First and foremost is the desire for peace of mind for the individual and his family. In practical terms, it means the absence of violence or threat of violence, be it physical or psychological. Insecurity, harrassment, uncertainty as to what will happen next, political instability—all these are components of an anxiety syndrome that is mentally and physically debilitating. Many educated Arabs have chosen to reside in the West primarily to enjoy the luxury of a happy and productive life unencumbered by worries over personal safety.

The second most important incentive which has attracted Arab elites to the West is the presence of excellent research and teaching facilities and general employment opportunities, as well as a proper appreciation of the individual's personal merit. The third important factor is a good income, though it is worth emphasizing that financial gain has by no means been the primary concern of Arab elites seeking em-

ployment abroad.

Bearing these factors in mind, we can now discuss the different means which may be utilized to benefit from Arab talent abroad. Here it is important to state my belief that a campaign to bring back Arab professionals—no matter how strenuous and concerted the effort—is bound to be of little value if not completely fail if it is naively assumed that all expatriates *should* return to their country of origin or the Arab homeland generally. Such an attitude is harmful and counterproductive because it implies that no one is entitled to emigrate to another country and/or that those who do are either fools or traitors. If these assumptions are made, then many Arabs abroad will be driven to frustration, despair and the temptation to cut off any and all contacts with their mother country. It is, therefore, important for the Arab governments to recognize and accept the fact that some of those who have left the Arab world have found the right place somewhere else and do not wish to return—though many even among this group are happy and anxious to visit and help! Once this view is thoroughly internalized by Arab officials seeking the utilization and possible repatriation of Arab professionals abroad, then certain incentives—some negative, others positive—may be instituted with high expectations of success. By negative incentives I mean measures taken to alleviate or remove certain existing conditions which clearly contribute to the brain drain. Positive measures are the steps initiated in order to encourage educated Arabs to remain in their homeland and/or entice professional Arab expatriates to return.

Negative Measures

1. Perhaps the most serious obstacle placed before expatriate Arabs wanting to visit their homeland is the fear of prosecu-

tion or detainment once they are there. Often this fear is unjustified but it is not removed or reduced merely by stating that it is unjustified. A country can easily remove this fear by assuring, i.e. granting, the returnees exit permits ahead of time and guaranteeing against harassment or prosecution. Any country that is really serious about this, can launch a major informational effort to publicize its position. For many reasons which need not be entered into here there exists a crisis of confidence between many expatriates and their respective Arab governments. Consequently, greater effort will be needed to persuade the majority of expatriates of the sincerity of any particular Arab government on this score. But if the desire is genuine, good results can be expected within one to two years after the initiation of the program. In this regard, authorizing embassies and consulates to issue exit permits abroad and prior to entry into the Arab country concerned would greatly reduce the anxiety of many an Arab expatriate. Lebanon and now Egypt permit the holding of double nationality. Other Arab countries would do well to investigate the value of this practice in retaining strong ties between expatriates and their homeland.

As a corollary, harassment for political views, including one-time membership in a banned political party, should be stopped. Differentiation between the holding and expression of political views, especially when such expression is not public, on the one hand and actual political participation on the other, is not only the sign of a strong and confident government but, more importantly for our purposes, will assure expatriate elites against undue hardship once they return. Furthermore, any Arab government would do well to disabuse itself of the notion that the political views of individuals are unchanging and un-

changeable appendages to their person. It is both ludicrous and counter-productive to assume that the middle-class, thirty-five year-old, married professor or engineer is the same "radical" student of college days, for instance.

2. Pay discrimination in favor of non-Arab nationals should be reduced if not completely eliminated. This is a complaint that is frequently and bitterly heard from educated Arabs at home. Of course, foreign experts are sometimes needed and they have to be attracted at salaries competitive with what they get back home in addition to hardship pay and inducements to have them work in an alien environment. Nevertheless, wherever possible, the rule should be "equal pay for equal talent and service." Once the salaries (and standard of living generally) are raised to an appropriate level, then these grievances and the basis for them will disappear. Until then, a conscious effort to avoid such extreme discrimination is essential. As a general rule of thumb, the pay of non-Arab nationals should not exceed that of Arab nationals on the same educational and employment level by more than 10% for the same service.

3. Ascriptive criteria of employment should be modified (their complete disappearance may be too much to expect for some time) in order to make possible employment on the basis of merit also. In a traditional society, the family (both nuclear and extended) is the basic social *and* economic unit. Business enterprise, government largesse, and important official posts are, therefore, farmed out to relatives even when not deserving, rather than to an outsider, even if he is talented.

The Arab world is no longer a traditional society and emphasis on merit in employment criteria has gained favor. Nonetheless, favoritism toward relatives or, per-

haps more important today, people with a *wasta* (intermediary) is rather widespread and generates resentment among many an educated Arab who does not have or does not wish to use a *wasta* to get a job.

4. Although the education of students at home and abroad constitutes a substantial national investment, misguided laws and poor coordination in many Arab countries combine to drive many of the best educated to emigrate or to remain abroad if they are already there. It should not be difficult to remove these handicaps. For instance, laws discriminating against Arabs married to non-Arab nationals are in the end harmful to the country promulgating them. They are not likely to discourage many from marrying foreigners but will most certainly persuade them to get out of their homeland. In any case, the basic premise that marriage to a foreigner is somehow unpatriotic is unreasonable to say the least. A more positive approach to the problem would be to encourage students going abroad to marry before they leave and to take their families with them, thus strengthening their bond to the homeland and increasing the chances of return after the period of study is over.

Being given the wrong job in the wrong department can be the result of poor coordination and bad laws. Military service illustrates this well. In some Arab countries, unless one has the right *wasta* or pays waiver money, one is inducted in the armed forces for 2-3 years even though he is thirty years or older. Furthermore, he receives nominal pay and is quite likely to be assigned to the wrong job, thus isolating him from his specialty and denying the country the benefits of his education. If the concept of national service is broadened to make it possible for the highly educated to serve in their particular specialities for the required 2-3 years, with the minimum

necessary military drill, then both they and the country would be better off—and an obstacle to repatriation would be removed.

5. The emphasis on titles or the mere attainment of an academic degree should be reduced to be replaced by a concern for knowledge, the search for truth and for excellence in whatever job one undertakes. This phenomenon is not peculiar to the Arab or non-Western world. But it is more crucial for the areas seeking rapid social and economic development to go beyond mere formal education and encourage the desire for doing a job well no matter how unimportant it seems and regardless of whether or not anybody is watching. The establishment and growth of a true community of scholars is then also facilitated. One cannot overestimate the importance of interested and concerned public officials in this particular area, since their own example as well as their official position can be used to good effect.

Having discussed some suggestions for change in attitudes and practices at home, we now turn to the positive measures which can be instituted.

Positive Measures

1. The first and most important step is for the League of Arab States and/or for individual Arab countries to set up employment or liaison offices abroad. To begin with, one such office in North America (New York or Chicago) and one in Western Europe (London or Paris) are the very minimum. Without such offices, Arabs finishing their studies abroad or even those who have resided in the West for many years but desiring to return to the Arab homeland are faced with the impossible task of finding a suitable job upon their arrival. I know from personal experience as well as from numerous reports relayed to me by friends in a similar position that

to secure a job in the Arab world while one is in the U.S. or Europe is—unless one has a *wasta*—at best frustrating and humiliating and, at worst, bound to fail after a trying and difficult period. In fact, it is not uncommon for the government, business or university which is contacted by a prospective employee to ignore any and all his applications. One does not know, in other words, whether or not his application ever reached the right office or the responsible official.

Occasionally, however, a response is made but other complications arise. An example from personal experience is illustrative. When I was about to get my Ph.D., I wrote to various universities in the Arab world seeking a position there. Only one such university answered—three months after my initial letter. I had applied in early January and the response came in March. It would have still been all right if a decision could have been made shortly afterwards. However, I was told that I should send in a formal application in the summer, that the budget would not be approved until July, and that appointments would be made in August! This is a combination of poor planning and what might be termed the "*bukra* (tomorrow) phenomenon"—putting off until tomorrow what needs to be done today.

What has to be made crystal clear to Arab governments and to Arab League officials interested in attracting Arab talent now abroad is that they are in competition with agencies which hire their personnel 9-12 months ahead of the time when work actually begins. This necessitates planning and anticipation of needs at least one year in advance. Otherwise, the best Arab graduates of Western universities will have found and secured lucrative positions in their host countries and the Arab world will have lost some of its most educated

sons and daughters as well as a major economic-educational investment. To be more specific, unless the Arab student is under a government contract to return to his homeland after graduation, the Western-educated Arabs who are willing to wait until 1-2 months before the employment date to actually be appointed belong to one of three categories: (1) They have decided to return to the Arab world and are willing and capable of waiting perhaps several months for an appropriate position, (2) They have a *wasta* and feel sure that an opening will be found for them somewhere, or (3) They have been unable to find a job in the host country for one reason or another.

Employment offices are, therefore, essential in order to process the numerous requests for job opportunities in the Arab homeland. Such offices can serve as a clearing house and a two-way channel of communication between the Arab governments and business on one hand and the Arab professionals abroad on the other.

When such offices are set up (I do not say if, since I believe they are most essential if the Arab world is serious about the brain drain problem), then the personnel in charge have to be selected with care. They should be people who themselves received their education in the West, have a general understanding of the various educational fields and can make reasonable judgments concerning the jobs available and the right candidates for such jobs. Speed and efficiency have to be the hallmarks of such offices. Also, cooperation from the various Arab governments will have to be extensive and unhampered by the usual red-tape.

For such offices to function optimally, they should be separate from country or Arab League official posts since they might otherwise be associated with political or

special informational campaigns. Neither can such offices be operated by amateur groups or organizations lacking the finances and personnel to run them. The estimated cost of such offices, at least for the first year or two of operation, is as follows:

Rent = \$600-\$1,000 month,
 \$ 7,200/yr. — \$12,000/yr.
Director: \$25,000/yr.
Secretary — Full time \$10,000/yr.
Secretary — Part time \$ 5,000/yr.
Office supplies, etc.
 — non-recurring \$ 2,000
Travel, incidentals \$ 5,000/yr.
Total = about \$60,000 per office/yr.
2 offices = \$120,000/yr.

2. The above suggestion, if adopted, would be particularly useful in recruiting younger scholars and those just finishing their higher studies—perhaps at the best time for luring them back home. An effective means of attracting expatriate Arab elites who are already well-established in their various fields abroad is to initiate a large-scale “exchange” program on the university, government and business levels. Under such a program, a professional of Arab descent is invited to accept a visiting appointment for 1-2 years to replace a professor, a government employee or a business executive who is sent abroad for further education or specialization. Such a program would have the following advantages: (1) It helps to improve the general quality and education of Arab personnel, (2) It familiarizes the expatriate Arab with the problems and needs of his homeland which he will be in a better position to help either doing research on the subject when he returns to his job abroad or (3) He might well decide to stay in the Arab world now that he has come and felt the need, the challenge, or the satisfaction of being in the Arab world.

This exchange program can be carried

out independently on the country level, through an agency of the League of Arab States, or through U.N. or other foreign technical aid programs. The cost of such a program will depend on the qualifications and ranks of the participants as well as the standard of living in the host country. In general, an average of \$15,000 per person should cover salaries and travel.

3. National universities in the Arab world must be upgraded, especially in the area of graduate studies. In order to have an effective upgrading effort, it is necessary to conduct a major survey of Arab universities and the different colleges and departments within each one as well as the manpower needs of the Arab world in the various professional disciplines. The pay of professors in many national universities needs to be doubled or tripled in order to encourage good teachers and dissuade them from working at two or three jobs. The reduction of the teaching load to 6 or 9 credit hours is an added encouragement for research activity. At the same time, the poor teachers could then be gradually channeled into non-teaching careers or shifted to secondary schools where they can perform a useful service. Such measures would help stem the outflow of Arab talent as well as induce Arab elites abroad to consider permanent appointments back home.

The cost of upgrading Arab universities is not easy to estimate, though it could well be in the neighborhood of a thousand million dollars. This is not prohibitive, though it may be sometime before it is feasible to carry out.

4. If the upgrading of all universities and institutes is not possible in the near future, it is quite possible and worthwhile to establish in the Arab world what Professor Edward Shills calls Centers of Excellence. These centers, universities as well as institutes, though few in number, can

act as the nucleus of attraction for highly skilled professionals and achieve the objectives outlined in the previous suggestion, albeit on a reduced scale.

Budgets for such centers or institutes will vary according to the objectives, subject area and need. In general, however, a budget of 3-5 million dollars per year will probably be needed to establish and run each such institute.

5. Related to the above, expatriate as well as indigenous Arab professionals in various fields might be encouraged to focus their attention on specific needs and problems of the Arab area. This can be done by setting up a major tax-free foundation (similar to the Ford or Rockefeller foundations in the U.S.) to sponsor 1-2 year research projects by Arab expatriates on Arab problems in the Arab countries. At the same time, resident Arab professionals who have excelled in their field of specialty may qualify for 1-2 year grants to go abroad for research and closer contact with the latest developments in their field. This part would be similar to one initiated by the Indian government known as the Nehru scholarship program.

Several private philanthropic foundations can be set up in and for the whole Arab area. To begin with, one well-endowed individual or family might set up a \$10,000,000 tax-free foundation as capital to be invested in stocks and/or in a savings bank. In general, the return on such an investment is not less than 10% per year or \$1,000,000. It is this \$1,000,000 profit that is then used to encourage research on Arab problems. If we assume that the administration of these funds in the processing of applications and distribution of grants consumes about 10% of the original sum (i.e., \$100,000) then we are left with \$900,000 for research fellowships. At an average of \$15,000 per fellowship, a total

of 60 professional Arabs can be given a chance *every year* to work on Arab problems either at home or abroad.

Once more, the scholarship committee needs to be composed of individuals of high integrity. Also, especially in the social sciences and the humanities, there has to be diversity of opinion in order to avoid favoring a particular solution even before the research is done. Otherwise, it turns out to be not scholarly research but mere declarations of particular ideologies and costly propaganda material.

Also, there needs to develop a better understanding of scholarly research in order to facilitate the process of gathering information and conducting interviews. There are many difficulties in this area which need to be discussed frankly and honestly before inefficiency and inertia can be separated from legitimate concern over national interest.

6. All the research, no matter how scholarly or scientific, is of little value if it is locked up in some office drawer and ignored—or if it is not shared by a community of scholars to be reviewed, utilized or expanded. This can be made possible only through good scientific journals which can and should be established. Such journals (with primarily Arab editorial boards but with international advisory bodies—a fairly common practice) are bound to have limited, but most necessary and important, circulation. In the social sciences and the humanities some of the writing will be controversial, but it should, at the very least, be recognized that such writing differs markedly from the political diatribe in a daily tabloid or a weekly magazine.

The various fields is a further inducement for expatriate professional Arabs to return or at least contribute scholarly studies. As it is now, most Arab professionals abroad

as well as many Arab professionals at home publish their important findings in whatever field in a respectable journal in the West and send mainly translated summaries to journals published in the Arab world. The situation can be changed radically and to great advantage at a reasonable price. Such journals, because of limited circulation, need to be subsidized, in the beginning at least—but without censorship or control. The cost per journal will probably be \$15,000 - \$20,000 per year.

7. Finally, conferences on specific topics (such as industrial development in the Arab world) can be set up on a *regular* yearly basis to which expatriate as well as indigenous professionals are invited. The advantage of having these conferences on a regular basis is that it provides lead time for the potential participants to prepare adequately for the presentation of a scholarly contribution in their area of expertise.

Once more, such conferences are useful not only in the development of contacts and exchange of ideas between the resident Arab professional and his counterpart abroad. They also might induce the latter to consider returning to his homeland for shorter or longer periods.

The cost will depend on the number of conferences and the number of participants. An average of \$1,500 per participant (from N. America) should cover travel and accommodations.

8. Some manpower surveys are now being conducted especially by the Institute for Palestine Studies and the Industrial Development Center for Arab States (IDCAS)

to gather basic information on Arab professionals abroad. These are worthy efforts which need to be encouraged and expanded. Furthermore, in order to speak more authoritatively about Arab expatriates and how to attract them back, a major study of those expatriates, their attitudes, needs and desires is badly needed. The cost here will depend on how urgent the demand is for information on the subject. If the results are needed within a year or so, then the researcher needs to devote full time to the task. The cost would then amount to \$15,000-\$20,000

* * * *

No grandiose scheme for mass repatriation of Arab elites was presented because such would be illusory. Also, it is quite clear that little or no emotional language was used either to describe how expatriate professional Arabs feel about their homeland or how to appeal to that particular group. This is not because such appeals are totally useless nor is it because Arab elites abroad lack any emotional ties to their homeland. On the contrary, if that were the case, then the whole effort is doomed from the start. What is needed is to combine the emotional appeal of the various Arab governments with concrete measures which show the definite steps being implemented to attract this Arab talent back home. Similarly, Arab professionals abroad, seeing such positive steps, can then put an end to their yearning and return to play a happy and constructive role in the development of their homeland.



APPENDIX

TOTAL COST ESTIMATE SUMMARY OF STATISTICS

Upgrading Universities:	\$? ?
Private Philanthropic Foundation:	\$10,000,000.00
Research & Technical Institutes:	\$ 3,000,000.00 to
	\$ 5,000,000.00 to establish
Two Institutes:	\$ 6,000,000.00 to
	\$10,000,000.00
After the first year:	\$ 2,000,000.00 to
	\$ 4,000,000.00 / yr.
Employment office:	\$ 60,000.00 each
Two offices:	\$ 120,000.00 / yr.
Exchange Program: (per participant)	\$ 15,000.00
For 30 participants:	\$ 450,000.00 / yr.
Conferences: (per participant)	\$ 1,500.00
For 30 participants in TWO conferences / yr.	\$ 90,000.00 / yr.
Journals:	\$ 15,000.00 to
	\$ 20,000.00 each
Three journals (Sciences, social sciences & humanities)	\$ 45,000.00 to
	\$ 60,000.00 / yr.
Survey on migration of Arab Professionals:	\$ 15,000.00 to
	\$ 20,000.00
First year total:	\$17,000,000.00 to
	\$21,000,000.00
After first year:	about \$ 5,000,000.00
Employment Office + Exchange Program + Conferences + Journals:	about \$ 700,000.00
Employment Offices:	\$ 120,000.00


NOTES

1. One author states: "Modest estimates indicate that almost 30,000 Arab intellectuals have left Egypt, Syria and Iraq for America since late 1967." Abdo A. Elkholy, "The Arab-Americans: Nationalism and Traditional Preservations," in Elaine C. Hagopian and Ann Paden (eds.) *The Arab-Americans: Studies in Assimilation* (Wilmeite, Ill.: Medina Univ. Press, 1969), p. 14. *Time* (February 9, 1970), p. 24, reported that "each year 15,000 well-educated Egyptians emigrate, many to Canada." Different figures are quoted in A.B. Zahlan, *The Brain Drain: Lebanon and Middle Eastern Countries* (Beirut, Mimeographed, November, 1969). According to Zahlan, 40,000 students annually leave the Arab world for study abroad. On the average, 20% of them brain drain. On the whole, "some 95% of all Arab college graduates remain in, or return to, the Arab world." *Ibid.*, p. 9. But Zahlan goes on to argue that the 5% that brain drains includes some of the best minds of Arab graduates.



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TUNISIAN EDUCATION:

SEEDS OF REVOLUTION ?

Malcolm H. Kerr

Early in February of 1972, students rioted in the streets of downtown Tunis, shouting slogans against President Habib Bourguiba and his regime. For the first time since Bourguiba led Tunisia into independence in 1956, opposition to him was now being openly and vigorously expressed—by the very people who owed their privileged status to him: the students in Tunisia's mushrooming system of higher education. As these words are written a few weeks later, it is impossible to predict what, if anything, might come of this particular event. Nonetheless, its symbolic importance is considerable. The essential fact is that all the money and attention that the Tunisian government has invested in education over the years can now be seen to have led straight to an explosive and basically insoluble social and political problem.

Since 1960 Tunisia has been spending a higher proportion of her national income

and state budget on education than any other country in the world. This was the result of a deliberate choice of priorities made by Bourguiba and his partners after independence. One important purpose was to democratize the society, a purpose which has largely been achieved: the social revolution is a solid and, in itself, admirable reality, as many thousands have received an education that had been well beyond the reach of their fathers. Of course, this was enormously expensive; but the expense was conceived by Tunisia's leaders as a sound economic investment which would eventually pay off in the productivity of the newly trained manpower. It was this investment that was the second purpose, and it is this purpose that has been unsuccessful. The economy has stagnated, and with it the atmosphere has soured. The practical consequences are being felt by ever-growing numbers of young Tunisians

emerging from various levels of the educational system and finding that the career opportunities to match their schooling simply do not exist. Many who have been trained for very specific kinds of work find their services unwanted; others lack the incentive to pursue the careers for which they have been trained, because of low pay and demoralizing conditions of work. Many of those with the most advanced and expensive education are looking for the chance to emigrate. There is a developing climate of anxiety and, in some instances, outright alienation.

Until now, the wide-open door of educational opportunity has served as a means of unifying Tunisians of all social backgrounds behind the regime, and has thus been a useful antidote to domestic conflict. Any curtailment of such opportunities, which in effect would be an acknowledgment by the government that there was only room in the lifeboat for some of the ship's passengers, would be likely to provoke social strife with a vengeance. Already before 1972 there were a number of signs of growing disillusionment with the ageing and ailing President and his regime: a series of strikes at the University of Tunis, for instance, and a riot, with political overtones, that erupted at a football match in the summer of 1971. Could matters be put right within the existing system, by means of piecemeal reforms in the educational program and improved planning of the economy? Perhaps, but in recent years it has seemed increasingly likely that much more drastic medicine will be needed.

The Investment: A few statistics will illustrate the impressive scope of Tunisia's efforts in the field of education. From 1960 to 1968 the budget of the Ministry of Education climbed from 17% to 26.4% of the total state budget, from 4.7% to 10.5%

of national income, and from 5.3% to 12.5% of per capita private consumption (By comparison, in 1968 Holland and the U.S. each spent 7.5% of national income on education, while in Eastern Europe the figure ranged from 5% to 7.5%. In terms of percentage of national budget, worldwide figures generally range between 15% and 20%. In fact, the actual Tunisian figure reached in 1968 was higher than 26.4%, since other government Ministries also spent funds on particular educational programs under their supervision.)

Primary school enrollment rose from 213,000 in 1956 to 900,000 in 1969, or from 29% to 72% of school-age children; secondary school enrollment rose from 33,000 in 1959 to 117,000 in 1968; and university enrollment (excluding foreigners) rose from 1,908 in 1960 to 7,440 in 1968. By 1971 the student body of the university and other institutions of higher learning had reached 10,800. In addition, approximately 3,000 Tunisians were studying abroad, mainly in France.

This rapid expansion would not have been possible without the employment of a large number of French teachers. While these had all been replaced at the primary school level by Tunisians by the end of the 1960's, there remained over 3,000 in secondary teaching and 150 at university level. These and other French *coopérants* in other professions have been paid, according to certain negotiated formulae, mainly by the Tunisian government—but at French salary rates which are perhaps four times as high as those applicable to Tunisians, even though the *coopérants* are often young, inexperienced, and ill-qualified. This has added heavily to the overall cost of the educational program and has added to the desire of the government to hasten the process of Tunisification, but at secondary

and university levels this cannot be done quickly. Meanwhile the expense continues to grow as enrollments expand and French pay scales also rise. During the years 1960-1968 the cost of national education grew at the rate of 14% a year, while gross domestic product was growing only at 4.1% a year (and was offset by a 2.8% annual population increase). At this rate, by 1976 education would consume 17% of gross domestic product—clearly more than the economy could sustain.

But can Tunisia seriously consider cutting down on school enrollments? It would be extraordinarily difficult. Those who pass the elementary school program successfully clamor for entry into the secondary system, and those who pass the Baccalauréat cannot be turned away from the University. Yet the numbers being fed into this pipeline are growing steadily, swept along by a demographic structure in which some 25% of the entire population is of elementary school age—about twice the rate of many European countries. This statistic alone suggests a threatening prospect for the future, with the continuing progress toward full enrollment in elementary schools being followed by an inexorable flood into secondary and university-level institutions as well, and with mushrooming costs and declining quality. And as detailed studies in Tunisia have shown, the financial cost per student rises very steeply as one moves up the ladder. Thus from 1960 to 1968 the State spent 23 Dinars per year per elementary student, 123 Dinars per intermediate (junior high) student, 140 Dinars per secondary student, and (from 1965 through 1968) 667 Dinars per university student. Tunisia thus spent less than one-fifth what France did per elementary student, but *more* than France per university student.

There are several reasons for this out-

landish ratio. With the concentration of highly paid foreign teachers at the university, annual faculty salary costs per student from 1965 to 1968 averaged 271 Dinars, while the construction of buildings and facilities added another 167 Dinars. But what is now becoming the subject of particular controversy is the exceedingly liberal scholarship program, which during these four years cost an annual average of 229 Dinars per student enrolled. In principle, any Tunisian who passes the Baccalauréat can enroll at the University and receive a government scholarship as long as he remains in good standing, provided he is willing to commit himself to work for the government for ten years. The amounts vary among Faculties, and during the 1960's were lower than today, but in 1970-71 over 60% of the University's 10,800 students held scholarships in amounts ranging between 350 and 450 Dinars per year. This approximates two to three times the average per capita consumption in the country and exceeds the entire family income of a good many students, who use their scholarships to help support their parents. The government's rationale is that holders of the Baccalauréat already possess earning power at this level, which they forfeit in order to continue their education, and that those from the poorest families would otherwise be under great pressure to quit and go to work, thus defeating the social-democratic objective of the educational system. But the state, which now spends almost three million Dinars a year on scholarships, cannot easily plan to increase this allotment in proportion to the enrollment, which is expected to triple in the next nine years. And the alternatives are difficult. A decline in the percentage of students on scholarship, or in the size of scholarships, would be socially regressive; the concentration of scholarships in those Faculties whose gradu-

ates are most needed in the economy (e.g. sciences, medicine, engineering) would be inequitable in other ways, and would ensure, for instance, that the legal profession would be the perpetual preserve of the upper class. The Director of Planning in the Ministry of Education advocates replacing the entire scholarship program with a student loan system, but so far he has made few converts to the idea. Meanwhile, while the debate goes on, the costs continue to rise. In November 1971 Prime Minister Nouria announced an increase in the size of scholarships, and in December no less than 39.5% of the total national operating budget approved by the legislature was allotted to education.

The Returns: These high costs would not matter so much if Tunisia were a well-endowed country or if there were reason to believe that the investment would pay off significantly in terms of economic productivity. In neighboring Algeria, for instance, the situation is altogether different: the oil and gas industry provides a considerable reservoir of capital for investment in agriculture and industry, as well as in education, all at the same time; there is plenty of room for the development and expansion of agriculture; there is a much larger domestic market than in Tunisia. What Algeria glaringly lacks is trained manpower in just about every field, and consequently there is an unambiguous effort to put young Algerians through school, and then to work, as rapidly as possible. Young men with higher education do not lack for career opportunities. Algeria does have educational problems, but they are of a different sort: notably, Arabization and the modification of an inherited French curriculum.

Tunisians are also concerned with questions of language and curriculum, but their

most pressing concern is inescapably the economic one. This concern is sharpened by the very disappointing rate of growth of the economy in general: from 1956 to 1964, a 5.5% annual increase in gross domestic product, but since 1965 only half that rate. The ratio of invested capital to increased output during the 1960's moreover, was a dismal 5.45 to one.

Doesn't education generate economic development? Presumably, in some ways; the mechanisms, however, are anything but clear to the econometricians. But where is the evidence in Tunisia even for the general proposition? And what are the prospects that the growing number of graduates of the University, the lycées, and the trade schools will really be absorbed into productive roles in the economy? And what about the dropouts and repeaters, who exist in such a large proportion in Tunisian schools?

A conservative approach, which appears to be taking hold currently in the relevant government ministries, would measure the projected educational manpower in various fields against presently foreseeable job prospects, on the implied assumption that the schools ought not to be training people for whom there is no anticipated need. A more liberal approach, which characterized Tunisia's initial plunge into mass education after 1956 has tended to look more to the new classes of educated people to create their own economic opportunities, or at least to stimulate a significant margin of new enterprise on the part of potential employers, including the State itself.

Two studies have been made in recent years, one in the Ministry of Planning and one for the Ministry of Education by Professor R. Delorme of the University of Limoges. Both of these attempt to forecast manpower needs up to 1980 and to match

these with the available supply, and both conclude that the overall demand for university graduates (*cadres supérieurs*) will at least equal the supply over this period, although a surplus may arise subsequently as the university's enrollment reaches its anticipated plateau at about 30,000. But whereas the Ministry of Planning study forecasts a slight overproduction of secondary graduates and the equivalent (*cadres moyens*), notably including a considerable excess of graduates of non-agricultural trade schools, the Delorme report concludes that there will be an across-the-board shortage of *cadres moyens*. (Presumably Delorme omitted trade-school graduates from his calculations, although that was not made clear.)

As these two studies rely on highly divergent statistics and both fail to make certain calculations and assumptions clear, it is difficult to know what sense to make of their conclusions. It is noteworthy, however, that the Planning report was deliberately based on the most optimistic projections of job needs, in order to draw attention to the conclusion that even under the best circumstances there would be an oversupply of *cadres moyens*. In fact to judge from some sections of the report, it appears to be assumed that the economy will grow at a rate of at least 6% annually, or twice the rate that prevailed from 1965 through 1970.

In 1971 the economy showed a marked improvement, with record-breaking olive oil production and influx of tourists. Still, at the end of the year the Minister of National Economy, Tijani Chelli, told the press that the creation of new jobs had become an urgent national problem, and that according to current projections, unemployment over the coming decade would rise by 213,000, even after allowing for an emigration figure of 160,000.

Whatever the precise shape of this numbers game, the picture in practice seems a good deal less hopeful than any of these reports suggests. Even assuming that jobs could be found for virtually everybody from now to 1980, in itself this would not say anything about the productivity of the economy nor about the anxieties of Tunisian youth. For example, there is an undoubted need for thousands of elementary and secondary school teachers, and many graduates will no doubt accept such jobs because they are legally obligated to do so, or because they cannot find anything better; yet they may continue to be demoralized, as they are already now, by the low pay and by assignment to provincial towns. It is widely believed that thousands of Tunisians who are presently well qualified to replace French *coopérants* do not do so because they have been lucky enough to find better-paying jobs elsewhere (an outlet that is now saturated), or have emigrated.

Similarly, among all those trained at university or secondary level in agriculture, where the need for technical and scientific skills is undeniable, many prefer to live in the cities and pursue urban professions. A Ministry of Agriculture source reports that the overwhelming majority of children who complete elementary school in the countryside subsequently migrate to urban areas. Holders of university degrees in other subjects that are much more popular such as law, commerce, and economics, do not possess the specific skills that would make desirable to potential employers in the private sectors; the government, for its part, badly needs economists, but according to reports it finds few good ones.

At the non-agricultural technical secondary level the problem reaches scandalous proportions. Several recently published studies in Tunisia confirm that unemploy-

ment and misemployment of trade-school graduates are rampant. Employers testify that they often find technically trained mechanics and craftsmen unsuitable: even if they are trained well, it is likely to be in the use of advanced equipment which the employer does not possess; the smallness of the Tunisian domestic market rules out more than a modicum of expansion and modernization in the manufacturing and maintenance industries. Moreover, the young men are said to be spoiled, over-demanding, and unresponsive to the directives of their employers; hence it is preferable to hire illiterates at lower pay, and train them on the job to do exactly what is needed.

In short, at all levels of the educational system, whether jobs really lie vacant or not, the common problem is that education does not prepare students to perform the particular kinds of work that are actually available to them, or which they are of a mind to accept. It has proved much easier for the Tunisian government to send its citizens to school than to put them effectively to work. Yet the schooling is increasingly expensive, as we have noted. Furthermore, it is alarmingly wasteful in terms of the success ratios among students. Thus only 40% of those who enter the academic secondary program ever complete it, while at the University the rate is only 30%. The Tunisians in this respect have inherited a notorious weakness of the educational systems of France, where similar rates of failure prevail. It means not only that large sums of money are wasted on the schooling of eventual dropouts, but also that the labor market is saturated with unqualified people.

Clearly a major source of the difficulty is to be found in the elementary school classrooms, where student-teacher ratios are

high (52 to one in 1968-69) and many teachers are underqualified even according to formal criteria (40% of all elementary teachers in 1968-69 had not even completed their own secondary education, or lacked other requirements). But this situation, whose ill effects are felt all the way down the line in the school system, the economy, and the society at large, could hardly be corrected as long as the government continued to spend 29 times as much money on each university student as on each elementary pupil. (In industrialized countries generally, this ratio lies between five and seven to one.)

Social and Political Consequences: Tunisia appears to present a classic example of a cultural-political-social problem in many developing countries: rapid social and psychological mobilization as a consequence of the spread of education, which however greatly outruns the available economic outlets, plus a political leadership devoted to the principle of social progress but ill-equipped to cope with the consequent challenge to its wisdom and authority.

The bulk of the current student body of the University of Tunis, 10,800 strong, were between the ages of two and five when Tunisia became independent, and between six and nine in 1961 when the clash with French troops at Bizerte caused several thousand Tunisian casualties. Inevitably, among this age group, the reputation of Bourguiba and his generation as nationalist militants and social revolutionaries is therefore pretty dim, and the officially propagated personality cult is pretty cloying. The decision to invest so heavily in education after independence was certainly a bold stroke at the time, worthy of the intensely nationalist background of the Neo-Destour Party; but at the same time it amounted to a massive borrowing of poli-

tical credit, and those who are today going to school as the beneficiaries are perhaps the least inclined to feel gratitude toward the regime and ease its burden of repayment. On the contrary, they see themselves as the primary creditors, for it is their life aspirations which have been enhanced and which they clamor to fulfill. Thus what was initially a kind of political cement appears to be turning into dynamite. Once the gates of social opportunity have been opened, they cannot be closed without provoking conflict. This leaves the government with a choice between economic and political impossibilities.

Views of the nature of this problem and of what should be done naturally differ, but only in degree. Some say that in view of the prospective job shortage (if there is one) and the likely unrest, it would be better to curtail school enrollments, while others believe either that the jobs are potentially there or that the social democracy of mass education is too important to be sacrificed. But even if the latter group would like to see the expansion of education continue indefinitely, they face the undeniable problem of its prohibitive expense. Nor can they disagree that the heavy proportion of dropouts and failures is wasteful and pernicious.

Consequently it was inevitable that some moves would be made to tighten up at least on the enrollment of weaker students, and equally inevitable that such moves would provoke counterreactions. In the Spring of 1970 the determination of the government to reduce enrollments became a matter of public gossip and caused general anxiety. Officials in the Ministry of Planning, for example, were urging that the proportion of students allowed to pass from elementary to academic secondary status be reduced from 40% to 27%. Under a compromise

formula negotiated with the more permissively minded Ministry of Education, they were only able to achieve a cutback to about 36%.

More open and serious conflicts occurred at the University. In the fall of 1970 a new regulation reduced the number of times unsuccessful students could repeat their examinations; some 800 students were thus threatened with retroactive elimination. Under threat of a strike, Dr. Chedly Ayari, the Minister of Education who doubled as Dean of the Faculty of Law and Economics, beat a retreat through a technical loophole which saved the 800 but left the new rule on the books for the future. Meanwhile, however, a strike did occur among science and medical students over a farcical issue concerning the location of a bus-stop; the strikers returned to class when threatened with the suspension of their scholarships.

In December 1970 the Faculty of Law and Economics promulgated a new system of mid-year examinations to supplement the year-end examinations on which the fate of students had previously been totally dependent. The declared purpose of this new program of "contrôles des connaissances" was purely pedagogical, but many students saw in the plan yet another device to flunk more of them out so as to ease the University's problem of over-population. The exams, at first scheduled for February, were put off to March 8, then March 13; there was talk of negotiations between students and administration over the weighting of the exams, but none occurred. At length a strike began on March 1, and four days later the Minister-Dean formally closed the Faculty, thus automatically suspending all scholarships. Ayari, a moderate and enlightened man who in the past had been something of a defender of the interests of students, was evidently exasperated and de-

terminated not to yield on a matter in which the official policy had been so carefully and deliberately established.

However, locking students out and denying them their scholarships was drastic political medicine indeed—too drastic for the ailing President Bourguiba, who sent word from his sanatorium in Geneva reproving the students but overruling his Minister and calling for the resumption of classes. Ayari and his professors insisted that the exams should proceed as scheduled on March 13, but no one came to take them, and eventually Ayari was overruled altogether by an extraordinary meeting of the 81-member General Committee of the Socialist Destourian Party and compelled to cancel the mid-term exams. It was symbolically appropriate that this supposedly pedagogical issue should have been ultimately decided by the ruling political party rather than by any academic agency, and that the decision should have been made in favor of the students, i.e. those who had flouted established authority but whose aspirations for social advancement were in jeopardy. After Bourguiba finally returned from his Swiss convalescence in June, he appeared at a ceremony at the University and made statements implying that as long as he remained in charge, the doors to education would continue to be wide open. This was certainly a popular message, but would students accord any credit to Bourguiba himself for it? Was it really workable for much longer? What would happen when further efforts were made to move away from it?

Not only Bourguiba himself but the whole Tunisian political system has much less to commend itself to youth today than to an older generation with longer memories. The Destourian Socialist Party which seeks always to advertise its ongoing militancy, evokes little enthusiasm among the

youth, and some students are openly contemptuous. The tightly controlled press restricts its reporting of Tunisian affairs to the most incredibly banal topics (headline: "President Bourguiba Receives Prime Minister Nouira"), and thus offers no outlet of expression whatever. Independent political activity, and even open discussion, have no place—as Tunisian intellectuals learned in the fall of 1968 when several dozen were given a kangaroo trial and sent to jail for the crime of publishing leftist ideas in a magazine. The subsequent dismissal and imprisonment of Ahmed Ben Salah, the former economic czar of the country, stimulated further wariness on the part of Tunisians who previously had not had to worry about what it was safe to say and to whom. At the time of his fall Ben Salah had been unpopular with countless small (and large) proprietors and merchants, but he subsequently became a belated object of sympathy among some of the young and better-educated, who now see him as a scapegoat for the failures of an ageing and vindictive President.

In the fall of 1971 such sympathies found a new object, when Bourguiba vented his willfulness on his popular Minister of Interior, Ahmed Mestiri, who had dared to criticize the authoritarian practices of the regime and to advocate steps toward liberalization. Bourguiba dismissed Mestiri from office, but soon afterward the Congress of the Destourian Socialist Party elected Mestiri to the Central Committee by a resounding majority. Bourguiba retaliated by expelling Mestiri from the Party and barring him from all political activity. Other liberally inclined men resigned or were dropped from high office, including the luckless Dr. Ayari. The Mestiri affair was less dramatic than that of Ben Salah, but in a way it cut deeper as far as educated Tunisians were concerned. Weary of the

absurd Bourguibist cult of personality and eager for a freer atmosphere of political expression, they could read Mestiri's treatment as a direct rebuff to themselves and their aspirations.

A few years ago such dissatisfaction might have mattered much less. They are, after all, the special problems of a restricted class of intelligentsia, and the average Tunisian could not be much interested. Now, however, the situation has changed. The stagnation of the economy, the persistent unemployment and the rising living costs, are everyone's concern, and the government is getting the blame. The economic upturn of 1971 is not enough to overcome this atmosphere, and it may or may not continue in 1972. With the youth-accented demographic structure and the advent of mass education, there is a rapidly growing new

mass of people capable both of feeling their frustrations sharply and expressing them articulately, and thus perhaps spearheading more broadly based popular dissatisfactions. In short, Bourguiba and his fellow militants who launched the educational revolution sixteen years ago are now finding that in the process, they have succeeded in creating their own opposition.

One might be tempted to shrug this off and say that Tunisians are too easy-going and peaceful (too "soft" in their own common expression) to turn to violence and rebellion. But to say this would be to imagine foolishly that after sixteen years of going to school, Tunisians haven't learned anything. In fact, if one lesson has surely been absorbed, it is that established authority—whether French or Tunisian—need not command their unthinking acceptance.

NOTES

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
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1946	134,000,000	19,000,000	70,000,000	2,180,000
1951	175,000,000	26,000,000	104,000,000	1,527,000
1956	518,000,000	32,000,000	300,000,000	3,035,000
1961	773,000,000	89,000,000	498,000,000	6,915,000
1966	1,170,000,000	105,000,000	852,000,000	7,076,000
1971	1,452,000,000	130,000,000	1,067,000,000	7,535,000

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REVOLUTION IN DHOFAR

SULTANATE OF OMAN

Ray L. Cleveland

Internal political struggles in the Sultanate of Oman, on the eastern extremity of the Arabian Peninsula, have erupted in two serious armed conflicts since World War II. The first, under the nominal leadership of Ghalib bin Ali, who claimed the Ibadhi religious title "Imam of the Muslims,"

gained international attention in the summer of 1957. Using tribesmen partly trained and equipped in Saudi Arabia, generally conservative leaders of tribal factions, supported out of desperation by inchoate reformist forces, seized control of Nazwa and other towns on the inland slopes of the central massif known as Jabal Akhdhar.

Upon receiving news that his red banner had been replaced in disaffected districts by the white banner of the Ibadhi imamate, Saïd bin Taimur, the Sultan of Muscat and Oman (as the ruler was titled until 1970), invoked the aid of his treaty partner, Britain, and with military assistance from that source was able, within a few months, to reassert his authority over most of the interior of the country. However, it was January, 1959, before the three main leaders of the revolt, Ghalib bin Ali, his ambitious brother Talib (who gratuitously assumed the title *Amir*), and the notoriously rapacious and impious chieftain Sulaiman bin Himyar, were dislodged from an inaccessible mountain stronghold and forced to flee the country. Their activities in exile contributed to the major lasting effect of the rebellion, namely the damage done to the image of Sultan Saïd. He in fact had done nothing substantially different from what has been done by certain other Arab rulers, but the consequences for him were quite different. Among many Arabic-speaking people, and even some non-Arabs, the name of Saïd bin Taimur became a byword for a lackey of British imperialism, while those in the United Kingdom who favored disengagement regarded him as one of the unpopular and tottering monarchs who were being propped up to no worthwhile end.

The motives of the 1957 rebellion were mainly personal, parochial and secessionist, encouraged by the Arabian policy of the Saudi government. Notwithstanding, the

leaders of the rebellion represented their goals not only as religious but even more prominently as nationalistic—paying no regard to the contradictions. They were so successful that eventually the alleged suppression of the Omani people by Britain was discussed by the United Nations Organization.

The second major armed struggle in the Sultanate of Oman has taken place in the province officially known as the Dependency of Dhofar, which forms the southwestern end of the country, located on the southern coast of the Arabian Peninsula some 500 miles from the principal population centers of Oman. The name of the province indicates its separate administrative status. The conflict in the Dependency of Dhofar, which began in earnest following the end of British rule in Aden late in 1967, is of particular interest because the anti-government group has represented the struggle as a people's war of liberation from exploitative foreign domination, casting the Sultan in the role of reactionary puppet of capitalist imperialism. This conceptualization must be tested according to the historical genesis and societal context of the conflict.

The Dhofar area entered the 20th century very little affected socially or economically by the modern industrial world. As in the earlier periods, in this century the only towns have clung to the shore of the Arabian sea, existing on fishing, agriculture and trade. The towns have served as the commercial links between the coastwise sea traffic and the nomadic hinterland. The Dhofar Plain around Salala has had significant agricultural use only during periods when strong government has maintained security from the tribesmen of the mountains and adjacent steppe for whom raiding sedentary populations has been part of their

economy. Knowledge of the prosperity derived from oil in other parts of Arabia since the middle of the 20th century has created intense economic dissatisfaction in the face of continued local poverty.

Intensifying the tribal rivalries endemic in Arabia, the Dependency of Dhofar has in addition suffered the social and political consequences of a linguistic split. While most of the tribes of the northern deserts of the Dependency and nearly all townspeople of the coast are Arabic speaking, there are nomadic herdsmen concentrated in the mountains, but also found elsewhere, who speak a group of languages similar to one another but lacking mutual intelligibility with Arabic. Although historical linguists know these languages of the Mahri group to be remnants of Semitic tongues ultimately related to Arabic, this theoretical knowledge has no practical consequence, and this linguistic difference has conspired with tribalism to create separatist tendencies.

The principal non-Arabic language of the Dependency of Dhofar is Shahri, used by the Qara People of the mountains bearing their name in the central section of the coastal range. Shahri is locally often called Jabali by Arabic-speakers and occasionally Qarawi. It is quite similar to Mahri, the most widely used non-Arabic language of Arabia. Mahri is the dominant tongue of the Fifth Governate (easternmost province) of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen immediately to the west of the Sultanate of Oman' Dependency of Dhofar, and Mahri-speakers frequent parts of the Dependency. The linguistic affinity between Shahri and Mahri has influenced the loyalty patterns of the region, ignoring the international boundary, and has facilitated the supplying of the anti-government forces in the Dependency from the territory of People's Yemen.

The present direct rule of Dhofar by the Sultans of Oman had been firmly established before the end of the 19th century, though until the reign of Sultan Said genuine Omani administration often was exercised only in the settled areas of the central Dhofar littoral, while the hinterland remained in tribal strife. Before the 19th century Dhofar had been alternately subject to Persian, Portuguese, Hadhrami, and Yemeni, as well as Omani, influence. International recognition of Omani rule came about in large part through policies of Britain, the paramount power in the Indian Ocean through the 19th and early 20th century. The British involvement in this matter, however, was not a deliberately planned affair; indeed some of the actions were taken with reluctance. Britain's 19th-century interest in Arabia, as in other regions bordering on the Indian Ocean, grew primarily out of concern for secure access to India. Very simply stated, Britain's recognition of Omani rule in Dhofar grew out of specific events in which H.M. Government saw the danger of the area falling under the sway of the Ottoman Empire or one of its clients. Cooperative Oman was regarded as a safer custodian. An Omani goal pursued since early in the century was securely achieved, therefore, with British endorsement.

In general, the sedentary population of the Dhofar coastal towns preferred orderly Omani rule to anarchy, raiding and cyclic vendetta. The tribes of the mountains and steppe, on the other hand, found their manner of life inhibited. For one thing, their raiding of the sedentary population was curtailed. For another, they resented taxation on goods bought and sold in the markets of the towns. Furthermore, the Qara People of the mountain slopes were independent minded, and their pride resisted the idea that their own slopes should

be considered to be under the suzerainty of an outsider. This dichotomy between the settled and nomadic communities has persisted into the current generation.

Various dissatisfactions of the Qara tribesmen were intensified when Dhofar Cities Service Petroleum Corporation began exploration in 1953, then drilling in 1955. Many Qara and members of other tribes questioned the right of the Sultan to grant a concession, without consulting them, which included areas to which according to tribal folkways they had certain rights. Sedentary and nomadic attitudes again clashed. The Sultan's government received payments from the Company, levied impost on certain of its supplies, and taxed its employees, but tribal leaders received only limited stipends as a share of this income. They were disappointed when they compared their allotments with the extravagant sums passed out by King Saud to guarantee the loyalty of the tribes in his domains.

The economic grievance was an added irritant to Qara sensibilities. When a motorable road was being constructed and improved in the 1950s, running north from Salala across the mountains to the desert, some of the Qara were employed as laborers, but after it was completed the particularistic Qara were displeased to see that they received no further profit from it, though in their view it violated their mountain sanctuary. On occasion seismic crews and exploration parties from the Company operating near the Qara Mountains were confronted by angry tribesmen who told them, "This is our land; Sultan Said cannot give you permission to come here." Work was sometimes interrupted, though in the early years no blood was shed.

An employment policy sought by Sultan Said and agreed to by the Company alienated many inhabitants of the Dependency.

Ever cautious, the Sultan feared that the Company would only operate for a few years and that if Dhofaris became accustomed to good jobs during that time, they would be dangerously dissatisfied when the Company left. For that ostensible reason, nearly all labor was imported. Unskilled labor was supplied mainly with men from Aden, largely Adenese Somalis. The aggrieved Dhofaris knew, some from travel experience, that in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait the companies hired and trained local manpower at relatively high wages. The Sultan and his retainers profited from the Company, but most people did not. For the Qara, this was a real grievance which contributed to their political unrest, already strongly based on tribalism and linguistic distinctiveness. Such was the situation when the present writer spent three months in Dhofar at the beginning of 1960.

Tribesmen of the Dependency of Dhofar have generally regarded Oman as a rather distant place from which members of other tribes have come to impose their rule. This rule was supported until 1970 mainly by Sultan Said's private guards of African descent, many of whom were owned outright as slaves, though in the last dozen years of his reign Sultan Said had a Regular Dhofar Force. This force was not entirely successful, however, because many of the local recruits lacked loyalty. For purposes of guarding Company installations and working parties, young men from Oman with antiquated rifles were imported at the expense of the Company. These guards, wearing characteristic Omani turbans and other garb, were distinctly non-Dhofari and to the local tribesmen represented another instance in which the profits of the oil industry were going to outsiders.

These domestic security arrangements provided for the Sultan's maintaining con-

trol of the Dependency. The international complications were the rental from the Sultan of a landing field just north of Salala by the R.A.F. on a yearly renewal basis and the use by the Sultan of British and Pakistani officers for training the Dhofar Regular Force. While the R.A.F. operated the field as a staging base between Aden and the Arab Gulf (until late 1967), it also furnished communications facilities for the Sultan's government and for the Company. (Since 1971 it has served as a staging base between Cyprus and Gan in the southern Maldives.)

It is inevitable, needless to say, that any kind of military installation (even as in this case what is officially a civil airfield under control of the Sultan) has a potential use in internal affairs of the country in which it is located. One is not surprised, furthermore, that the dissident tribesmen of the Dependency have not appreciated the nicety that the planes flying against them from the field are owned by the Sultan's government and flown by pilots hired by him. When an Arab delegate to the United Nations Organization in November, 1969, accused the United Kingdom of "maintaining a puppet regime to perpetuate the exploitation of natural resources," the R.A.F. installations at Salala appeared to be evidence. In terms of logistics the facility has been an asset, but politically a liability, to the Sultanate of Oman.

The present episode of rebellion in the Dependency of Dhofar began in 1963 when an armed group entered from Saudi Arabia. The Dhofar Liberation Front as such began to function in 1965. Its first activities were sporadic acts of terrorism directed not only against the government, but also against Dhofaris not belonging to the Qara faction, as well as against foreigners. A particularly spectacular action was an ambush on

the road winding up the slopes of the Qara Mountains. The driver of a Company truck was killed by an automatic weapon fired at point-blank range; the spray of bullets virtually dismembered his body. An Omani guard was also seriously wounded. The most daring action of the period was an attempt to assassinate Sultan Said in 1966 while he was reviewing the Dhofar Regular Force near Salala. The Sultan's own quick actions saved his life when one or more soldiers suddenly turned their guns on him.

While this terrorism placed restrictions on the operations of the Company, it was in fact mainly disappointing results of drilling which led to curtailment of operations. Dhofar Cities Service Petroleum Corporation had transferred its right to John W. Mecom and Pure Oil Company in 1962. After 1965 operations were continued by John W. Mecom, Union Oil Company of California, and Continental Oil Company. These interests abandoned the concession in 1967. In 1969 a six-year lease of the Dhofar concession was granted to Petroleum Development (Oman), the company which had already begun producing oil in central Oman in 1967. This company has continued exploration in the northern and central parts of the Dependency, but as of early 1972 had not undertaken drilling.

There was a notable improvement in the fortunes of the armed revolt in the latter part of 1969, when the insurgents deprived the government of control over the mountainous regions of the Dependency. The Mainland Chinese *HSINHUA News Agency* on December 9, 1969, asserted that "the heroic people's liberation army of Dhofar wiped out more than 130 enemy [i.e., government] troops" . . . from the September to late October. While the death count was exaggerated, the successes of the Front were apparent. Especially important was securing the lines of communication with People's

Yemen. Owing to its position near the border, the primitive little coastal village of Rakhut became a main staging base for supplying the Front. Following its much-heralded capture in August, 1969, its chief magistrate, an appointee of the Sultan's government, was given a summary trial and shot as a "British agent." By the end of 1969 the Sultan's control of the Dependency was limited mainly to an enclave around Salala, as well as the desert North.

Until 1968 what ideological and organizational direction the rebellion had was given it by the Dhofar Liberation Front, which had contacts with cells of revolutionaries in states of the Arab Gulf. The local support for the DLF was in large measure the Qara separatism, aiming at independence from Omani rule, mentioned above. What popular support the DLF had in the Dependency was not effectively organized, nor was material support available to it.

The transformation of the rebellion in the Dependency into something more consequential than it had been was the result of the achievement of independence by the British-protected states in the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula to the west of Oman, variously known as the "Aden Protectorates" and "South Arabia." Under the leadership of the National Liberation Front centered in Aden, the newly independent nation, named first the People's Republic of South Yemen, then in late 1970 renamed the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, emerged as a socialist and revolutionary entity. One of the major Arabian policies of South Yemen, or People's Yemen, has been helping to "liberate" all of the oil-producing Arabian states, particularly along the Gulf, from the putative exploitation of capitalist nations, particularly Britain. As first Dhofar, then the rest of

Oman were seen as the way to the Gulf, this policy of People's Yemen was the cause for the change in goals and fortunes for the Dhofar rebel leaders.

South Yemen became at once the supply base for material supplies for the dissidents in the Dependency of Dhofar. It also became a more convenient access route for the leadership, both Dhofari and non-Dhofari, required to organize and train the tribesmen. South Yemeni independence provided an opportune moment for Dhofari rebel leaders, trained in China and elsewhere, to return. They returned both with guerrilla training and with Maoism. South Yemeni and Marxist influence then altered the framework and scope of the DLF. In 1968 the organization changed its name to the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf (although Dhofar itself is not, of course, on the Gulf) and set up a coordinating office in Aden. The Dependency of Dhofar was no longer the objective in itself, but in the larger movement only a step toward overthrowing the monarchy in Oman, gaining control of its new oil income, and using the country as a base for "liberating" Trucial Oman and other states farther up the Gulf.

Maoism gave the rebels the ideological boost which they needed to make their activities into something less narrow and self-interested than the tribalism, factionalism and separatism which in the first instance gave rise to their movement. The simple clichés of the Arabic translation of *The Quotations of Mao Tse-tung* gripped the imaginations of idealistic youths. Just as the complexities of urban Islam had not been fathomed by the nomadic society of the Dependency, so the Little Red Book remained rote and undigested. But there was a fervor derived from the phrases that carried individuals beyond their immediate

personal interests.

PFLOAG was also to control the mountainous regions of the Dependency in late 1969 and make military forays against government forces because of these three changes (a supply base in South Yemen, an inspiring ideology, and trained leadership) of the preceding 18 months. Most significant was the new equipment, including mortars, heavy machine guns, anti-aircraft guns, and even light artillery. From the foothills, the rebels were in bare range of the R.A.F. landing field, but did not have the armor necessary to venture far out onto the Dhofar Plain or to confront the Sultan's forces. Because of the danger of grenades and hand-carried bombs, tribesmen were forbidden from entering the coastal towns. The edge of the Dhofar Plain became not only a battleline but almost a boundary between the areas of government control and rebel control.

For the Chinese government in Peking, Dhofar became important. The depth of the penetration of Maoism and the seriousness of the Front on a wider Arabian scale were exaggerated, but to the Chinese opinion-makers, Dhofar was proof that the validity of Maoism was universal in its appeal to those oppressed by capitalist imperialism and elitist ruling classes. The apotheosis of Chairman Mao was enhanced by the far-away non-Chinese of Dhofar. The *Peking Review* of January 23, 1970 (pp. 25-27) printed a report entitled "Dhofar Liberation Army Fighters and People Warmly Love Mao Tse-tung Thought." The article concluded with a song purportedly popular "among the revolutionary fighters and masses in Dhofar":

From Dhofar to Peking,

We salute the Chinese people—workers and peasants,

Our revolution supports you, truly supports you,

Long live the great teacher Mao Tse-tung!

One paragraph in this article interestingly identifies "the people of Dhofar" as a linguistic group who "As a result of the protracted colonial rule . . . still have no written language of their own." As writings systems have almost universally been developed by sedentary populations and not by nomads such as the Qara, it is difficult to see how some "colonial rule" can be blamed for the lack of a script for their language. More serious is the equation of "the people of Dhofar" with those who use a language other than Arabic. It is quite clear that a goodly number of natives of the Dependency, both the townspeople and many tribesmen speak Arabic dialects and do not know Shahri or any other language of the Mahri group. Thus the *Peking Review* report glibly disfranchised a very large number, perhaps a majority, of the inhabitants of the Dependency.

The Chinese and other socialist treatments of the Dhofar rebellion do not recognize the significance of the linguistic or other cultural factors in the conflict. Centuries of feuding along tribal and linguistic lines is ignored, as the conflict is pressed into a Marxist mould of class struggle. While the anti-government side has garbed traditional social values in a more abstract ideological fabric, the participants are in fact still practicing vendetta against their traditional enemies. If a historic Islamic parallel is wanted, one can cite the process by which economic, political and social discontent among the Berber population of the Maghrib during Umayyad and Abbasid rule there was manifest under the banners of religious schism, first Kharijite, then Shiite. In the present case, Marxism plays

the ideological role of dissent in opposition to the established political order which schism played so often in earlier eras.

Chinese news reports concerning the military actions of PFLOAG have used some rather inexact vocabulary in characterizing the nature of the conflict. In reports printed in *News from HSINHUA News Agency*, March 24, 1970 and April 1, 1970, the government forces, with their British and Pakistani mercenary officers, became "the British colonial troops and its [*sic!*] mercenaries." The employer-employee relationship was unabashedly reversed, while the foreign officers other than Britons in the Sultan's employ were not mentioned.

Another demonstration of Chinese friendship for the rebels in the Dependency of Dhofar came in the period soon after the military successes. According to the *Peking Review*, April 10, 1970, p. 38, a delegation led by Talal Saad Mahmud representing PFLOAG spent slightly more than a month in China and departed two days after having been received by Premier Chou En-lai, who "had a cordial and friendly talk with them." Sympathy for PFLOAG was also expressed by North Korea and North Vietnam. The only Arabian state to offer either sympathy or support was South Yemen, which at the time of the China visit was attempting to advance the Dhofar revolutionary movement with increased publicity. The oil-producing states of the Arab Gulf, which were the ultimate target of PFLOAG, did not feel immediately threatened and in any case did not express public support for the Sultan's unrewarded efforts to suppress the revolt. They generally thought the British government should either persuade Sultan Said to introduce in the Dependency the economic and social improvements needed to allay opposition or that Britain should arrange a change of

rulers. The latter alternative was a procedure which had already worked rather well in the case of Abu Dhabi with the disposition of Sheikh Shakhbut in 1966. The Omani monarch should have found a natural ideological ally in Saudi Arabia and have received aid (as did the Royalists in Yemen), but Saudi Arabia was still affected by hostility arising mainly from territorial ambitions, particularly in the region of Buraimi. Even an agreement to exchange ambassadors was not reached until the end of 1971, after Sultan Said had left the scene, and only with certain Omani concessions on the Buraimi issue.

There was, in early 1970, a widespread belief, even among his well-wishers, that Sultan Said was incapable, owing to his traditionalism and exasperating caution which often resulted in inaction, of managing affairs of state properly, especially in view of the successes of PFLOAG in addition to other rapidly changing circumstances. There were few regrets, then, when during the final week of July 1970, Sultan Said's palace on the shore at Salala was the scene of a gunbattle, lasting one and a half hours, which was the only violence accompanying the passing of control of the Sultanate to his only son Qabus (also spelled Qaboos). Although the new and younger ruler immediately moved to the capital at Muscat, where his father had not visited for many years, the Dependency of Dhofar remained one of his government's greatest causes for concern.

At the end of 1970 the insurgents still controlled all the mountains of the Dependency and were able to make short forays outside them. PFLOAG remained at its greatest potential. Its military leader, Muhammad Ahmad Ghassani, and more than a score of his officers possessed guerrilla training received in China. Several hundred of

its soldiers had received training in South Yemen, the present People's Yemen, or from Chinese advisors in the Dependency. In addition to its light artillery, mortars, and automatic rifles, the PFLOAG forces also had portable rocket-launchers of Russian make.

Thus at the beginning of 1971, Sultan Qabus, aided by his uncle Tariq bin Taimur as Prime Minister, faced a difficult situation in the Dependency. The southern slopes of the mountains are ideal terrain for guerrilla war. From deep ravines, the sides of which were pitted with large dark caverns, snipers could ambush army patrols with virtual impunity, as these regions were inaccessible to wheeled vehicles and hiding places undetectable from the air were everywhere. Furthermore, no others knew the trails and valleys like the Qara who lived there. The new Sultan's promises of economic development, his administrative reforms, and his efforts to establish contact with the citizenry improved the monarchy's security in Oman, but the cost of fighting the rebels in the Dependency, added to the costs of economic projects, and the loss of confidence accruing from the rebellion kept the young Sultan's fortunes under a cloud through most of 1971.

The first direct government counter-offensive in the Dependency began in late summer, 1971. The way for it had been prepared by conciliatory gestures. A year earlier Sultan Qabus had offered amnesty to every rebel who surrendered. After a number did, including a handful with middle ranks in PFLOAG's military wing, the Front used summary execution for anyone within the ranks suspected of disloyalty to the Revolution. That discouraged further desertions, but it also brought fear of the Front to some of those who had been attracted to it by its goals and promises.

Coupled with the new Sultan's efforts to improve conditions, this fear had a certain effect on loyalty to the Front. Sultan Qabus also abolished his father's ban on people from the rebel areas entering the coastal towns, which had served as a boycott to deny them markets as well as a security measure. Thereupon PFLOAG forbade anyone from its area of control going into the towns, taking upon itself the onus of being suppressor of individual freedom, which tribal Arabians value highly. However, what trends toward disillusionment with PFLOAG leadership existed made only a minor impact in the short term. Qara separatism and territoriality remained strong. The Sultan's armed forces were attacking Qara territory, and every loyal man had to defend Qara interests. PFLOAG was able to continue using long-established values and attitudes for its own purposes.

The Sultan's military offensive made slow gains during the last three months of 1971, but there was no realistic hope that it could gain control of the mountains in the foreseeable future by military means. The offensive could contain the rebels within certain areas and provide security in the remainder of the Dependency, but even limited objectives remained very costly. Furthermore the expense was not entirely popular in Oman, where people tend to think of Dhofar as distant and only of secondary importance. While the Sultan's government has been criticized for spending a large share of oil revenues on the military effort, it cannot afford to admit defeat, fearing that to do so would further undermine confidence. Also, Sultan Qabus has a personal attachment to Dhofar; it is his home. His mother belongs to a Qara family native to the area around Lake Darbat in the district of Taqa some thirty miles east of Salala, and Qabus himself grew up in Salala.

The Dependency cannot be expected to make a significant contribution to the economy of the Sultanate in the practical future. The government of Oman would save great expense by withdrawing entirely from the Dependency and working with other Gulf states to isolate the revolutionary zeal of People's Yemen and PFLOAG in southwestern Arabia. Broad tracts of desert could serve as insulation between Dhofar and Oman. Real economic interests, however, must often be shunted aside in deference to political requirements of other sorts. There are serious considerations militating against withdrawal. One of them regards the townspeople of Dhofar, many of whom would not want to fall under the vengeful rule of PFLOAG and the Qara. To those people, Omani withdrawal would be irresponsible .

As Dhofar needs development funds from outside sources, such as Oman itself, the true economic interests of the Qara would perhaps best be served by accepting the authority of the Sultan under some special agreement allowing local autonomy in the mountains. PFLOAG leaders are aware

that the oil royalties of eastern Arabia are needed in the southwestern parts of the Peninsula. While the Front is making use of Qara separatism, the Front's objective is not secession, but acquiring control of the oil wealth of Oman and other Gulf states. People's Yemen shares this goal and therefore gives its support to PFLOAG. Britain, which has vested interests in the political and economic *status quo*, aids the Sultan against the rebels. The deaths of several Britons in combat during the winter of 1971-72 has called attention to the seriousness of British involvement.

In summary, the rebellion in the Dependency of Dhofar has possessed several aspects. In origin it was only another episode in a traditional feud. More recently this conflict has been recast in Marxist terms as a people's war of national liberation. It is the economic motive, however, which explains the intense international interest in the conflict. Dhofar has become a major battlefield in the struggle to control Arabian oil, and the outcome of the conflict has great political significance for the future history of the Arabian Peninsula.



IRAN:

THE POLITICS OF REFORM

E. Burke Inlow

nate building, was a model of historical invocation and of present witness. An initial reference to the coincidence of the opening of the current legislative session with the 2500th year of the founding of the Iranian Monarchy was followed by a review of economic growth, land reform, industrial expansion, equity courts, health and medical services, etc. More than once in his 50 minute address,¹ His Imperial Majesty made reference to the principles of the Iranian Revolution. "Land reform, which is the first principle of the Sixth of Bahman Revolution, has been completed successfully." Again, in referring to the newly established equity courts: "Regarding another principle of the Iranian Revolution . . ." And finally, in discussing the social foundation of Iran, "based on the 12 principles of the Revolution," the Shah once more gave notice to the world that he considered his leadership to be of a revolutionary nature. At the same time, the coincidence of His Speech from the Throne with the inauguration of two new Parliament buildings was a clear reference to the fact that Iran's was a parliamentary form of government and that he shared his power role. His closing words were: "We should also like to express our satisfaction with

In September of this past year, the Shah of Iran opened "with much joy" the 6th legislative term of the Senate and the 23rd legislative term of the Majlis. His Speech from the Throne, delivered in the new Se-

the constant cooperation that existed between the legislative and executive branches in examining, correcting and approving various laws as well as the sincerity of the two houses in thinking about improving laws. The two houses obviously have had an important share in carrying out constructive work. We pray to God that He will continue to guide us toward the right path in implementing our national and humanitarian duties and will give the legislators success in serving sincerely while guiding them in their vital responsibilities."

A Speech from the Throne such as the one cited above is a constant reminder to the world that Iran's is a constitutional monarchy—and one of long and stubborn standing. The establishment of the Constitution, or the Fundamental Law as it is sometimes called, in the years between 1906-9 has been fixed in a kind of permanency that has surprised many Western observers. While other Constitutions in that part of the world have been suspended or abolished, the Iranian Constitution is still a pride of the Iranian people, and while it has not been free from prejudice, pressures, and tamperings, it still exists pretty much in its original form and still remains the goal and the ideal of those who believe in Constitutional rule.

Why is this true? The purpose of this paper is to provide an explanation for this unusual political phenomenon. Constitutional government in Iran has always been identified with reform. When the present Constitution was established in the early years of the present century, it was not designed to introduce democratic government or to discard a traditionally autocratic throne. To the contrary, the Iranians were firm believers in the divine right of kings² and showed no intention during the crisis years of destroying an institution that was

so integral a part of their nation's history. As Professor Browne put it, "the mere tyranny of an autocrat" would never have driven the patient and tractable people of Iran into the arms of the Constitutionalists.³ What was involved had its driving force secured to other intentions.

At the turn of the century, Iran was indeed in a perilous state. The extravagances of the Shahs had brought the nation to the verge of bankruptcy. Enormous debts were owing foreign powers. Russia in the north and the British in the southeast were inexorably dividing Persia between them save for a buffer state. In what we now describe as a "plural" state, there was continuing disintegration aided and abetted by interested proponents. Corruption was everywhere. So was inefficiency; so was despair. By the time of the assassination of Nasir al-Din Shah in 1896, there was discontent so great that Iran could go nowhere but to its own untried and untested human resources.

These were not lacking. For years a reform movement had been floating around the edges of the Persian Monarchy. Its early founder was the great Islamic Nationalist teacher, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani. He had been supported primarily by intellectuals such as Malkom Khan, one-time Minister to Great Britain, by many enlightened *mullas* and *mujtabids*, (who must surely have realized that a reformed regime might well curtail their power and influence), and by many great merchants. In addition there was an active underground press that was publishing in Turkey and in England.

It was this group and its heirs—who might roughly be described as Nationalistic—that finally forced from the Shah on August 5, 1906, an imperial rescript (*farman*) that has since been known as the

Magna Charta of Iran. In this document, Muzaffar Shah, successor to Nasir al-Din, directed that an "assembly of delegates" be constituted to "render the necessary help and assistance to our Cabinet of Ministers in such reforms as are designed to promote the happiness and well-being of Persia." It was likewise decreed in this farman that a code of regulations governing the Assembly was to be prepared.⁴ The words *law* and *constitution* do not appear in this document. It was a clear call for reform and this term has, in fact been the one used by the historians of the period such as Browne and Lockhart.⁵

Iran's first Majlis met on October 7, 1906. It promptly designated a committee to draw up the terms of this Constitution. This original Constitution, signed by the Shah on December 30, 1906 and its Supplement of 1907 are together known officially as the "Fundamental Laws of the Constitution of the State of Iran."⁶ A close examination clearly establishes it as a reform document—the reform of the government itself being of the first priority.

The Shah, for example, still retains much of his awesome power. Twenty three articles deal with the rights and powers of the throne. "The Sovereignty is a trust confided, by the Grace of God, to the person of the King by the Nation" (Article 35). "The person of the King is absolved from all responsibility" (Article 44). On his ascent to the Throne the Shah swears an oath "to preserve the independence of the nation"; "to protect the frontiers of the country"; "to be the guardian of the Constitutional Law of Iran"; "and to endeavour to promote the Ja'fari doctrine of the "Shi'ah sect of twelve Imans." (Article 39) In general these are historic powers that had always been present in the office of the Shah, just as was his stated power to act

as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces "in person" (Article 50) and to declare war and conclude peace (Article 51). What could be described as a major break with the past was Article 57 which stated that the prerogatives and powers of the King "are only those expressly mentioned in this Constitutional Law." Thus while the Shah held great power, it was a granted power by the nation which clearly defined a relationship not heretofore clearly understood by some Shahs.

By far the major reforms contained in the Fundamental Laws, however, were the 51 articles that spelled out the duties, rights, and limitations of the Majlis in the original document and the 5 contained in the Supplementary Law. These were what gave reality to "The Constitutional Monarchy of Iran" as it was described in Article 35 which was vested "by the people through the Constituent Assembly in the person of His Imperial Majesty"

There is no need here to go over item by item the various aspects of legislative power in Iran. It pretty much paralleled the powers of legislative bodies the world over although it is important to note that it was not—as was the case in the Iraqi Constitution which was finally abolished in 1958—the work of foreign experts. It was a truly indigenous formulation although many of the Constitutionalists had, of course, western contacts and in some cases, training. Much has been made in late years⁷ of the classic tripartite system of government provided by the Constitution—"the powers of the State are divided into three parts" (Article 27). This does not represent the reality of the situation. The judicial power—the legislative and the executive are the other two—has run an extremely different course in Iran than it has in other countries. It has always been lacking in what

we like to describe in the Western World as political "clout." The judicial arm was, in fact, not implemented as a political reality until well over a decade and even now, the judicial power is one limited by political expediency.⁸

As a consequence of the practical working out of the original Constitution, the recent history of Iran, therefore, has basically been a see-saw battle between the legislative and the executive powers with both sides claiming as a constitution right and heritage, the primary role of reformer and revolutionary. At the beginning, the Majlis was the political seat of the reformer and the nationalist. Its actions have been, over the years, at variance with the expectation of some of the Shahs and yet the latter have never dared suspend the Constitution any more than the Majlis, in such crisis times as the Musaddig period, would have dared to do so. So the battle of the Constitution has continued as a struggle of reform—first political and financial, then agricultural, economic and industrial. In the last few years, the balance has shifted and the present Shah sees himself as a revolutionary nationalist and in no way, a defensive monarch.

It might be useful at this point to recapitulate in very brief focus the course of the Constitutional movement as it has evolved to the present.

Almost from the beginning, the Persian Constitutional movement took form as one of challenge and response. When the Majlis met on October 7, 1907, having secured at least the shape of political reform, finance was highest on the agenda. One of the new body's first acts was to reject proposals for an Anglo-Russian loan on the ground it would endanger Persia's independence.⁹ Interestingly enough, it was one of the merchants in the Majlis, Hajji Mu'in

at-Tujjar, who led the fight against the loan.

Unfortunately the attention of the Majlis was soon diverted with the accession of Muhammad 'Ali Shah in January, 1907. Although as Crown Prince he had signed the Constitution and agreed not to dissolve it for at least 2 years, he refused to invite any members of the Majlis to his enthronement ceremonies and eventually on June 23, 1908, he dissolved the Majlis and destroyed the building in which it was meeting. His bid to enlist the support of such eminent liberals and constitutionalists as the three "Proofs of Islam" at Najaf, Mulla Muhammad Kazim al-Khurasani, Hajji Mirza Husain ibn Khalil and Mulla 'Abdullah al-Mazandarani¹⁰ was a total failure. Spear-headed by the Tabrizi liberals who withstood a siege and threats for 11 months; supported by the liberals of Isfahan and the Bakhtiari, the Constitutionalists of Iran stood firm. On November 15, 1909, a new Majlis convened and by a simple vote dethroned the Shah and crowned his minor son Ahmed with a regency. Myriad problems cannot be considered here in such small compass. But with the departure of Muhammad 'Ali Shah and the creation of the Regency, the need for financial and legal reform took precedence over political strife. In fact, the Iranians themselves see this as a most important date: "It is from this date that the Constitution of Iran began its real life."¹¹ In May, 1911, Morgan Shuster arrived upon the invitation of the Majlis to seek some solution to Iran's pressing financial needs. Meanwhile the Majlis was seeking some attempt at reform within the Finance Ministry itself; seeking also to eliminate various Qajar institutions that had come down to the present but were a real impediment to financial modernization.¹² Shuster, of course, left in a matter of months to be followed by a suc-

cession of financial experts.

At the same time as financial reform was being sought, M. Adolphe Perni, again at the invitation of the Majlis, completed the task of organizing a Ministry of Justice and submitted the first penal code to the Majlis in January, 1912. It was an attempt to graft the Napoleonic Code on to the Sharia and thereby remove the Majlis from the doubtful role it had played in its first convening, when, among other things, it had attempted to act as a court in a quasi-revolutionary sense.

One of the difficult problems arising during this early period was the rift developing between the Cabinet and the Majlis. With no Shah to act in counterbalance it was perhaps inevitable, given the nature of political power, that where none existed under the Constitution of the day, one would be created. Further, the growing strength of the Bakhtiari was creating enormous strain with the Regency itself. Nevertheless reform continued in one form or other with new Ministries being created and others being strengthened. They were constitutional in origin and were responsible to the Majlis. The fact that the Cabinets were short-lived and lacked a sense of joint responsibility made it perhaps no exaggeration to say that the rise of the Iranian bureaucracy while the creature of the Majlis, because of the weakness or indifferences of the Cabinet, provided the groundwork for what became later one of the real bulwarks of Kingly power. Thus reform without real accountability becomes a hostage to future adventurers.

The story of Iran and World War I was a dismal one. The major powers ignored Persian neutrality and despite the fact that an 18 year old Shah was enthroned in July 1914, it came as no real surprise when the Majlis was suspended in 1915. Iran was

to remain an unfortunate pawn in the hands of rival foreign powers until the rise of Reza Khan. Not until 1923 was the Majlis to reassemble with the former Commander of the Cossack Brigade in power as Prime Minister.

The final collapse of the once powerful Qajar dynasty was signalled by the Majlis on October 31, 1925. A new body was elected and assembled and on December 12, 1925, the Crown was formally invested in Reza Khan with right of succession to his heirs. Three days later he took the oath to defend the Constitution and on April 26, 1926, his coronation took place.

Reza Shah ruled from 1925 to 1941. In those years he eventually came to a personal military dictatorship, one in which the Majlis and the cabinets were bent to serve his purpose. But no move was ever made to abrogate the Constitution nor did he move to destroy the institution for which it provided.

In the early years of his reign, modernization and reform were the keynotes to action.¹³ Once the authority of the central government had been reasserted as against the tribes from within and foreign powers from without, he initiated a large number of reform measures, including the adoption of a Civil Code modelled on the French, the promotion of industry and communications, particularly the construction of the Trans-Iranian Railway; the creation of state-owned or financed industries; the introduction of civil marriage and divorce and the unveiling of women; and the fostering of education.

It was pretty much of a one man show, of course. The reforms were the Shah's not, as they had been at an earlier period, those of the Majlis. And when reform stopped in his last years, there was no new initiative to be found within the Constitutional struc-

ture of Iran. When Reza Shah went into exile, therefore, and World War II brought the bitter fruits of occupation home to the Iranian people, it was not surprising that the pendulum of power should once again swing away from the Throne and back to the people. When the 14th Majlis was elected in 1943, it seized the purse strings—as was its constitutional right—and demanded that cabinet and ministerial appointments receive its vote of confidence as a first step toward reasserting the legislative power as against the young successor to Reza Shah. The emergence of the Tudeh party, a genuine party active for the first time in Iran undoubtedly at the beginning added to the strength of the Majlis position. Originally composed of rightists, liberals, and left-wing politicians imprisoned by Reza Shah (some belonging to the Communist International), the party drew strong support from both workers and intellectuals. It stopped short of demanding collectivization of the land and nationalization of private property, but advocated progressive labor legislation, an improved standard of living for the peasants, reform of the judicial system, and national industrialization. It was a strong program with wide appeal and as competitive politics emerged under the occupation, it pointed the way of future reforms. The fact that after 1944 it increasingly moved to identify with the Soviet Union did, to be sure, provide the young Shah with a much needed fillip which he was able to turn to his advantage, but it also pointed the method of legislative leadership and it found a successor in the strong nationalist party headed by Dr. Musadig which emerged in strength at the 15th Majlis in July 1947.

Full sovereignty was restored to Iran in 1946. But with the occupation ended, Iranian politics acquired a surrealist quality, with the Shah fulfilling the public role

of a constitutional monarch while quietly trying to recover the absolute authority of his father.¹⁴

The Shah's position, of course, was an anomalous one. As stated above, during the war the Majlis had come to a position of power long denied them by Reza Shah. They not only reasserted what they believed to be their Constitutional rights but they exercised their power in fact. The concept of party had caught hold and because Reza Shah had never built a party, his son found himself above and outside party politics. Consequently he was forced to rely on his constitutional position and the powers claimed under it. Small wonder the Constitution so soon after Reza Shah's death loomed large as the keystone to Iranian politics not only in the eyes of the Shah but in the eyes of the Majlis as well. Both saw the Fundamental Law as a mandate and both sought to project the image of strong nationalism and forward looking reform.

The struggle for power—it was not one for balance—reached its climax in 1952-53 over the issue of responsibility for management of the armed forces. In October, 1947, the U.S. and Iran signed a military aid pact. Here of course, was foreseeable conflict and trouble. Without a party, the Shah welcomed the potential of an army. The Majlis, on the other hand, while not denying the need for a national army and not disputing the constitutional position of the Shah as Commander-in-Chief, had no intention of helping to restore another Reza Shah's military regime. Consequently the Majlis vigorously maintained its control over government finances and scrutinized in particular the military outlays. When, during the Session of the 16th Majlis, the legislators moved to extend control over the budget to include control over the appointment and dismissal of all ministers

except the Minister of War, there was, of course strong opposition from the Shah. But by this time the Majlis was leading from strength. In 1949, Dr. Mussadig had organized the National Front. In April, 1951 he became Prime Minister. When the 17th Majlis met in July, 1952, he was able to force the war ministry portfolio for himself as well as holding the Prime Minister's position. He likewise was granted power to rule by decree in the name of the Majlis for 6 months. The events of the next year are too well known to require recapitulation here, but when the Shah, his wife, and one lone pilot who is now Chief of the Air Force, flew from Iran in 16 August 1953, many felt it was the end of the monarchy.

It was to be expected that once the Shah returned to Iran from his brief exile the consolidation of the monarch's power would have highest priority. This was, in fact, what happened. One of the Shah's first acts upon his return was to dissolve the Majlis by royal decree (December, 1953), the first time in history this had been done. The country was placed under martial law and it was not lifted until 1956. By this time, the Tudeh party had been smashed, Savak, a counter-espionage group had become a permanent government agency; the modernization of the Army had moved into high gear and the Shah, his immediate family and his close associates at Court were moving to unparalleled positions of power. Elections in 1954 and 1956 for the 18th and 19th Majlis were closely managed by the government which played an important part in nominating the candidates and in supervising the balloting.¹⁵

By 1957, the Shah felt sufficiently sure of his power to permit the formation of two parties, the Mardum, or People's Party and Milliyun/or Nationalists Party. They

were intended, of course, to break up the residual strength of the old National Front of Mussadig as well as provide for a legislative vehicle for the Shah. But nothing seemed to work, and the parties seemed unable to promote any kind of legislative program. There was by now much talk, of reform—now that the Shah's position was secure. But the tension between the Shah and the Majlis seemed to take precedence over the national interest. The Shah criticized the Majlis for being too conservative or too inexperienced and of thwarting his leadership role.¹⁶ The Majlis, on the other hand, felt that they were being used by the Shah, and that the latter's primary reliance on the Generals and on Savak was pointed toward keeping them in line.¹⁷ Neither side was very pleased with the other. When the 20th Majlis was elected in August, 1960, the election was nullified by the Shah as fraudulent. An election rerun early in 1961 appeared no better. The Shah dissolved the Majlis for the second time and again placed the country under martial law. It was at this point in history that the Shah launched his famous White Revolution.

The Shah's proclamation on reform was made public at the meeting of the Council of Ministers on 11 November, 1961 in the Marble Palace.¹⁸ The actual recounting of essential reforms was prefaced by a longish paragraph in which concern was expressed "for this country and its people" and the determination to take immediate steps "for achieving the social, material and intellectual advancement of the realm"; "for the comfort and well-being of the people and the establishment of social justice and progressive development of individual members of the community"; to the end that a life for the nation would be achieved "in keeping with the standards of the modern world."

The Shah added to his prefatory appeal for social justice and modernization—to state the two key concepts of the proclamation—a surprisingly candid statement of the political circumstances surrounding the issue on the document. “Acting on the right given us by the Fundamental Law, we being recognized as one of the originators of law, we commission the government, until the convening of a Parliament (based, we hope, on valid elections without the need again ensuing for annulment of elections due to their improper conduct) to put into execution the laws required for convening Village Councils and in respect of the laws . . . to bring about necessary modifications in existing laws . . .” “The meaning of democratic government is this, that the people’s affairs be assigned to the people themselves as they gradually obtain the right degree of maturity . . .”

There are two aspects to these prefatory remarks to which attention should be drawn. The first is the statement regarding the right given under the Fundamental Law to the Shah and the second is the reference to participatory democracy that appears conceptually to belong in the category of direct rather than representative government.

The essential reforms as named in the Proclamation are six in number. The first concerns civil servants. Rules of service are to be uniform among the several ministries with close attention being paid to both recruitment and administration. Excess personnel shall be retired and compensated for service due. Promotion shall be on the basis of “merit, honesty and personal ability.”

The second proposal is, in fact, a continuation of the first. Civil servants shall be provided with living accommodations under a “special scheme.” Other amenities are to follow. Priority is to be given to “the most important categories of civil ser-

vant” and these are designated as the army, police and gendarmerie, school teachers and Ministry of Justice officials.

The third proposal deals with agriculture. Mechanization in the sphere of agriculture is the first charge. The law for land reform and limitation of proprietorship are to be put into effect and if the land reform law proves impracticable, “the government must, with utmost dispatch, embark on its revision in whatever way is deemed necessary.” Cultivators left under landlords are to be guaranteed their welfare and well-being and cooperative establishments are to be commissioned. The government “must especially strive to achieve an extraordinary increase in production.” To this end a number of development projects—road construction, the digging of irrigation channels, construction of rural houses, etc. are to be devised. Modern agricultural methods and chemical fertilizers are to be employed. So-called “Development and Construction Battalions” of young people are to join forces with village and municipal authorities to provide added work force.

The fourth proposal reads almost like a preliminary excursus rather than an actual blueprint. The condition of labor is held to be “satisfactory” under the present law although employers “must be persuaded to build houses for workers.” To an extent, however, the full impact of this is negated by the suggestion that employers can reckon this expenditure as a portion of the insurance they are legally bound to pay. The protection of home industries is assured as is the promotion of factory products. The government is to guide and aid in the matter of industrial installations and “every type of production unit and domestic industry” is to be protected against “foreign markets.” Provision should be made for selling up to 25% of the stock to the

workers.

The fifth proposal deals with tax revenues. It is pointed out that the wealthy are still not paying their fair share of the revenues and an "ethical relationship" is admonished as between tax-payers and collectors. Special attention should be paid to the stabilization of a revenue system.

The sixth proposal calls for a revision of the education program. Free elementary education must be broadened, intermediate vocational training provided, while at every level, the world's standards must be met. The Ministry of Education "must watch pupils from the very first day they enter Primary School, keeping records of all with outstanding ability." Bursaries are to be made available to the needy. "The utmost care" is to be exercised with regard to sending students to foreign countries for study so that money is not wasted and students are trained under the supervision of conscientious people.

The conclusion of the proclamation is a brief one, reiterating the base for the operation as one of social justice.

Although two anti-corruption bills had been passed in 1958-59, and a land reform law passed on 16 May, 1960, limiting land holdings to 400 hectares of irrigated or 800 hectares of unirrigated lands, this—the Shah's Proclamation on Reform—is generally seen to be the beginning of the reform movement in Iran. The fact that the Reform was pronounced when neither the Majlis nor the Senate was in session in effect meant that the Shah was assuming personal responsibility for the success of the program. His announcement that he had a right under the Constitution to initiate legislation and the fact he was, in effect, carrying the reform movement directly to the people was, in a sense, reminiscent of President Kennedy's approach to problems of social re-

form and the reference to "social justice" was one clearly echoing the voice of western modernization.

On the other hand, there was strong opposition to the Shah's claim under the Constitution. The National Front issued a very strong statement describing the claim as a "return to despotism fifty-five years after the Constitution was inaugurated." Warning was plainly given that the instructions issuing from His Imperial Majesty's Bureau concerning the enactment and modification of laws without Parliamentary approval must be deemed contrary to the clear purport of the Fundamental Law. Even the contention that the Throne was one of the initiators of law was challenged on the grounds that the Fundamental Law clearly states that laws are valid and can be executed only after Parliament has passed them and they have received Royal assent. "The Throne and the Executive Power do not have the right of enacting laws and the enactment of law is among the special rights of Parliament" the statement of the National Front read, and the statement concluded: "The National Front cannot tolerate any infringement on the rights of Parliament which is the representative of the whole nation . . . the utmost vigilance will be shown and the followers of individuals rule not permitted to deprive the people of their rights."

The initiation of the Shah's Proclamation on Reform and the response of the National Front joined an issue ten years ago that has been too much neglected in the continuing dialogue over reform in Iran. The issue was and is constitutional. As a leading authority wrote in the same year the Proclamation on Reform was issued—"the Constitutional Movement may still be considered to be continuing."¹⁹

The Shah's statement contains three ele-

ments that constitute his position: (1) the office of the Shah was "one of the originators of law," (2) the Shah is "acting on the right given us by the Fundamental Law," (3) the Shah could "commission the government" in the absence of Parliament.

The first point was no doubt premised on (1) the fact that it was an Imperial Firman dated August 5, 1906, which ordered a National Council to be set up (this is contained in the preamble to Constitutional Law promulgated on December 30, 1906) and (2) Article 27 of the Supplementary Law—and referred to above²⁰ which alludes to the fact that the legislative power is divided into 3 parts—that derived from the Throne, from the National Consultative Assembly, and from the Senate. The article further states "Each of these 3 sources has the right to introduce laws." A further explanation, however, is that it becomes law only when it's not at variance with religious principles of Islam, and is approved by the two Houses and signed by His Imperial Majesty.

The second element present in the Shah's position is his statement "acting on the right given us by the Fundamental Law." The basis for this is less clear and as no explanation has been made, one must assume that the right is contained within the rights comprehended under the section of the Constitution titled "Rights of the Throne in Iran." Here, however, one has difficulty. Article 44 states: "The King is free of responsibility. The Ministers of State are responsible for all matters to both Chambers." Article 49 is an amendment passed in 1957 which states that "it is one of the rights of the King to issue decrees and give orders for the enforcement of laws . . ." It would not appear that the right to "issue decrees" stands alone.

The third element, to wit the Shah can "commission the government" in the absence of Parliament would seem to refer to Article 45 which provides that "all decrees and rescripts of the King shall be put into effect (only) when they have been signed by the responsible Minister . . ." There is, however, no provision in either the Constitution or the Supplementary Law for rule by the Shah in substitution for the dissolution of Parliament. Article 48, as amended in 1949, does provide for the dissolution of the National Consultative Assembly or the Senate separately or at the same time but makes no provision for rule by royal decree. Rather it calls for an election within a month and a convening of both houses within 3 months.

The constitutional argument of the National Front is direct and challenging to the Shah's statement of his responsibility under the Constitution. The argument builds upon 2 basic premises: (1) the throne does not have the right of enacting laws, and (2) the enactment of laws without Parliamentary approval is contrary to the Constitution. Article 16, of the Constitutional Law, states: "all laws necessary for the consolidation of the foundations of the State and of the kingdom (Throne) for the regulation of the affairs of the Country . . . must be approved by the National Consultative Assembly." And again in the Supplementary Law, Article 27 as stated above, the wording is that "any project of law becomes law only when it . . . is approved by the two Houses . . ."

It is clear throughout the Fundamental Law that the Ministers are responsible to the two chambers. Article 60 of the Supplementary Law so states and Article 67 states that when a majority of the National Consultative Assembly or the Senate declares itself dissatisfied with the Cabinet

or a Minister, the Cabinet or Minister shall be considered as dismissed. In other words, the Ministers are responsible to the Majlis (Article 44).

Certain words contained in the Fundamental Law suffer the ambiguity found in Constitutions elsewhere, of course. For example the Powers of the State "are derived from the nation." The nation is not defined and it is not unusual to find rulers who identify with the Nation. Further, Article 2 of the Supplementary Law states that "any contradiction between the laws made by the Assembly and the principles of Islam are to be resolved by doctors of theology." Burujidi's statement in 1963 that land reform was contrary to religious law affords the kind of example that renders an actual constitutional article so difficult of interpretation. Particularly when the Shah is himself charged (Articles 1 and 39) with propagating the faith.

It can be seen then that the Shah's Proclamation of Reform involved much more than a matter of government by decree in 1961. The fact that Article 39 charges the Shah with being "the guardian of the Constitutional Law of Iran" and the fact that the Resolution the Constituent Assembly of 1949 which was annexed to the Supplementary Law refers to the "Constitutional Monarchy of Iran," are statements that do, in fact, define the Reform Proclamation as being a matter of Constitutional consideration.

This paper has been concerned with the politics of reform in Iran and not the reform itself. Therefore it seems unnecessary to recount the details of the reform movement over the last 10 years.²¹ Any observer can note the changes. The present writer was in Iran in 1961, the year the Shah's first proclamation on reform was cast. He was in Iran again exactly 10 years later. Covering the length and breadth of the land by car, he could see clearly and explicitly the enormous changes that had been wrought in one decade.

Time alone, of course, is going to resolve what has been a continuing constitutional crisis during this period. The White Revolution has still left unresolved the reform of politics itself. The participation base is still small. Elections are not yet the method of choosing leaders. The Majlis lacks both the strength and the zeal of its earlier revolutionary prototype. There is no real opposition in a parliamentary sense. Yet the Shah has moved forward through what he himself sees as a Kingship in Transition."²² The politics of reform in Iran, therefore, continue to involve key questions for Iran; and demand answers. Yet the reform movement is probably, all things considered, the best vehicle for constitutional clarification in Iran today and with the added prosperity of the nation, there is much reason to believe that the politics of reform will serve, in fact, the cause of constitutionalism for Iran.²³



NOTES

(1) Text of the Speech from the Throne, *Kayhan International*, September 4, 1971, pp. 4 ff.

(2) Inlow, E. Burke, "The Divine Right of Persian Kings," *Journal of Indian History* XLV (August, 1967), p. 399.

(3) Browne, E. G., "The Persian Constitutional Movement," *Proceedings of the British Academy*, London, 1917-18, VIII, pp. 323-4.

(4) *Ibid.*, pp. 353-54 for an English translation of this farman.

(5) Lockhart, Lawrence, "The Constitutional Laws of Persia," *Middle East Journal*, Autumn, XIII, 1959, pp. 372 ff. Browne, E. G. as cited above. Also see *Area Handbook for Iran*, DA PAM No. 550-68, Washington, D.C. 1971, p. 246 ff.

(6) I have used the texts as they appeared in the *Iran Almanac*, 1968.

(7) Government of Iran (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), *The Iran of Today*, 1971, Tehran, pp. 35 ff.

(8) Inlow, E. Burke, "The Supreme Court of Iran," *Osgoode Hall Law Journal*, VIII (December, 1970), p. 557.

(9) Browne, E. G., *History of the Persian Revolution, 1905-1909*, Cambridge University Press, 1910, p. 125.

(10) Avery, P. W., "The Iranian Constitutional Movement, 1905-11," an unpublished

paper, Cambridge, May 1961, p. 10.

(11) Farman Farma, A., "Constitutional Law of Iran," *The American Journal of Comparative Law*, III (1954), p. 243.

(12) For details see Avery, P. W., *Modern Iran*, London, Ernest Benn Ltd., 1965, p. 150 ff.

(13) Banani, A., *The Modernization of Iran*, Stanford University Press, 1961.

(14) Hurewitz, J. C., *Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension* (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 280.

(15) *Area Handbook for Iran*, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

(16) Bayne, E. A., *Persian Kingship in Transition*, New York, *American Universities Field Staff*, Inc. 1968, p. 63.

(17) *Hurewitz, op. cit.*, p. 287.

(18) The Document and the Statement of the National Front appeared in the *Middle East Journal* XVI (Winter, 1962), pp. 86-90.

(19) Avery, P. W., *op. cit.*, p. 14.

(20) See above, p. 5.

(21) However, see *Area Handbook for Iran, op. cit.*, Section III.

(22) Bayne, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

(23) A less optimistic conclusion is to be found in Ismael, T.Y., *Government and Politics of the Contemporary Middle East*, Homewood, III., The Dorsey Press, 1970, pp. 177-78.

Documents :

Legal action to compel production of classified studies concerning American contingency plans in the Middle East.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

James Lafferty, Dr. Paul Lowinger,
Jerry Tyler, James Ingram, Professor
William Gohlman, Professor Noam
Chomsky, Professor David Herreshof,
Reverend Joe Gipson, Professor Howard
Zinn, Professor Wilson C. McWilliams,
Marcus Raskin and Richard Barnett
Plaintiffs,

-vs- No: _____
William Rogers, Secretary of State
for the United States; Melvin Laird,
Secretary of Defense for the United
States; Henry Kissinger, Special
Advisor to the President,
Defendants.

COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTION

ABDEEN M. JABARA
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Lafferty, Reosti, Jabara, Papakhian,
James, Stickgold, Smith and Soble
726 Pallister Avenue
Detroit, Michigan 48202
875 - 3333 (area code 313)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

James Lafferty, Dr. Paul Lowinger,
Jerry Tyler, James Ingram, Professor
William Gohlman, Professor Noam
Chomsky, Professor David Herreshof,
Reverend Joe Gipson, Professor Howard
Zinn, Professor Wilson C. McWilliams,
Plaintiffs,

-vs- No: _____
Williams Rogers, Secretary of State
for the United States, Melvin Laird,
Secretary of Defense for the United
States, Henry Kissinger, Special
Advisor to the President,
Defendants.

COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTION

1. This action is brought under Section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act, as amended by the Freedom of Information Act of July 4, 1967, 5 USC Sec. 552(2) (3), and under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, seeking preliminary and final injunction against withholding information from plaintiffs and ordering that it be disclosed.

2. Plaintiffs James Lafferty, Paul Lowinger, James Ingram and David Herreshoff are residents of the City of Detroit, Wayne County, Michigan. Plaintiff Jerry Tyler is a resident of the City of Seattle, King County, Washington. Plaintiff Noam Chomsky is a resident of the City of Lexington, Middlesex County, Massachusetts. Plaintiff Joe Gipson is a resident of the city of Washington, District of Columbia. Plaintiff Howard Zinn is a resident of the City of Newton, Middlesex County, Massachusetts. Plaintiff Wilson Carey McWilliams is a resident of the City of Highland Park, Middlesex County, New Jersey. Plaintiff William Gohlman is a resident of the City of Berea, Cuyahoga County, Ohio.

3. Defendant William Rogers is the duly appointed Secretary of State for the United States. Defendant Melvin Laird is the duly appointed Secretary of Defense for the United States, and Defendant Henry Kissinger is the duly appointed Special Ad-

visor on national security affairs to the President of the United States.

4. That on September 2, 1971, Plaintiff James Lafferty, by and through his attorney, directed a formal written request by registered post to the named Defendants requesting the production and transmittal to him of certain studies prepared by, at the request of, or with the assistance and cooperation of Defendants which, upon information and belief, concern the facts and circumstances surrounding increasing American involvement in the Middle East including contingency plans for the deployment of American armed forces personnel to the Middle East for unilateral American military action or joint action with the defense forces of a Middle Eastern nation, which studies are now in the possession of the Defendants. Defendants have not, as of the time of the filing of this action, produced and transmitted the requested studies to Plaintiff although Defendant Secretary of State, through his agent and employee, has responded that the study of Julius Holmes has been classified by Executive Order.

5. That said studies requested included, but were not limited to, a voluminous study prepared in 1967 and 1968 by Julius Holmes at the request of President Johnson; a study prepared in 1967 by McGeorge Bundy at the request of President Johnson; a study prepared by Rand Corporation pursuant to a request by Defendant Henry Kissinger concerning the circumstances in which American nuclear weapons might be used in the Middle East; numerous political studies of Rand Corporation conducted under the direction of Professor Sidney Alexander of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, financed by the Ford Foundation; certain unpublished volumes of the so-called Pentagon papers; and such other studies unknown to Plaintiffs at this time

detailing the extent of U.S. commitment in the Middle East and contingency plans for military involvement.

6. That Plaintiffs Paul Lowinger, Jerry Tyler, James Ingram, William Gohlman, Noam Chomsky, David Herreshoff, Joe Gipson, Howard Zinn, and Wilson McWilliams have spoken to and concurred with Plaintiff James Lafferty, personally and through his attorney, in the necessity of securing a full presentation of facts concerning the increasing involvement of the United States in the Middle East conflict and contingency plans for the deployment of American armed forces personnel into the area on behalf of any party, or the use of nuclear armaments, without full knowledge and consent to such deployment by the American public, and join Plaintiff Lafferty in his request for the production of these studies.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray that this court:

1. Issue a preliminary and a final injunction directing defendants to cease from withholding from Plaintiffs the studies conducted by Julius Holmes, McGeorge Bundy and Rand Corporation, and such other studies by Defendants or their agents or employees, that involve contingency plans for the deployment of American armed forces personnel to the Middle East and or the use of nuclear weapons in the area, and such other studies concerning the nature, extent and history of American involvement and commitment in the area.

2. Order defendants to make available to Plaintiffs such memorandums or studies involving contingency plans for the deployment of American armed forces personnel to the Middle East and/or the use of nuclear weapons in the area, and such other studies concerning the nature, extent and history of American involvement and commitment in the area.

3. In lieu thereof, supply Plaintiffs a statement of the reasons for the decision and determination of classification status, and a summary of the evidence before the defendant when it is so decided and determined.

4. Grant such other and further relief as to the Court seems proper.

Lafferty, Reosti, Jabara, Papakhian,
James, Stickgold, Smith & Soble
by ABDEEN M. JABARA
Attorney for Plaintiffs
720 Pallister
Detroit, Michigan 48202
Phone: 875-3333

Dated: October 7, 1971

Original of this letter sent to Melvin Laird,
William Rogers, Henry Kissinger.

September 2, 1972

William Rogers
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

Dear Secretary Rogers:

I have been retained by Mr. James Lafferty, one of the national coordinators of the National Peace Action Coalition, to represent him concerning the obtaining of copies of certain studies which have been prepared by or with the cooperation and assistance of your department, concerning the involvement of the United States in the Middle East and the role of Israel in U.S. strategic planning. These studies include a voluminous study prepared in 1967 and 1968 by Ambassador Julius Holmes at the request of President Johnson, a study prepared in 1967 by Mr. McGeorge Bundy at the request of President Johnson, a study prepared by Rand pursuant to a request by Henry Kissinger concerning "the circumstances in which American nuclear weapons

might be used in the Middle East," numerous political studies of Rand under the direction of Professor Sidney Alexander of M.I.T., financed by the Ford Foundation, and certain unpublished volumes of the so-called Pentagon papers.

My client, Mr. Lafferty, is desirous of securing a full presentation of all facts concerning U.S. involvement in the Middle East, short of jeopardizing national security, and is increasingly concerned that the policies pursued in the area on behalf of Israel by the last several U.S. administrations is leading toward the creation of a situation in the Middle East not unlike that now faced by the American people in Southeast Asia, involving the deployment of American military personnel, to a situation for which the U.S. would bear much of the responsibility.

Therefore, we are hereby making a formal written request to your office for the disclosure and transmittal to us of the mentioned studies and any others on this same subject matter.

Very truly yours,
Abdeen Jabara

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

James Lafferty, Dr. Paul Lowinger,
Jerry Tyler, James Ingram, Professor
William Gohlman, Professor Noam
Chomsky, Professor David Herreshof,
Reverend Joe Gipson, Professor Howard
Zinn, Professor Wilson C. McWilliams,
Plaintiffs,

-vs-

No: _____

William Rogers, Secretary of State
for the United States, Melvin Laird,
Secretary of Defense for the United
States, Henry Kissinger, Special
Advisor to the President,
Defendants.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
AND
ARGUMENT

ABDEEN M. JABARA

Attorney for Plaintiffs

Lafferty, Reosti, Jabara, Papakhian,

James, Stickgold, Smith and Soble

726 Pallister Avenue

Detroit, Michigan 48202

Phone: 875 - 3333

Respectfully submitted,

Lafferty, Reosti, Jabara, Papakhian,

James, Stickgold, Smith and Soble

by ABDEEN M. JABARA

Attorney for Plaintiffs

726 Pallister

Detroit, Michigan 48202

Phone: 875 - 3333

Dated: October 7, 1971

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On September 2, 1971, Plaintiff James Lafferty, one of the national coordinators for the National Peace Action Coalition, directed a letter to Secretary of State William Rogers, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, and Presidential Advisor Henry Kissinger requesting the transmittal to himself of studies concerning the extent of American involvement and commitment in the Middle East, stating that he was:

desirous of securing a full presentation of all facts concerning U.S. involvement in the Middle East, short of jeopardizing national security, and is increasingly concerned that the policies pursued in the area on behalf of Israel by the last several U.S. administrations is leading toward the creation of a situation in the Middle East not unlike that now faced by the

American people in Southeast Asia, involving the deployment of American military personnel to a situation for which the U.S. would bear much of the responsibility.

Specifically, Plaintiff requested transmittal to himself of specific studies as well as others dealing with contingency plans for American military intervention into the Middle East conflict.

The existence of plans for American military intervention and the request that they be made a matter of public record is based on several facts:

The first formal American commitment to intervene militarily in the Middle East can be found in the great power Tripartite Declaration by France, Britain and the United States of May 25, 1950, which guaranteed the 1948 armistice lines between Israel and the neighboring Arab states against any alteration as *de facto* borders of Israel through the use of force. Department of State Bulletin, V22 (June 5, 1950), p. 886. The commitment contained in the Tripartite Declaration was made despite the fact that the armistice lines left the newly created state of Israel in military occupation of substantially more area than was allotted to it in the United Nations Partition Resolution of November 29, 1947, Quincy Wright, *The Middle East Problem*, A.J.I.L., Vol. 64, 1970, p. 277, which resolution was sponsored and promoted by the great powers, particularly the United States. Indeed, the U.S. played the key role in its passage after its defeat on the first ballot. Sumner Welles, *We Need Not Fail*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1948), p. 63; Walter Millis (Ed.), *The Forrestal Diaries*, (New York: Viking Press, 1951), p. 363. The area which Israel occupied after the conclusion of the Arab-Israeli armistice agreements was approximately one-third more

area than contained in the United Nations Partition Resolution of November 29, 1947.

The Second announced formal American commitment to intervene militarily in the Middle East was the promulgation of the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957. This Doctrine had specified that the United States was willing to come to the aid, militarily, of countries threatened by international Communism or "Communist subversion." It stated that:

The United States is prepared to use armed force to assist any such [Middle Eastern] nation or group of nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by International Communism. Public Law 85-7, 85th Congress, 1st Session, H.J. Res. 117 March 9, 1957).

This Doctrine was invoked by President Chamoun of Lebanon against internal nationalist political opposition, and the Sixth Fleet was alerted and American marines took up positions in Beirut. John Campbell, *Defense of the Middle East*, pp. 144-145, (Praeger, 1961). The Doctrine undoubtedly reflected the cold war policies of that period and was eventually repudiated by the Arab countries.

On October 8, 1970, the *New York Times*, in a front page article, a copy of which is attached to this memorandum, disclosed, for the first time, the existence of joint U.S.-Israeli contingency plans which envisioned an American-backed Israeli military intervention into Jordan to insure that King Hussein would not be overthrown. This support of Israel as a "policeman" in the area has developed into full view with the promulgation of the Nixon Doctrine in Guam. In President Nixon's February 18, 1970, message to Congress on U.S. Foreign

Policy for the 1970s, the President stated concerning this new Doctrine that:

Its central thesis is that the United States will participate in the defense and development of allies and friends, but that America cannot — and will not — conceive *all* the plans, design *all* the programs, execute *all* the decisions and undertake *all* the defense of the free nations of the world. (National Diplomacy 1965-1970, May, 1970, p. 119, Congressional Quarterly.)

Further, this is in keeping with the 1968 Middle East Plank of the Republican Party which provided that: "Her [Israel's] forces must be kept at a commensurate strength both for her protection *and to help keep the peace in the area.*" (Emphasis added.) National Republican Party Platform, 1968, p. 26, Republican National Committee, Washington, D.C.

This commitment to Israel has been largely unconditional. David Nes, a member of the U.S. Foreign Service for 26 years, has partially described the extent of this relationship. See attached article entitled, "A Very Special Relationship." Other indices of the relationship can be pointed to. Israeli fund-raising in the United States has enjoyed a tax-exempt and tax-deductible status as "charitable contributions." (Exemption Letters of U.S. Internal Revenue Service for United Palestine Appeal, United Israel Appeal and United Jewish Appeal under 26 U.S.C.A. sec. 501 (c) (3)) This has involved the unilateral transfer of no less than two billion U.S. dollars to Israel by private donors, all of which has been tax-exempt and tax deductible. *American Jewish Yearbook*, 1971. *Israeli Government Development Bonds sold in*

the United States have been exempted from the Interest Equalization Tax to which foreign securities sold in the U.S. are subject. 26 U.S.C.A. 4916(a); Executive Order 11285, June 10, 1966, 31 F.R. 8211. For the period 1962 to 1969 the largest volume of classified arms sales by the U.S. to any nation has been to Israel. National Diplomacy, 1965-1970, supra p. 25.

Americans have been allowed to serve in the Israeli armed forces without fear of the loss of U.S. citizenship.

As early as August 1951, the United States, in the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, which was concluded with Israel, sought, in its 25 paragraphs, to promote large scale private American capital investment in the newly-created state. 5 UST 552, (1951).

Of this situation, the Honorable Christopher Mayhew, a Member of the British Parliament, at a lecture at the Church Center for the United Nations under the joint sponsorship of Americans for Middle East Understanding and the Holy Land Center, has said:

.. Today, Israel can sustain herself without the aid of American troops. Today, to send arms, to give financial and diplomatic support is enough. Direct American intervention in the Middle East is unthinkable today. But then direct intervention in Vietnam was unthinkable in 1955. I visited Vietnam that year. Then you had in Vietnam a Westernized, anti-Communist tough little regime, well worth sending arms to, well worth sending money to, which was capable of sustaining itself without the help of American troops.

Then the balance of power shifted against President Diem and the South Vietnamese. Then the United States was faced with this fearful problem, this fearful dilemma: whether to let her friend and ally go under, a friend and ally who, whether willingly or not, should be encouraged to be uncompromising, to reject a negotiating attitude toward its enemies, whether to let it go under or to take the other, more appalling course of going to the assistance of the regime with direct military intervention by the United States. . . .

I must say that reading any *New York Times*, I see the same leaders of public opinion who helped drive the United States into disaster in Vietnam are helping to drive the United States to disaster again in the Middle East. "There is a good stout, anti-Communist little regime, Westernized, our friend, our ally," they say. "We've only got to send them Phantoms and they'll stave off the Communists" and so on. Recognition of a deadly similarity is growing in my mind." The Link, Published by Americans for Middle East Understanding, May-June, 1970, p. 6.

One such example is in the article by George W. Ball, former undersecretary of state in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, which appeared in the *New York*

Times Magazine of June 28, 1970. Ball states that the economic and strategic interests of the U.S. in the Middle East are of such importance that the U.S. must be prepared to intervene militarily. This need for intervention, Balls states, could not arise at a worse time because the "tragedy of Vietnam" is that it has led the American people toward "pacifism and isolationism." Thus, Ball regards the task ahead is for the President to "educate" (sic) the American public that their interests in the area may necessitate the deployment of American military force to the area.

The existence of contingency plans for intervention is supported by the *New York Times* of September 20, 1971, in an article concerning the possibility of renewed hostilities in the Middle East and the expected U.S. reaction to any Russian involvement in flying combat aircraft against Israeli superiority in the air vis-à-vis the Egyptians. Beecher states:

American planners say the United States would consider sending American -manned Phantom fighters and Hawk missile battalions to help protect Israeli airspace, much as the Russians have done in Egypt.

On August 8, 1969, *Newsday* newspaper, which was published by the former Press Secretary of President Johnson, Bill Moyers, reported the possible existence of a Rand Corporation study, commissioned by Presidential Advisor, Henry Kissinger, on "the circumstances in which American nuclear weapons might be used in the Middle East." Prior to that, *Army* magazine of April 1968, on page 21, reported that representatives of the Departments of State, Defense and Treasury, including the various intelligence branches, participated in its preparation. This article was also written by

New York Times correspondent, William Beecher.

It has been reported that President Johnson, in the days immediately following the June 1967 war requested that McGeorge Bundy, former advisor to Presidents Johnson and Kennedy on national security affairs, form a consultative committee to study the question of "security" in the Middle East. His report was submitted to President Johnson and is believed to have been classified. Also, at the request of the U.S. government, numerous studies have been conducted by Rand Corporation and Resources for the future under the direction of Professor Sidney Alexander of M.I.T. Only a few of these have been made available to the public.

All of the available information cited above that certain contingency plans for the deployment of American military personnel to the Middle East either unilaterally or in joint American-Israeli action constitute unannounced commitments which Plaintiffs, as deeply concerned Americans, and the American public generally are legitimately entitled to be informed and apprised of. The concern and interest of the general public has been unequivocally demonstrated in several national polls of public opinion. In a national poll of 864 students on over 100 college campuses representing a cross section of the nation's 7,000,000 full-time college population, which was stratified geographically and by population, and used established professional public opinion techniques, students were asked whether the U.S. should continue to back Israel at the time the poll was conducted (1969), and 60 per cent answered "No" while 6 per cent were undecided. In the event of an armed conflict, 50 per cent were against supplying Israel with additional arms and 28 per cent were undecided. The College Poll, Greenwich College Research Center,

Greenwich, Conn. An equally important poll of public opinion on this subject was a *Time* magazine-Louis Harris poll which appeared in *Time* magazine on May 2, 1969, pp. 16-17. Only 9 per cent of those sampled believed that the U.S. should go so far as to send in troops on behalf of Israel, and then only if Israel were in danger of being overrun. "Clearly," Harris observed, "the American people are not prepared to make to Israel anything like the commitment that we have made to South Vietnam."

Additionally, in two recent congressional polls in Illinois, of those asked: "Should the U.S. increase the sales of planes and armaments to Israel?" Only a minority approved such sales, and when queried: "If the existence of Israel becomes threatened, should we go to its aid with our own military forces?" 10,655 replied "No," 1,294 had "No Opinion," and only 2,793 answered "Yes." (Congressional Record, September 17 and September 21, 1970, E8278 and E8397). A March 1970 Gallup Poll supports the contention that the vast majority of Americans desire a neutral stance in the Middle East with no deep unilateral commitment to any party. *New York Times*, March 19, 1970.

Plaintiffs in this action feel that the U.S. government has never opened the spectrum of U.S. interests and commitments in the Middle East to general public debate although the course of these interests and commitments has been the subject of comprehensive study, including contingency plans for military intervention, of which the American people are unaware, and opposed to.

ARGUMENT

This is an action brought under the Freedom of Information Act, amending Section

3 of the Administrative Procedure Act, and under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The purpose of the Freedom of Information Act was to provide a true federal public records statute by requiring the availability, to any member of the public, of all the executive branch records except those described within nine stated exemptions. House Report No. 1497, prepared to accompany Senate Bill 1160, 2 U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, 89th Congress, Second Session (1960), p. 2418. Its prime purpose was to elucidate the availability of government records and actions to the American citizen. *American Mail Line, Ltd. v. Gulick* (1969) 133 App. D.C. 382, 411 F2d 696, 7ALR Fed. 840.

Under the Act, if the agency refuses to produce identifiable records, as in the instant fact situation, the aggrieved person or persons are given the right by Section 552 (a) (3) to file an action, and the District Court is required to conduct a hearing on the complaint and determine the matter de novo. This de novo review under the Act extends to records which the governmental agency claims falls within a specific exemption. *American Mail Line, Ltd. v. Gulick*, supra. This extends to whether, and the extent to which, the conditions exist as claimed by the agency to support its decision to withhold records. *Epstein v. Resor*, 296 F Supp. 214 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd 421 F2d 930 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970). In the *Epstein* case the Court took the logical position that since the legislative purpose of the Act was to make it easier for private citizens to secure government information, it seemed most unlikely that it was intended to foreclose a judicial review of the circumstances of the exemption, but rather that Sec. 552 (a) (4) (b) was intended to specify the basis for withholding and that a judicial review de novo with

the burden of proof on the agency should be had as to whether the conditions of the exemption in truth exist.

In the instant case, Defendant Secretary of State has responded that the voluminous study by Julius Holmes is classified by executive Order 10501, 3CF.R. 280 (1970) as requiring protection in the interests of national defense. Defendant does not know the whereabouts of the Bundy or Kissinger studies and states that the Alexander studies are available to the public.

With regard to the classification of the Holmes study, the holding of the Court in *Epstein* avails this Court of the power to determine whether the classification is arbitrary, unreasonable and unnecessary in light of the public policy and First Amendment considerations involved. The District Court in *Epstein* said:

Otherwise, the agencies could easily frustrate the purpose of full disclosure intended by Congress merely by labeling the information to fall within the exemption [to 5 U.S.C., Sec. 552]. 296 F. Supp. at 217.

While Executive Order 10501, *supra*, setting forth a system of classifying government documents lacks statutory or constitutional authorization, we are not claiming here that the Executive does not have the power, being charged with national security and the conduct of foreign relations, to classify. What is claimed here is that classification must not be capricious under the circumstances. The Executive Order itself cautions against over-classification in its first paragraph:

WHEREAS it is essential that the citizens of the United States be informed concerning the activities of their government.

but in Sections 16 and 18 of the Order, sets up its own system of review.

Indeed, the information sought in this action is not such that it "requires protection in the interests of national defense" pursuant to the criteria for classification under the Order, but rather that it is *in the national interest* to make the information public. Plaintiffs contend that these secret studies concerning the history, nature and extent of American involvement, commitments, including contingency plans for intervention, known and unknown, are a legitimate matter of public debate and concern since the pursuit of particular foreign policy can involve the American people in conflicts abroad which are not in the national or public interest.

On April 20, 1970, addressing 1,500 people at the annual luncheon session of the Associated Press in New York, Defendant Secretary of Defense stated: "Let me emphasize my convictions that the American people have a right to know even more than has been available in the past about matters which affect their safety and security. There has been too much classification in this country." Lloyd Shearer, *What Price Security*, Detroit Free Press, Parade Magazine, August 22, 1971, p. 5.

In testifying before the Foreign Operations and Government Information subcommittee of the House of Representatives on June 23, 1971, former Supreme Court Justice and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur J. Goldberg, stated:

... I have read and prepared countless thousands of classified documents and participated in classifying some of them. In my experience, 75 per cent of these should never have been classified in the first place, another 15 per cent quickly outlived the

need for secrecy; and only about 10 per cent genuinely required restricted access over any significant period of time. Floyd Shearer, *supra*, p. 5.

William G. Florence, a retired Pentagon security expert, helped during the Eisenhower Administration to write the original document (Executive Order 10501) which sets up the classification system and defines top secret, secret, and confidential. He has stated:

Only one-half of one per cent of all the information currently classified top secret, secret, and confidential, deserves such protection. The other 99.5 per cent could easily be made public.

In my 43 years of military and civilian service with the government involving responsibility for safeguarding defense information, I discovered widespread disorientation at all levels concerning the purpose and meaning of Executive Order 10501.

The Defense Department has incorrectly imposed all kinds of classification restrictions on the press, its own employees, and government contractors. The basic classification system was originally designed for the very narrow field of military information that could be used by some foreign nation against the United States.

Now, however, it's become a way of life, and it's used as a cover-up for all sorts of governmental inadequacy and

failure, and these rightly should be made public. Lloyd Shearer, *supra*, p. 7.

The passage of the Freedom of Information Act can be interpreted as the result of increasing concern with governmental secrecy and the "right to know" as a basic right secured by the First Amendment. While Congress has made no law by which the executive privilege is being exercised in the instant fact situation, the extent to which that privilege may be exercised against the importance of free and open debate and discussion in a democratic society has been a proper consideration for the courts. *United States v. Reynolds*, 345 U.S. 1, anno. 97L Ed. 727 (1953).

In *Reynolds* an action was commenced under the Federal Tort Claims Act for compensation for the death of civilians in a military accident. Plaintiff sought the production of the accident report under Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On appeal from a ruling for Plaintiff, while the Supreme Court held that a court does not *automatically* have the right to look at such documents *in camera* when there is a reasonable danger that they would contain military secrets, the Court also stated at pages 9 and 10 of 345 U.S.

judicial control over the evidence of a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive officers.

If there were a greater need to see the withheld documents, the court might have to probe more, the Court stated. In the instant case there has been no claim by the Defendant Secretary of State that the Holmes study contains military secrets, and if there had been a claim, it would be a bald assertion of a fact which Plaintiffs cannot contest because Defendant refuses to disclose the documents in question.

Moreover, the very question of what constitutes national defense is itself a matter of fact and judicial control.

In a criminal trial under the Federal Espionage Act the appellate court held that the defendant had a right to a jury trial on the question of whether or not classified documents, in fact related to national defense and that it was not merely a question of how the documents were marked or classified. *United States v. Drummond*, 354 F 2d 132 (2d Cir. 1965) cert. denied 384 U.S. 1013 (1966).

That the courts have the power to review executive actions, even emergency actions, for possible misuse has been recognized. "The Executive has broad discretion in determining when the public emergency is such as to give rise to the necessity of martial law . . . executive action is not proof of its own necessity, but a judicial question." *Duncan v. Kabanamokv*, 327 U.S. 304, Stone concurring at 336 (1946).

No showing has been made, and, indeed, none can be, that the security of the United States will in any way be jeopardized or exposed by the production of any one or all of the studies on the Middle East which are the subject of this suit. Moreover, any argument of security by the government is far outweighed by the right and need of the public to know what its government is doing and committing this country to. "The principle bases of democracy are knowledge and discussion." *James v. Opeliker*, 316 U.S. 584, 62 S. Ct. 1231, vacated on other grounds. (1942) The Department of Justice has, in previous matters, taken the position that in withholding information the Executive is accountable only to the electorate (Statement of Norbert Schlei, Assistant Attorney General, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Judiciary appellate court held that the defen-

dant had a right to a jury trial on the question of whether or not classified documents, in fact related to national defense and that it was not merely a question of how the documents were marked or classified. *United States v. Drummond*, 354 F 2d 132 (2d Cir. 1965) cert. denied 384 U.S. 1013 (1966).

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Judge Gurfein recognized this principle in his opinion in the *Times Vietnam Papers* case, at p. 328 F. Supp. 324 (1971).

Yet, in the last analysis, it is not merely the opinion of the editorial writer, or of the columnist which is protected by the First Amendment. It is the free flow of information so that the public will be informed about the Government and its actions.

In the concurring opinion of Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black, in the *Times-Post* case, 91 S. Ct. 2140 (1971), while that was a case involving prior restraint, it was stated on page 2146 that:

The dominant purpose of the First Amendment was to prohibit the widespread practice of governmental suppression of embarrassing information. It is common knowledge that the First Amendment was adopted against the widespread use of the common law of seditious libel to punish the dissemination of material that is embarrassing to the powers-that-be . . . A debate of large proportions goes on in the nation over our posture in Vietnam. That

debate antedated the disclosure of the contents of the present documents. The latter are highly relevant to the debate in progress.

Since an informed public is an essential component to a viable democratic system, employing a form of censorship by the government can only smack of a serious discrepancy between the principles of the nation, on the one hand, and the actions of its government on the other. Robust debate can only take place in a forum where the public possesses the knowledge and information to make that debate meaningful. Moreover, since the citizenry of this country must, in the last analysis, be held responsible for the actions of its elected government, both at home and in its conduct and involvement abroad, it is doubly imperative that the citizenry might request an accounting now of actions which it will be called on to support physically, morally, politically and materially in the future.

Respectfully submitted,

*Lafferty, Reosti, Jabara, Papakhian
James, Stickgold, Smith & Soble*

by ABDEEN M. JABARA

Attorney for Plaintiffs

726 Pallister

Detroit, Michigan 48202

Phone 875 - 3333

Dated: October 7, 1971



Reviews

Law & Culture: A Critique of Bozeman's Approach to Comparative Generalization.

I

The students of comparative political generalization today appear to be drifting toward a state of increasing frustration. Political scientists find themselves supplied with a wealth of data yet they have been unsuccessful in formulating a generally acceptable conceptual framework for it. After the publication of Gabriel Almond's formalistic model, for the comparison of political processes,¹ political scientists redoubled their efforts to find more sophisticated and precise methods for comparing political systems. These efforts have not, however, met with a great deal of success and construction of theoretical models appears destined to be the center of concern in comparative research for some time to come.²

Although an outgrowth of the behavioral movement, present efforts to formulate scientific models for comparative analysis threaten to remove the political scientist farther from man as a behavioral being. In their insistence on the applicability of a methodology derived not from the data but taken *a priori* from the methodological logic of the physical sciences,³ political scientists have perverted the proper place of methodology. In the words of the philosopher of social science, Alfred Schutz, "... Methodology is not the perceptor or the tutor of the scientist. It is always his pupil ..."⁴ Yet the felt need to provide generalizations of at least high levels of probability⁵ appears likely to elevate political analysis to excessively abstract heights and to result in veritable reification of the paradigms of the physical sciences. In this respect Giovanni

Sartori's recent criticism of "conceptual stretching" as an attempt to achieve broader generalizations recognizes the lack of substance and the artificiality in many of the efforts to conform to currently acceptable scientific standards.⁶ His suggestion of a ladder of levels of abstract conceptualization is clearly aimed at grounding comparative analysis in concrete behavior.⁷

The search for a useful framework for comparison is further complicated by the fact that raw data in itself cannot constitute explanatory material across cultures. For as Schutz has pointed out the important elements of social behavior are the intangibles of human interaction⁸ and as such they constitute a cultural context of meaning that is essential to much of the statistical data gathered. Schutz credits phenomenological philosophy with having paved the way for social scientists to focus on comprehending social reality. Integral to this comprehension is concern with how men know and Schutz urges that it is on this point that the social sciences should move beyond the limited objectives of the physical sciences which are concerned primarily with what men know.⁹ Thus, although the relativism implicit in the approach taken in this paper would not set well with the father phenomenologist, Edmund Husserl,¹⁰ the general concern with the individual's perspective that his ideas have engendered¹¹ can be particularly useful to efforts at accurate behavioral political comparison. For, unfortunately, current political science efforts to construct a comparative paradigm and taxonomy along the lines suggested by the logic of the physical sciences have failed to consider the basic

epistemological obstacles to generalization that are raised by the different kinds of meaning engendered by different cultural circumstances.

The importance of the relationship between man's *Weltanschauung* and his cultural circumstances has, of course, been noted by a number of scholars outside the phenomenology-existentialist school. Over seventy years ago, Jacob Burckhardt declared that cultural history "...goes to the heart of past mankind; it declares what mankind was, wanted, thought, perceived, and was able to do. ..."¹² However, the most influential and extensive analyses of man as a cultural being have been those of Max Weber. Weber's methodology explicitly aimed at discovering the motivations of individual actions within a given cultural context.¹³

Nonetheless, even though he spoke in terms of the individual as the beginning point for analysis, Weber's methodology in fact positioned the individual as a deduced entity from the formal theoretical models with which he began.¹⁴ Weber's ideal type was constructed from his knowledge of the social and cultural arrangements of an era and motivations for individual actions were deduced from this construct.¹⁵ Thus explication of the individual proceeded from those cultural and social forces that Weber saw as important and, even more subjectively, specifically from those forces that he believed relevant to the issue with which he was concerned at the time.¹⁶ Weber's dependence on typological formulations external to the existential being prevented him from treating the individual comprehensively from the individual's perspective.¹⁷

It should be understood that these reservations are not meant as criticisms of Weber's approach within his own logic but are intended to distinguish his approach from that discussed below. Weber's works

contain an abundance of insights and his articulation of the problems involved in grasping human motivations remains invaluable in the heuristic sense.

II

Fundamental cultural differences become particularly crucial where legal doctrines are concerned, because these doctrines reflect the basic values of a culture. It is, therefore, to Adda Bozeman's credit that in her latest book, *The Future of Law in a Multicultural World*,¹⁸ she has clearly recognized the difficulties that cultural differences pose for comparative interpretation. Bozeman states her purposes to be: (a) identifying the meanings of law to the peoples of the West, Islamic Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, Indianized Asia, and China and (b) trying to determine if there is sufficient accord among these meanings to provide a basis for international stability. But before proceeding to an area-by-area analysis, Bozeman incisively examines the sources and extent of cultural differences and notes the problems that these differences pose to cross-cultural comparison. In particular she draws on a variety of secondary materials to show the effects of language and culture generally on ways of thinking.

In discussing the relationships between language and thought and between culture and thought, Bozeman touches important parameters of ones being in the world. She points out that the modes of expression in a language not only determine to a great extent the kind of conceptual apparatus that a person can use but the words of a language are often so intimately interwoven with their particular cultural configurations that when they are used indigenously they inevitably convey more than their literal meaning. The unique relationship between words and particular cultural and social ar-

rangements can render simple translation of words without thorough understanding of the cultural context highly misleading. Thus, language constitutes a culturally distinctive yet uniformly essential route toward formulating knowledge of the universe. Language reflects a particular perspective on life and it is part of a more inclusive cultural configuration that molds approaches to thought and gives meaning to ones being in the world. From this standpoint, Bozeman does a creditable job of showing in general terms the effects that a culture's *Weltanschauung* can have on its political and legal values.

Regrettably, in her area-by-area analyses, Bozeman does not follow up her rather auspicious beginning to the extent one might expect. The singular exception is her treatment of the cultures of sub-Saharan Africa. Combining her introductory ideas about cultural differences with anthropological and sociological data on sub-Saharan Africa, Bozeman produces an analysis that conveys a sense of how Africans see the world and particularly how the African cultures have produced unique perceptions of the substance and role of law. But in her analysis of other areas, Bozeman relies more heavily on an historical approach and consequently, in terms of explaining the behavior and perspectives of individual men, the power of her analyses suffers.

Bozeman specifically notes the applicability of an historical approach for understanding Islamic attitudes toward law. In this respect, she follows the tradition of many Western exegeses of Islamic law.¹⁹ These treatments have been generally limited to describing the development of Islamic legal doctrine and with few exceptions have not been concerned with the sociological and behavioral factors related to the formulation of legal doctrine and to legal practice. Despite the fact that scholars note the diver-

gence between legal doctrine and legal practice, the complex theoretical issues contained in the development of Shari'a law have received far more attention than their relation to the cultural contexts within which they occurred. Thus from a contemporary behavioral perspective, the standard treatments of Islamic law leave many unanswered questions.²⁰

While Bozeman provides some cultural depth to her treatment of the Middle East, her general reliance on historical description seriously limits her ability to explain the Muslim perspective. She deals with manifestations of attitudes rather than root causes. For example, she describes the attachment of Middle Eastern thinkers to the supremacy and immutability of theological doctrine as "explaining" why the Middle East "could not come to terms with Greek thought" and why the Renaissance had no parallel in the Middle East. But this explains very little, for the dedication to theological authority stems from the unique cultural and social conditions of the Middle East. Identification of these conditions and of their linkage to Muslim perspectives on the world would go much further toward explaining why the Middle East remained impervious to many Western ideas.²¹ Again, the discrepancy between theological doctrine and legal practice seems fairly general to the Middle East.²² Bozeman, for example, notes that Muslim statesmen are flexible in their international dealings despite the Shari'a doctrine that the realm of Islam must continuously expand.²³ Yet nowhere does she indicate the parameters of a psychic orientation that enables what to the Western mind appears to be a dissonant relationship between theologically authoritative doctrine and the practical implementation of rules governing social behavior. It would appear that in terms of locating the meaning attached to law in the Middle East de-

lineation of this particular behavioral pattern would be crucial.²⁴

III

Essentially, Bozeman's confusion as to the efficacy of the historical method relative to her purposes has weakened seriously her conclusions. One problem is that she is seeking to determine what is a behavioral or attitudinal question, namely what are the meanings that law has within a particular area, through an historical procedure. This procedure clearly tends to pull her focus away from existential human beings toward much broader and more abstract entities such as tradition and doctrines.

Bozeman would undoubtedly argue that the particular meaning given to law can be largely discovered through the past practices and traditions of an area. She asserts that "...the present situation in all non-Western societies reveals quite unequivocally that the future is being fashioned—often by means of revolutions—in terms of resurrecting trusted ancient orders. . . ."²⁵ But the crucial problem with Bozeman's interpretation of history is her failure to recognize that, just as identical words carry different meanings from one cultural area to another, so within the same area they can carry different meanings from one cultural era to another. As Sartre has noted in his criticism of contemporary Marxists' blindness to changes in individual perspective, over a period of time an idea may lose its original meaning and become in effect an object that can be reproduced verbally but cannot be recaptured in its entirety without attention to the cultural values of the engendering era.²⁶

Every culture, R. G. Collingwood argues, is bounded by "absolute presuppositions" beyond which epistemological endeavor cannot go because they form the basic axioms of man's way of knowing.²⁷ By attempting

to identify the epistemological assumptions of a cultural era, Collingwood's cosmological approach to the history of ideas focuses on the core of cultural differences. Man as a living, thinking being derives his meaning and his view of the universe from the cultural framework within which he lives and the words that he uses carry the unspoken assumptions of his era as part of their meaning at the time that they are used. To take but one example of this phenomenon, Collingwood shows that in the West the Renaissance marked a departure from an animistic view of nature toward the more modern view of objective, neutral matter.²⁸ This change, of course, had repercussions on all modes of thinking and social behavior. If the term "cosmological" is expanded beyond Collingwood's use of it, to encompass the whole range of cultural beliefs and social arrangements that enwrap an individual's being and from his world view, it provides an apt label for sophisticated analysis of ideas from the past and from other cultures.²⁹

Of the two kinds of ideas, those from the past are probably the more susceptible to superficial interpretation due to society's tendency to overlook real historical differences and thus to read current meanings into words from the past. It is possible, however, to identify fundamental changes in social arrangements and technology that provide clues as to the form of the *Weltanschauung* of an era. Marshall McLuhan's ideas suggest, for example, that the printing press changed substantially the substance and scope of man's approach toward knowledge.³⁰ Social arrangements such as slavery or the city-state indicate distinctive kinds of assumptions about men. Finally, it does not take a great deal of insight to predict that improvements in the technology of contraception will have profound effects on the social status of women and thus on many

basic assumptions of contemporary society.

Legal doctrines are, of course, subject to the same cultural constraints as other ideas. Their meaning in any particular era derives from the cultural and social conditions of that era. No one would suppose today that the word "men" in the American "Declaration of Independence" applied to all men at that time or, for that matter, to any women.³¹ Similarly, but less obviously, W. W. Crosskey has shown that the meaning of the word "state" at the time that it was included in the U.S. Constitution was probably significantly different from what it is now taken to mean.³²

The rapid changes in the United States make attempts to construct any kind of American ideological tradition treacherous at best. Thus, Bozeman speaks of a "...United States where theory, ideology, tradition, and experience combined at an early time to foster the vision of a multinational, egalitarian and open society in which members, however various their background, are yet in the final analysis subject to the same laws of social evolution. ..."³³ Now, there is a kernel of truth to this generalization, but an examination of American social history discloses a much larger portion of myth. Certainly, Negroes and American Indians would have serious reservations as to whether the vision that Bozeman has seen has ever included them and many other groups, such as the Irish Catholics in the 1840's, have at one time or another had similar doubts. The claim here is not that the United States experience duplicates that of any other area but that it points up rather well the problems in Bozeman's approach to comparative generalization.

IV

For illustrative purposes, the discussion

to this point has focused heavily on the West. There is no reason to believe, however, that the non-Western literate societies have been immune to cultural and social changes sufficiently fundamental to change their dominant world views over a period of time. Certainly, in recent times all non-Western cultures have been profoundly affected by contact with the West. And in areas such as India and the Middle East where invasion has been followed by foreign domination more than once, other upheavals have obviously occurred.

In many respects Shari'a law represents the most stable legal tradition of all those examined by Bozeman. Yet despite the theoretical position that the Shari'a developed above and apart from society, a position that at one time had some secular parallel in American constitutional doctrine,³⁴ the practice must have been otherwise.³⁵ Clearly, there was considerable innovation and adjustment in the early centuries of Islam. This movement was technically ended with "the closing of the door of *ijtihad*" in the early tenth century. The following period was marked by the dominance of *taqlid*, or strict adherence to traditions.³⁶ But, of course, law must be interpreted and applied by men and, although the words of legal authority may remain static, their substantive content, or meaning, changes as men from different times use them. Additionally, as Americans of the latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries discovered, erection of legal doctrine into a socially detached absolute in effect makes it the special conduit of the biases of the men who interpret it.³⁷ The heavy opposition to reform of the *waqf* in modern Egypt gives some indication that vested interests in America were not the only such interests to profit from the image of a law removed from immediate social needs.³⁸ If it is to have social force, law, whatever its genre,

must rely on existential men for its implementation and in this regard must remain subject to the conscious and unconscious forces of meaning and perspective engendered by a cultural era.

It might be objected at this point that because she uses as a basis for comparison the Western concept of law derived as she sees it from tradition dating at least from the Romans, Bozeman's standard itself is illusory. This objection gains added force from the fact that Bozeman relies heavily on Grotius, a man of a cultural era of three centuries ago, who in turn utilized the ideas of earlier cultures. The fact that there are problems with Bozeman's view of Western tradition does not, however, destroy the usefulness of her concept of Western law as a comparative standard. Her presentation of the components of Western ideas of law appears acceptable by contemporary standards irrespective of the validity of the tradition that she attaches for legitimatizing purposes.

Nonetheless, Bozeman's approach contains a considerable tinge of ethnocentrism in that, while her contemporary standard of Western law may be adequate, her view of Western tradition virtually ignores the militaristic and other violent aspects of Western history. A student with a different bent of eclecticism could fashion a Western heritage much more similar to those that Bozeman constructs for the non-West. However, the more serious question is whether the ideas that Bozeman has uprooted from their unique cultural eras of the past can derive sustenance from the contemporary cultures to which she has attempted to transplant them.

In constructing her comparative generalizations, Bozeman has chosen from those traditional practices and doctrines, regardless of their cultural era, that she believes reflect an area's general attitude toward law

in the Western sense. She discovers that in the non-West, "...conflict seems to be accepted everywhere not only as the ruling norm but also as the major and sustaining source of politically significant normative thought and behavior. . . ."39 On this basis, she concludes that the prospects for international order based on observance of the Western concept of law are dim.

But if the validity of Bozeman's findings is dependent on her use of tradition then they cannot stand, for two obvious differences between present and past in the non-West bear directly and detrimentally on them. Historically, warfare in the areas covered by Bozeman was limited in terms of technological capability and in terms of popular involvement. Today, of course, entire cities can be devastated in a short time and the fruits of decades of economic development destroyed in a day. More people are directly threatened by war as participants and victims. Furthermore, in a number of countries an increasing popular voice in political matters has removed policy decisions from the hands of an elite. Even where this is not so, the rising material expectations of the masses must be balanced against the economic drain and destruction caused by the demands of modern warfare.

Thus, the objective conditions of warfare and international violence have changed drastically within the last fifty years.⁴⁰ Changes of this scope clearly must affect the individual's subjective being vis-à-vis his perspective toward war. Today the rhetoric of violence assumes a meaning different from the eras when obedience to military and warrior-like virtues could cause only limited harm. Some rhetoric will remain and war quite probably will occur in a number of the areas analyzed, but the forces that define and cause these activities are located in contemporary cultural and social conditions. In this respect, contem-

porary differences in attitudes toward law still pose numerous obstacles to international cooperation and understanding. But, regardless of past practices, in today's world continual reliance on overt conflict as an instrument for the resolution of international differences carries a cost too heavy for most countries to bear.

This is not to say that the use of an idealized version of tradition does not play an important role in non-Western nations. Political leaders throughout history have selected from the past for their present purposes. Although use of tradition has rarely achieved the thoroughness suggested by George Orwell in his novel, *1984*, such use has been for primarily manipulative purposes. This sort of propaganda can become a supporting part of a people's value system, but as the components of this system change the image of the past tends to change in complementary fashion. It would be sociologically and historically untenable to rely on contemporary political ideology as the source for an accurate representation of a nation's heritage as it appeared to those who lived it.

V

If in their efforts toward comparative generalization, political scientists are to be accurate in the descriptive and explanatory senses and are to provide the basis for reliable prediction, they must incorporate man as a whole being into their methodologies. Use of idealized, partial or formalistic conceptions of man can yield only misleading conclusions. Man is an existential being in that he lives, thinks, and intends within a particular configuration of cultural beliefs and social arrangements and he must be studied as such.

In the academic field, the political scientists' infatuation with scientific method has given rise to far more interest in generalization than in the components of human experience that must be incorporated into universal statements. The heavy emphasis on the collection of data that can be formulated statistically reflects this disposition. Objective data of this sort, while it bears a resemblance to the data of the physical sciences, cannot substitute for human beings on a culturally comparative basis, for it is the meaning given to objective factors that defines their function in a particular political system. To achieve an understanding of this kind of meaning the political scientist must try to move inside the individual's perspective.⁴¹

It is in this latter respect that Bozeman has made an important contribution to the comparative study of law and politics. She clearly accepts the importance of man's cultural perspective as a basis for comparison. Moreover, her analysis recognizes the fundamental differences that exist between cultures. These insights amalgamated into a cosmological approach that provides for historical cultural differences could form the rudiments of an especially valuable comparative methodology.

Adherence to such an approach may not, of course, produce any universally valid or widely probable conclusions other than those so abstract that they are almost meaningless or those that apply on a rudimentary physiological level. On the other hand, there may be, as Husserl would probably urge, significant uniformities in man's way of knowing and his life styles. In any case, it is difficult to see how any comparative efforts can be fruitful without an accurate model of man as their starting point.

NOTES

(1) Gabriel A. Almond, "Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics" in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), *The Politics of Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 3-58.

(2) Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1970), p. xi.

(3) See Przeworski and Teune, *op. cit.*, p. 12; Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," *The American Political Science Review*, LXV (September 1971), 682-693.

(4) Alfred Schutz, "The Problem of Rationality in the Social World," in Dorothy Emmet and Alasdair Macintyre (eds.), *Sociological Theory and Philosophical Analysis* (New York: The Millan Company, 1970), p. 114.

(5) Przeworski and Teune, *op. cit.*, p. 4; Lijphart, *op. cit.*, pp. 683-686, 691.

(6) Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics," *The American Political Science Review*, LXIV (December 1970), 1034-1036.

(7) *Ibid.*, pp. 1040-1042.

(8) Alfred Schutz, "Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences," in Emmet and Macintyre, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8.

(9) *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12, 18.

(10) W. T. Jones, *Kant to Wittgenstein and Sartre* (Second edition; New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1969), pp. 392-394, notes Husserl's criticism of relativism.

(11) The ideas of the existentialists Jean-Paul Sartre, *Search for a Method*, translated by Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), and R. D. Laing, *The Politics of Experience* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1967), have focused heavily on the context and content of the individual's perspective. Of course, Schutz was a follower of Husserl.

(12) Quoted in Reinhard Bendix, *Max Weber* (Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor Books, 1962), p. 265, n. 16 from Burckhardt's, *Griechische Kulturgeschichte* originally published 1898-1902. The philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey also achieved a sophisticated understanding of the relations between man's approach to meaning and his place in the world. See H. A. Hodges, *Wilhelm Dilthey* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1944). Dilthey also had some influence on Max Weber. *Ibid.*, p. viii.

(13) Bendix, *op. cit.*, pp. 262, 266-267, 387.

(14) Gerth and Mills point out discrepancies between Weber's professed methodological ap-

proach and the reality of his implemented analysis. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, "Introduction: The Man and His Work" in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds. and translators), *From Max Weber* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 57-59; see also Bendix, *op. cit.*, pp. 259-260.

(15) Gerth and Mills, *op. cit.*, pp. 59-61; Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*. Translated by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons. Edited by Talcott Parsons. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 92, 112.

(16) Bendix, *op. cit.*, p. 388.

(17) For an indication of Weber's propensity toward typological conceptualization and definition see *ibid.*, pp. 258-259, 383-390; also see Gerth and Mills, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

(18) Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971.

(19) See Joseph Schacht, *The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959) and *An Introduction to Islamic Law* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964); Majid Khadduri and Herbert J. Liebesny (eds.), *Origin and Development of Islamic Law*, vol. 1 of *Law in the Middle East* (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1955); N. J. Coulson, *A History of Islamic Law* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1964).

(20) In many ways the study of Islamic jurisprudence resembles the dominant approach to American constitutional doctrine during the latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Students of constitutional law during this period confined themselves to the abstract formulas of legal logic derived from judicial precedents and somewhat tortured interpretations of the U.S. Constitution. This approach has been succeeded at the U.S. Supreme Court level by a much more sociological orientation that explicitly recognizes the practical effects of law on society. The closer relationship between legal doctrine and legal practice in America undoubtedly partially accounts for the rather swift reaction against abstract formalism. American social scientists now study legal processes as part of the social context, but law schools still tend to be quite traditional in their approaches. For a penetrating criticism of the contemporary failure of the American judiciary and legal profession to deal adequately with behavioral reality, see Jerome Frank, *Courts on Trial* (New York: Atheneum, 1963).

(21) Western thinkers also for centuries acknowledged the pervasiveness and sovereignty of

divine authority, yet the West moved from this position while the Middle East did not. The explanation for this difference is located in the underlying assumptions and attitudes engendered by the cultural and social arrangements of each area not in the theoretical positions themselves.

(22) Coulson, *op. cit.*, pp. 38, 120, 147.

(23) Schacht, *An Introduction to Islamic Law*, p. 76, notes "...the law of war was deduced from a one-sided picture of the wars of conquest, and was hardly ever applied in practice"

(24) The methods used by Richard Solomon in his analysis of Chinese perspectives might be usefully applied elsewhere. See his *Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture* (Berkeley: University of California, 1971).

(25) Bozeman, *op. cit.*, p. xvii, also with regard to the Middle East, note Bozeman's rather abrupt switch from discussion of the traditional internal structure of the Islamic community to description of the tradition, as she sees it, of Islam's external, aggressive activities, pp. 78-79

(26) Sartre, *op. cit.*, p. 137. With regard to comparisons across time and geographical cultures, C. E. Black notes, "...The trouble with such comparisons is that since any aspect of a society is largely dependent on its total culture, the uniformities tend to be more nominal and the variations more real as the time-span increases." C. E. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 39.

(27) R. G. Collingwood, *An Essay on Metaphysics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940), pp. 93-94.

(28) R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of Nature* (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 95.

(29) Collingwood's use of the term is limited primarily to man's view of nature and the universe, which, of course, composes an important part of a cultural's epistemological system. See *ibid.*, pp. 1-3.

(30) Marshall McLuhan, *The Gutenberg Galaxy* (New York: Signet Books, 1969).

(31) Although the "Declaration of Independence" does not have the force of law in the United States, the ideas expressed in it form part of the ideological background for the U.S. Constitution even though the Constitution is a considerably more conservative document. The "Declaration" is also reflective of Western ideas about the obligations existing between rulers and ruled and the proper form for dissolving these obligations. On this point see Erich Angermann,

"Sändische Rechtstraditionen in der Amerikanischen Unabhängigkeitserklärung," *Historische Zeitschrift*, CC (February 1965), 61-91.

(32) W. W. Crosskey, *Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), I, 55-69.

(33) Bozeman, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

(34) U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice George Sutherland was an important spokesman for the position that constitutional law reigned free from social changes. See Alpheus T. Mason and Richard H. Leach, *In Quest of Freedom* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1959), pp. 446-452.

(35) Coulson, *op. cit.*, p. 4

(36) *Ibid.*, p. 80.

(37) Edward S. Corwin, "The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment," in Edward S. Corwin, *American Constitutional History*. Edited by Alpheus T. Mason and Gerald Garvey. (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 67-98; Eric F. Goldman, *Rendez-vous with Destiny* (Revised edition; New York: Vintage Books, 1956), pp. 102-115.

(38) Farhat J. Ziadeh, *Lawyers, the Rule of Law and Liberalism in Modern Egypt* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1968), p. 127.

(39) Bozeman, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

(40) The foregoing discussion also applies generally to operations short of war such as sabotage and guerrilla activities. In the Middle East, for example, activities of this sort have pretty clearly been held at a low level due partly to the kinds of sanctions that Israel can apply and to large power maneuvers. On the other hand, in an area where a number of countries with limited military technologies exist in relative isolation, the potential for aggressive activities may be greater, although the possibility of intervention by a bigger power poses a constant threat to the limited nature of this kind of activity.

(41) In this respect, note Schutz's postulates of the subjective interpretation and of adequacy Schutz, "The Problem of Rationality in the Social World," pp. 110-111.

Robert Heineman

Chairman, Department of
Political Science
Alfred University



Bassam TIBI (ed), *Die Arabische Linke*. Frankfurt /M., Europäische Verlagsanstalt 1969. 182 pages, Bibl. Index 12, — DM.

One of the most important ideological features of the contemporary Arab world is the transformation of Arab nationalism and the emergence of the Arab new left, the topic of Dr. Tibi's edited volume. Little attention has been given to this phenomenon in the Western world. As a matter of fact, the reviewer is not aware of any attempt of this nature in English, and knows only of one other book similar in nature, although it differs in scope (Abdel-Malek (ed.), *La Pensée Politique Arabe Contemporaine*, Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1970.) Dr. Tibi's book fills an obvious gap in Western literature on Middle East realities, and thus is a most welcome addition.

Dr. Tibi introduces his book with a long editor's introduction which surveys the Arab situation since the destruction of the Abbasid dynasty to the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt in 1798, and analyzes the causes of the Arab renaissance which followed. The remainder of the book is comprised of translations of basic writings of Arab left intellectuals categorized under five chapter headings. The first three chapters deal with, respectively, the Arab left's criticism of Arab communists (pp. 43-68); Arab left criticism of Arab nationalism (pp. 69-86), and the

left's criticism of Arab socialism (pp. 87-118). Chapter 4 presents samples of writings from what the editor feels are the only true revolutions in the Arab world—Algeria and the People's Democratic Republic of Southern Yemen. The final chapter deals with the problems of the Arab left. An excellent bibliography concludes the book.

As with many books of this kind, the sampling of selections is narrow and does not reflect fully the many currents of thought that characterize the various categories chosen by the editor. This is not a problem of scholarship, however, but of space; and while on the one hand the editor may have been able to give a fuller picture by narrowing the scope of his topic, on the other, he has chosen the most significant writings for his categories. It is an essential book for the study of the contemporary Arab world, and a book that introduces scholars in the Western world to a topic of great importance that they seem to be unable to understand.

T.Y. Ismael

Associate Professor of Political Science
The University of Calgary

R. Hrair Dekmejian, *Egypt Under Nasir : A Study in Political Dynamics* (Albany : State University of N.Y. Press, 1971), PP. 310. \$ 10.

Dekmejian's study, *Egypt Under Nasir*, is the most recent and updated work on post-WWII Egypt. This, however, is not the only merit the study enjoys. More im-

portant is the author's scientific ability to identify with the values, concepts and ideals of the society under discussion. In consequence, Dekmejian's work definitely distin-

guishes itself by the author's vivid and enthusiastic cognizance of the perceptions and aspirations of the individuals, groups and peoples he is writing about. Such scientific and sympathetic studies, in contrast with the many politics-expediency motivated and oriental 'studies', should be emphatically acclaimed and welcomed.

The following discussion realizes the obvious built-in limitations of reviewing a study which is as comprehensive as Dekmejian's in such a small space. This is why it is plainly admitted from the very outset that it is impossible to do any justice to the contents of the book in any other means than reading it. To be sure, neither the intuitive analysis nor the systematic research could be over-emphasized. All said, we can start reviewing the book, commenting on its contents and differing with some of the author's conclusions. Neither our differences with the author nor our comments on the book's themes should, however, obscure the general positive evaluation of the study as it was firmly enunciated above.

* * *

Notwithstanding Professor Dekmejian's occasional (and necessary) references to certain salient historical evidences and variables, his focus is, nevertheless, restricted to the analysis of Egyptian politics since 1952. In chapter one (pp. 2-16) the author aptly defines the problem he intends to examine. He then lucidly delineates the scheme of analysis and the basic and auxilliary variables utilized to examine the dynamics of politics in Egypt between 1952-71.

Chapters two (17-22), three (23-36) and four (37-47) focus on the societal background of Nasir's coup, the consolidation of the military dictatorship and the emergence of Nasir's charismatic authority respectively. Chapters five (48-63), six (64-

81) and seven (82-96) discuss the ideological imperative confronting the new regime, the metamorphosis of the revolutionary present with the heritage of the past and finally the Arabization of modern Egypt. An analysis of the Nasirite theory and practice of Arab-unity nationalism (97-118) as well as Arab socialism (119-43) are portrayed in chapters eight and nine. Separate discussions of the first phase of the routinization of Nasir's charisma, the power elite between 1952-69 and the dangerous stress through which the political system evolved between 1965-67 constitute the themes of chapters ten (144-66), eleven (167-224) and twelve (225-43), consecutively. Finally post-1967 War Egypt is discussed in chapters thirteen, fourteen and fifteen (244-310).

* * *

Though the author appreciates the "circumstances of crises" that helped actualize and foster Nasir's charisma, his "primary focus of inquiry (on) the leader himself"¹ was at the expense of other variables as important as the charisma itself. Any justification or explanation on the basis of 'time and space limitations', in such a voluminous work, seem to stand on shaky grounds and must be immediately ruled out. Moreover, and perhaps because of the focus mentioned above, Professor Dekmejian chose to study 'the behavior of political elites'² in Egypt. His reasons for doing that are highly understood and appreciated. Nevertheless, the author's attempted study of 'the behavior of political elites' fell short of meeting such an ambitious aim. While Professor Dekmejian's work stands as an excellent study of the *formal* Egyptian political elite it neither covers the broad spectrum of 'the behavior of political elites', nor does it go deep enough to *uncover* the *actual* decision-

making elite. The author's painstaking effort to describe the military infiltration into the *presidential* and *ministerial* levels since 1952 (through the study of 131 Egyptian leaders³) emphasized the structure rather than the *process* of decision-making in the Egyptian political system. Had it not been for the very quick and occasional references to the decisive influence of Nasir on the decision-making process, the reader would have been completely left to conclude that the 131 men mentioned above were the real decision-makers⁴. Neither the military establishment proper nor the military elite '*under*' Field Marshal Amer were ever given the attention they deserve in the course of the study. This major omission takes place despite the many evidences that the military elite referred to above (particularly after 1963) was one of the most, if not the most, important political elite. Furthermore, Nasir's decisive decision-making powers were envisaged in a more or less *static* way. In consequence, the various *direct* and *indirect* military limitations on Nasir's freedom of action were never mentioned. It is this specific major shortcoming that fatally distorted the whole decision-making picture depicted by Professor Dekmejian. Moreover, the more or less hasty adoption of the Egyptian official description of the infiltration of the military into the Egyptian society, is incompatible with Dr. Dekmejian's demonstrated method of independent meticulous research and evaluation.

The same major criticism mentioned

above accounts for the author's unfortunate analysis of the "deep" reasons responsible for the 1967 debacle.⁵ The author's lack of inquiry on the military bureaucracy (and elite) '*under*' Amer with the consequent unawareness of the deep corruption and disintegration of that military elite led Dr. Dekmejian to (unfortunately again) seek explanations for the humiliating military defeat by directly accepting and indirectly propagating unfair and unscientific "basic character traits of Arabs generally and Egyptians specifically."⁶ Professor Dekmejian's precautionary mitigating and apologetic words and sentences in this regard in no way counterbalance the (once again) unfortunate remarks that he accepts and preaches about "Arab national character."⁷ In brief, Dr. Dekmejian's 'reasons' for the June 1967 military defeat not only throw a shadow of doubt on the author's acclaimed objective approach but also go contrary to the many evidences on the real 'character traits' of the Egyptians and other Arabs as demonstrated by them during the same period under discussion.

Finally, Dr. Dekmejian's utilization of the concept of "routinization" of charisma lacks the clarity that his study generally enjoys. Moreover, his references to the 'routinization' of Nasir's charisma in particular⁸ is controversial and debatable. This last point, it is maintained, needs to be answered by the future and the future alone.

As'ad Abdul-Rahman

The University of Calgary

NOTES

(1) p. 1.

(2) p. 2.

(3) pp. 168-219.

(4) pp. 219-223.

(5) pp. 247-251.

(6) p. 248.

(7) pp. 248-49.

(8) pp. 8-9, 144-167 and chapter 13 *passim*.

Sholmo A. Deshen : *Immigrant Voters in Israel*,
Manchester University Press (Distributed in
the U.S.A. by Humanities Press), 1970, 239
pp., \$ 9.00

This book mirrors, in a way not intended by the author, the essential paradox of the Israeli State. Israel, Israeli Jews, and the Euro-American Jewish intellectual community combine the most advanced scientific methodology and analysis with a primitive, insensitive tribal exclusiveness that is truly barbaric. Over and over again Shlomo A. Deshen in his book and his advisor and mentor, Max Gluckman, in the introduction mouth the tired cliché of the "dream and reality of Israel" while totally ignoring the real nightmare it has proven for the Palestinian Christians and Muslims. Twice Gluckman quotes with approval Lionel Trilling's admonishment "to liberate the individual from the tyranny of his culture." Alas, neither he nor Deshen escape the bounds of Zionism.

Deshen frankly states (p. 8), "I am an Israeli and I accept the basic ideological premises of Israeli State and society." Later we are told he is of "veteran European" stock. This tribal exclusiveness, that he embraces, defines as a legitimate resident of Israel *any* Jew from *anywhere* at *any* time. This "dream cum reality" chauvinism relegates the original inhabitants to a second class category or to total elimination. (No references to Palestinians, Arabs, Muslims, or Christians appear in the index.) One may wonder if a university press in England or a press calling itself "Humanities Press" in New York would publish a work by a South African social anthropologist who repeatedly extolls the merits of apartheid.

Deshen's constant vaunting of his ideological biases combines with his stilted pe-

destrian style to make the reading tedious to all but the most devoted partisans of Zionism. However, much information can be gleaned by a careful reading of this book. Deshen attempts a study of an election campaign in an Israeli community consisting largely of Arab Jews. Deshen prefers to call them "orientals" though he notes (p. 181) that they consider the term offensive. He explains (p. 10) why he does not use the terms "sephardi" or "mediterranean." He, like all Zionist apologists, tries to avoid identifying them as Arab.

Briefly, as is the pattern of Israeli social scientists, he notes the educational, economic, residential, and social deprivation of the "Oriental Jews" in Israel and in particular, Ayara, the development town studied during the election of 1965. Significantly, he admits that the mobility trend for immigrants, especially "orientals," is downward at least at first for those who come to Ayara.

The picture that emerges of Arab Jews in Ayara is depressing. Although the Moroccan Jews represent more than 45 per cent of the population of Ayara, they are truly submerged. At least in the time of the study, the Ashkenazis of Euro-American Jewry had managed to divide the "orientals" and were successful at playing the Tunisian and Moroccan Jews against one another. Deshen tells us that the status of the Moroccans was so low (pp. 57-58) that they used the Hebrew term for "North Africa" in the title of their organizations in order to identify with more prestigious communities. One can appreciate how the dominant Ashkenazis instill strong negative self-iden-

tification in the Arab Jews when Deshen observes, (pp. 179-180) "Orientals — particularly Moroccan — immigrants . . . have very little pride in their ethnic culture. In fact, they often make pathetic efforts to divest themselves of it as quickly as possible."

How ironic! While social scientists in America and Canada have argued the case for the preservation of ethnic groupings in a plural society, Israeli social scientists support policies of forceful or pressured assimilation or "integration." Jewish social scientists in America decry the assimilation of East European Jewry into American society. Yet, they regard the erosion of Arab ("oriental") culture as meritorious in Israel.

While the description of the Arab Jews in Ayara is sad, his discussion of the interplay of religion and the election processes verges on the sordid. Deshen, who describes himself as "religious" and sympathetic to traditional rituals, provides a picture which indirectly explains why the vast majority of young Israeli Jews have rejected religion. It appears that most synagogues like the labor unions, banks, and schools are directly connected with political parties. Cynicism triumphs over orthodoxy. The ancient Israelites tried to raise a tribal deity to the level of an universal god. The modern Israelis seem bent on reducing God to a common ward healer.

The cynicism involved in the exchange (traffic) of Toras and prayer books for political manipulation verges on the level of simony. Vote buying is explained as recruiting "election workers" (p. 115) from the synagogues. Deshen, himself, admits that individuals may be financed as "election workers" by more than one party. The amount of money spent on the local election is said to be far higher than in similar English elections. Deshen uses the descrip-

tive term "haggling" for these quasi-commercial interactions dealing with voting.

The picture of the "pious" elements of the community is rather unsavory. Ritual purity clearly outrates morality or integrity. Deshen waxes lyrically about one Tunisian religious elder, and Gluckman hails the same man as a truly tragico-comic figure. Others, more likely, may see this ritualistic fanatic as strongly resembling the pharisee in the parable of the publican and the pharisee in the New Testament.

Deshen doesn't develop the point, but it deserves to be stressed that the vast expenditures used to run the local election process are ultimately derived from foreign (Euro-American Jewry) contributions. Since these contributors are bedazzled by talk of dreams, there is little accounting of funds and a strong potentiality (reality) for irregularities and corruption.

Recognizing parallels with the seamier aspects of old American Tammany politics, Deshen argues that the welfare state nature of Israel mitigates the dangers and insures protection of the democratic process. What nonsense! The relief agents, the labor recruiters, and the medical programmers are all party people. Given the haggling venality of the system, the "welfare" nature of the society maximizes the potentialities for corruption.

Indirectly Deshen helps explain the emergence of the Israeli "Black Panthers," who seek to advance the socio-economic position of the Arab Jews. (Alas, the Arab Jews are as hostile to the advance of the Arab Muslims and Christians as their Euro-American mentors who have taught them through the "school of hard knocks" of the advantages of ethnic stratification.) Interestingly, Deshen speaks (p. 56) of an earlier "wave of ethnic consciousness" that swept over the Moroccan Jews in 1959. None of the many "foreign correspondents"

(actually most of the Anglo-American coverage is by Israeli Jews) reported this at that time. Indeed, there was a total denial of such "consciousness" at that time. Similarly, Deshen reports "oriental" resentment to a book, entitled *The Ashkenazi Revolution*, written in Hebrew about 1964. Deshen, himself, describes its contents as "anti-sephardi, on the lunatic fringe." No other social scientist or enterprising correspondent informed the outside world of this "reality." (Let the Institute for Palestine Studies check this reference!)

In conclusion, Deshen touches upon much that has been concealed earlier. This book should be in the libraries of all those who seek to understand this political entity that masquerades as a "secular, democratic, so-

cialist state." The Arab states have not yet approximated the goals of democratic socialism. Neither has Israel. And of its social scientists remain content to "dream," to explain away, to deny, and to conceal, it never shall.

Trivial footnotes: Deshen explains the increasing popularity of knitted skull caps as a cultural borrowing from Euro-American Jewry. Obviously he is unaware of its old popularity among Nubian, Sudanese, Yemeni, and Saudi Muslims. Similarly, "Judaico-Arabic" of the Tunisian Jews is most likely Tunisian colloquial Arabic in counter distinction to classical Arabic.

George H. Weightman
Associate Professor of Sociology
Lehman College, C.U.N.Y.



Lebanese Handicraft

A Thousand Years Old Traditional Handicraft Younger Than Ever

by Samira Harfouche

The beauty of a country lies in its natural sites, but the soul of a country dwells in its people, and it is from the people that real beauty emanates.

What would a beautiful face be without a smile to light it up ? What would a beautiful city be without its inhabitants ? It is this anonymous crowd, this smile just glimpsed, that attracts the stranger. Man is forgotten, but his work remains, and it keeps him more vividly before our eyes when it is the product of his hands. Thus handicraft constitutes an immense source of wealth to a people, because it represents the typical product of a country, the very soul of a country.

The Lebanese has always been a craftsman. The Phoenicians blew glass which time has given a marvellous iridescence. Their textiles, their amphoras, their objets d'art, executed in alloys of silver and gold, spread all over the world. What has become of this handicraft ?

Go to an exhibition, and you will find the same articles, made with the same tools, but adapted to modern taste

Perhaps with a view to maintaining another ancient tradition, the "**Maison de l'Artisan**" chose a site by the sea for its centre where, in a vast, well-lighted hall it exhibits the


work of Lebanese craftsmen. Right beside it the "**Artisan**", in the vaults of an old house, is strangely reminiscent of the shops in which our ancestors in the ancient city of Beirut must have exhibited the first works of our craftsmen, in the hope of selling them to travellers about to leave by ship.

Beneath the Parliament building **caftans, table-cloths, abayas and ladies'underwear**, exhibited by the "**Artisanat Libanais**", combine genuine inspiration with the most refined taste.

Thus this wealth of handicraft, this heritage left to us by our ancestors, is still to be found, but as we pass through our villages we realise that it could be made even richer, made to cast its rays even further.

Let us begin at Jezzine where, some 200 years ago, a villager called Jabbour Haddad started hand-carving weapons of buffalo horn inlaid with Damascus steel. He sold these weapons to the Sultan and the Emirs. His sons inherited and maintained his art and, in 1930, his grandsons deposited in the Ministry of National Economy their first complete service of table cutlery. Using the same tools, his descendants (a dozen or so brothers and cousins, all Haddads) today carve and sell cutlery services to the value of 125,000 L.L per year. Their

Deeply rooted in the soil, the Lebanese handicraft is a precious testimony of the cultural traditions of the country.



great pride and joy is the services they make of solid silver and ivory. There are only **four** such complete sets in the world. One belongs to King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, and another graces the table of the Shah of Persia

Unfortunately workmen new to the job, less in love with their art and less concerned to maintain their reputation as master craftsmen, are now making the same models of a silvery-looking metal that rapidly oxidizes. Their knives sell well because they are cheaper, but they soon rust and thereby prejudice the reputation of the craftsmen of Jezzine.

Similarly the proliferation of textile-centres in Lebanese villages has been somewhat prejudicial to the reputation for taste and authenticity formerly enjoyed by the textiles woven at Zouk.

Before the 1914-1918 war, there were more than a hundred craftsmen working at Zouk on handlooms ("**nawles**") manufacturing silk textiles with gold or silver threads, ecclesiastical habits and table-runners. Today there are no more than thirty of them-master craftsmen and apprentices-producing almost exclusively shawls, abbas and caftans. (A fair number of them work in the pilot workshops of the «Artisanat Libanais»). It is true that the caftans they produce (in the «Artisanat» workshops, for example) are probably the finest in the world. But one of the Zouk craftsmen assured us that these are only a by-product of their art. What they dream of doing, and doubtless are capable of doing, is to use their looms to weave beautiful tapestries. But in the absence of orders, designers and encouragement, weary of weaving *nothing but abbas and shawls*, they are losing interest in their art and gradually leaving it

Embossed copper, is not, indeed, a Lebanese speciality, but is cut and hammered in

Lebanon (especially in Tripoli) with fantastic skill and elaboration, it attracts foreigners and has huge sales because of its typically oriental style

Nor is blown glass an exclusively Lebanese craft, but it is produced in Lebanon with much greater skill and sincerity than in the neighbouring countries. Nowadays sets of rustic glasses, often hand-painted, are made of blown glass. Madame Nina Helou, formerly the First Lady of Lebanon, had the Presidential Residence at Baabda lit by very beautiful blown glass lustres which all visitors both Lebanese and foreign, greatly admire, thereby according to Lebanese craftsmanship the honour which is its due.

There are only three master craftsmen. The most artistic of them, Kassem Dene, interviewed at Tripoli, spoke to us lovingly of his trade. He still blows glass as it was blown in in the time of Abraham. He is opposed to fundamental changes which, he says, would rob this craft of its authenticity.

But if methods have not changed, shapes have been adapted to contemporary taste. Kassem has no idea of teaching his art to a foreign apprentice, because it is hereditary in his family. His sales total 40,000 L.L. per year, and he will not increase production until his sons grow up

At Amshit, four old women sitting on their doorsteps plait hats, mats and Moses baskets in straw. They are the only ones in this village to keep up the tradition of this time-consuming and badly paid craft. When their generation passes away, this art will die out in Amshit, for the young women prefer to take up dressmaking or to work in the towns. In any case, straw-working is gradually dying out in villages throughout Lebanon, this craft being left to the Syrian villages where labour is less costly.

The same applies to pottery, because it is becoming less profitable, and less in demand. Jars and jugs are being replaced by refrigerators in the villages-this is another craft that is dying out. But coloured glazes have been recently introduced into Lebanon; this leaves room for hope of a revival.

In villages where the clay is suitable, Joseph Barchini, a professor of chemistry, is trying to coat pots with coloured glaze, decorated with taste and imagination. At present he is producing a delicate shade of green. In a year from now he hopes to have produced red and pink glazes, which are the most difficult. This will mean that he can offer the public rustic tea and coffee services, delicately coloured and, above all, entirely hand made.

The researches of Joseph Barchini are all the more meritorious in that they are unique. Craftsmen often have strong objections to change and the first pilot centre established by the Social Development Board (the "**Maison de l'Artisan**") at Aita al-Fukhar to encourage potting has disappeared. Israeli attacks have driven out the villagers who found working in a frontier village too dangerous and hazardous. The experiment has not been repeated in other areas.

But the "**Maison de l'Artisan**" must be given the credit for making known the carpets of Beskinta, and for introducing the craft to new forms and new dimensions. Beskinta bed-covers are now to be found in all Lebanese flats. The colours are gay, and the workmanship excellent.

The "**Maison de l'Artisan**" is also successfully making known the attractive and well made wood and rush furniture manufactured by craftsmen in the suburbs of Beirut, which is so often to be found in the flats of foreigners living in Lebanon

There are also the folklore dolls, the miniature shell figures made at Batroun, objects carved of cedar wood and the rush baskets made at Zghorta

Before completing our tour, let us visit Fakiha (Jdeidet Baalbeck) In this villages fifteen girls are being trained to weave carpets, entirely knotted by hand This craft was born, and was at one time very flourishing, at Aidamoun in Akkar A girl from that village brought it to Fakiha where she went to live after her marriage to a young man from those parts. But until recently the craft was dying out in both villages.

The "**Maison de l'Artisan**" hopes to revive the craft through its pilot centre at Fakiha. Typically Lebanese designs are used for the carpets, which sell at 70, 80 and 100 L.L the square metre. The experiment is important from two points of view. The carpets formerly manufactured at Aidamoun were beautiful, and we have every reason to hope that those now being made at Fakiha will be just as beautiful and will have a great success. Moreover, these villages are extremely poor, and a profitable craft like this could give them new life

Again this is one of the basic objectives of the promoters of handicraft. It was to prevent the massive flight from the land, to develop the taste of country people and to solve the problem of unemployment that the «Artisanat Libanais» was founded in 1936 by Madame Emile Eddé, then First Lady of Lebanon

At present the "**Artisanat**" provides work for more than seven hundred workers, supervised by monitresses, which means that, since its foundation, it has provided work for several thousand craft workers in 62 villages. A woman social assistant inspects these families to provide them with medical attention, contribute to-

wards school fees and find work for the unemployed

The "**Maison de l'Artisan**" founded in 1963 to help craftsmen find a market for their wares and to diminish the role played by middlemen, has also done much for crafts. It now deals with 450 master craftsmen, employers and apprentices. Sales in 1970 totalled 850,000 L.L.

It is difficult to determine the monthly income of a craftsman because his work is so often seasonal, but there can be no doubt that the practice of handicraft provides the villager with comfort and a better life. Above all it gives him his pride and builds up his reputation as a good workman. It is common to see tourists going to Zouk, to Tripoli and even as far as Jezzine, to see our craftsmen at work and to buy from them directly their finished products and works of art

It must also be emphasised that the objects to be obtained are often perfect of their kind. They reflect the intelligence and open-mindedness of the Lebanese craftsman, who adapts himself to contemporary taste

When prominent Lebanese personalities pay official visits, they present products of Lebanese handicraft to Heads of State.

The table-cloth presented by the President and Madame Helou to the First Lady of France was embroidered in gold by the «Artisanat Libanais»; it was a piece of rare distinction, unique, outstandingly beautiful. This marvel of craftsmanship was greatly admired by the Presidential couple and by all the members of their entourage. At the exhibitions and fairs in which they have taken part, Lebanese craftsmen have been - deservedly - successful. Just recently, at the International Fair of Arts and Crafts held at Florence, Lebanon, re-

presented by the «Artisanat Libanais», won a Gold Medal and a Prix d'Honneur. At this Fair, the Lebanese stand was the only one whose displays received a mention, couched in the most glowing terms, from the French Television. The O.R.T.F. also had a unit there to film the Lebanese craftsmen at work

Sales of craft products total nearly 2 million L.L. per year. This total is increasing, but it would be much higher if publicity abroad was more efficient

If the export figures of other countries are often very high, it is not because their products are more beautiful, but because more often than not they sell goods produced by industrialised handicraft as "**handmade**". To industrialise handicraft is to rob it of all imagination and deprive it of its personality. Moreover, cheaper labour and a less exacting insistence on perfection, mean that craftsmen made in other countries can be sold at lower prices and compete with those produced in Lebanon

If the materials that our craftsmen are obliged to import for their work were exempted from customs duties, they would certainly lower their prices, and this could do Lebanon nothing but good

Finally, modern trends, studies that have to be pursued in the capital city life and its pleasures, office jobs and their attractions, are much more attractive to young people than the arduous, lonely and unglamorous work of the craftsman

The competent authorities should see to it that the craftsman receives his due meed of honour, and is protected from want. The Social Development Board owes it to itself to protect the craftsman from material anxieties and takes every care to attach him to his trade, which has always contributed so much to the renown of Phoenicia.

INDEX

MIDDLE EAST FORUM 1971

XLVII Nos. 1 - 4

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ARTICLES

		<u>Issue</u>	<u>Page</u>
Atiyeh, George N. Bushrui, Suheil B.	Contemporary Arab Ideologies Shakespeare in the Arab World	Nos. 3 & 4 No. 1 (Spring)	23 54
Cleveland, Ray L.	Revolution in Dhofar, Sultanate of Oman	Nos. 3 & 4	93
Dekmejian, R.H. Drabek, S.	The Arab World After Nasser Problems of Urban Politics in Canada and the Middle East: A Comparative Study	Nos. 3 & 4 Nos. 3 & 4	37 53
El-Mallakh, Ragaei	The Suez Canal Closure: Its Cost for the United States	Nos. 3 & 4	47
Howard, Harry N.	Recent American Policy in the Middle East	No. 2 (Summer)	13
Hourani, Cecil A.F.	In Search of a Valid Myth	No. 1 (Spring)	39
Hudson, Michael C.	Towards a Critique of U.S. Middle East Policy	No. 2 (Summer)	25
Inlow, E. Burke Kerr, Malcolm H.	Iran: The Politics of Reform Tunisian Education: Seeds of Re- volution?	Nos. 3 & 4 Nos. 3 & 4	103 83
Khal, Helen	Birth of a Tradition	No 1	9
Kuroda, Yasumasa & Alice	Personal Political Involvement of Palestinian Youths: A Study of Political Socialization in a Re- volutionary Policy	No. 2 (Summer)	51
Love, Kenneth	The Dangerous Middle East Dou- ble Standard	No. 2 (Summer)	31
Nasr, Seyyed Hossein	Sacred Art in Persian Culture	No. 1 (Spring)	19

Pfaff, Richard H.	Perceptions, Politicians, and Foreign Policy: U.S. Senators and the Arab-Israeli Problem	No. 2 (Summer)	39
Ragette, Friedrich	The Lebanese Arch	No. 1 (Spring)	46
Suleiman, Michael W. Tibawi, A.L.	The Repatriation of Arab Elites Some Misconceptions About the Nahda	Nos. 3 & 4 Nos. 3 & 4	71 15

B O O K R E V I E W S

Abdul-Rahman, As'ad	Egypt under Nasir: A Study in Political Dynamics by R. Hrair Dekmejian	Nos. 3 & 4	136
Al-Qazzaz, Ayad	Republican Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics since the Revolution of 1958	No. 1 (Spring)	73
Cleveland, Ray	The Reviewing of a Book: Case Study of "The Israel-Arab Reader" edited by Walter Lacqueur	No. 2 (Summer)	67
Dickerson, Mark	Social Mobility and Political Change by Joan Davies	No. 2 (Summer)	73
Heineman, Robert	Lawyers, the Rule of Law and Liberalism in Modern Egypt by Farhat J. Ziadeh	No. 2 (Summer)	74
Heineman, Robert	Law & Culture: A critique of Bozman's Approach to Comparative Generalization	Nos. 3 & 4	127
Inlow, E. Burke	Persian Kingship in Transition by E. A. Bayne	No. 2 (Summer)	75
Ismael, Tareq Y.	Die Arabische Linke by Bassam Tibi	Nos. 3 & 4	136
Knight, Glenn A.	The Political Awakening in the Middle East by George Lenczowski	No. 2 (Summer)	76
Schleifer, Abdallah	Jerusalem, Key to Peace by Evan M. Wilson	No. 1 (Spring)	67

Weightman, George H.	Immigrant Voters in Israel by Shlomo A. Deshen	Nos. 3 & 4 139
Zeine, Zeine N.	The British in the Middle East by Sarah Searight	No. 1 (Spring) 71

D O C U M E N T S

Jabara, Abdeen M.	Legal Action to Compel Production of Classified Studies concerning American Contingency Plan in the Middle East	Nos. 3 & 4 115
-------------------	---	----------------

