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# MIDDLE EAST FORUM





# MIDDLE EAST FORUM

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## Editor's Note

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**T**he emergence of the Palestinian personality is one of the most dramatic features of the Middle Eastern scene today. The articles compiled here attempt to pin-point the Palestinian movement within the context of Middle Eastern and world affairs. The subject is introduced by Professor Salih J. Altoma's article, "The Treatment of the Palestinian Conflict in Modern Arabic Literature: 1917-1970". This article traces the human tragedy of Palestinians over the last 50 years as reflected in Arabic poetry, thus providing "some insight into the mind and the spirit of the Arab people as they cope with one of their greatest modern problems."

Where Professor Altoma places the subject in its human context, the second article by Professor Walter Lehn—"The Palestinians: Refugees to Guerillas"—places the transformation of Palestinians in its historical and political perspective. The establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 and the inability of the League of Arab States to prevent this laid the foundation for the birth of the Palestinian Resistance Movement a decade later. Israel's military successes in 1967 thrust the Resistance Movement prematurely into the foreground, making inevitable its clashes with the Arab governments, notably in Jordan—the primary base for the Movement. These clashes almost brought about the demise of the Resistance Movement.

Professor Lehn contends that ironically, and unintentionally, the efforts of King Hussein to achieve this end contributed significantly to the Movement's survival. By driving it back underground, he has, in effect, given it a renewed lease on life. Today the Palestinian Resistance Movement survives, its vision of a New Palestine undimmed—the best hope for a tomorrow of peace in the Middle East.

The third article by Professor Yasumasa Kuroda and Alice Kuroda, entitled "Palestinians and World Politics: A Social-Psychological Analysis" examines how Palestinian youths perceive of themselves, how they feel toward major powers of the world, and how realistic and justifiable they are in viewing the world as they do. The article derives its major source of the data from a survey of Palestinian secondary school students in Jordan in the late spring of 1970.

The Kurodas learned that the Palestinians identify themselves as Palestinians when they were asked an open-ended question: "Who are you?" The respondents showed their positive feelings in the following order of preference: Russians, Chinese, French, English,

Americans and Israelis. They exhibited the same order of preference for the governments of these nationals. Thus, the findings seem to closely correspond to political alignments in the Israeli-Palestine conflict. Furthermore, the Kurodas found that the Palestinians distinguish a government from its people in viewing countries they dislike but not those they like with *ceteris paribus*. This refinement of the existing hypothesis suggests that the affective component of international image affects the cognitive component of the international image; i.e., when one *dislikes* (affective) a people, one is most likely to *separate* (cognitive) the people from its government.

The final selection, "Some Causes for the Rejection of the Partition Plan by the Palestinian Arabs" by Professor Fawzi Asadi, examines the physical, socio-economic and political problems of the Partition Plan. The Arab-Israeli conflict has been passing through its 23rd anniversary, and there is little hope for seeing an end to this conflict at present. The reason for this is related to the fact that the conflict has been transformed from a Palestinian-Israeli conflict to an Arab-Israeli conflict—or even more, to an East-West confrontation. The writer believes that the essence of this Arab-Israeli conflict still remains embodied in the rejection of the Partition Plan by the Palestinians. This rejection has been overshadowed by the later involvements of the Arab countries in this conflict due to Israel's expansionist attitude.

# Contributors

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SALIH J. ALTOMA is Associate Professor of Arabic, Department of Near Eastern Languages and Literature, Indiana University. Born in Karbala, Iraq, in 1929, Professor Altoma received his B.A. from Baghdad University in 1952, M.A. and Ed.D from Harvard University in 1955 and 1957 respectively. He has taught at the University of Baghdad, Harvard and Princeton. His publications include: *Zilāl Al-Ghuyūm*, poems, Baghdad, 1950; *Ar-Rabi' Al-Mubtadar*, poems, Baghdad, 1952; *Al-Adab Al-'Arabī Al-Hadīth*—Modern Arabic Literature, (Co-author) Baghdad: Ministry of Education, 1959-1967 (Seven Editions); *The Problem of Diglossia in Arabic: A Comparative Study of Classical and Iraqi Arabic*. Harvard University, 1969; *A Bibliographical Survey of Arabic Dramatic Literature: 1945-1965*. Baghdad, 1969; "Al-lughah al-āmmiyya wa isti māluhā fī al-amal al-adabi," *Maqālāt Mukhtāra*. Baghdad: Union of Iraqi Writers, 1961, pp. 65-82; "Some phonological features of Classical Arabic and Iraqi Arabic" *Sabahidullah Presentation Volume* Edited by A. Dil, Lahore, Pakistan: 1966, pp. 149-184.

WALTER LEHN, Professor of Linguistics at the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, was born in 1926 in Canada and received his B.A. (1951) from Tabor College and his Ph.D. (1957) from Cornell University. He was first in the Middle East, in Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, studying Arabic and assisting in its instruction to employees of the Arabian American Oil Company, 1952-54. From 1957-60 he was Director of the English Language Institute, American University, Cairo, and from 1960-66 was Director of the Middle East Center, University of Texas, Austin. The summers of 1962, 1964, and 1965, and most of 1963 were again spent in Egypt as consultant to the Ministry of Education. He is the author of books on Hindi, English, and Arabic, and of articles, predominantly on Arabic, in professional periodicals. His general publications include "On the Arab-Israeli Conflict," *Reconciliation Quarterly* (Spring 1970).

YASUMASA KURODA is Acting Director of Peace Research, Associate Professor of Political Science, and Associate Political Scientist of the Social Science Research Institute at the University of Hawaii. He was born in Tokyo (1931), attended Waseda University there and completed his undergraduate work in sociology and graduate work in political science, receiving his Ph.D. from the University of Oregon in 1962. His postdoctorate work includes an N.S.F. sponsored summer study on welfare economies at Princeton University. He has taught at Montana State University, University of Southern California, and the University of California at Los Angeles prior to his coming to Hawaii. His major research activities center around political socialization, community politics, and peace research. He has published over two dozen articles on these topics mostly dealing with Japan and the United States in professional journals in Europe,

Japan and North America. His book entitled *Community Power Structure and Political Change in Reed Town, Japan* will be published by the University of Hawaii Press in 1972. Currently, he is working on a monograph entitled *Palestinians Without Palestine: A Study of Political Socialization in a Revolutionary Policy* with Mrs. Alice K. Kuroda.

ALICE K. KURODA was born in Palestine and attended Montana State University (B.S. in history, 1962 and M.S. in sociology and statistics, 1963) and the University of Hawaii. She is President of Survey Research Consultant Service in Honolulu, has published several articles on attitudes, and was instrumental in constructing and translating the survey questionnaires upon which the article included in the present issue is based. She is co-authoring a book entitled *Palestinians Without Palestine: A Study of Political Socialization in a Revolutionary Policy* which reports on various aspects of the survey data not touched in the article appearing in the present issue.

FAWZI ASADI is Assistant Professor of Geography at the University of Northern Iowa, Cedar Falls, Iowa. Palestinian by origin, he received his B.A. from the University of Syria, M.Sc. from the University of Wisconsin, and Ph.D. from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. He taught at Southern Connecticut State College, New Haven, Connecticut; University of Michigan Extension Center; Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan; and at Eastern Michigan State University-Ypsilanti, before coming to UNI. He is currently at work on a book on the Economic Geography of the Middle East.

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# The Treatment of the Palestinian Conflict in Modern Arabic Literature, 1917-1970

Salih J. Altoma

As a source of literary themes, Palestine is rivaled by no other issue in modern Arabic literature. For more than fifty years, since the Balfour Declaration was issued in 1917, it has engaged the attention of a growing number of poets, dramatists, novelists, literary critics and other writers.<sup>1</sup> Yet, one looks in vain for serious Western attempts which aim at examining this facet of Arabic literature. Even the few anthologies or translations of Arabic literary works which British and American scholars have prepared in the last twenty years seem to evade almost completely the poems, stories, and plays related to the Palestinian question.<sup>2</sup> By so doing, these works fail not only to achieve a balanced view of modern Arabic literature, but also to develop some insight into the mind and the spirit of the Arab people as they cope with one of their greatest modern problems. The value of such a literary approach hardly needs a new

assertion. Nevertheless, many students of the Arab world still feel compelled to plead for what has become commonplace for studying Arabic literature as a tool for a better understanding of the world it reflects. It was only recently that a leading Italian orientalist, Umberto Rizzitano, felt the need for stressing this point by stating:

No research work on the ancient and modern history of the Arab peoples, no study on western policy in the Near East can pretend to be exhaustive if its author neglects to know the soul of these peoples, as well as the limits and the aspects of what is called the 'conscience of the masses,' which the writers try to present to us through their novels, poems, and dramas. This literary production is the true and precious auxiliary to history and, if it is unable to explain and show everything,

it nevertheless illuminates, in many cases, facts which without it would seem obscure and it sometimes reveals to us the psychological reactions which the chronicles completely ignore.<sup>3</sup>

An examination of Arabic literature revolving around the Palestinian conflict reveals a number of general features or trends. In terms of literary genres, poetry is by far the most widely used medium, not only because it has been for centuries the primary genre in Arabic, but also because it represents the most effective instrument for reaching a wider audience and arousing or shaping public opinion. As a Palestinian critic, Jabra I. Jabra, remarked, "poetry might be condemned as too weak a toy against guns, but in actual fact it was often as good as dynamite. It gave point to a whole nation's suffering and wrath. It crystallized political positions in telling lines which, memorized by old and young, stiffened popular resistance and provided rallying slogans."<sup>4</sup> Therefore, it is not surprising to observe that much of the poetry is oratorical, militant or didactic, and deals with subjects which seem to a Western taste too practical to serve as legitimate content for poetry. Other genres, fiction or drama, have thus far played a minor role in projecting Palestinian themes. This can be explained by a number of reasons among which is the fact that both these genres are new in Arabic and are still in a developing stage. Consequently the reaction of the novelists, short story writers, and dramatists to the problem begins late, perhaps not earlier than 1940's, whereas poetry began to reflect upon it as early as 1917.

With regard to regional representation in Palestine-oriented literature, writers from all Arab countries have participated in varying degrees. But the countries most actively involved are, in addition to Palestine; Syria,

Lebanon, Iraq, and Egypt. A recent Arabic study surveying poetry on Palestine (1917-1955)<sup>5</sup> suggests that, before the creation of Israel, Syria had the largest share of the literary output, followed by Lebanon, Iraq, and then Egypt; in the period following the creation of Israel, Iraq seems to have taken the lead, followed by Syria, Egypt, and Lebanon. Although one may question the criteria on which these conclusions were based, it does not seem unusual that the countries adjacent to the scene of conflict should be more preoccupied with it. Aside from the role of Arab states, the Arab-American writers both in the U.S. and South America have contributed to the growth of this literature, though the role of the U.S. group is minor compared to that of South America. From the U.S. come the voices of Ameen Rihani (1876-1940) and the great poet-journalist Iliyyā Abū Maḍī (1894-1957), but South America provides us with the works of more than a dozen established writers who have been active up to the present time.

Viewing the literature from religious or ideological angles, we readily notice that all shades are represented. Indeed, there is no other issue which has had such a universal appeal transcending political or religious boundaries: Christians, Muslims, Druses and occasionally Jews, Pan-Arabists, socialists, communists and others have responded to the tragedy in their literary works with almost a unified condemnation of what they regard as the injustice done to the Arabs. To present an overall view of this literature, it is advisable to examine its line of development in two stages: before and after the creation of Israel

### (1)

The first period is characterized by a number of themes and motives which reflect

the response of Arab writers to external dangers, their painful discovery of their society's paralyzing ills, and a tragic vision of disasters which were destined to take place with and after the establishment of Israel.

First among these themes is the notion that Balfour's Declaration promising a national Jewish home in Palestine, and Western policies regarding Arab aspirations for an independent united entity, represent both betrayals of earlier promises and acts of ingratitude. Expanding upon this theme, the Arab poet brings into focus the images of the Crusaders to suggest that the West is following their steps in the new encounter with the Arab-Muslim East. Three poets from Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq can be cited to illustrate this theme in its early phase. KHAYR AL-DIN AL-ZIRIKLI (1893- ) a Syrian poet and a leading bibliographer of Arab-Muslim history, was among the first to voice a feeling of disappointment with, and anger against, the divisive policy pursued by Britain and France. In his poem "Inertia" written in 1919, he laments Arab apathy which was apparent while the "Syrian homeland" was being carved into fragments — Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine. And he seeks, by recalling their past glory, to impress them with the urgent need for a new heroic deed. Echoing the spirit of the traditional ode, Zirikli first appeals to the historical Arab roots of the territory as a prelude to his rejection of the Western claims to any part of his homeland; he then states his people's attempt to protect their rights through peaceful negotiation with the hope that the West — symbolized by greed — will return to the light of guidance. Finally he resorts to an old poetic technique, the oath, by which he vows that if the aggressors leave his land, his people

will cherish their act with friendship, but if they persist, then the sword, a renewed Arab revolt, will be the arbiter.<sup>6</sup>

WADĪ AL-BUSTĀNĪ (1886-1954), a Lebanese Christian, who joined the British administration in Palestine in 1917, was shocked to see upon his arrival an office for the "Jewish Agency" and was led to view it as a foreboding sign. He expressed his feeling in a poem "The Infant State" which he addressed to the British reminding them:

We opened for you our arms, extended  
to you our hand, but I fear you will turn  
against us

Then he tells of an abyss growing in depth between his people and the British, warning that he sees "the edifice of the national home rising." His mistrust of the British policy and Zionist ambitions continued to permeate his poetry for more than thirty years as his collection *Filastīniyyāt* (Palestinian Poems), 1946, testifies.<sup>7</sup>

The second theme attempts to demonstrate that the opposition is not directed against Jews or against limited immigration, but rather it is directed against imposing an alien European solution detrimental to the rights of the majority in Palestine. One can cite many examples which illustrate not only this view, but also the devotional respect for Judaic religious heritage. Two months before Balfour's declaration was issued, Ameen Rihani, a leading Christian figure of the Arab-American community in New York, published an article in an American periodical "The Holy Land: Whose to Have and Hold"<sup>8</sup> in which he reiterated the same point. Rejecting Zionism as impracticable and fraught with dangers, Rihani envisaged, as an ideal solution, a Syrian nationality embracing all the religious elements of the whole Syrian region. "The



Syrian Jews," to quote Rihani, "the Syrian Christian, the Syrian Muhammedan will all be the citizens of one country, a country that should remain one and indivisible and that will yet, and soon let us hope, enjoy the blessings of a liberal and just government where every one . . . will share equally the same rights, religious and political, and the same equality of freedom and protection."<sup>9</sup> In 1920, when the political climate was tense in Palestine, the great Iraqi poet Maruf Al-Ruṣāfi (1873-1945) addressed to Herbert Samuel, the Jewish High Commissioner, a poem in which he stressed blood relationship between Arabs and Jews, but also warned against 'violating Arab rights.<sup>10</sup> Aḥmad Shawqī (1868-1932), the only Arab poet crowned as the Prince of poets, in a patriotic poem glorifying Egypt, takes pride in the fact that its soil was blessed by Moses who performed on it the miracle of the rod, and alludes again to Moses, on another occasion praising the Nile, by declaring:

The chest of Moses still adorns you  
with its majesty and fragrance.

Indeed, Shawqī went beyond that by identifying himself, while in exile, with Moses, and Egypt with Moses' mother:

She (Egypt) like Moses' mother supports me in relying on God, and in His name she has thrown me into the river.<sup>11</sup>

It is evident from these and other examples that modern Arabic literature in its early stage does not betray an inimical image for the Jews.<sup>12</sup> However, as the religious identity of the Jews themselves is de-emphasized, and gradually submerged by Zionism, Arabic literature, in turn, begins to evolve a new image highly critical and mistrustful of the Jews, not as members of a faith,

but rather as promoters of a political injustice.

It is interesting to note that non-Zionist Jewish characters in Arthur Koestler's novel *Thieves in the Night* (1946) provide a picture not very much different from the point just made. For example, a Palestinian Orthodox Jew is depicted as saying, "In the old Turkish days, the few thousand Jews in the country had been tolerated by the Moslems except for an occasional program hardly worth mentioning; whereas now that the Zionists had come with their talk of a Hebrew state, the Arabs had become hostile."<sup>13</sup> The same can be said of another character, presented as a professor at Hebrew University, who feels that without extremists on both sides "Arabs and Jews could live as happily together as they did a thousand years ago in Spain." "Our young fanatics," the professor is led to remark, "want a Jewish majority. What is this talk? A provocation. What are numbers? What are quantities? It is the spirit which counts. We must come in a spirit of friendship and understanding to our Arab friends. The Jews abhor violence. It is our historical mission."<sup>14</sup>

The third theme which has been constantly emphasized is the religious sanctity of Jerusalem. This type of appeal derives its support from Jerusalem's central position in Islamic religious thinking, which can only be briefly suggested here. Historically, Jerusalem represents the first site toward which early Muslims turned in prayer. To a true Muslim believer, it represents the sacred spot which Muhammad visited in his night journey and from where he is said to have undertaken his ascension to Heaven. As a result, it is held sacred next only to the twin cities of Mecca and Medina. Besides, it is regarded as the scene of Judgment Day.<sup>15</sup> In dealing with some

of these themes, the Arab poet often alludes to the Crusaders to suggest that the West is moving on a similar track in the new encounter with the Arab-Muslim East. Hence the inevitable appeal to Saladin who defeated the Crusaders in 1187. Although references were made to this idolized hero before the Palestinian conflict, the frequency with which his name is now invoked has made of him a salient literary motif as Arab writers continue to depict the present predicament and search for a new savior or a solution.<sup>16</sup>

Fourth, in addition to these external themes, various internal ills have been repeatedly exposed, ranging from the selfishness of landlords selling their lands to the enemy to the divisiveness which has impaired much of Arab resistance. The Palestinian poet Ibrahim Tūqān (1905-1941) devoted several poems to these subjects, some of which offer a contrast between achievements attained by the Jewish settlers and the destructive acts of Arab parties engaged in petty partisan and selfish clashes.

Finally, cognizant of the "enemy's" quiet execution of a well-planned scheme to occupy Palestine, and becoming more conscious of his people's inadequate response to the challenge, the Arab poet found himself caught up between two conflicting worlds: a world of optimism based on his sense of the justice of his cause, and a reality incapable of fulfilling his optimism, in view of its corruption, outmoded values, and selfishness. He seems on the one hand moved by a spirit of unwavering determination to withstand the new foreign onslaught, by a mystical faith in the ultimate triumph of his cause in Palestine, and on the other overtaken by a tragic prophetic vision of an impending disaster. Both Palestinian and non-Palestinian poets have been instrumental in forging a tragic vi-

sion of developments to come. Al-Jāwāhirī, perhaps the greatest living poet of the traditional school, and often noted for his prophetic lines, foresaw more than thirty years ago the loss of Palestine.<sup>17</sup> But because the Palestinian poet had the advantage of actually living the events unfolded in his country, this tragic vision becomes, with him, an obsession, a hallmark of his poetry. Abd Al-Raḥīm Maḥmūd (d. 1948) delivered a poem before Prince [former king] Saud during his visit to Palestine in 1935, in which the possible loss of the Aqṣā Mosque was envisaged.<sup>18</sup>

Have you come to visit the Aqṣā  
   Mosque  
 or to bid it farewell before it is  
   lost?  
 To-morrow, and how near it is,  
   nothing  
 will be left for us save tears and  
   remorse

This poet, believing in self-sacrifice for his national cause, met his death later in 1948, in a battle near Jerusalem, as if to honor a vow embodied in his poem "The Martyr" which begins with the following lines:<sup>19</sup>

I will carry my soul on my hands,  
 And throw it into the path of  
   death  
 To attain either life pleasing my  
   friends.  
 Or death annoying the enemies.

Tūqān placed before his countrymen a vision of an approaching black day when the land would be gone. His bitterness and his fear of the future were perhaps best expressed in a satirical poem "You" which he addressed to the leaders:<sup>20</sup>

You are the faithful guardians of  
   patriotism

You have shouldered the burden  
   of the problem  
 You are men of action, without  
   uttering a word  
 May God bless your 'strong arms!  
 A statement from you equals an  
   army  
 Marching with its war material  
 A meeting amongst you will res-  
   tore to us  
 The past glory of Umayyad's  
   conquest  
 The salvation of the homeland is  
   around the corner  
 Its rosy festivities have arrived.  
 We have not denied your favors  
 But our soul still cherishes a hope  
 We have in our hands a remnant  
   of our soil  
 Please take a rest, lest the remnant  
   wither away.

As a way out of this predicament, the poet had no alternative but to turn to physical force. The futility of arguments, negotiations or declarations had been proved beyond any doubt. What was needed now was heroic actions, especially as exemplified by both past heroic figures and modern examples of martyrdom. In addition to specific figures, there emerged the image of the martyr, as illustrated by Maḥmūd, and of the Fedayyin, which was drawn as early as 1930 by Ṭūqān.<sup>21</sup>

## (II)

Following the creation of Israel, and its tragic consequences, the source of Palestinian themes, which had not been fully tapped, began to overflow. Not only are the earlier themes pursued with more intensified tone, but new issues, new ideas, new symbols have become evident in the literature of the last twenty years. The prophetic vision of losing Palestine to the

enemy is now no longer a vision but a reality. About one million Palestinians, including those prophetic writers, find themselves refugees in many lands. It was inevitable that much of the new literature should be devoted to the themes of regaining a lost paradise, the plight of the refugees, and the physical, emotional and spiritual pains which permeate the life of Arabs living in Israel. Although these and related themes are reflected or treated in the works of Arab writers in general, it is advisable to approach them from three different points of view: those of the Palestinian exile, the Israeli Arab, and the non-Palestinian Arab. Each is marked by a prominent accent: yearning, resistance and self-criticism respectively.

## — 1 —

The literature of the exile naturally stresses a sense of alienation and a deep feeling of nostalgia. As A. L. Tibawi suggested in his article, "Visions of the Return,"<sup>22</sup> (1963) the present Arab emotion is no less intense than the sentiments expressed by the Psalmist who sings

If I forget thee, O Jerusalem,  
   let my right  
 hand forget her cunning.  
 If I do not remember thee, let  
   my tongue  
 cleave to the roof of my mouth;  
   if I prefer  
 not Jerusalem above my chief joy.

Countless poems, numerous short stories and several novels and plays constantly bring into prominence the images and memories of the past, still fresh and vivid, and describe at the same time the sufferings of the refugees. To illustrate this theme, I shall refer briefly to the works of several leading writers. Maḥmūd Al-Hūt,

born in Jaffa and educated at the American University of Beirut, was among the first to devote a long poem, entitled *Al-Mahzala Al-'Arabiyya* (The Arab Comedy) (Baghdad, 1951), to his new experience as "A Palestinian Arab lost in other countries." The poem, consisting of 26 stanzas, 8 lines each, covers a number of subjects ranging from the bravery of the Palestinians defending their country alone to a sarcastic description of the "seven mighty Arab states" trying to rescue Palestine. But it is noted especially for its intense nostalgic vision of his home town of Jaffa and his lost paradise.

"O Lost paradise! You were never  
   too small for us  
 But now vast countries are indeed  
   too small  
 Torn asunder your people  
 Wandering under every star."<sup>23</sup>

Like other poets before him, or afterwards, Al-Hūt repeatedly equates Palestine with God's Paradise. In this regard, the Palestinian Arab writers echo sentiments voiced by early Jewish settlers in Palestine. For example, Joshua Barzilai (1855-1918) is quoted as saying when the land of his time was barren:

"It is not within my power to  
   describe the trees  
 in the land of Israel and how  
   could I tell the  
 beauty of the palm trees, the olive  
   and fig trees  
 If paradise resembles Jericho  
   it must be very beautiful."<sup>24</sup>

If Barzilai and others of his generation were moved by a biblical atmosphere to feel vicariously the unreal beauty of the land, the Arab poets are possessed by the real beauty of their homeland, their fresh

memory of it, and a wealth of actual experience with its landscape. Hence the added intensity noted in their projection of Palestine as a Paradise lost. Mu'īn Baṣīṣū, in his recent collection *Palestine in the Heart*, 1965, provides us with variations on the same theme. After citing a line by the Turkish poet Nazim Hikmat which runs as follows:

The poet was placed in Paradise,  
 but he cried

Oh! my homeland!

he sums up his longing in a short poem ending with the following lines.

My homeland!

Who will give me a sip of light-  
   ning from  
 your clouds? a fragment of your  
   thunders?

Were they to gather all rivers in  
   my cup,

I would collapse, under the sun,  
 Thirsty for your eyes.<sup>25</sup>

In another moving poem entitled "Poem to the Barbed Wires," he expresses a sacrificial yearning:

Were I destined to see you  
 As a newly born virgin land  
 like a straying sail carried to you  
   by the wind,  
 I would throw myself on your  
   sword,  
 Tearing my heart with its kiss,  
   to see you.<sup>26</sup>

The story of the refugee accepting or seeking death as the price of seeing his land is told in various works, but one of the best illustrative poems is that of Fadwā Ṭūqān, a poetess from Nablus, and the author of several collections including *Alone with the Days*, 1952 and *I Found It*, 1959. Her poem "The Call of the Land"

describes the refugee's inability to accept the fate of a wanderer with shame in foreign lands, and his determination to return whatever the price may be. Later, the refugee is shown walking on as if in dream; he fulfills his vow to return to his soil only to hear for the last time shots ripping the silence of the night.<sup>27</sup>

Salmā Al-Jayyūsī, another poetess, takes up in her collection *The Return from the Dreamy Well*, 1960, the theme of return which can be realized only through a long tortuous process of redemption. Her poem entitled "Redemption" ends with a hopeful note in which are fused the image of the martyrs blessed by the call for redemption and the sun of hope filling with light their long and rocky way.<sup>28</sup> A refugee poet in Gaza, Hārūn Rashīd has published at least six collections: *With the Strangers*, 1954, *The Return of the Strangers*, 1956, *Gaza on the Firing Front*, 1957, *The Land of Uprising*, 1959, *Till Our People Return*, 1966, and finally a post-1967 collection, *Ship of Anger* (n.d.). Nearly all revolve, with militant tone, around the idea that only through reunion with their land will the refugees be able to restore a meaningful life. Hence his faith in the inevitable return. As he puts it bluntly in one of his latest poems, "Destiny,"

We are coming, from the ocean  
  and the gulf  
They will never find joy on our  
  land  
Nor will tranquility reign there  
It is a battle of destiny;  
Either for them to be or for us.<sup>29</sup>

The agony of the refugees searching in vain for a new life beyond their land is described in a mixture of pathetic tone and admonition in his poem "Travellers."<sup>30</sup> Here in a rapid succession of scenes the refugee is shown struggling with the dif-

ficult yet unavoidable decision to leave his camp alone, dreaming of a more promising land. His old parents, wife and innocent children lament all night his approaching departure, and before daybreak all gather to bid him farewell at the railway station, which the poet presents as the platform of tears. After the train moves off, the family is left in a state of shock, enduring at night the "adamantine silence" overtaking their "wounded camp." The departing refugee, now somewhere in a foreign land, is chased restlessly by his own sin, finding no reward other than wandering, and hearing nothing but the mocking remark: "Refugee!"; his letters to his family burst with yearning and sorrow, and the anxious children torment their mother with their persistent questions about the news of his return. Finally, as if all this suffering were not enough, the poet adds a sense of guilt reminding him that he, by his act of departure, has betrayed his role as a defender of his homeland. Among the reassuring symbols which Rashīd and others use for their intention to return is the house key carried by the refugees as they wander in their exile. In a poem totally devoted to this subject,<sup>31</sup> the key acquires a halo of sanctity and becomes an object for reverence and worshipping.

The same attachment to the key is found also in the poetry of Maḥmūd Darwish, an Israeli Arab who in one of his poems: "Behind the Wires,"<sup>32</sup> expresses his eagerness to preserve it till death in the following manner:

Jaffa! I will come to you as a  
  pilgrim  
Wiping off from my lamp,  
The dust of darkness and time  
For I still have the keys.  
They are with me, in my pocket,  
My eyes, and my winding sheet.

Other inspiring symbols which have become more frequent in contemporary Arabic literature in general, are drawn from Biblical sources. The crucifixion is the most dominant symbol, but others such as Abel, Cain, and Job are also invoked. A recent poem entitled "Palestine" written by Al-Shabaawi from Gaza, treats the tragedy in a most subtle way without any reference to the present. Through its three stanzas devoted respectively to Christ, Abel and Job is told the story of the sacrifice, guilt, and ultimate triumph of the oppressed.<sup>33</sup>

—2 —

If the literature of the exile has been mainly obsessed with the tragic conditions of the refugees, and the theme of the return in particular, the literature of the resistance written by Israeli Arabs has been primarily concerned with the preservation of the Arab Palestinian identity. If the former is noted in general for its spirit of lamentation or militant and loud enthusiasm, the latter is more often marked by a suggestive, calm and hopeful tone. However, while the literature of the exile reacted immediately to the new situation, the resistance literature had to wait more than ten years before it was able to assert itself. This slowness can be explained by a number of factors, including the fact that almost all Palestinian writers have left the country. But more important is the political climate, which Israeli Arabs found to be hostile to their literary activities. As late as 1958, an Arab writer, Najwa Farah, in reviewing a collection of poems for the Israeli journal *New Outlook* pointed to this climate by stating: "The Arab writer has to beat around the bush hiding the greatest part of his story, depending as it were on the intelligence and comprehension of the reader." Then she quoted, from the work under review, several lines which suggest the climate:

'A slave, my freedom I cannot  
 enjoy it  
 For there is a tragedy, so awful  
 that I stammer,  
 There is a crime, so perfect and  
 well done,  
 I cannot speak, my tongue cannot  
 utter.'<sup>34</sup>

Although the Arab voice became less subdued in the late fifties, it was only in the sixties that we witness an upsurge of literary works devoted in large measure to the plight of the Arabs within Israel. An Israeli critic, (born in Baghdad) Shmuel Moreh, writing on "the Arab Literary Revival in Israel," 1967, maintained that efforts were made by Israelis to persuade Arab poets to deal with broader issues such as those confronting their own minority, instead of the love themes which dominated their early works. But he seems to complain when he goes on to remark that these efforts "have proved only too successful. Today there is hardly an event reported in the press that is not made the subject of a poem." This phenomenon seems to have been criticized also by an Israeli Arab poet, Rāshīd Ḥusayn, who is quoted as saying: "I don't deny that our poets should write political poetry but that does not mean to say that everything they write must be political. Most of our poets today in Israel wait for tragic or political incidents about which they can compose a poem."<sup>35</sup> But such criticism unduly ignores the fact that these poets do not need tragic events to write about, as they live or feel them daily; that they are, in their intense vision of the tragedy, not different from other writers like the Israeli poet Isaac Lamdan (1900-1954) who subscribes to the notion, "It would be criminal to sing trivial songs or write of nature, friendship or love while his people are being stabbed."<sup>36</sup> If Israeli Arab poets seem to seize upon

"events," "incidents" or "news" it is because they find in them a literary device, a technique to present their own case. Two recent examples serve to illustrate the poet's use of events to depict his own predicament: one addressed to an African from Rhodesia, the other to the Russian poet Yevtushenko, the author of "Babi Yar." In the first, the poet, hearing that Ian Smith, the Rhodesian Prime Minister had declared that as long as he lived, he would not permit Africans to rule there, finds a human tragedy that is not different from his own, and thus is moved to write a poem in which the image of the Rhodesian African is intermingled with that of the Israeli Arab.<sup>37</sup> The second example attempts to remind the Russian poet, who wrote about the massacre of Babi Yar, that there are other Babi Yars dotting his homeland, such as Dayr Yasin, Kifr Qasim and other places of sad memory.<sup>38</sup>

Among the leading exponents of the resistance literature are Maḥmūd Darwīsh (1941- ), Samīh Al-Qāsim (1939- ), and Tawfiq Zayyād (1932- ).

These three young poets have published more than ten collections in a relatively short period. For the purpose of illustrating their spirit my observations will be mainly based on the works of Darwish, which include: *Birds Without Wings*, 1960, *Leaves of the Olive Tree*, 1964, *Lover From Palestine*, 1966, *The End of the Night*, 1967, *A Diary of A Palestinian Wound*, 1969, and *My Beloved Rises From Her Sleep*, 1969.

The first theme that immediately strikes us as we read this literature is that of a pride in Arabism and a devotional love for the Palestinian identity of the land. Haunted by the spectre of losing his identity, and by various forms of discrimina-

tion against his people, the poet finds himself compelled to express pride in his Arabism but without arrogance or derogatory remarks against the national character of his opponents. His approach is more or less defensive and usually void of chauvinism. Among the poems reflecting this feeling is "Identity Card" which describes the life and sentiments of an Arab quarry worker threatened by unemployment telling in simple direct language his sense of pride and defiance.<sup>39</sup>

The long poem "Lover From Palestine" also by Darwish illustrates a romantic faith in the Palestinian spirit that permeates every site and movement in his homeland.<sup>40</sup>

Secondly, although this literature abounds in examples of brutality, suffering and other negative symptoms, it rarely yields to despair, resignation or an outlook of futility. On the contrary, it is optimistic, hopeful and defiant. "Tammuz and the Serpent" by Darwish is a case in point. Here we see a disappointment with the return of the Babylonian god of spring without its promised fertility, but it is not without a faith in the eternal yearning.

If occasionally this literature betrays a sense of resignation as in the "Song of Troy's Daughters," it is the kind of resignation which invites action, in a subtle way.

Farewell, O nights of chastity,  
O walls of Troy.  
We left our shelters  
And joined the festivities of our  
conquerors.  
To dance for the death of Troy's  
heroes.  
We are their captives,  
We will offer them our virginity  
And what they want. They are  
strong

We will sleep in the beds of those  
                        who killed  
Troy's heroes.

Farewell, O nights of chastity and  
                        dreams  
O memories of the loved ones,  
From now on, we are captives,  
And among Troy's remains.

The spirit of defiance sometimes seems unrestrained, and perhaps suffers from its extravagance, as shown in Tawfiq Zayyād's poem "The Impossible."<sup>41</sup>

"It is a thousand times easier  
To pass an elephant through the  
                        eye of a needle  
Or catch fried fish in galaxy,  
To plough and till the sea.  
Or humanize a crocodile,  
Than to destroy by persecution  
The shimmering glow of a belief  
Or check our march  
One single step."

But at least it succeeds in indicating the degree of humiliation and persecution which the Arabs feel or endure in Israel.

Finally, there is a cheerful expectation of death and a mystical religious obsession with crucifixion as the only hope for the salvation of the poet and his people. Therefore, the jails, chains, and torture which recur in this literature appear to be not only incapable of extinguishing the poet's spirit but rather instrumental in heightening and renewing his faith in the triumph of his cause. To sustain his spiritual strength, his pride, his defiance and his faith, the poet resorts to an increasing number of devices or symbols, including those derived from the landscape, past events in Arab Muslim history, allusions to a host of heroes, myths, and triumphant causes of other nations, ancient

and modern, and above all the crucifixion of Christ.

Rocks, the mountain, and the roots of various trees, olive, fig and palm trees inspire the poet with images that affirm his deep rooted and unbreakable relation with the soil and the triumph of his homeland. For the poet the tree stands, as Darwish himself declared, as a symbol of life's continuity, hope, endurance, and nativeness. As a result, we see him projecting his land in the image of a palm-tree unbending to the storm, heedless of the woodcutter's blow, and beyond the reach of desert or jungle beasts, or reminding his mother that she should not despair if he dies, for the roots of the fig tree deeply entrenched in rocks will eternally yield new boughs. In a poem entitled "Rain," Noha's Ark, a symbol of salvation, is reversed to a symbol of death because it means uprootedness, and for the poet safety can be maintained only on the soil which nourishes his roots.

Noah!  
Don't take us away.  
For death here is safety  
We are roots that cannot live without  
                        soil  
Even if my soil be the scene of dooms-  
                        day!<sup>42</sup>

The mountain and the sea are used as contrastive symbols; the former for determination to stay on, for life, the latter for death or misery of wandering. In a poem entitled "Waiting for the Returnees,"<sup>43</sup> Darwish poses himself as the son of Ulysses awaiting on the mountain the return of the wanderers:

I am the son of Ulysses  
Invited by a sailor, but refused to sail  
Anchoring his boats, he ascended to the  
                        peaks of the mountain



O rock on which my father prayed to  
 shelter a rebel  
 I will never sell you for pearls  
 I will never travel, never travel, never  
 travel

Examples illustrating the use of crucifixion are too numerous to cite. The following lines taken from three poems<sup>44</sup> should serve as a measure of the constant recurrence of the symbol.

1. "The Singer Said"

The singer on the cross of pain  
 With his wound shining like a star  
 said to the men around him  
 anything you ask but repentance.

Thus I die standing,  
 like a tree I die standing  
 only thus the cross becomes a platform,  
 a melody  
 and strings.

2. The Martyr of a Song

I am not the first to wear a crown of  
 thorns  
 to bid the brunette beloved cry!  
 you whom I love as I love my faith  
 and whose name in my mouth, dipped  
 in dusty thirst,  
 has the taste of wine aged in jars.

I am not the first to wear a crown of  
 thorns  
 to say: cry!  
 For my cross may become  
 a courser's back  
 and the thorns on my forehead,  
 adorned with blood and dew  
 may turn into a crown of laurel!  
 And may I be the last to say:  
 "I've longed for death!"

3. Response

They shut me away from light in a cell

only to see the sun of torches glowing  
 in my heart.  
 They wrote my number on the wall  
 But the wall blossomed with stalks of  
 grain

The conquerors on the roof of my house  
 have conquered none but the promises  
 of my thunder  
 If I perish on the cross of my worship  
 I shall return a saint in the uniform  
 of a fighter.

— 3 —

Turning to the reaction of the non-Palestinian Arab writers, we observe that they were equally concerned with the tragedy of the Palestinians, particularly the refugees. Among the outstanding poets of the new school, free verse, who addressed themselves to this plight are the Iraqi poets Badr Shākir Al Sayyāb (1926-1964) and 'Abd Al-Wahhāb Al-Bayātī (1928- ). The imagery of the brutality to which the refugees were exposed seems nowhere in modern Arabic poetry as forceful as in Al-Sayyāb's poem "The Caravan of the Refugees."<sup>45</sup> It is fairly long and extremely difficult to convey in translated version. However the following lines, selected from different parts, should, I believe, suggest the intense emotional atmosphere he builds up in the poem.

Have you seen the caravan of the lost?  
 The refugees?  
 Carrying on their shoulders, from the  
 famines of generations,  
 The guilt of all sinners,  
 Bleeding without blood,  
 Moving backward,  
 To bury Abel, hanging on the cross as  
 a lump of mud.

"Cain, Where is your brother?  
 Where is your brother?"

Heaven gathered all its distances to  
  scream;  
And rolled up the stars into a cry;  
"Cain? Where is your brother?  
— "Lying in the refugee's tent . . .  
Exhausted by consumption  
And Hunger.  
Adam's first damnation and the inheri-  
  tance of the perished.

Fire pursues us, as if the daggers  
Of all thieves and highway robbers  
  gasp in it with plague  
As if the tongues of dogs heated by it  
  dig up  
a hole, in the wall of light,  
From which darkness pours out like a  
  deluge  
No soil for the renewal of creation  
Christ was swept away with the flood,  
As he was closing up the hole with his  
  bleeding heart.  
The deluge swept him away,  
Leaving no heart to bleed,  
But darkness, like mud, out of which  
the Refugees' homes are built.

The fire . . . behind us, and the bullets  
  sleepless  
My father is on my back,  
And in my womb, an embryo moves,  
Naked without mouth, without eyes  
Rubbing with a hand his nose in a  
  pool of blood  
His echoes, like a small bell, ring in  
  my blood  
And my spirit almost gleams with peace  
I nearly see him in the illuminated  
  twilight of blood  
Naked, without mouth;  
As poor as man could be,  
Without bones, fatherless,  
Without Jaffa and without memories.  
Thousand years of darkness extends be-  
  tween  
Jaffa and the caves,

A bottomless well, like Hell's infernal  
  depth,  
Stands between yesterday and the caves.

Al-Bayāti, in contrast, tends to present an idyllic vision of the return in numerous instances, especially in his collection: *Glory to Children and The Olive Tree*, 1954, as the following examples indicate.<sup>46</sup>

As if a battle rages  
Between me and death, in silence and  
  sad stubbornness  
I will never die  
As long as there is light and oil in  
The lantern of the refugees' darkness  
Across the border cemetery,  
Where worn out tents  
Stand, in the winds, as signs  
Pointing to the near road of return,  
Stained with blood.  
The candles of the eyes,  
Your eyes  
Sweep darkness away  
O my starved brothers, scattered  
Under the stars.  
It was as if I dreamt of carpeting your  
  path  
With flowers and tears,  
Of Jesus returning along with you to  
  the Galilee  
Without cross.

The most pronounced aspect of this literature is its self-evaluation and criticism. More works have been directed inward, to seek the internal source of the tragedy of Arab defeat. The South American Arab poet Mūsā Haddād went in his self criticism so far as to absolve Balfour or Israel of all responsibilities. The Iraqi playwright Khalid Al-Shawwāf<sup>47</sup> in his play *Al-Aswār* (The Walls), 1956, attempts to strike a balance between internal and external causes of defeat, though the internal side was more emphasized. The play, historical and Baby-

lonian in frame but contemporary and Arab in spirit, seems to attribute the cause of the defeat to the corruption and the treason infesting the court. Bākathīr, finding no parallel to Arabs' sin except the Oedipus story, adapts the classical Greek tragedy to depict the sin which the Arabs committed in Palestine. In his play *Ma'sāt Ūdīb* (The Tragedy of Oedipus)<sup>48</sup> (1949?) the Greek hero symbolizing the Arab is led to his temporary defeat challenging the high priest who partly represents the enemy from without, but also the corrupt feudal and religious institutions. When Oedipus finally emerges triumphant, absolved by the people of his unintended crime against his father, he rids Thebes of starvation and the plague by confiscating the temple's riches and distributing the land to the people. Yusuf al-Sibāī, a former Egyptian military officer and a prolific novelist, brings into focus several negative aspects of the Arab-Israeli war of 1948. His novel *Tariq Al-'awda* (The Road to the Return) (Cairo, 1958) revolves, in large measure, around the life of a romantic hero who decides to join the army on the front, motivated not so much by patriotism as by a personal desire to escape his failure in Cairo, and to secure better pay. It also offers an indictment of the former regime for its responsibility in the defeat because of the scandalous rotten armaments.

A central character in Jabra I. Jabra's English novel *Hunters in a Narrow Street* (London, 1960) points to "dishonesty right and left," as a major cause for the defeat. He is quoted as saying:

"The things we've done for Palestine!  
But it's all gone down the drain.  
Dishonesty right and left, within and without . . . . Our papers find in Palestine a rich source of material to fill up their columns. It's repetitious, uninformed, hot-headed, high-worded, and

the people are sick of it. But how else can we prove to them we're patriotic?"<sup>49</sup>

This inward-looking approach becomes more pronounced after the war of 1967. Nizār Qabbānī, the former Syrian diplomat, and the master of erotic poetry, offers perhaps the harshest and the most unrestrained condemnation of Islam, as practiced, the corruption of the political systems, and the writers' betrayal of their mission. Among his latest poems are "Investigation" and "Actors" (1969),<sup>50</sup> which express his impatience with all causes of lethargy, stagnation and defeat. In the first, the religious Imam is murdered as a symbol of fatalism and resignation, and the murderer is defended by his testimony regarding the futility and the deception of relying on the Imam. By stabbing him to death, he feels that he kills "all the parasites in the garden of Islam," and idles relaxing on the sidewalks of dreams. The second poem reflects the poet's disappointment with the fact that despite the stunning defeat of 1967, the same mentality, the same actors and the same approach leading to the defeat still prevail. The following excerpts reveal the tempo set by the poem:

When the word in a city  
Becomes hashish forbidden by law,  
When thinking becomes a crime,  
like

Prostitution and opium  
When men become like frogs  
Neither rebelling, nor complaining  
Neither dying nor living  
The forests, children, flowers, and  
fruits will perish  
And man becomes in his homeland  
more humiliated  
than roaches.

The June war has ended  
And our condition — praise be to  
God — is at its best

Our writers are idle on the side-  
walk of thought  
Living on the Sultan's kitchen  
Striking with his long sword  
Our writers have not practiced  
thinking

For centuries  
They have not been crucified  
They have not seen the borders  
of death and madness  
Our writers are on a vacation  
Living outside history

The stage has been burned to its  
foundations,  
But the actors have not yet dis-  
appeared.

As this painful process of self examination continues, the list of identified ills, individual or institutional, grows. Selfishness, dishonesty, lack of group discipline or action, obsession with talk, bankruptcy of the political system and outmoded values become increasingly the target of literary portrayal. Among the best novels that dealt with the Palestinian problem, and attacked such ills in a more systematic fashion, are *Sittat Ayyām* (Six Days), 1961, and *Awda Al-tā'ir ila Al-baḥr* (The return of the Sailor (Flier) to the Sea), 1969, by the young Lebanese Christian novelist Halim Barakāt.<sup>51</sup>

Barakāt's vision is characterized by a constant tension between reality and illusion, a rejection of the existing values, traditions or institutions and a search for seemingly unreachable exits from his predicament. His characters tend to be, like their creator, both recipient of, and disillusioned with, western cultural values. Western historical and mythical figures emerge often in their dialogue or monologue and function as a source of strength which adds intensity to their feelings, or supplies them with a means to

grasp their situation. *Six Days* offers what has been described as a prophetic vision of the six-day war of June 1967. *The Return of the Flier to the Sea* unravels the inner feelings and thoughts of the characters as they live the events of the 1967 war. The former is a story of a small Arab town — told in a six-day diary — as it struggles with the enemy's ultimatum: either to surrender or to be wiped out completely. Given six days to make up its mind, the town accepts the hero's option: death or triumph; and appears determined to defend itself. Suhayl is an alienated intellectual torn between his love for his people and his disgust with their world, his anticipation of the impending defeat, and a desire to leave for posterity "a legend of defiance, heroism and martyrdom" which may inspire them to uplift their level of existence. The town he describes, like much of the Arab world, is a mosaic of fear, ignorance, poverty, rivalries, chaos, greed, and an updated but not integrated western facade. In a number of events and dialogues, he hammers at the point that his people have failed in their encounter with their enemies from without, because they ignored too long their enemies from within. The whole heritage they inherited shelters those internal enemies. One basic solution is to refuse what is imposed from above, to respect every individual's right to determine his destiny, and to confront, without fear or restraint, these internal ills. Primarily through the hero's eyes, the reader is shown irreconcilable patterns of behavior or mentality as the town accepts the challenge: a girl with slacks next to a woman covered by a thick veil, an educated girl who has no sympathy for her own town and locks herself in the house listening to western music, the hero's pious uncle who offers nothing but prayer while the enemy destroys the town and even slashes his wife's womb. The greed mani-

fested by individuals who sell their properties to escape and the drivers who carry people away to safety only at inflated prices, the passive or futile outbursts of emotional response, the betrayal of a deceiving patriot who runs away with the money collected for defense and reveals the town's plan to the enemy before the deadline, and finally the manner in which the enemy overtakes the defenders by surprise, unprepared, and before the arrival of the awaited reinforcements. The story ends with a foregone conclusion, but not without two interrelated phases of heroic resistance: that of Suhayl's fighting comrades who remained until their death loyal to their ideals, and his own refusal to accept reality as it is, to run away from it, or to reveal his mission to the enemy when arrested and tortured. Both phases of this heroism are the outcome of an individual will rather than a collective spirit to fight. The town now has turned into ashes, his captor remarks, and the hero suggests that they will fertilize the land. "We will exploit it," the captor responds. "But only for a short while" is the last unyielding answer given by Suhayl.

Barakāt's obsession with the gloomy projection of his hero's social setting borders on the excessive. Nevertheless it has a salutary effect of bringing to his reader's attention basic ills of the Arab society, stressing the urgent need for a fresh and honest evaluation not only of the ills but also of the manner in which they have been treated. One of the motifs which he uses in describing the Arab dilemma is a western one: the Flying Dutchman. In Suhayl's account of the first day reference is made to the death of the Flying Dutchman, upon finding the faithful woman who sacrifices herself for his sake, and to the notion that his people continue to sail, like the Dutchman, helplessly. This motif turns into a

major theme in his latest novel: *The Return of the Flier to the Sea*. Again Ramzī, on the first day of the war, finds parallels between his country and the western legend. His country is like the Flying Dutchman, doomed to sail aimlessly on the high seas of fear, terror and ignorance. It seems impossible for it to reach a shore; its incompetent crews who have found neither death nor shore are faced now with the war, exhausted more than ever before, by their endless wandering. Nothing remains but anger: let them rebel in the face of devils and gods (symbolic of western powers) responsible for their plight whatever the consequences may be. The hero feels that his country is refused by death as much as by life, and that it is a rudderless ship; it pains him to see his countrymen deluding themselves with a non-existent rudder, but his country is not without anger. Here lies its future, though its suffering will persist until it finds its savior, the one who will remain loyal to it until death. Ramzī is not searching for a leader who will impose his decision on his people, mould them, deceive them and appease rotten institutions. He wants a leader who radiates, challenges, and inspires the people to think, feel, search and converse in freedom with themselves and their leaders.

The work itself falls into three parts. The prelude and the epilogue, entitled respectively "The Threshold" and "Days of Dust," are relatively minor and cover the same period June 11-20, 1967. The central part, "Waves of sounds and the Southern Wind," is divided into six days, each with a title suggesting a major theme or mood. They are as follows: (1) Thunder in children's voices, (2) the Flying Dutchman returns to the sea, (3) Death is a field, (4) Once more Jacob circumcises the Palestinians and the stage collapses, (5) Death

shall have no dominion, and (6) Flood in the streets and ants crawl in the arteries of the heart.

The prelude takes Ramzī, the American woman Pamela who represents the sympathetic and understanding voice of the West, and other Arab specialists and doctors to Jordan. There, surrounded by a terrified defeated world, Ramzī carries on a short dialogue with Pamela, in which the depth of his agony is revealed.

Ramzī The Arabs are passing along with Dante through purgatory.

Pamela What are their sins?

Many. Most important: ignorance.

Perhaps the war will become purgatory for the Arabs.

Will they reach the earthly paradise?

The legend says that whoever enters purgatory will inevitably reach paradise. Purgatory is a journey of hope.

Was this war the beginning of the journey toward hope?

I believe so. This is a necessary stage which they will pass.

His agony and loss of faith are further illustrated in an imaginary dialogue which he carries on with two stone heads in a mountain overlooking the Jordan valley.

The first head: From where did you come?

Ramzī I brought my body from an Arab shore.

Futile to tell you who I am. My name is not known. I myself almost forgot it, and began to doubt that I exist, was exiled when I was an infant.

What happened to the great rivers?

Dried out.

In Rome, we used to eat their fruits.

The fruits have died too; so has Rome.

The second head: Did Rome die?

Since Christians occupied it.

You are a Muslim!

No. I am a rejector and rejected, neither a believer nor an atheist.

Are you a communist?

No, nor a capitalist.

What are you then?

I am a part of nothing. What I know about myself is that I am a dissenter and an outcast.

In spite of his loss of faith, Ramzī seems determined to go through purgatory with a glimpse of hope looming ahead of him. Moreover, through flashbacks, the prelude attempts to capture the devastation unleashed by the war, the hospitals crowded with napalm-burnt faces, schools overfilled with refugees, and other horrors. It ends with the hero in a state of shock and disbelief, seeing none being baptized in the river Jordan, only bullets. Handel's Messiah reverberates with a new ending: Halleluiah to the bullets being baptized in the river Jordan.

The central part covers the root of the problem, the Arabs' determination to regain their rights in Palestine, and the various issues or factors pertinent to it. Ramzī, now a university teacher and a Palestinian in exile for twenty years, wonders, in the face of the new danger, whether the story of his exile is coming to an end. Although he is carried by the prevailing sense of over-

confidence, he feels that his reality does not justify it. Through his monologue and discussions with others, he gradually advances the thesis that his country is backward, disjointed, lacking planning and a realistic vision of the future. He attacks the myth of unity among the Arabs, by pointing to the fact that Arabs live in their shells, detached from each other. Neither genuine cooperation nor coordination exists among the Arabs, as states, as groups or as individuals. Even the experts are individualistic in their endeavor, lacking often the spirit of teamwork. The revolutions which are regarded as a positive development have failed, in the hero's view, to bring about drastic changes. Turning to the role performed in the present crisis—by students, teachers, and intellectuals in general—Ramzī finds them totally unprepared, and incapable of any act, except killing their time, like the rest of the people, reading newspapers, listening to the radio and TV stations or exhausting their vitality in senseless emotional outburst. They are partly to blame, but the schools, universities and the governments are primarily responsible because they have failed in preparing these intellectuals for such a crisis, by barring them from free participation in the transformation of their society, as they have failed in making proper use of their potential. He recalls that there are thousands of experts, technicians and specialists who are paralyzed by one means or another: persecution, improper placement, lack of encouragement or incentives. The other important point in this self-critical appraisal is related to the unrealistic assessment the Arab makes of forces at work in his society or elsewhere, and the deceptive and illusionary world which he helps to shape or to which he falls victim. This becomes very loud, when Ramzī listens to the exaggerated accounts of the war, and the news of Arab

armies advancing in the enemy's territory, while in fact the Arab defeat was determined or predicted on the first day of the war.

Although Ramzī seems more concerned with the faults of the Arab society, he does not absolve the West of responsibility for the creation of Israel or the problem of the refugees, and of an unrealistic assessment of the Arabs' determination to regain their rights. The West and the Zionists suffer from a number of myths or false assumptions: that the Arabs will give up their fight; that once the refugees are forced to settle elsewhere, the tension will be removed; and that the more frequently the Arabs are defeated militarily the greater will be their willingness to compromise. To the hero, not only are these assumptions false, but they will generate a more militant response. Therefore it is not surprising that he sees, in the aftermath of the war, the fedayyin as the only hopeful sign which restores to the Arab his pride and his faith in the future. Ironically, because Ramzī is Western-oriented he chooses to rely heavily on western voices to express his anger against the West—and his faith in the ultimate triumph of his people: T.S. Eliot, *The Flying Dutchman*, Dante, American civil rights songs (particularly "We Shall Overcome") and most importantly Dylan Thomas, who in his poem "Death Shall Have No Dominion," seems to reflect the Arab mood of defeat and defiance. By so doing, Barakāt seems to suggest that his people are not basically anti-West, that once the causes of tension are removed, a more constructive dialogue between the Arabs and the West will be restored.

In conclusion, an extensive body of literature, poetry, fiction, and drama has emerged in response to the Palestinian conflict. Much

of it may be criticized for being rhetorical, or repetitious in language, themes and devices. But through it the Arab writer has succeeded in presenting the soul of his people and in revealing the depth of their agonizing search for a solution. He can be

credited at least with three positive traits: his prophetic vision of the events as they developed, his unyielding spirit and faith, and finally the increasing intensity and courage with which he attacks his people's faults and weaknesses.

## NOTES

The author wishes to express his appreciation to Indiana University for providing him with a research grant to undertake a general study of modern Arabic literature.

(1) A glance at a few titles of recent studies indicates both the predominance of the Palestinian themes and the growing scholarly interest in the subject. Naseer Aruri and Edmund Ghareeb, *Enemy of the Sun: Poetry of Palestinian Resistance*. Washington, D.C.: 1970, Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Asad, *Al-Shīr al-ḥadīth fī filasṭīn wa al-Urdun*. Cairo: 1961, Ṣāliḥ al-Ashtar, *Fī shīr al-nakba*. Damascus 1960, Ghassān Kanafāni, *Adab al-muqāwama fī filasṭīn al-muḥtalla: 1948-1966*. Beirut: 1966 and see his article "Resistance Literature in Occupied Palestine," *Afro-Asian Writings* 1 (nos. 2-3, Summer 1968) 65-79, Yūsuf al-Khaṭīb (ed) *Diwān al-waṭan al-muḥtall*. Damascus: 1968, Shmuel Moreh, "The Arab Literary Revival in Israel," *Ariel* 2 (1962) 14-27, Emile Nakhleh, "Wells of Bitterness: A Survey of Israeli-Arab Political Poetry," *The Arab World* 16 (no. 2, February 1970) 30-36, M.Ḥ. al-Ṣaghīr, *Filasṭīn fī al-shīr al-naṭāṭī al-mu'āsīr: 1928-1968*. Beirut 1968, Kamīl al-Sawāfirī, *Al-Shīr al-arabī al-ḥadīth fī ma'sāt filasṭīn: 1917-1955*. Cairo: 1963, A.L. Tībawī, "Visions of the Return: The Palestine Arab Refugees in Arabic Poetry and Art," *Middle East Journal* 17 (1963) 507-526 and Abd al-Rahmān Yāghī, *Ḥayāt al-adab al-filasṭīnī min awal al-nahḍa ilā al-nakba*. Beirut: 1968, and his *Dirāsāt fī shīr al-Arḍ al-Muḥtalla*. Cairo: 1969.

(2) See for example: Arthur Arberry, *Modern Arabic Poetry*. London: 1950 and his *Arabic Poetry: A Primer for Students*. London: 1965, James A. Bellamy and al.ed. *Contemporary Arabic Readers: IV Short Story*. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1963), and *V Modern Arabic Poetry* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1966), William M. Brinner and Mounah Khouri, *Advanced Arabic Readers*. Vol. I (Berkeley: University of California, 1961). James Kritzeck, *Modern Islamic Literature from 1800 to the Present*. New York: 1970. In all these works, we find only two items, a short story, and a poem, dealing with the Palestinian refugees. See Bellamy's IV, Part I, pp. 52-60, and V, Part I, pp. 88-90.

(3) Umberto Rizzitano, "Reactions to Western Political Influences; Alī Aḥmad Bākathīr's Drama." *Historians of the Middle East*. ed. Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt, London: 1962, p. 442.

(4) Jabra I. Jabra, "The Rebels, the Committed and the Others: Transitions in Modern Arabic Poetry today," *Middle East Forum* 43 (no. 1, 1967), p. 20.

(5) Al-Sawāfirī, *op. cit.*, pp. 346-355, 627-631.

(6) On Al-Ziriklī's poem see Sāmī al-Dahhān, *Al-Shīr al-ḥadīth fī al-iqlīm al-sūrī*. Cairo: 1960, pp. 159-160.

(7) See his *Filasṭīniyyāt*. Beirut: 1946, p. 82. In addition to his literary activities, Bustānī was actively engaged in Palestine's politics, especially in the twenties. As early as 1923, he was regarded by a British correspondent as "an excitable energetic young demagogue whom the Moslems tolerate. He may become dangerous but he does not seem in the least constructive." See Philip Graves, *Palestine, the Land of Three Faiths*. London: 1923, p. 111. For another unfavorable remark on his part in the "Beisan Agreement" of 1923, see Chaim Weizmann, *Trial and Error: The Autobiography of Chaim Weizmann*. New York: 1949, pp. 275-276.

(8) See *The Bookman*. 46 (1917/18) pp. 7-14.

(9) *Ibid.*, p. 12.

(10) See his *Diwān*. 7th ed. Cairo: 1963, pp. 429-430.

(11) Ahmad Shawqī, *Al-Shawqīyyāt*. Vol. 2. Cairo: 1964, p. 17, 104 respectively.

(12) There are other instances in which Arab poets or leaders reflect a humanistic vision of the relationship among Christians, Muslims and Jews. A case in point is the great Egyptian poet Ḥafīz Ibrāhīm (1871-1932) who envisages a world of equality embracing Christians, Jews and Muslims as indicated in his poem: "Taḥiyya Al-Shāmm," which he delivered in Beirut: 1929, see his *Diwān*. Vol. 1, 6th ed. Cairo: 1954, pp. 94-95. King Fayṣal of Syria and Iraq in a speech he gave in Aleppo (November 11, 1918) pleading for the unity of the Arabs irrespective of their religions declaring: "He who strives to sow dis-



sension among Muslims, Christians and Jews is not an Arab." See Aziza Muraydin. *Al-Qawmiyya wa al-imsāniyya fī shīr al-maḥjar al-jaṇūbī*. Cairo: 1966, p. 271.

(13) Arthur Koestler. *Thieves in the Night: Chronicle of an Experiment*. New York: 1946, p. 208.

(14) *Ibid.*, pp. 213-218.

(15) On Jerusalem's position in Islam and some pertinent sources, see: Charles D. Matthews. *Palestine-Muhammedan Holy Land*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949, and Heribert Busse. "The Sanctity of Jerusalem in Islam," *Judaism* 17 (1968) pp. 441-468.

(16) For a brief survey of Saladin's place in modern Arabic poetry, see the author's article: "Ṣalāh al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī fī al-chī r al-arabī al-mu āṣīr," *Al-Ādāb* 18 (no. 11, November 1970), pp. 17-22, 73-78.

(17) Sawāfirī, *op. cit.*, pp. 272-273.

(18) *Ibid.*, p. 213.

(19) *Ibid.*, p. 223.

(20) Ṭūqān. *Diwān Ibrāhīm*. Beirut: 1955, p. 80.

(21) *Ibid.*, pp. 65-66.

(22) Tibawī, *op. cit.*, p. 508.

(23) *Ibid.*, p. 513.

(24) Reuben Wallenrod. *The Literature of Modern Israel*. New York: 1956, p. 10.

(25) Mu in Basisū. *Filasṭīn fī al-qalb*. Beirut: 1965.

(26) *Ibid.*, pp. 23-24.

(27) Tibawī, *op. cit.*, pp. 517-518.

(28) *Ibid.*, p. 518.

(29) Rashīd. *Safīna al-ghaḍāb*. Kuwait: n.d. pp. 30-31. The other Arabic titles are: *Ma a al-ghurabā'* Cairo: 1954, *Awḍa al-ghurabā'* Beirut: 1956, *Ghazza fī khaṭṭ al-nār* Beirut: 1957, *Arq al-shawrāt* Beirut: 1959 and *Ḥattā ya ud sha bunā* Beirut: 1966.

(30) Rashīd. *Ḥattā ya ud sha bunā*, pp. 37-42.

(31) *Ibid.*, pp. 119-121.

(32) Maḥmūd Darwish. "Khalīf al-aslāk," *Al-Jadīd* 13 (nos. 4-5, 1966), pp. 8-9.

(33) Abdel Karim al-Shaba awī. "Palestine," *The Arab World* 14 (nos. 5-6, May-June 1968), p. 12.

(34) Najwa Farah. "A Poet of Galilee: Songs from Galilee by Jamal Kawar," *New Outlook* 1 (no. 11, June 1958), pp. 48-49.

(35) Moreh, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

(36) Wallenrod, *op. cit.*, pp. 69-70.

(37) Hāyil Asāqila. "Anta minnī," *Al-Jadīd* 15 (December, 1968), p. 34.

(38) Samīh al-Qāsim. *Damī alā kaffī*. Beirut: n.d., pp. 159-167.

(39) See its translation in Arurī, *op. cit.*, pp. 2-4.

(40) Darwish. *Āshīq min filasṭīn*. Beirut: 1968, pp. 5-15; see also Salīh J. Altoma. "A Lover from Palestine: A Poetic Vision of Palestine's Tragedy," *The AMARA Newsletter*. (Boston: The American Arabic Association), 2 (no. 1, January, 1969), pp. 12-16 and Arurī, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-19.

(41) Sulafa Hijjawi. *Poetry of Resistance in Occupied Palestine*. Baghdad: 1968, pp. 16-18.

(42) Darwish. *Āshīq*, pp. 64-65.

(43) *Ibid.*, pp. 55-56 and see the author's articles: "Ab ad al-taḥaddī fī shīr Maḥmūd Darwish," *Mawāqif* 2 (no. 7, January-February 1970), pp. 222-232, esp. 225-226.

(44) See *Āshīq* respectively pp. 18-19, 40-41 and Darwish. *Ākḥīr al-layl*. Damascus: 1968, pp. 111-113.

(45) Badr Shākīr al-Sayyāb. *Unshūda al-maḥjar*. Beirut: 1960, pp. 59-65.

(46) Abd al-Wahhāb al-Bayātī. *Al-Majd al-afṣāl wa al-zaytūn*. Beirut: 1954, pp. 7-8, 13.

(47) Khālīd al-Shawwāf. *Al-Aswār*. Beirut: 1956.

(48) Alī Aḥmad Bākathīr. *Ma'sāt 'ūdīb*. Cairo: 1949? See also Ibrahim Hamada. *Treatments of Sophocles' Oedipus the King in Contemporary French and Egyptian Drama*. Ph.D. Thesis, Bloomington: Indiana University, 1968, pp. 128-170, esp. 163-164. On other related works by Bākathīr, see Rizzitano, *op. cit.*, pp. 442-448.

(49) Jabra I. Jabra. *Hunters in a Narrow Street*. London: 1960, p. 27.

(50) Nizār Qabbānī. "Al-Istijwāb" and "Al-Mumaththilūn" *Mawāqif* 1 (no. 1, October-November, 1968), pp. 41-50.

(51) Other attempts which deserve special attention are three novels by the Palestinian writer Ghassān Kanafānī: *Rijāl taḥī al-shmas* Beirut: 1963, *Mā tabaqqā lakum* Beirut: 1966 and *Ā'id ilā Hayfa* Beirut: 1970? For a brief treatment of the first novel and a slightly different version of my discussion of Halīm Barakāt, see my paper "Socio-political Themes in the Contemporary Arabic Novel: 1950-1970" to appear in *Cultural Nationalism and the Modern Writer* ed. by H. Ernest Lewald Knoxville: the University of Tennessee Press.

# THE PALESTINIANS: REFUGEES TO GUERRILLAS

Walter Lehn

In June 1967 Israel won a spectacular and apparently decisive military victory over the forces of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. Yet in June 1971 Israel's declared objective of "a lasting peace establishing recognized and secure boundaries"<sup>1</sup> had clearly not been realized. The most significant consequence, indeed, of Israel's victory has been the emergence of the Palestinian<sup>2</sup> Arab resistance movement as a political force in the Arab World. By June 1970 it was clear that this force could materially affect the interests of all parties to the continuing conflict, and that hence it could no longer be ignored. Efforts made since then to destroy the resistance movement attest to this conclusion.<sup>3</sup>

Most Westerners appear to find such claims incredible. Their reaction is an index of the failure of the public media to record the development of this force, the beginnings of which can be seen as early as 1956.

Yet before 1967 the media almost never referred to the Palestinians as such. If referred to at all, they were simply identified as "Arab refugees," somehow a result of the establishment of Israel. Then in recent years these refugees have been transformed into Palestinian guerrillas or commandos, who are a threat to Israel, who defy the efforts of the Big Powers to achieve a settlement, and who have openly clashed with the governments in Jordan and Lebanon. In Arabic sources these guerrillas (*fidā'iyyīn*,<sup>4</sup> "self-sacrificers") are commonly referred to as heroes and freedom-fighters, in Israeli as terrorists, infiltrators, or saboteurs.

Who are these people? How, and why, has the transformation from refugees to guerrillas taken place? What are their objectives? How do they propose to achieve them? Are their objectives realistic and feasible or hopelessly utopian?

It is to such questions that this article addresses itself and reflects (the writer's understanding of) the views of the Palestinians. As distinguished from those of the Israelis, or of the Arab states, these are seldom clearly expressed and accordingly even less frequently understood. No attempt has been made to present an overall or "balanced" account of what has come to be called the Middle East crisis.

## THE REFUGEES

Today there are some 3,000,000 Palestinians, all either born in Palestine or, since 1948, born of Palestinian parents. Of these about 1,300,000 are under some form of Israeli rule in Old Palestine. The balance are in exile, dispersed throughout the Arab World, although mainly in Jordan and Lebanon. How did they become displaced and hence refugees? The answer differs markedly, depending on the source one consults and accepts. The official Israeli version since 1949 is that the refugees are an unfortunate consequence of the misguided refusal of Palestinian Muslims and Christians to agree to the establishment of the greater part of Palestine as a Jewish state and of the invasion of this state by the forces of the adjoining Arab states. Accordingly, Israel acknowledges, in the words of Prime Minister Golda Meir, "no responsibility whatsoever"<sup>5</sup> for the plight of the Palestinians. In the official Israeli view, furthermore, the Palestinians are not a nationally identifiable people; therefore there can be no question of Palestinian rights, nor can the Palestinians be regarded as a party to Israel's conflict with the Arab states.<sup>6</sup> On the latter point, incidentally, Zionist-Israeli policies have completely reversed themselves. Prior to May 1948, they always held that the conflict was only with the Palestinians and that the other Arab

states were in no sense parties and should not be involved in discussions proposed by the British to effect a workable compromise.

As for the Palestinian version, suffice it to say that it differs sharply from the Israeli at almost all points.<sup>7</sup>

Unofficial and less partisan sources, including both Arab and Israeli, provide ample documentation for the claim that the exodus of the Palestinians was the intended result of Zionist political and military strategies, and that hence it was the cause — and not the consequence — of the unsuccessful invasion of Palestine by other Arab forces after the state of Israel was established in May 1948. As Israeli Member of Parliament Uri Avnery relates it,

it is no exaggeration to say that the struggle for Hebrew Labor was the real beginning of the Israeli-Arab war . . . Hebrew Labor meant, necessarily, No Arab Labor . . . A Jewish plantation owner who employed Arabs in his orange grove was a traitor to the cause, a despicable reactionary who not only deprived a Jewish worker of work, but even more important, deprived the country of a Jewish worker. His grove had to be picketed, the Arabs had to be evicted by force. Bloodshed, if necessary, was justified . . . The "redemption of the land" often meant, necessarily, "redeeming" it from the Arab *fellahin* who happened to be living on it . . . These were simply evicted when the land was redeemed by the Jewish National Fund in order to set up a *kibbutz*.<sup>8</sup>

Thus the Palestinians, having been deprived of independence as a matter of poli-

cy by the British Mandate Administration, were subsequently deprived of national political existence by Israel. Accordingly they see themselves as the victims of the attempt of American and European (both east and west) states to salve their collective consciences about the persecution of Jews in Europe and of the Zionist Movement to solve the "Jewish problem."

By the time the bilateral armistice agreements were signed in 1949 between Israel and Egypt, Lebanon, Transjordan, and Syria (but *never by the Palestinians*), the Palestinians had been scattered, thoroughly demoralized, and more or less in a state of shock. It could not have happened, they felt; but it had! Their leaders had been discredited, and the two parts of Old Palestine not under Israeli occupation lost their identity. The Gaza Strip was placed under Egyptian administration and the West Bank was annexed by Transjordan (though this annexation was never recognized by other Arab states) which then became known as Jordan. It was even reported that King Abdullah was prepared to make some settlement with Israel. True or not, it was believed by the Palestinians, one of whom assassinated the King while he was on a visit to Jerusalem in July 1951. King Abdullah was assassinated not, as has been widely claimed, because of his reported willingness to negotiate with Israel, but because in the view of the Palestinians he had been willing to participate in the liquidation of Palestine.<sup>9</sup> His assassination was their way of announcing, since no one seemed to listen to their more moderate pleas for understanding and justice, that they had given neither King Abdullah nor any other Arab leader a mandate to speak for and negotiate on their behalf, and that accordingly they felt under no obligation to honour an agreement arrived at without

their full and active participation.

Apart from this act of defiance, most of the Palestinians continued to hope, vainly and, in retrospect, we might add naively, that the UN and the Big Powers, especially the USA, would come to realize that an injustice had been committed and that it would somehow be made right. In the context of current rhetoric about the USSR as a friend of the Arabs, it is worth recalling that at that time, as indeed from the establishment of Israel in 1948 through March 1954, the USSR and its East European satellites were firm friends of Israel and consistent supporters in the UN of her interests. Thus the Palestinians had no illusions about support from the USSR, and very few about Britain and France. As for the UN, their hopes here were tempered by the recollection that a majority of the members had voted in support of the November 1947 General Assembly recommendation to partition Palestine.<sup>10</sup> This recommendation proposed establishing a Jewish state with 56 percent of the territory of Palestine, while Jews constituted 33 percent of the population and owned six percent of the land.<sup>11</sup> As the Palestinians saw it, in voting for this recommendation these states were thus prepared to make right the wrong committed against Jews in Europe at the expense of the Muslims and Christians of Palestine who had in no way been responsible for the wrong. The Palestinians, in the words of Yasir Arafat,

sympathized with the suffering of the Jews under the Nazis, but this sympathy does not mean that we ought to pay the price for Hitler's crimes. Why do we as Palestinians have to suffer terror, hunger, and deportation for what someone else has done?<sup>12</sup>

Whatever illusions or hopes the Palestinians had that the UN, the Big Powers, or the League of Arab States would take action on their behalf, these were all shattered by the British-French-Israeli attack on Egypt in October and November 1956. For the Palestinians the lessons to be drawn from this event were clear. The Arab states were *unable* and the Big Powers were *unwilling* (which effectively immobilized the UN) to do anything. By this time they had also largely lost faith in the USA. While President Eisenhower continued to insist that Israel evacuate her forces from Egyptian territory and from the Gaza Strip,<sup>13</sup> as British and French forces had already done, at the same time the USA was clearly not prepared to bring pressure on Israel to recognize the Palestinians as the primary party on the Arab side in the continuing conflict.

#### ORGANIZING FOR RESISTANCE

These conclusions, in addition to increasing frustration and bitterness at being ignored, confirmed the Palestinians in their resolve to take control of their own destiny. Having made this decision, and having the effectiveness of guerrilla warfare against vastly superior forces demonstrated by the Algerians and others in their struggle for national liberation, the Palestinians now took liberation of their homeland as their objective and decided on resistance and guerrilla warfare as the only means available to them. Thus was born the idea which in 1958 resulted in the formation of the *Palestinian National Liberation Movement*, commonly known as *Fateh* (a sort of reverse acronym — popularly identified with *fath*, “conquest” — formed from the abbreviation *htf* of the name in Arabic: *ḥarakat atṭahrīr alwaṭani alfilastīni*), the first and still the largest of the guerrilla groups.<sup>14</sup>

Six years of planning, organizing, fund-raising, and finally training followed, and the first clash between Israeli border patrols and Palestinian guerrillas occurred in August 1964. The first operation undertaken by *Asifah* (*ʿaṣifah*, “storm” — the commando wing of Fateh) in Israeli occupied territory occurred on New Year's Eve 1964. On New Year's Day 1965 Fateh issued its first communiqué, which read in part:

Sixteen years have elapsed while our people live detached from their cause which has been shelved at the United Nations as a problem of displaced refugees whereas the enemy plans, with all his means, on the local and international levels, for an extended stay on our homeland . . . . In the light of this distressing fact and because of the adverse effect of the lapse of time, the *Asifah* forces have been launched forth to reiterate to the enemy and the world at large that this people did not die and that armed revolution is the road to return and to victory.<sup>15</sup>

Just over a year later, Israel took official cognizance of the Palestinian guerrillas and on 3 May 1966 the Israeli UN delegate complained to the Security Council:

In January 1965, an Arab terrorist and sabotage group known as El Fatah commenced organized armed incursions into Israel territory... Since January 1965 there have been a total of forty-three such terrorist attacks across the frontiers.... The El Fatah organization publishes in the Arab press “communiqués” about its exploits. Although boastful and exaggerated,

these stories are reasonably accurate about times and places.<sup>16</sup>

The significance and revolutionary force of the nascent resistance movement had even earlier been recognized by the Arab states. They also feared that it would provoke additional Israeli retaliation. Accordingly, after initial attempts to discourage the movement had failed, the Arab states led by Egypt and Jordan, and in implementation of an Arab League September 1963 decision, decided to give a voice to the Palestinians and established the *Palestinian Liberation Organization* (PLO) in May 1964. A secondary, but by no means unimportant, motivation in forming the PLO was an attempt to mobilize and hence to be able to use the growing influence of the Palestinians. While many of the Palestinians, especially the older generations, looked with favour on and supported the PLO, a significant number of the younger ones had misgivings about it. Since the existing Arab states had failed in their efforts to help the Palestinians realize their objective — to return to their homeland — how, these young Palestinians asked, could an organization established and ultimately directed by these states serve their interests? Accordingly, while an open break with the PLO was avoided, the strength and influence of Fateh, and subsequently of other guerrilla groups also, continued to grow.

#### INDEPENDENCE OF THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

If the British-French-Israeli attack on Egypt in 1956 aroused the Palestinians from their state of shock and hopelessness, the effect of the so-called third Arab-Israeli war in June 1967 was even more electric. The shattering defeat by Israel, then as now the dominant military power in the Middle

East, of the forces of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, and her occupation of all of Old Palestine plus Egypt's Sinai and Syria's Golan Heights, galvanized the Palestinians into action. In the eyes of the Palestinians, especially those of the resistance movement, the leadership in the Arab states and the PLO had indulged in irresponsible talk and self-defeating actions and had consequently thoroughly discredited itself. At the same time, in the eyes of all Arabs, the only force to emerge untainted from the June debacle were the Palestinian guerrillas, who were now catapulted into a position of prominence and potential leadership for which, as subsequent events proved, they were not ready and for which they eventually paid a high price.

From 1967 on the Palestinians were determined to control all aspects of their affairs and realized that they would either have to see the PLO abolished or to take control of it. The latter in point of fact is what they attempted to do, and in February 1969 Fateh began to take control of the PLO and Yasir Arafat became chairman of the Executive Committee. The PLO now became for all practical purposes a Palestinian government-in-exile and was increasingly so regarded by the Palestinians, by the Arab masses in other states, and even by some of the Arab states, notably Algeria and Egypt.<sup>17</sup> It also was clear by this point (although few Canadian and American, in contrast to European, correspondents reported) that, far from being the pawn in Arab politics, the Palestinian resistance movement was a dominant and increasingly radical revolutionary force that no Arab state could control fully. Accordingly Israel's policy of massive retaliation against Jordan and Egypt, subsequently also against Lebanon and Syria, had the opposite of the intended effect — to annihilate the

guerrillas and to hold the Arab states responsible for all actions of the Palestinians. These attacks in fact served to strengthen the hands of the guerrillas and increased their prestige and hence influence and independence.

A striking example of this was the Israeli air and land attack in March 1968 on Karamah, a village in Jordan of some 50,000 Palestinians just across the River Jordan from Jericho. The Israeli forces destroyed most of the village, although they sustained "a greater blow than they suffered in any comparable action," according to the correspondent for *The Guardian* reporting from Tel Aviv. He further added:

Apart from the fairly heavy casualties, there was the additional blow for the Israelis of seeing captured tanks and other equipment being shown on Jordan television. This can be received in Israel and is avidly watched on the occupied West Bank.<sup>18</sup>

In knowing violation of the rules of guerrilla warfare, the Palestinians at Karamah, outmanned and outgunned, stood and fought. Whether or not, as claimed by the Palestinians, this was a military defeat for Israel is not important. What is important is that it was believed to be and hence showed that the Israelis were not invincible. For the Palestinians the battle of Karamah was a psychological victory, a crucial event dividing their experience into a *before* and an *after*, and gave a tremendous boost to their morale and determination. Most significantly perhaps, since it destroyed the myth of Israeli invincibility — invincible enemies are impersonal, nonhuman — it enabled the Palestinians to begin to come to terms with their irrational fear and hatred

and to begin to see the Israelis as persons whose motivation, strengths, and weaknesses could be studied, understood and dealt with. In addition, probably more than any other single event, the battle of Karamah resulted in massive popular support for the resistance movement, not only among Palestinians but also among Arabs elsewhere. A week after the Israeli attack on Karamah, the correspondent of *The Observer* saw the long-range significance of the event and reported from Beirut:

Apart from increasing the precariousness of the cease-fire, its main effect has been to put the Palestinian Arabs themselves as a separate people back on the Middle East political map for the first time since 1948. There is no longer any question of the Palestine problem being settled by the Arab Governments over the heads of the Palestinian Arabs themselves.<sup>19</sup>

#### THE PALESTINIANS AND THE ARAB STATES

The Palestinian resistance movement was to undergo further testing. Both Lebanon and Jordan, partly in response to the severe punishment meted out by Israel, made serious attempts to restrict the guerrillas' freedom of action and to bring them under control of the respective governments. The guerrillas saw these as attempts ultimately to crush them and decided to make their stand, even though this meant Arab fighting Arab. Thus the guerrillas and Lebanese forces clashed in April and October 1969 and again in March 1970. Clashes with the Jordanian army occurred in November 1968 and again in February, June, and August 1970.

Individually these clashes were relatively unimportant. Cumulatively their effect was to strengthen the resistance movement in the view of the Arab states, to demonstrate that Israel's policy of retaliation against the adjoining states for actions of the guerrillas was self-defeating, and to convince the Big Powers that the Palestinians would have to be reckoned with.

The response of the USA (with the prior knowledge of the USSR?) was to launch in June 1970 what has come to be known as the Roger's Plan. The Palestinians saw this as an attempt to defuse the resistance movement, to isolate it from support by the Arab states, and to preserve the status quo in the Middle East. Clearly, if these objectives were to be realized, the resistance movement would cease to have any impact and, in time, even to exist. Accordingly the leaders of the various guerrilla groups immediately and unitedly denounced the Roger's Plan. Their opposition was underscored at a meeting of the Palestinian National Congress, then consisting of 112 elected members, convened in Amman in late August, at which Security Council Resolution 242 (November 1967), the Roger's Plan and its acceptance by Egypt and Jordan, and the cease-fire on the Suez Canal were denounced and rejected by the Congress. With these actions the resistance movement placed itself on a collision course with Egypt and particularly Jordan.

Since King Hussein had scores of his own to settle with the Palestinians, apart from their denunciation of his acceptance of the Roger's Plan, he now determined to bring the guerrillas under his effective control. The opportunity for this was provided by the successful hijacking in September of several airliners by the *Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine* (PFLP) to a

small guerrilla controlled airport in Jordan. Since this action called into serious question the ability of the Jordanian government to make good its acceptance of the Roger's Plan, the army, assured of support by the USA and Israel, attacked guerrilla bases and strongholds in refugee camps on the edge of Amman. Casualties in these camps were high and shocked even those who had willingly seen King Hussein attempt to bring the guerrillas to heel. At the initiative of President Nasser, the Arab League negotiated a truce, later known as the Cairo Agreement, accepted by Fateh leader Arafat on behalf of the guerrillas and by King Hussein. Under its terms, the guerrillas agreed to respect Jordanian sovereignty and to withdraw their forces from Amman and other cities, while Jordan agreed to allow the guerrillas freedom of movement and activity appropriate to their struggle against Israel. The League also appointed a Supervisory Committee charged with overseeing the fragile truce.

After the Cairo Agreement, King Hussein declared martial law, appointed a new cabinet to enforce it, and ordered the Palestinians in the camps to turn in their arms. The guerrillas claimed this was in violation of the Cairo Agreement and fighting again erupted. The Supervisory Committee managed to restore the truce and a supplementary (Amman) Agreement was negotiated in October. The effects of the fighting, in which the guerrillas sustained heavy losses in men and material, and of the Agreements were to restrict the guerrillas to a few bases in northern Jordan, greatly curtailing their freedom of action and their ability to infiltrate into Israel and Israeli occupied territory.

By now it was obvious that there remained little, if any, basis for trust and



cooperation between the guerrillas and the Jordanian government. Increasingly bitter reciprocal accusations of violations of the Agreements, alternating with periods of fighting, and punctuated by short periods of truce became the pattern in subsequent months. By late May 1971 the confrontation had reached the point of no return, and in June the fighting grew more intense. The army moved supplies to the north and in early July began shelling the guerrilla bases, followed by a full-scale offensive and the rout of the guerrillas. Many were captured, others fled into Syria and Lebanon, and a few even crossed the truce line and sought refuge in Israeli occupied territory.

This action by Jordan was condemned by the other Arab states. Kuwait and Libya suspended financial aid, and Iraq, Syria, and Algeria broke relations with Jordan. Egypt and Saudi Arabia called for adherence to the Cairo and Amman Agreements and arranged for a meeting in Jiddah in September 1971 of Jordanian and guerrilla representatives. The guerrillas insisted that Jordan had violated the Cairo and Amman Agreements, that implementation of these was called for, and that any new agreements must be based on the former. The Jordanians argued speciously that the Cairo and Amman Agreements had achieved their objectives, hence were no longer required, and thus could not form the basis for any negotiations. Predictably the conference ended in failure, and the Jordanian-Palestinian rupture was complete. As a consequence the resistance movement has again gone underground, not inappropriate for such a movement, and a position from which it was not ready to emerge when thrust into prominence by the defeat of the Arab states in 1967.<sup>20</sup>

The costs of the confrontations beginning in February 1970 in Jordan have on the

other hand, at least in part, been offset by gains. The confrontations emphasized to the leadership of the resistance movement the need for unity, and that factional and ideological disagreements were luxuries they could not afford. Accordingly various steps have been taken toward a united front: (1) In February 1970 a Unified Command was established for all guerrilla groups including the PFLP, which had thus far always insisted on maintaining its independence. (2) The Palestinian National Congress at its meeting in Cairo in June 1970 ratified this agreement and reorganized the PLO to try to give more effective expression to it. Among other measures, a policymaking Central Committee with authority over all member groups was established with representatives of the ten major guerrilla organizations, including the PFLP which was not a member of the Congress nor of the Executive Committee. (3) The need for effective unity, costs of its lack, and measures to realize it have continued to dominate intergroup discussions as well as those at the Congress meetings in Cairo in March and July 1971. At the latter meeting the highest degree of unity to date was achieved. The PFLP became a full member of the Congress and of the Executive Committee, both bodies being enlarged, thus giving a voice to all of the groups (with the exception of the small communist-backed Ansar). (4) Fateh—the first and by far the largest, and which displays the greatest political sophistication—has emerged and remains as the dominant group. This is attested to by the fact that its leader Yasir Arafat not only continues as chairman of the Executive Committee (as he has been since 1969) but was elected chairman in June 1970 of the Central Committee; in July 1971 he was reelected chairman of the PLO and commander in chief of the Forces of the Palestinian Revolution.

In addition, he has represented the Palestinians in negotiations with Jordan and the Arab League states since September 1970. (5) Not insignificantly, and in spite of the loss of bases in Jordan, the Palestinian resistance movement continues to exist, to display the resilience required for this, and is again—beginning in late 1971—making itself felt in Israel and Israeli occupied territory. Accordingly Western press reports of the “liquidation” of the resistance movement appear to be premature, if not wishful thinking, and King Hussein’s “victory” may prove to be pyrrhic.

A second positive gain to the resistance movement was the intervention and mediation by the League of Arab States to try to stop the fighting in Jordan. Since the other members did not see their action as interference in the internal affairs of Jordan, in effect, this granted recognition to the Palestinians as an equal of the League members. Consequently King Hussein had to negotiate with Fateh leader Arafat, thus acknowledging that Arafat—and not the King—was the spokesman and representative of the Palestinians. A final gain was the establishment of the Palestinians as a force that would have to be reckoned with in any attempt to work out a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This seems to be clear and tacitly acknowledged almost everywhere, including in Israel, which, for understandable reasons, is reluctant to take official cognizance of it.<sup>21</sup>

In summary, the Palestinian resistance movement appears to be moving to a new organizational phase marked by resolution of the competition among the various groups by the establishment of a united front. If this indeed proves to be the case, then the influence of the Palestinians on Middle Eastern affairs in general, and on the out-

come of the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular, will continue to grow. Ironically, future historians will probably give King Hussein a share of the credit for this. An unintentional but significant result of his efforts to exploit Palestinian intergroup differences has been to suppress these and thus to prevent them from hopelessly fragmenting the resistance movement. Fateh, for example, denounced the September 1970 hijacking by the PFLP and had the latter expelled from the PLO Central Committee. This break looked like an opportunity to bring the guerrillas to heel, and the army struck hard. As a consequence the split between Fateh and the PFLP was immediately repaired, the PFLP was welcomed back into the PLO, and, although they sustained heavy losses, the guerrillas stood together and were not annihilated.

#### THE PALESTINIANS AND THE BIG POWERS

The attitude of the Big Powers, notably the USA and the USSR, toward the Palestinian resistance movement appears to vacillate between annoyance and concern. Like Israel and some of the Arab governments, they wish the Palestinians would somehow quietly disappear and cease to be, at best, a disruptive element in the game and, at worst, an increasingly radical force, the revolutionary impact of which is difficult to predict and, more important, to control. Since such a force may ultimately affect all the players, it could change significantly the nature of the game.<sup>22</sup> As a consequence neither the USA nor the USSR is currently prepared to accede to the demands of the Palestinians that they be recognized as one of the primary parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict,<sup>23</sup> and neither is willing to grant that the Palestinians have national political rights at stake. But the latter is precisely

what the Palestinians regard as the central issue. In fact they do not even regard matters such as compensation and permanent settlement—however important on an individual level—as primary issues. A further complication is that the Palestinians believe that the Big Powers are interested not in settlement, but only in containment, of the derivative conflict, and that they are not prepared to do anything about the basic conflict.

These attitudes further explain why the Palestinians rejected Security Council Resolution 242 as well as the cease-fire in effect since August 1970. In none of these do they see any recognition of them as a party to the conflict, with national political rights at issue. In their view, the affirmation in the Security Council resolution of "the necessity . . . for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem"<sup>24</sup> represents a refusal to deal with the central issue. Hence they fear it is nothing more than another attempt to sweep them under the proverbial rug.

In point of detail, the attitudes of Washington and Moscow of course display differences. Since 1949 the official attitude in Washington has been that the Palestinian refugees represent a humanitarian problem, a group of unfortunate victims of war who are in need of assistance to enable them to build a new life for themselves wherever they are welcome. Important reasons for this attitude are no doubt (1) a realization that the recognition of another party to the conflict at best complicates an already complex situation and might well result in the breakup of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and (2) support for Israel's position of nonrecognition of, hence nonnegotiation with, the Palestinians. Thus the view of Washington has been at complete variance

with that of the Palestinians about themselves and the issues.

More recent pronouncements in Washington may represent a change in this view. In October 1970, a State Department press officer, in speaking of efforts to bring about negotiations between Israel and the Arab states, said:

Certainly the Palestinians will have to be a partner in the peace and their legitimate interests and aspirations will have to be considered . . .

*New York Times* correspondent Hedrick Smith further noted:

Administration officials now speak of the Palestinian movement as a more potent political and military force than they thought before the Jordanian civil war and the death of Mr. Nasser. The failure of King Hussein's forces to quell the commando movement, it is now reasoned, established them as a permanent factor to be reckoned with . . . . One high official suggested for the first time that consultations with Palestinians would probably be required at some point for any negotiation to succeed.<sup>25</sup>

A similar view seems to be reflected in President Nixon's February 1971 Report to the Congress on Foreign Policy. On the prospects for peace in the Middle East, he listed "some of the principles and elements that must be included if a settlement is to be reached." These included, *inter alia*: "No lasting settlement can be achieved . . . without addressing the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people."<sup>26</sup>

In summary, the attitude of the USA appears to have shifted from indifference to a cautious wait-and-see. Any greater recognition of the Palestinians would, of course, clash directly with current policies of support for Israel and Jordan. It would appear to be highly unlikely that these will change in the readily foreseeable future, certainly not in an election year.

The attitude of Moscow, on the other hand, is more difficult to characterize and is probably best labeled as ambivalent. Since the USSR likes to see herself as the champion of national liberation movements, especially in the Third World, she might be expected to support the Palestinians. This motivation, however, clashes directly with Moscow's current tactical position—support for what she regards as progressive regimes, as in Egypt and Syria. Thus when the Palestinians are at loggerheads with these regimes, as they currently are, Moscow is caught on the proverbial horns of a dilemma. Moscow is also clearly uneasy at the increasing support—thus far largely verbal—of Peking for the Palestinians. In attempting to deal with this dilemma, Moscow's attitude has moved from outright hostility to the guerrillas, labeling them "extremists" and their tactics as "hot-headed and adventurist,"<sup>27</sup> to pledging to the Palestinians the cautious support of "the Soviet people," but not of the Soviet government. This distinction has not been lost on the Palestinians, who also note that when Yasir Arafat and a delegation visited Moscow in February 1970 and October 1971, they came as guests—not of the government—but of peoples' organizations such as the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee.<sup>28</sup> John K. Cooley quotes a Fatah spokesman:

The Russians are just as anxious as the Americans to keep an eye on us and know what we are up

to. We know the Americans are hostile, and we will never have any illusions otherwise. But simply because the Russians have been so ambiguous, it is difficult to trust them. They know this, of course, and they are going to get just as friendly as they can without giving us the kind of support we get from the Chinese.<sup>29</sup>

Thus Moscow's attempts to be "even-handed" appear to have been no more successful than those of Washington.

The USSR has, of course, much greater latitude than the USA in effecting a change—should this be deemed desirable—in policies toward the Palestinians. Greater recognition of and support for them is not as incompatible with Soviet support for the Arab states as is that of the USA for Israel. The USA accordingly has fewer options and is faced with an either-or proposition; the USSR is not.

If USA and USSR attitudes toward the Palestinians change, it may well be primarily in response to the attitude of China, now a member of the UN. China has indicated she cannot be counted on to support USA or USSR policy and has declined a French invitation to participate in the four-power talks. According to Beirut sources, the Chinese UN delegation have made clear their position in private talks with Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmud Riyad: They will "continue to reject Security Council Resolution 242" and "concentrate first on supporting the Palestinians in their struggle for recovery of their country and, second, on aiding the Arab states in ending Israeli occupation of their territory."<sup>30</sup>

China, of course, is not motivated by concern for the Palestinians in particular,

nor for the Arabs in general, but by her need for petroleum and her desire, in the first instance, to establish herself as an equal of the Big Two. The latter, however, are already established in the Middle East as patrons of the existing states, in other words of the status quo. China, therefore, has nothing to gain by seeing this maintained. On the contrary, like the Palestinians, she is very much interested in seeing it changed. Thus while the Palestinians and the Chinese have by no means the same motives and ultimate objectives, they have converging, and therefore the same, short-term interests and objectives. Hence China has assumed the role of champion of the Palestinians, believing them to represent a significant revolutionary force and therefore the most likely to effect changes in the status quo. In short, China in currently supporting the Palestinians for precisely the reason that makes the USA and the USSR unwilling to do so.

#### TOWARD A NEW PALESTINE

As the PLO increasingly takes on the functions of a government — political, social, and economic, not just military — the leadership has matured and has become much more careful and responsible in their statements and declared positions than was the case before 1969. They have also been forced to articulate positions on questions to which formerly no serious thought was given. For the most part, these changes have not been reflected in the public media.

On a number of points, a significant shift is not only made explicit, but discussed at length. Notable among these is the attitude toward Jews and their place in the foreseen New Palestine. Various Palestinian spokesmen within the last year or so have repeatedly declared a change from previously re-

ported positions which tended to raise the spectre of a wholesale slaughter of Jews in Israel. While the Palestinians see their having been "thrown into the desert" as an injustice demanding rectification, they do not see "throwing the Jews into the sea" as a solution. This would be merely substituting one wrong for another, of no greater or lesser proportions than the former. The leadership came to the "realization that revenge was not a sufficient cause;"<sup>31</sup> accordingly,

the revolution undertook serious studies of its enemy and of itself. A progressive liberation movement cannot be motivated by revenge and cannot suffer from the racism that characterizes the very enemy it is trying to conquer. Therefore, study of the history, suffering, and achievements of the Jews took place . . . . Serious discussions with progressive Jews in Europe and America helped foster a new image for the Jew at large, the Jew as Zionist, and the Jew as a Palestinian citizen — a human image. No supermen, monsters, or pygmies, but people who were persecuted by European racist Nazis and then manipulated by European racist Zionists into Palestine and the replacement of its people....

The Palestinians are fighting to create a tolerant, democratic, and liberated land for "all of us," Jews, Christians, and Muslims.... A plural, open, tolerant Palestine for Jews, Muslims, and Christians is a vastly superior country than an exclusive racist state built on the forced exclusion and misery of any part of its population....

All the Jews, Muslims, and Christians living in Palestine or forcibly exiled from it will have the right to Palestinian citizenship. This guarantees the right of all exiled Palestinians to return to their homeland . . . . Equally, this means that *all* Jewish Palestinians — at present Israelis — have the same right . . . . The revolution therefore *rejects the supposition that only Jews who lived in Palestine prior to 1948 or prior to 1914 and their descendants are acceptable . . . .*<sup>32</sup>

Jews, or non-Jews for that matter, would have the right to practise their religion and develop culturally and linguistically as a group, beside their individual political and cultural participation in the new state. It is quite logical, for example, to have both Arabic and Hebrew as official languages taught in government schools to all Palestinians, Jews and non-Jews.

More succinctly, the Palestinians have a single objective: the liberation of Palestine. Negatively — and this needs to be emphasized — this does *not* mean the restoration of the status quo ante May 1948, or November 1947, or even November 1917. Their conception of what the liberation of Palestine involves is much more sophisticated than that which this deceptively simple phrase may suggest. To effect the liberation of Palestine, radical changes will be required on several levels and in successive stages. The effecting of these changes is what the Palestinians mean when they speak of the Palestinian revolution, or simply the revolution. At the same time, they judge the strength of the opposing vested interests

on all levels such that they see no alternative to armed struggle as the way to bring about the revolution. Armed struggle by definition entails violence and violence may result in terrorism. While few Palestinians justify the latter — indeed Fateh has publicly condemned terrorism as a tactic on the part of the PFLP — they fail to see why delivery of explosives in a basket to a market is more reprehensible than delivery of explosives by jet bomber to a village or refugee camp.

The first level and stage, in progress since at least 1967, is the individual. On this level the liberation of Palestine means the liberation of individual Palestinians and Israelis — Muslims, Christians, and Jews — whether residents in, exiles from, or recent immigrants to Palestine, from their fears and hatred and consequent oppression, actual or potential, of each other. The new Palestinian intellectual leaders<sup>33</sup> are entirely serious when they declare that if the revolution is motivated only by hatred and desire for revenge then it deserves to fail.

The second level is the national, involving the Palestinians and the Israelis, both of whom need liberation from an oppressive chauvinism. Muslims and Christians must be liberated from a narrow Arab chauvinism, and Jews from an equally narrow Zionist chauvinism — largely the result of discrimination and exploitation, of the Jews in Europe and of the Palestinians in Palestine. The Jews in Europe, however, were persecuted by their fellow Europeans, not by the Palestinians. In response to this persecution, European Jews became immigrants to Palestine and thus allowed themselves to be used as instruments of exploitation and eventually displacement of the indigenous Palestinians. Thus Zionism, in ruthless pursuit of its goals, allied itself

with European imperialism and subsequently with the present-day Big Powers in establishing the state of Israel, an outpost of European interests in the heart of the Arab World. However unwarranted the Israelis today may regard such a view, it is firmly held by all Palestinians. In addition it is lent credence by statements of Zionist leaders from as far back as Theodor Herzl, who, in his famous *Der Judenstaat*, saw the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine as forming "part of a wall of defense for Europe in Asia."<sup>34</sup>

Thus liberation on the national level necessarily entails destruction of the Zionist state — but not the people — of Israel, a state imposed on Palestine by foreign imperial interests and in which non-Jews, however zealously protected their rights may be, are still second-class, not full, free, and equal citizens. To substitute a Muslim or a Christian state for the existing Jewish state is not a worthy objective. This, according to the Palestinians, would be replacing an existing evil by a new evil of the same magnitude. Thus the state to the creation of which the Palestinians have dedicated their efforts and struggle is not a non-Jewish replacement for Israel, but a democratic, pluralist, and non-sectarian alternative to Israel, with equality for all as individuals and discrimination against none on the basis of religion or nationality. The new Palestine (or whatever it is called — the name is not an issue) for which the Palestinians are fighting is indeed new, not the Old Palestine renamed. The latter is not worth fighting for.

The Palestinians see their revolution as having implications on the regional and, in a limited sense, on the international level as well. They see it as the vanguard of a revolution that will have a liberating in-

fluence on the entire Arab World and on World Jewry, freeing the former from imperial or Big Power domination and the latter from the dilemma cited by I.F. Stone:

Israel is creating a kind of moral schizophrenia in world Jewry. In the outside world, the welfare of Jewry depends on the maintenance of secular, non-racial, pluralistic societies. In Israel, Jewry finds itself defending a society in which mixed marriages cannot be legalized, in which non-Jews have a lesser status than Jews, and in which the ideal is racial and exclusionist. Jews must fight elsewhere for their very security and existence — against principles and practices they find themselves defending in Israel.<sup>35</sup>

The Palestinians do not underestimate the difficulties that lie ahead. The pitfalls they see on their side, among others, are the differences among the guerrilla groups. Will these again come to the fore and result in open clashes? At the very least, such possibilities cannot at this point be ruled out. The Palestinians are also very much aware of the fact that were Israel and the adjoining Arab states to come to some agreement making possible peaceful coexistence, if not full settlement, then the resistance movement would shortly be of interest to historians only. Accordingly the leadership is gambling, thus far successfully, that such agreement is unlikely to emerge for a variety of reasons — Israel's uncompromising stance, inter-Arab differences and rivalries, competition between the two Big Powers, and, not least, the ability of the Palestinians to capitalize on these factors and hence to frustrate attempts at such an agreement. Another pitfall is

actions that the two Big Powers, alone or in concert, may take. The other major problem they face is the response of Israelis. Will they continue, with thus far very few exceptions, to support their leaders who have responded to the Palestinian revolution by first declaring the Palestinians nonexistent, then by raising the spectre of "national suicide" and "genocide"? The Palestinians are encouraged by the latter reactions and see such emotionally irresponsible charges as evidence that the Zionist leadership — at the moment fully in control — is in fact much less complacent about them than it appears to be.

The objectives of the Palestinians are indeed idealistic, perhaps even utopian.<sup>36</sup> Yet the passage of more than two decades has brought forth no mutually acceptable settlement; the years or decades to come hold no promise of doing so either. Conflicts which involve the existence of a people are not solved by the mere passage of time, a proposition to which the Jews themselves have surely lent adequate testimony. The time has come for new and bolder initiatives. If today the objectives of the Palestinians appear idealistic, it must be emphasized that it is unrealistic to continue to hope for, or to try to force, acceptance of the status quo by the Palestinians. In the final analysis, such acceptance cannot be forced but must be given, and each succeeding generation of Palestinians since the creation of Israel in 1948 is clearly less willing to

do so.

The insights of Isaac Deutscher and his suggestions of the directions in which a solution might be sought are still relevant today. In 1954 after a visit to Israel he wrote:

The State of Israel has had explosives — the grievances of hundreds of thousands of displaced Arabs — built into its very foundations.... As long as a solution to the problem is sought in nationalist terms both Arab and Jew are condemned to move within a vicious circle of hatred and revenge . . . There seems to be no immediate way out of this predicament . . . . The Jews are still too deeply intoxicated with their newly acquired nation-state and the Arabs are too fully obsessed with their grievance to look very far ahead.<sup>37</sup>

Is 1972 still too far ahead to look for more imaginative efforts to break this vicious circle? The Palestinians today are in agreement with Deutscher. They too can foresee no solution if the only alternatives are an exclusive Jewish or an exclusive non-Jewish state. They believe their proposal is a viable alternative. Bargaining positions aside, the only other alternative is continuation of the war that began in 1947.<sup>38</sup>





## NOTES

(1) Foreign Minister Abba Eban in Security Council debate, 22 November 1967.

(2) Although the label *Palestine* is old, it has not always denoted the same area. Precise geographic delineation emerged from the peace settlements after World War I. In 1923 Britain divided the mandated area into *Transjordan* and *Palestine*, respectively east and west of the River Jordan. This usage came in time to be widely accepted and is followed in this article. In the interest of brevity, *Palestinian(s)* hereafter means Palestinian Arab(s).

(3) Similar conclusions are expressed in the articles by Michael Hudson, "The Palestinian Arab Resistance Movement: Its Significance in the Middle East Crisis," *Middle East Journal*, XXIII (Summer 1969), pp. 291-307, and Don Peretz, "Arab Palestine: Phoenix or Phantom?" *Foreign Affairs*, XLVIII (January 1970), pp. 322-333. At variance is the account in John B. Wolf, "The Palestinian Resistance Movement," *Current History*, LX (January 1971), pp. 26-31, which represents a serious misreading of the objectives and strategies of the Palestinians. None of these articles, however, provides an account of the transformation of refugees into guerrillas.

(4) The notion of *fida'i* is an old one in Arab history. The modern sense of politically motivated guerrillas occurs as early as 1919. In August of that year Major J. N. Camp, Assistant Political Officer in Jerusalem of the British occupation forces, identified various Arab nationalist societies in Palestine, "equally opposed to Zionism and Jewish immigration." Of the major societies, one of the most militant was the *Fedayeh*. *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, 1st Series, Vol. IV (London 1952), pp. 362-363.

(5) Interview by Frank Giles, *The Sunday Times*, London, 15 June 1969. In the same interview Prime Minister Meir also declared: "It was not as though there was a Palestinian people in Palestine considering itself as a Palestinian people and we came and threw them out and took their country away from them. They did not exist."

(6) For a clear and forceful expression of this view, see the article by former Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion in *Ha'aretz*, 15 March 1968.

(7) Among many studies, the following—all by Palestinians—are representative and carefully documented: Henry Cattan, *Palestine, the Arabs and Israel* (London 1969); Sami Hadawi, *Bitter Harvest* (New York 1967); Hisham Sharabi, *Palestine and Israel* (New York 1969). Although none of the authors is a Palestinian, a most useful collection of essays by scholars in various disciplines is Ibrahim Abu-Lughod (editor), *The Transformation of Palestine* (Evanston, Illinois 1971).

(8) *Israel without Zionists* (New York 1968), pp. 84-85. Avner's view is neither as unique nor as recent as Westerners generally believe; see the article by Nathan Chofshi, an Israeli, in *Jewish Newsletter*, 9 February 1959. In contrast to public assurances by Zionist leaders that there was room for both Jews and Arabs in Palestine, Joseph Weitz, former head of the Jewish Agency's Colonization Department, writing in *Davar*, 29 September 1967, quotes a revealing entry from his diary for 1940: "Between ourselves it must be clear that there is no room for both peoples together in this country . . . . We shall not achieve our goal of being an independent people with the Arabs in this small country. The only solution is Palestine, at least Western Palestine [i.e. west of the Jordan river], without Arabs . . . . There is no other way but to transfer the Arabs from here to the neighbouring countries, to transfer all of them—not one village, not one tribe should be left."

(9) The fact that King Abdullah had agreed, after the March 1949 cease-fire, to cede to Israel approximately 110 square miles of the area under control of the Arab Legion in central Palestine, and had subsequently annexed the so-called West Bank, made him—in the view of the Palestinians—an accomplice in the liquidation of Palestine and account for the bitter denunciations of him by the Palestinians.

(10) The significance of the 29 November 1947 UN General Assembly recommendation to partition Palestine has, in my view, been overstated by almost all writers. At midnight of 14 May 1948 the state of Israel was proclaimed and the Provisional Government sought recognition. It was this declaration and its recognition by other states that "created" Israel, not the earlier UN partition recommendation.

(11) Of the balance, 46 percent was owned or held in trust by the state, and 48 percent was owned by Muslim and Christian Arabs. Proportions of landownership are even more striking if the Beersheba subdistrict, which was sparsely settled and contained almost all of the public lands, is excluded from calculation. Then 10 percent was Jewish-owned, 13 percent state-owned, and 77 percent Arab-owned. Based on Government of Palestine, *A Survey of Palestine* (Jerusalem 1946-47), and UN Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly, *Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question*, 1947.

(12) Interview by Edmund Ghareeb, *The Arab World*, XV (May 1969), 27.

(13) For the full text of his 20 February address, see *The New York Times*, 21 February 1957.

(14) The public media and Israeli claims to the contrary notwithstanding, radical Palestinian nationalism and guerrilla activities are neither

recent nor post-1967 developments. With considerable historical justification, the guerrillas see themselves as successors to earlier movements, directed first against the Turks and later against the British. For a brief but useful survey see H.M. Government, *The Political History of Palestine Under British Administration* (Jerusalem 1947).

(15) *Fateh* (official organ of the Palestinian National Liberation Movement), Beirut, January 1, 1970.

(16) UN Doc. S/7277.

(17) In July 1970, President Nasser appeared to have modified this policy and suspended Fateh's broadcasts over Cairo's Voice of the Arabs and closed their Cairo office. However, in March 1971, President Sadat permitted resumption of these broadcasts, reopening of Fateh's office, and the convening in Cairo of the eighth session of the Palestinian National Congress.

(18) *The Guardian*, Manchester, 25 March 1968.

(19) *The Observer*, London, 31 March 1968. That this conclusion was probably not an overstatement is dramatically underscored by the fighting in Jordan, beginning in September 1970, and the subsequent efforts of the League of Arab States to mediate the conflict.

(20) For a fuller account see "The Palestinian Resistance and Jordan," *Palestine Studies*, I (Autumn 1971), 162-170. For a Fateh assessment see the report of a press conference held in London by Nabil Sha'ath, *Free Palestine*, July 1971.

(21) For example Hebrew University political scientist Shlomo Avineri concludes "that any settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict that does not deal with the problem of Palestinian self-identity will fall short of the requirements of a truly peaceful solution. The Palestinian organizations have said time and again—and their statements should be taken seriously—that even if the Arab states make peace with Israel, they will go on fighting . . . . The options open after the Sinai War of 1956 are simply not open today, since one has now to deal not only with Egypt and Jordan, but with the Palestinians as well, and the latter will not abide by any settlement to which they are not a party." "The Palestinians and Israel," *Commentary*, XLIX (June 1970), 37.

(22) The Palestinians believe that much of their independence and strength derive from their unpredictability, most of which they would lose were they to form a provisional government and seek recognition, which is why they have to date refused to do so. Another reason is that they would then find it even more difficult to remain aloof from inter-Arab differences.

(23) To the Palestinians this label obscures an important distinction. They see at least two conflicts. First, in time and in priority, is their conflict with the Israelis over Palestine; second,

and clearly derivative from the first, is the conflict between Israel and the adjoining Arab states.

(24) UN Doc. S/8247. While some Palestinians disagree, the leaders of the resistance movement remain unconvinced that, given the attitudes of the Big Powers, any solution will be forthcoming from the UN, in spite of the fact that the XXIV, XXV, and XXVI Sessions of the General Assembly adopted a number of resolutions which appear to grant much greater recognition to the claims of the Palestinians than any heretofore; see, e.g. Resolutions 2535 B (10 December 1969), 2628 (4 November 1970), 2649 (30 November 1970), 2672 C & D (8 December 1970), and three very similar ones adopted 1 December 1971 (UN Doc. A/8547).

(25) *The New York Times*, 16 October 1970.

(26) *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 1 March 1971, 346. While the Palestinians noted with satisfaction the recognition of them as a "people" with "legitimate aspirations," they remain unconvinced that these pronouncements indicate a shift in USA policy. See the report by John K. Cooley from Cairo, *The Christian Science Monitor*, 1 March 1971, and the analyses by John C. Campbell, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict: An American Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, XLIX (October 1970), 51-69, and Tareq Y. Ismael, "The Palestinian Emergence and U.S. Foreign Policy," *Middle East Forum*, XLVI (Nos 2-3, 1970), pp. 65-71.

(27) John K. Cooley, "Moscow Faces a Palestinian Dilemma," *Mid-East*, XI (June 1970), 34. The quotations are translations from *Sovetskaja Rossiya*, April 1968.

(28) The general statement of Don Peretz, *op. cit.*, 328, that the USSR has "recently . . . withdrawn its disapproval of the commandos as a reactionary and disruptive element" is surely correct. But his conclusion—"Now they have been awarded Soviet accolades as fighters for independence of the people of Palestine"—is questionable, implying a much greater degree of support for the Palestinians than available evidence suggests. In my view, the USSR remains willing to support the Palestinians only to the extent that this is compatible with support for states such as Egypt. See also Faiz S. Abu-Jaber, "Soviet Attitudes toward Arab Revolutions: Yemen, Egypt, Algeria, Iraq, and Palestine," *Middle East Forum*, XLVI (No. 4, 1970), 41-65, and David P. Forsythe, "The Soviets and the Arab-Israeli Conflict," *Middle East Forum*, XLVI (No. 4, 1970), 29-39.

(29) *Op. cit.* For some very perspective comments on the relationship of Israel and the Big Powers see the Amos Kenan column, *Ha'aretz*, 17 June 1970.

Following the October 1971 visit to the USSR, reports in Beirut and Cairo quoted Arafat saying that the visit "has brought about complete backing and support by the Soviet Union . . . for the Palestinian revolution at the political, military, and information levels." He added that the

Soviets showed "complete understanding of the Palestinian revolution's views, especially with regard to the Palestinian people's right to determine its future on its own land." While this appears more specific than previous declarations of support, in the absence of confirmation from USSR sources, it is not clear that any shift in policy is indicated; *Middle East Monitor*, 15 November 1971.

More recently, unnamed USA State and Defence Department analysts reportedly believe that Soviet policy has shifted, and that the USSR is now willing to provide training and arms for the Palestinian guerrillas; *The Minneapolis Tribune*, 2 January 1972.

(30) *Middle East Monitor*, 15 December 1971.

(31) This and following quotations are from a series in *Fateh*, 20 November 1969, 1 January 1970, and 19 January 1970. These provide rather detailed discussion of current objectives, their relationship to formerly stated ones, and the place of Jews in the foreseen New Palestine. These articles have been reprinted in *Free Palestine*, March-June 1970. For an eloquent statement by a young Palestinian relating his feelings see F. Turki, "I Belong to No Nation, but Damn You all, I Belong to a People," *International Herald Tribune*, 10 August 1970; similarly Fayez A. Sayegh, *Palestine, Israel and Peace*, PLO Palestine Essays No. 17 (Beirut 1970).

(32) Emphasis added. Such recent statements which do not restrict Palestinian status to "Jews living in Palestine before the Zionist invasion" appear not to have been seen by Don Peretz, *op. cit.*, and "Getting to the Heart of the Matter: Palestine," *Mid East*, XI (June 1970), nor by Shlomo Avineri, *op. cit.*, who are still concerned about the PLO National Charter adopted in 1964 and revised in 1968, both before the Palestinians began to take control of the PLO into their own hands. See also the interesting lecture, dealing directly with this issue, by Nabil Sha'ath, a Fateh spokesman, at the II International Symposium on Palestine held in Kuwait, February 1971, and the report of the Palestinian National Congress meeting in Cairo, March 1971, both in *Fateh*, 23 March 1971.

(33) The significance of the new leadership—all Palestinian, relatively young, well-educated (frequently graduates of European or North American universities), and generally not of upper class background—has received little notice in the public media. A clear, nontrivial exception is the report by Robert Stephens in *The Observer*, 31 March 1968. He noted the emergence of "a new generation of revolutionary nationalist leaders in place of the old 'notables' whose authority collapsed after 1958, and who are as different from them in education, determination and technical abilities as the Zionist activist leaders were in their time from the wealthy assimilationists of the Diaspora or the passive patriarchs of the ghettos." The impact of this leadership on the resistance movement has been assessed in some detail by Michael Hudson, *op. cit.*, and Hisham Sharabi, *Palestine Guer-*

*rillas: Their Credibility and Effectiveness*, Supplementary Papers, Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington 1970). Also useful are Naseer Aruri (editor), *The Palestinian Resistance to Israeli Occupation*, Association of Arab-American University Graduates Monograph Series No. 2 (Wilmette, Illinois 1970), Don Peretz et al., *A Palestine Entity?*, Middle East Institute Study No. 1 (Washington 1970), and a number of the articles in Herbert Mason (editor), *Reflections on the Middle East Crisis* (The Hague 1970).

(34) Arthur Hertzberg (editor), *The Zionist Idea* (New York 1959), 222.

(35) "For a New Approach to the Israeli-Arab Conflict," *New York Review of Books*, 3 August 1967.

(36) What is open to question is the political feasibility, but not the sincerity, of their objectives, although the Israelis for understandable reasons question the latter. For a critical, but not always relevant (because it is based on an inaccurate translation from Arabic), Israeli reaction see Y. Harkabi, "The Position of the Palestinians in the Israeli-Arab Conflict and Their National Covenant (1968)," *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics*, III (Spring 1970), 209-244.

(37) Tamara Deutscher (editor), *The Non-Jewish Jew and Other Essays* (London 1968), 116-117.

(38) Within recent years a number of suggestions have been made by various spokesmen, particularly Israeli, about a possible Palestinian state. The most frequently mentioned possibility has been to establish such a state in Gaza and the West Bank. Whatever corridor or transit arrangements between these noncontiguous areas could be agreed on, they would be so vulnerable that such a state could clearly exist only as a puppet of Israel, leading the Palestinians to reject the notion out of hand. Furthermore they simply do not believe that Israel is prepared to give it serious consideration, noting the continuing expulsions of Palestinians and the establishment of permanent settlements by and for Israelis in the occupied areas (*Time*, 4 January 1971; *The Jerusalem Post*, 26 April 1971; *The Washington Post*, 17 August 1971; *The Manchester Guardian Weekly*, 21 August 1971), and the political, economic, and demographic problems in Israel which, for the immediate future, would in all probability be exacerbated by a settlement of the conflict; e.g. the reports on the Israeli Black Panthers in *The Observer*, 21 March 1971, the speech by Israeli writer Dan Ben-Amotz in *Ha'olam Hazeh*, 10 March 1971, the biting comments on Prime Minister Meir's reaction to the Panthers in *Yediot Abaronot*, 28 May 1971, and the editorials in *The Jewish Post and Opinion*, 11 June 1971 and 13 August 1971.

That the Palestinians are probably not wrong in their assessment is borne out by the Time-Louis Harris poll conducted in Israel; *Time*, 12 April 1971.

# Palestinians and World Politics: A Social-Psychological Analysis

Yasumasa Kuroda  
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## 1. Introduction

Both Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs have been accused of being paranoid in different ways for different reasons. Palestinians are said to be *unrealistic* for tenaciously clinging to their aspiration to return to their homeland. Such views are held in the West by policy makers of the major powers, peace-makers, and the public alike. Assuming that such is the case, is President Nixon's decision to bomb North Vietnam after Christmas, 1971 realistic, if his goal is to bring about peace on earth and good will to men? Is his decision to resume selling Phantom jets (offensive weapons) to Israel in 1972 realistic in view of his stated goals to reduce tensions and violence in the area? Is the Israeli government realistic in oppressing the Palestinians in the occupied areas and simultaneously

hoping to live peaceably with her neighbors? Are Palestinian commandos realistic in their determination to liberate their homeland in view of the reality that nearly the entire world, including some Arab brother nations, are against their activities? Was King Hussain realistic in his attempts to squelch all commando activities while at the same time striving to defeat Israel?

Go, go, go, said the bird: human  
kind  
Cannot bear very much reality.

In comparison with animals, we humans alone are capable of creating our own reality as we see fit, rather than to confront reality as it exists in the world, as so well expressed by T. S. Eliot in the lines cited above. And this man's unique ability to make his own reality, observed ubiquitously,

seems to be an underlying psychological hangup in our search for peace in the Middle East.

The purpose of this article is to examine how Palestinian youths perceive of themselves, how they feel toward major powers of the world, and how realistic and justifiable they are in viewing the world as they do.

How do refugees identify themselves? How do Palestinian youths view world powers? Do they like Americans, British, French, Chinese, Israeli Jews and Russians? Do they make any distinction between foreign governments and their citizens? Do their attitudes toward foreign governments and people in any way relate to political alignments in the Israeli-Palestine conflict? If the policy of the United States is to be influential in the Arab Middle East and among Palestinians in particular, what might help her to obtain her policy goals? The United States has been paying the major portion of the expenses for the UNRWA operation in the Middle East. Did such an effort by the U.S. help to build trust among the Palestinians? These are the questions to which this article addresses itself.

This study is unique in many ways. All studies of images of other nations, for example, as mentioned in Herbert C. Kelman's review of the literature,<sup>1</sup> deal with normal citizens who live in their own country and who grow up to believe what they can see and feel in their own country. This study derives its source of information from a survey of Palestinian students in Jordan in 1970. Our respondents are unique in that they live in a foreign country and furthermore have no government to call their own at this time. They, however, maintain their national identity as Palesti-

nians. Second, this is not a polemic paper.<sup>2</sup> The purpose of this article is to further our understanding of the Palestinian mind with regard to their view of other nations.

The present article derives its major source of information from a survey of Palestinian boys and girls, conducted in Jordan. The survey was conducted in the late spring of 1970. An ideal random sample was an impossibility; this led us to conduct the survey in two different schools. Most of those who were kind enough to cooperate with our survey happened to be the first graders in the secondary schools. The total number of respondents consisted of 177 boys, 54 girls and 3 respondents whose sex remains unknown. What we have obtained, then, was not a sample of Palestinian youths, but a universe or a population. We do not claim to make any "generalization" hypotheses, but we must be content with "substantive" hypotheses, which may be true only of those students to whom we happened to administer the questionnaire.<sup>3</sup> Thus, we must warn the reader that the hypotheses we present cannot legitimately be used to make any statistical inferences for all Palestinians. However, unless other plausible hypotheses are generated by others, we will use them as guiding hypotheses, to be substantiated in the future for the whole group of Palestinian youths.

## 2. Findings

### *Self-Identifications*

Self-identification of individuals is important in the sense that it affects what people do, particularly in the political arena. Hence, we wish to first deal with the question of with whom we are dealing. We simply asked an open-ended question: "Who are you?" We repeated the same question twice. Results of their responses are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1

## Self-Identification

	Palestinian	Arab	Refugee	Student	Commando	Other	NA	Total %
1st ans.	52%	12	2	15	7	0	12	100% (234)
2nd ans.	23%	4	3	2	9	1	59	101% (234)

Table 2

## Attitude Toward Foreigners

Response	Americans	English	French	Israeli Jews	Russians	Chinese
Like	7%	6%	18%	3%	49%	42%
Neutral	15	16	34	9	22	27
Dislike	18	20	12	14	6	6
Hate	48	44	20	59	12	12
N.A.*	12	15	17	15	11	14
Total %	100%	101	101	100	100	101
Total N (234)						
Standard Deviation**	.898	.879	1.008	.850	1.031	1.043
*N.A. = Not Ascertainable.			**See note 9.			

A high 52 percent identified themselves as Palestinians, followed by 15 percent who said that they are students and 12 percent who said they are Arabs. A significant minority of 7 percent identified themselves as commando members. Only two percent thought of themselves as refugees. In spite of the fact that all those who filled out the questionnaire are refugees only 2 percent of them identified themselves as refugees; this is very significant, in the sense that they are no longer refugees even if they live in refugee camps. *They are Palestinians first.*<sup>4</sup> Nobody considered himself to be Jordanian. Two-thirds of the Jordanian population prior to 1967 war was estimated to be of Palestinian origin. Here one can easily appreciate the nature of the problems faced by King Hussain. There is a state within the state of Jordan. The unique feature of the nation states is that it maintains the *monopoly of physical force* necessary to implement the national policy.

How can any head of state allow another state to emerge within his state? However, Palestinians are in Jordan not because they wanted to be. They simply want to maintain their national identity and return to their homeland. As far as they are concerned, King Hussain has no right to intimidate Palestinian commando activities.

The second answer to the same question shows that most of them consider themselves to be Palestinian. Fifty-four percent of them gave no further answer.

Arab nationalism might be on the rise, but our subjects are definitely Palestinians. It is Palestinian nationalism that appears to dominate the minds of the youths. These youths have learned to be Palestinians even though they were born and raised in Jordan.<sup>5</sup> Sirhan Sirhan identified himself as a

Palestinian in spite of the mass media's efforts to identify him as a Jordan immigrant.

If they are Palestinians, how do they like the United States?

### *Attitudes Toward Nations*

Two questions asked to obtain an effective component of our respondents' attitudes toward selected foreigners and their governments were: "Do you like or dislike the following people?" and "Do you like or dislike the following governments?" Responses to these questions are presented in Table 1 and Table 2. The Palestinians showed their positive feelings in the following order of preference: Russians, Chinese, French, English, Americans, and Israelis. The Palestinian youths showed a definite like for Russians and Chinese. French people are liked and disliked at about the same ratio while English, Americans, and Israelis are definitely disliked. It comes as no surprise to anyone that Israeli Jews are hated the most intensely, although there are a few who like or at least have neutral attitudes toward them. Also, we might point out that there are some respondents, consisting of 18 percent, who either dislike or hate even Chinese and Russians. This suggests that there may be some xenophobic Palestinians who dislike all foreigners. If it is indeed xenophobia, there are good reasons for Palestinians to be so because of the way in which they have been treated by foreign powers, including Arab nations. King Hussain's treatment of Palestinian commandos angered many Palestinians. Although Nasser was very popular among our respondents (data not reported in this article), Egyptian sabre rattlings without direct and substantive assistance to the Palestinian resistance movements left much to be desired as did Lebanon's nebulous sup-

port for the Palestinian cause. President Bourguiba is ready to sell Palestine in the name of peace as far as some Palestinians are concerned. Historically, there are many reasons for Palestinians to develop political cynicism. Fighting against the Turks in cooperation with the British did not bring about the elimination of alien rulers from Palestine. On the contrary, they had to fight eventually against the British and Zionists. More recently, the Soviet Union has deliberately shied away from getting involved in Palestinian liberation movements. When the Soviets did help the Egyptians, the aid was limited largely to defensive weapons necessary to defend Egypt, not help for Palestinians to enable them to regain their homeland. China seems to be selective in extending her hand of help to the Palestinians. Israelis continue to suppress freedom among Israeli Arabs and deal harshly with Palestinians in the occupied areas.<sup>6</sup> Ben-Gurion as well as his successors seem to have forgotten what he said on August 13, 1948, on "Freedom and Independence." He said:

A nation that is not free to challenge its rulers, and replace them as may be its will, is no free nation, but a miserable multitude that exists only by a despot's favor.

For these three things we shall fight, as workers, as men, as Jews and as Zionists. We will not surrender them, for they are of our very souls. Zionism and socialism, both, are reft of their meaning and become ghosts if our independence, our liberty, our free choice of leaders, are spoiled or are destroyed.<sup>7</sup>

There are, however, men like General Moshe Dayan who remarked:

It is not true that the Arabs hate the Jews for personal religious or racial reasons. They consider us — and justly, from their point of view — as Westerners, foreigners, invaders who have seized an Arab country to turn it into a Jewish state.<sup>8</sup>

To cite all reasons for the Palestinians' distrust of any nation would be a Sisyphean task, indeed. We were surprised to know that at least some Palestinians like some governments, even after what they had gone through in the past quarter of a century.

There are a great many events which took place in the area, which may account for these students' xenophobia, and not very many international events that would result in xenophilia, which seems to coincide with the data presented in Table 2.

Standard deviation scores as given in Table 2 suggest that our respondents had more consensus in their attitude toward Americans, English, and Israeli Jews than toward the French, Russians, and Chinese.<sup>9</sup> In other words, the Palestinians had more varied attitudes toward the people they like than those whom they disliked. They were more unanimous in disliking the Americans, English, and Israeli Jews than their liking the French, Russians, and Chinese. This rather neat distinction between the two groups appearing in the standard deviation scores may have resulted from actions and reactions of these governments in the past. Palestinians know that Americans, English and Israeli Jews dislike them. In fact, these nations along with other nations have caused them to become stateless refugees. On the other hand, they are uncertain about their friends, i.e., French, Russians, and Chinese. France has only recently changed her policy toward Palestinians. Russians



are helping Egyptians but not Palestinians. Chinese extend their help to certain elements among the Palestinian commando groups, such as the Palestine National Liberation Movement and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and they are sympathetic to the Palestinian cause in general. Consequently, the respondents' views might be more dispersed toward their not-so-reliable friends than toward their enemies.

Table 3 presents our respondents' attitude toward various nation states. As expected, Palestinians prefer the U.S.S.R., China, France, Great Britain, U.S., and Israel in that order. No one likes the Israeli government; while a small percent of the Palestinians like the U.S. and British governments. Nearly one-half of the Palestinian students showed their like for Russian and Chinese governments. The French government, whose policy oscillates, is not so well liked but still rated an 18 percent positive response. While the respondents hate the U.S., British, and Israeli governments more than the respective citizens of those nations there seems to be close correspondence between the respondents' view toward the people and their governments.

Standard deviation scores show that there is even less dispersion of opinions on the U.S., British, and Israeli governments than that of the respective nationals, as shown in Table 2. Otherwise the same pattern prevails in both Table 3 and Table 2.

Now, the logical question that comes to mind is, what could have caused them to dislike certain nations and their nationals and like certain other countries and their citizens. Palestinians are often accused of being *unrealistic* by many outsiders in their aspiration to regain their homeland. By the same token when Theo-

dore Herzl first published his book entitled *The Jewish State*, it was equally felt by many Gentiles to be an unrealistic point of view. It has been less than a quarter of a century since the Palestinians left their homes. Setting this argument aside, we are here concerned with the question of their views of world powers. Are these Palestinians unrealistic when they dislike the U.S., Great Britain and Israel and like China and the Soviet, with the French position somewhere in between?

Berelson and Steiner, concluding from various data gathered largely in the Western world, come to the same conclusion and cite the poem quoted at the outset of this article, to point to this agreement of the poet's acumen and the elaborate endeavors of social scientists.<sup>10</sup> The most important conclusion Berelson and Steiner came to after doing the most systematic and comprehensive inventory of social science findings, is this distinctively human quality of manipulating reality, which in their own words is "what makes life tolerable, lovable, bearable against all the burdens; against loss of position, pressure of demands, . . . the oppressor's wrong, the proud man's contumely, the law's delay . . ." Palestinians' determination to regain their homeland seems unrealistic to outsiders, and yet it is very real to the Palestinians. And according to social scientists, such is a commonly accepted generalization about man in general. Obviously, whether or not the Palestinians' determination becomes reality shared also by Westerners, depends largely upon the Palestinians' efforts to create the future they want.

Having said that it is only human to create one's own image of the world, we now return to the original question of what might have contributed toward Palestinian

Table 3

## Attitude Toward Foreign Government

Response	U.S.	British	French	Israeli	U.S.S.R.	Chinese
Like	2%	1%	18%	0%	53%	48%
Neutral	11	11	30	7	22	23
Dislike	18	21	13	13	6	6
Hate	56	49	21	64	9	10
N.A.	13	18	18	15	10	13
Total %	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
Total N (234)						
Standard Deviation	.737	.716	1.071	.698	1.059	1.090

attitudes toward various nationals and their countries. What Deutsch and Merritt refer to as "spectacular events" as well as "cumulative events" appear to have contributed to the construction of reality, as can be inferred from the present data. "Cumulative" support of the United States government, especially after Truman's regime, has changed pro-American attitudes possessed by the Palestinians immediately following World War I, as evidenced in the King-Crane Commission report to President Wilson, to that of anti-American over a long period of time. The U.S. policy notwithstanding Mr. Scranton's plea for an even-handed policy toward the Middle Eastern states or Mr. Johnson's declaration to maintain the territorial integrity of all Middle Eastern states, has been anti-Arab in general and anti-Palestinian in particular. Eisenhower's policy, especially in regard to the Suez crisis, remains to be exceptional rather than the rule of U.S. policy in the area. The British policy of ambiguity in dealing with both Zionists and Arab Nationalists in Palestine is seen by Palestinians who are imbued with revanchism to be nothing more than quislings. Dulles' ability to construct his own reality in dissonance with Ambassador Byroade had forced the Soviet Union to commit herself in the continuing conflict; this introduced the cold-war dimension to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The cumulative events since then has built up the Soviet Union as a friend to the Arab. Communist Chinese have gained support of at least some Palestinians for their moral as well as actual assistance to the Palestinian commando activities. She is obviously popular among radical sectors of Palestinian society.

De Gaulle's decision to reverse some French government policy since the 1967 war had brought about some changes in

Palestinians' attitudes toward the French government and its people. And this seems to be evidenced in the data presented here. Israeli's spectacular attack on Beirut airport on December 29, 1968 further solidified her neutralist policy concerning the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. She has since then oscillated in her Middle East policy, but her general policy has remained to not openly aid the Israeli cause as the United States and Great Britain have.

Rather than to go on describing the history of these countries' policy toward Palestinians, it is perhaps sufficient to say that the Palestinian students' attitude toward these countries reflect their policies toward the Palestinians to a large extent. Consequently, at least in this area of the Palestinian reality is reality that can be shared by outside observers. Put simply, the Palestinians do not like the governments which have been hostile to them and like the governments that have shown sympathy toward Palestinian revanchism. Many Westerners we are certain did not consciously shift their anti-semitism against Jews to anti-semitism against the other Semites or Arabs in *quid pro quo*. But rather the Westerners' sympathy for the Jews resulted in their unconscious antipathy toward the Christians and Moslems of Palestinian origin. This is dramatically illustrated in the reporting of the Westerners' sympathy with the Soviet Jews who desired to migrate to Israel. The Westerners, due largely to the mass media's anti-Palestinian policy, failed to be exposed to the idea that Israel does not allow Palestinian inhabitants to return to their own home and property in what is now Israel, because they are either Christians or Moslems. Why should foreigners be allowed to settle in Palestine while its indigenous Gentile population remains in the "dias-

pora" just because they are Christians or Moslems? We are, however, in sympathy with anyone wishing to live in a country of his desire including the Soviet Jewry.

### *Correlation Between Attitudes Toward Foreigners and Their Governments*

What is now a cliché in international circles is a saying that we don't like what your government is doing but we still like you. It goes on to say that we have nothing against you individual citizens. Is this true of Palestinians' perception of Americans and other nationals? Table 4 is constructed to answer this question.

A correlation coefficient between Israeli Jews and Israeli government is lowest with the figure of .590 indicating a high but not very high degree of correlation between them, while the relationship between the Soviet citizens and their government shows itself to be nearly perfect with the figure of .888. Correlations are very high for Russia (.888) and China (.863) and low for America (.625), England (.605) and Israel (.590) with France being located between these two groups (.728).

These findings suggest several items of interest. First, Palestinians associate foreigners and their governments to a large extent. Second, the degree of association between the people and the government depends upon the particular country. Third, the association between these two are strongest in the Palestinians' attitude toward friendly countries and weakest toward their enemies. It, in other words, suggests that the Palestinians are most careful in separating Israeli Jews from their government and Americans and the U.S. government, while they almost equate Russians and Chinese with their governments. *Thus, the notion*

*that people distinguish a government from its people is most likely to be true when it is applied to disliked nations and least likely to be true when applied to friendly nations with ceteris paribus.* This refinement of the hypothesis suggests further that the affective component of the international image affects the cognitive component of the international image; i.e., when one dislikes (affective) a people, one is most likely to separate (cognitive) the people from its government.<sup>12</sup>

### *Attitude Structure Toward Friends and Foes*

Factor analysis results reported in an earlier paper<sup>13</sup> reveal an interesting finding that is of relevance to our concern for the Palestinians' attitudinal structure toward their friends and foes. An expanded report representing only the relevant portion of the earlier paper is summarized in Table 5. The model employed in the analysis was the classical factor analysis using varimax rotation. Nine rotated factors accounted for 53.2 percent of the variance at the usual eigenvalue of 1.00. The data used included 47 variables that were amenable to quantitative analyses as noted earlier. The first two of the nine factors rotated were named Pro-Palestinian factor and Pro-Israeli factor, respectively. The loadings for these two dimensions are reported in Table 4. As one can discern, variables loaded very highly are Russians, Chinese, and their governments. The French and their government variables loaded highly but not to the extreme with the loadings of .585 and .654 respectively as opposed to loadings for Russia and China variables, all of which loaded beyond an absolute value of .900. These findings coincide with what has been presented thus far in this article.

Table 4

Correlation Matrix of Attitude Toward Foreigners  
and Foreign Governments

	1*	2	3	4	5	6	1**	2	3	4	5	6
1*	1.000	.925	.463	.651	.254	.212	(.625)	.522	.180	.473	.080	.034
2		1.000	.465	.619	.254	.245	.567	(.605)	.205	.473	.080	.061
3			1.000	.125	.560	.531	.164	.231	(.728)	.156	.430	.471
4				1.000	.129	.136	.637	.507	-.060	(.590)	-.038	-.085
5					1.000	.907	.045	.084	.545	-.013	(.388)	.817
6						1.000	.009	.039	.537	.076	.816	(.862)
1**							1.000	.842	.196	.774	.102	.041
2								1.000	.280	.790	.113	.086
3									1.000	.205	.594	.615
4										1.000	.008	-.054
5											1.000	.926
6												1.000

\*1 = Americans, 2 = English, 3 = French, 4 = Israeli Jews, 5 = Russians,  
and 6 = Chinese

\*\*1 = United States Government, 2 = British Government, 3 = French Government  
4 = Israeli Government, 5 = The Soviet Government, and 6 = Chinese Government

Table 5

## First Two Factors: Pro-Palestinian and Pro-Israel Factors

Variable Names	Loadings	
	1st Factor	2nd Factor
Like American	.146	-.813*
Like English	.164	-.812
Like French	.585*	-.268
Like Israel Jews	.008	-.759*
Like Russians	.931*	-.083
Like Chinese	.914*	-.048
Like U.S. Government	.023	-.873*
Like British Government	.059	-.831*
Like French Government	.654*	-.142
Like Israeli Government	-.037	-.797*
Like U.S.S.R Government	.928*	.004
Like Chinese Government	.926*	.057
Total Variance percent	9.9%	9.3%

\*Indicates extreme loadings over the absolute value of .500.

What interests us, however, is that the second factor which has been named the Pro-Israeli factor is *independent* of the first factor or Pro-Palestinian factor.<sup>14</sup> In other words, the Pro-Palestinian factor is not exactly on the same dimension as the Pro-Israeli factor. Accordingly, the second factor extracted cannot be named the Anti-Palestinian factor, which led us to name it the Pro-Israeli factor. An implication of our finding here is that the Palestinians' attitudes are structured in such a way that these two factors are independent. Second, these two what we would consider as affective components of the attitudes have accounted for 19 percent out of 53 percent of the variance explained. Social attribute and cognitive and behavioral components of the attitude variables included in the data analysis were less important in accounting for the variance within the data. In other words, whether or not we like certain nations and their governments seem to determine much of the other components of Palestinian attitudes. This is in consonant with much of the social science findings in the past.<sup>15</sup>

### 3. *Concluding Remarks*

We have learned that the Palestinian youth generate their own reality as they see fit, as would any other human being. Our respondents think and act as Palestinians while they live in Jordan. Their revanchist goals are real in their views and actions. The difficulty is that their reality does not always mesh with others' reality and yet their reality must be tested against those of others with whom they are forced to interact, in the pursuit of their goals. For those who are concerned with peace in the area, it is necessary to know the reality perceived by all parties involved. Findings presented in the present article seem in general to be consonant with findings in

other parts of the world, as far as the question of reality is concerned. Furthermore, on the basis of our findings we are now in a position to suggest several new hypotheses; e.g. one is more likely to distinguish people from their government in viewing countries one dislikes.

One of the lessons we learn from the question of Palestinians attitudes toward the United States *vis-à-vis* China or the Soviet is that moral support or psychological comfort is more important than economic assistance in dealing with the Palestinian youths. This may be true of other members of Palestinian society. How much does the Soviet or China contribute to the UNRWA operation, which keeps the Palestinian alive? Absolutely zero. The United States carries the bulk of the burden (about 70%) of keeping UNRWA in operation, an amount of about a half billion dollars. But unfortunately, the United States gives offensive weapons to Israel, weapons which are used against the Palestinians and other Arabs in the area. Lenczowski reports that over 3 billion dollars have gone from the United States to Israel in the forms of economic aid, the purchase of Israeli bonds, and private gifts.<sup>16</sup> We learned that political alignments of the nations have a close bearing on Palestinians' attitude toward these nations. France, probably because of her policy change since 1967, is no longer hated by the Palestinian youths as are England or the United States. The United States was once the most trusted friend of the Palestinians at the time of the King-Crane commission survey. The Palestinians are sensitive to the way they are treated by these powers. And as reported in the last part of the finding section, affective components of Palestinian attitudes do seem to account for much of what they do and believe.

## NOTES

1. Herbert C. Kelman, *International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965, pp. 12-13 and the references therein. Kelman's book represents a pioneering effort to survey the field of social psychology of international relations.
2. Regrettably much of the literature on the Middle East conflict remains polemic. Facts as given in many books are often one-sided at best if not false. To illustrate our point, we would like to refer to one of the best seller books published in 1970 in Japan; Isaiah Ben Dassan, *Nihon-jin to Yudaya-jin* [The Japanese and the Jews]. Tokyo: Yamamoto-sho'en, 1970. He declares that Jews have never left Palestine even once (p. 157), which is true. There have always been some Jews in Palestine, but he conveniently leaves out the fact that the vast majority of Palestinian inhabitants in recent centuries have been Arabs. He goes on to state that the Palestinian conflict is not a war between different ethnic groups or a war over the territory (p. 162). He fails to mention that only a small portion of the land in Palestine (7 percent) was owned by the Jewish population in 1947. His book should have been entitled "The Japanese and the Zionists." We consider his book to be an insult to the Japanese reader as far as his delineation of the Jewish history is concerned. It is unfortunate that there are not very many Japanese who are knowledgeable about the Middle East, particularly in view of the fact that over 80 percent of the oil used in Japan comes from the Middle East. For other sides of the Palestinian problem as presented by Jews, see such authors as Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, Noam Chomsky, Don Peretz, Alfred Lilienthal, and Moshe Menuhin.
3. Johan Galtung, *Theory and Methods of Social Research*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1967, pp. 358-88.
4. This finding coincides with Don Peretz's observation that the refugees become Palestinians. Don Peretz, et al. *A Palestinian Entity?* Washington, D.C.: 1970, pp. 41-53.
5. A comprehensive report of the Palestinian student survey is being written by the same authors. It should appear in book form in the future. The manuscript is tentatively entitled *Palestinians without Palestine*. For the rise of nationalism in the Middle East, see e.g., Tareq Y Ismael. *Governments and Politics of the Contemporary Middle East*. Homewood: The Dorsey Press, 1970, pp 50-68 and the references therein.
6. For example, see George Dib and Fuad Jabber, *Israel's Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Territories*. Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1970 and Sabri Jiryis, *The Arabs in Israel, 1948-1966*. Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1968 (The book was first published in Hebrew in Israel).
7. David Ben Gurion, *Rebirth and Destiny of Israel*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954, pp. 274-280.
8. As quoted in Noam Chomsky, "Nationalism and Conflict in Palestine." Herbert Mason, *Reflections on the Middle East Crisis*. Paris: Mouton, 1970, p. 68.
9. Data for this portion of the article is from a set of data extracted from the total sample data. Forty-seven variables which were deemed to be quantifiable (metric scale data) were selected to be used for various quantitative data analyses. All

those who had failed to respond to any one of these 47 items were deleted from the analysis, leaving only 77 respondents out of the total population.

10. Bernard Berelson and Gary A. Steiner, *Human Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1964, pp. 662-667.
11. Karl W. Deutsch and Richard L. Merritt, "Effects of Events on National and International Images," in Herbert C. Kelman, ed., *International Behavior*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965, pp. 130-187.
12. For other psychological functions of the enemy, see David J. Finley, Ole R. Holsti, and Richard R. Fagen, *Enemies in Politics*. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967, pp. 6-9.
13. "Young Palestinian Commandos in Political Socialization Perspective." A paper delivered at the 28th International Congress of

Orientalists, Canberra, Australia, January 6-12, 1971. A revised version of the paper is scheduled to appear in the *Middle East Journal* (forthcoming).

14. Orthogonal rotation, which the varimax method uses, leaves each axis orthogonal or perpendicular to each other which makes each of the dimensions independent of the other. For more detail, consult books on factor analysis, e.g., Harry H. Harman, *Modern Factor Analysis*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967.
15. E.g., Margaret R. Middleton, Henri Tajfel and N.B. Johnson, "Cognitive and Affective Aspects of Children's National Attitudes," *British Journal of Social Clinical Psychology*. Vol. 9, No. 2 (June, 1970), pp. 122-134.
16. George Lenczowski, ed., *United States Interests in the Middle East*. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1968, p. 73.







# Some Causes for the Rejection of the Partition Plan by the Palestinian Arabs

Fawzi Asadi

The Arab-Israeli conflict has passed through its 23rd anniversary without seeing any solution acceptable to both contending parties. President Nixon has described the Middle East as the most dangerous area and that this Arab-Israeli conflict may lead to a big confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union which may trigger a World War III.

This conflict has caused changes in the political and economic structure of many Middle Eastern countries. The 1967 confrontation between Israel and some of her Arab neighbors has engulfed the big powers into this conflict at a scale larger than ever before. The United States government has made it clear that its interests lie in maintaining the "present" balance of

power between Israel and her Arab neighbors. Similarly, the Soviet Union has also pledged to help the Arabs in restoring the land they lost in the 1967 war. These old policies by the two super-powers are impregnated with large risks and dangers, and thus the chances for large confrontations among the big powers are drawing nearer and nearer every day.

It is true that the roots of this conflict penetrate deep into history, but the basic causes can be related to the rejection of the Partition Plan of Palestine by its Arab population in 1947-1948. Their rejection was based on some serious physical, social, economic, and political factors which are not well known to many of the students of that region

## I. *The Physical Factors*

The U.N. Partition Plan in 1947 (Fig. 1) envisaged the partitioning of Palestine into six principal parts, three of which were set aside for the Jewish state and the other three with the enclave of Jaffa for the Arab state. In addition, there was to be the international zone of Jerusalem which was to be placed under United Nations control. (Fig. 2).

The first criticism to this Plan is that the sectors of each state are in a sense non-contiguous, and though they appear on small scale maps as converging at selected points, yet on the land these "points of convergence" are in reality "corridors of potential trouble" between both states. Traveling from one sector to the other of either state implies passing through the territory of the other. And if the two states are not friendly to each other, such points of convergence become impassable and points of continuous clashes and harassment—as what happened in the Gdansk corridor between Poland and Germany before World War II.

Similarly, the enclave of Jaffa from the rest of the Arab State is unrealistic for the same reasons mentioned above. Traffic to this port city reminds the person of the difficulties West Germans encounter when they travel to Berlin. Furthermore, the railway network in Palestine was not built for the complete benefit of either state. Problems in transporting products or passengers from one sector to another cannot be ignored.

This complex division of Palestine aimed to cure one situation but it created several problems. On one hand, it tried to include practically all the scattered areas and settlements inhabited by Jews, even though this

meant the inclusion of large areas owned and inhabited entirely by Arabs. On the other hand, the Arab state was set to include the least possible number of Jews and the smallest amount of Jewish property.

Palestine with a total area of 10,435 square miles, (of which 272 square miles comprised water areas), was to be divided as follows:<sup>1</sup>

An Arab State comprising 4,476 square miles or 42.88 per cent;

A Jewish State comprising 5,893 square miles or 56.47 per cent; and

An international zone of Jerusalem comprising 68 square miles or 0.65 per cent.

As regards ownership of the land, individual Arabs owned 2,212,075 acres or 77.69 per cent of the territory reserved for the Arab State, 894,456 acres or 34.24 per cent of the Jewish State, and 37,165 acres or 84.70 per cent of the Jerusalem International Zone.

Jews owned 23,885 acres or 0.84 per cent of the territory reserved for the Arab State, 345,964 acres or 9.38 per cent of the Jewish State, and 3,074 acres or 7.01 per cent of the Jerusalem International Zone; (the total land owned by Jews amounted to about 5.67 per cent of the total area of Palestine). Persons other than Arabs or Jews owned 20,864 acres or 0.73 per cent of the territory reserved for the Arab State, 12,522 acres or 0.34 per cent in the Jewish State and 2,126 acres or 4.85 per cent in Jerusalem International Zone. The balance was registered under "state domain."

Thus, the Partition Plan failed to divide the country equitably between the two con-

Fig. 1





Fig. 2

JERUSALEM INTERNATIONAL ZONE



tended parties. In other words, it was implied in this plan that those individual Arabs who owned about 34 per cent of Jewish state had to live within that state, whether they liked it or not. And since that Jewish state was intended from the time of its inception to follow the principles of political Zionism, whose essence was to convert that State into the "Land of Israel" exclusively for members of the Jewish Faith,<sup>2</sup> those landowners (and their peasants) had to move out of the Jewish State. Even if there were to be voluntary exchange of land and personnel, only that area owned by Jews in the Arab State (i.e. about 0.84 per cent) could have been exchanged for the same area in the Jewish State. The others had to sell out or abandon their land.

The Partition Plan failed also to take into consideration the differences in the productivity of the land. The land of Palestine was divided by the Government of Palestine into three groups: First Quality land, Medium, and Poor (Fig. 3). By contrasting Figs. 1 and 3, we notice that most of the land reserved for the Jewish State (except in S. Negev) included almost all the First Quality Land, whereas the Arab State was established on Medium and Poor Quality Lands. According to Ruedy, by 1948-49, Israel held 95 per cent of the good soils, 64 per cent of the Medium, 39 per cent of the poor soils (excluding the Negev).<sup>3</sup>

The Physical Map of Palestine (Fig. 4) shows also that most of the Jewish State was to occupy the major plains and lowlands (such as the Coastal plain, Esdraelon-Jezreel, and the Huleh-L. Galilee lowlands). The Arab State was to be established on Upper Galilee, Samaria-Judea Plateaus, and the coastal strip around Gaza—which is arid and mostly sandy.

## II. *The Social Factors*

### (1) Land Structure and Distribution of Land:

As it was mentioned above, the Partition Plan recommended 56 per cent of the total area of Palestine to the Jewish State, and about 43 per cent to the Arab State. The reasons given for this division is that the Special Committee tried to include most, if not all, the land owned by the Jews within the Jewish State. But why the Committee did not follow the same principle in regard to the Arab land is not clear.

Based on sources prepared by the government of Palestine in 1945, the regional structure of Land-ownership, shows that there was not a single sub-district in which the percentage of Jewish land ownership exceeded 39 per cent, and that in nine of the sixteen sub-districts the percentage of Jewish ownership is less than 5 per cent. Some of the sub-districts which were recommended for the Jewish State (such as Safad and Ramle) Arab ownership exceeded 82 per cent, as shown in Table 1.

The other reason for having much Arab land assigned to the Jewish State is related to the location of the Jewish holdings. By studying Fig. 5, we can notice that most of the Jewish holdings were restricted to the coastal plains, the Plain of Esdraelon and the Huleh-Galilee lowlands. In order to understand the reasons for such locations, one has to study the history of Jewish colonization in Palestine since 1882—which is very tedious and complex for such a paper to tackle in the given space. Their locations were much tied up to the policies of Jewish settlements in Palestine; however, a brief analysis of the objectives of Jewish settlement in Palestine may shed light on the situation.

Fig. 3




Fig. 4







Fig. 5



## (2) Jewish Settlements in Palestine:

Jewish land acquisition in Palestine passed through several stages extending from business-like adventures to well-planned policies whose objectives were to acquire land for the state-to-be. Until the 1920's, the most important body devoted to Jewish acquisition of Palestinian land was the Palestine Jewish Colonization Association (P.I.C.A.) led and supported financially by Barons Rothschild and Hersch. By 1914 PICA had acquired about 235,000 dunums, (4 dunums equal one acre) whereas the Jewish National Fund had 16,000 dunums, and total Jewish land holding was about 418,000 dunums.<sup>4</sup> Private landownership was mostly around Jaffa since it was the largest city with a large Jewish urban community. According to Granott, the British occupation of Palestine facilitated more stable conditions for land acquisition, which permitted the consolidation of land policies, the determining of what was desirable, and what merited priority.

Since for fifty years prior to the British occupation of Palestine, Ottoman law officially forbade land acquisition by foreigners, PICA and other Jewish buyers resorted to subterfuges in registration.<sup>5</sup> Because disappearance of, or irregularities in, Ottoman registers left the new British military hopelessly confused about property matters, all land transactions were suspended between November, 1918 and September, 1920. The opening of British registers at the latter date soon revealed total Jewish land acquisition prior to 1920 of an estimated 650,000 dunums.<sup>6</sup>

The real trouble over Jewish acquisition of land began only after the issuance of the Balfour Declaration (November, 1917). More than anything else it was the ultimate political content of Zionist land acquisi-

tions that drove the Palestinian Arab leadership to oppose these purchases. While immediate economic and human problems played their part in the rising resistance movement of the native leadership, that leadership correctly saw the keys to Palestinian survival or the seeds of its destruction in the twin issues of immigration and land. These were precisely the issues upon which the Zionists were also most intransigent. Physical possession and intimate relationship to land by Jewish colonists were seen by them as the only certain method of possessing Palestine.<sup>7</sup> Thus, Jewish strategy in acquiring land in Palestine can be best summarized by quoting the Israeli strategist, Netanel Lorch:<sup>8</sup>

It was not until the late 1930's, when the partition was in the air and it became apparent that the boundaries of the land already acquired were likely to coincide with those of the Jewish State-to-be, that political considerations came to the fore. Thereafter, settlement was directed toward the frontiers, far from previous colonies. A block of settlements was established near the Lebanese border in the north and others in the Beisan Valley, near the Central Jordan.

The White Paper of 1939, restricting land acquisition by Jews, was calculated to put an end to that activity. Yet, despite severe handicaps, settlements continued. As late as the fall of 1946, eleven settlements were established in the Negev desert.

Thus, it can be seen that the scattered locations of Jewish settlements in Palestine followed specific political policies,

namely, the more scattered these settlements are, the more likely they will be included within the Jewish State—carrying with them more Arab land. Furthermore, the settlements which were established along the Lebanese-Syrian borders and in the Negev, were planned to defend the State-to-be—should Arab armies invade that State. Purchases of land by Jews in the 1930's and 1940's were not influenced by suitability for settlement or quality of soil, nor by quantity of water, or even by security. But the decisive factor was whether the land would fall within the national policy, i.e. expanding Jewish ownership to the most strategic areas. And so, when the critical day arrived, and the United Nations decided to establish a Jewish state, the Zionist strategy prevailed: "Those who were responsible for defining its boundaries were impelled by realities to include the lands bought by the Jews, together with the settlement thereon. The frontiers of the new state which march in so curiously winding fashion, were largely determined by the success of the Jews in creating 'fait accomplis'."<sup>9</sup>

### *III. Economic Factors:*

Until May, 1948, Palestine had been administered as one political and administrative unit. Economic factors also made it one indissoluble body, and so the economies of all parts of Palestine were interdependent. Roads, railways, other communication systems, and public services had been provided on the basis of a unitary Palestine. Large funds were spent on the development of the port of Haifa and its oil refinery during the British Mandate in order to serve the needs of the whole country. Thus, depriving the Arab State-to-be from the facilities of such a harbor and its refinery, would have been a great economic loss—though certain provisions were made in the Partition Plan for this harbor.

Another example of the common and indivisible services is the fact that the sources of electricity to the major part of the Arab State-to-be would have been located in the Jewish State (in Lower Galilee). Similarly, the sources of the water supply to the city of Jerusalem is located in the Jewish State and the water would have to pass through the Arab State before it reaches the city.

The Special Committee fully realized the interdependence of the economy of Palestine and observed that under the Mandate there had been internal freedom of trade, a common transport system and a single currency. Its report lays stress on the economic unity of the country and its unanimous recommendations read:<sup>10</sup>

In appraising the various proposals for the solution of the Palestine question, it shall be accepted as a cardinal principle that the preservation of the economic unity of Palestine as a whole is indispensable to the life and development of the country and its people

The plan of the majority of the Special Committee accordingly recommended establishment of an economic union and its operation through a joint economic board. The majority, however, failed to realize that it is impossible to combine economic union with political divisions. Economic unity implies consent and cannot be imposed; in fact, it necessitates a treaty and involves a joint administration. In view of the unwavering opposition of the Arabs, that arrangement would be impossible. Moreover, the emphasis laid by the Special Committee on the economic unity and its interdependence of all sections of the population in Palestine leads inevitably to the conclusion that economic unity must necessarily be pre-

served This can be achieved only by maintaining political unity.

Another important factor for the rejection of the Partition Plan by the Arab Palestinians is the fact that most of the *cultivable land* of the Arabs would have been within the Jewish State. By the end of 1946, the British authorities placed Jewish ownership of land in Palestine at 1,624,000 dunums.<sup>11</sup> Granot places the total area of land in Jewish possession at the end of June, 1947 at 1,850,000 dunums; of which 181,000 dunums had been obtained through concessions from the Palestine Government.<sup>12</sup> Thus, the net area actually owned by the Jews before recommending the Partition Plan by the United Nations was about 1,668,900 dunums. In other words, whichever estimate one accepts, Jewish land ownership in Palestine in 1948 did not exceed 6 per cent of the total area of Palestine.

In terms of land cultivability, as defined by the British mandatory government, the distribution was as follows:<sup>13</sup>

	'CULTIVABLE'		'NON-CULTIVABLE'	
	<i>Dunums</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Dunums</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Arabs	7,797,129	84.70	4,969,395	29.03
Jews	1,176,745	12.78	314,954	1.84
Public	231,664	2.52	1,260,026	7.30
The unassigned 'uncultivable' lands of the Beersheba sub-district			10,573,110	61.83
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>9,205,538</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>17,117,485</b>	<b>100.00</b>

In terms of land use, the Arabs held also more tilled land than those held by the Jews, as shown in Table 2. The table shows that in all categories, except citrus, the

Arabs held more cropped land than their neighbors, the Jews. The large areas cultivated in cereals by the Arabs show that the majority of the farmers were much dependent on their land for their food supplies, and thus if they were to be deprived of most of this land, they would have to depend very much on imported food supplies.

Since most of the areas planted with citrus fruits were located either in the Coastal Plain or around Lake Galilee, their inclusion in the Jewish State meant depriving the Arabs also of their only commercial crop. The value of this crop was well pointed out in the Special Committee's report, which indicates: "The Jews will have the more economically developed part of the country, embracing practically the whole of the citrus producing areas. It is an undisputed fact that the basic industry in Palestine, which largely pays for imports of food, especially wheat, meat and cattle fodder, and of which the Arabs own approximately 50 per cent, would be almost entirely included in the proposed Jewish State."<sup>14</sup>

#### IV. Conclusion

The above discussion is not intended to be conclusive of *all* the physical and socio-economic factors for the rejection of the

Partition Plan by the Arab Palestinians—who formed then the majority of the population throughout the country, and in every sub-district, except the Jaffa sub-district. This paper tried to touch upon some of the significant factors which do not usually come to the surface when one is discussing the Palestine Problem or the Arab-Israeli conflict. The clashes which occurred in 1947-48 between the Arabs and the Jews were natural and expected because they were based mostly on the Palestinians' sincere belief that their existence and survival in their homeland was at stake. The Palestinians' motto was: "He who takes your land, takes away your life."

As events turned out, the Palestinian

Arabs were deprived of their homes, land, factories, jobs, and other assets. This is related to the shortsightedness of the Special Committee which recommended the Partition Plan, and to the double-dealings of the Zionist leaders in Palestine and outside. On one hand, they were asking for a "shelter" for their "persecuted brothers," yet on the other hand, they were preparing a full scale persecution and dismissal of all the Palestinian Arabs. If peace is to be restored to that area, the injustice which has been done to the Palestinian Arabs must be rectified first, before cooperation and coexistence can be dealt with. From the events of the last twenty-three years, the claims of the Palestinian Arabs have not waned but on the contrary, increased to a dangerous point

TABLE 1  
DISTRIBUTION OF LAND OWNERSHIP AND POPULATION  
BY SUB-DISTRICT — 1945 (in percent)

<i>Sub-District</i>	<i>Landownership**</i>		<i>Population</i>	
	<i>Arabs</i>	<i>Jews</i>	<i>Arabs</i>	<i>Jews</i>
Acre	87	3	96	4
Beersheba	14	less than 1	99	less than 1
Beisan	44	34	70	30
Gaza	75	4	98	2
Haifa	42	35	53	47
Hebron	96	less than 1	99	less than 1
Jaffa	47	39	29	71
Jenin	84	less than 1	100	00
Jerusalem	84	2	62	38
Nablus	76	less than 1	100	00
Nazareth	52	28	84	16
Ramallah	99	less than 1	100	00
Ramle	77	14	78	22
Safad	68	18	87	13
Tiberias	51	38	67	33
Tulkarm	78	17	83	17

\* Source: Adapted from Sami Hadawi (Ed.), *Palestine Village Statistics—1945*, p. 37 (Tables I and II).

\*\* The balance represents waste land and State Domain land.

TABLE 2

DISTRIBUTION OF LANDHOLDINGS ACCORDING  
TO VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF LAND USE-1945\*

Category of Use	Ownership In Dunums	
	Arabs	Jews
Citrus	135,368	139,728
Bananas	1,843	1,079
Plantations	1,052,222	94,167
Taxable Cereals (categories 9-13)	5,653,346	869,109
Taxable Cereals (categories 14-15)	823,046	67,839

\* Source: *The Partition of Palestine*—Monograph Series, No. 9, (Beirut: The Institute for Palestine Studies, 1967), Appendix VI.

For a more detailed analysis, see *Palestine Village Statistics—1945*, Table II, p. 79.

## NOTES

1 Robert John and Sami Hadawi, *The Palestine Diary—1945-48*, (New York: New World Press, 1970), vol. II, p. 271. See also Avraham Granott, *Agrarian Reform and the Record of Israel*, (London: Eyre and Spottiswood, 1956), p. 28 (Table II).

2 The "Law of Return" provides this condition for every Jew who seeks to migrate to Israel. See also Moshe Menuhin, *The Decadence of Judaism*, (Beirut: The Institute for Palestine Studies, 1969), p. 86.

3 John Ruedy: "Jewish Land Acquisition," in Ibrahim Abu-Lughod (Ed.), *The Transformation of Palestine*, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971), p. 135.

4 Granott, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

5 Ruedy, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

6 Government of Palestine: Survey of Palestine—Prepared in December, 1945, and January, 1946 for the Information of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 2 vols. Jerusalem, 1946—vol. I, p. 244.

7 Ruedy, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

8 Netanel Lorch, *The Edge of the Sword Israel's War of Independence 1947-49*, (New York: G. P. Putnam's and Sons, 1961), p. 32

9 Granott, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

10 *The Partition of Palestine* — Monograph Series, No. 9 (Beirut: The Institute for Palestine Studies, 1967), p. 38

11 Survey of Palestine, vol I, *op. cit.*, p. 244. (Granott places the figure for 1947 at 1,734,000 See Granott *op. cit.*, p. 28)

12 Granott, *op. cit.*, p. 278.

13 Sami Hadawi (Ed), *Palestine Village Statistics. 1945*, (Beirut: The Institute for Palestine Studies, pp. 19-20. (See p. 21, for explanations of the terms 'Cultivable' and 'Non-Cultivable' lands).

14 United Nations, General Assembly, Progress Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Suppl., 18, December 11, 1949—October, 1950, Chapter II, Paragraph 54.



# Documents:

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## PROGRESS IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Analytic Comments on the Work of  
Committee on Comparative Politics

John Woods

*Crises and Sequences in Political Development*<sup>1</sup> is the seventh volume in the Princeton *Studies in Political Development* and carries on what has become a minor tradition. The series chronicles the efforts of a committee<sup>2</sup> comprising several leading figures in American academia to develop an adequate theoretical and applied science of comparative politics.

Even before publication of the first volume, Lucian D. Pye's *Communications and Political Development*, in 1963,<sup>3</sup> the committee and the school of method it represents had come under an attack for being both 'static' and culturally relative in their thinking. The barrage continues to this day, although its intensity has declined sharply over the years. The book which invited the criticism and which was really the group's first effort appeared before the series was formally inaugurated. Two of the committee's leading figures, Gabriel Almond (chairman at the time) and James Coleman *The Politics of the Developing Area*,<sup>4</sup> for Princeton University Press in 1960 and drew widespread attention to the structural-functional approach with which Almond had already been working for several years. Its appearance sharply heightened dispute over whether the model which Almond had based on anthropological and sociological perspectives was adequate for the analysis of systems in the process of change, something which had not been at

the forefront of concern for either of those disciplines. Almond's thought has continued to set the style for the committee and the criticism has carried on accordingly, but whether or not it is well-founded, most of the criticism was beside the point almost from the outset. The real substance of the committee's thought, including that of Almond, has ranged well beyond the limits of Almond's original formalization. There has been a pronounced increase in both the scope of the formal conceptualization and the sophistication of insights which support it. But there has been no methodological about-face. The new volume, which makes a first attempt at an encompassing model of the developmental process, is as true to the essentially anthropological and sociological roots as were the efforts of ten years ago (although Pye's and Verga's social psychology has also become central). There has been no rejection of Almond's structural-functionalism, but rather a continuation of the methodological growth which, for the committee, began with his attempt.

Less fundamental criticism of the series have been that it is the product of a closed shop and that the volumes lack conceptual and stylistic uniformity. These faults are irritating, but not serious enough to impair the series' usefulness appreciably. New people are brought in for each volume, according to the need, even though the old guard remains both on the committee and in the lists of authors. A forthcoming study and volume, for instance, teams Almond with a group of historians in an attempt to apply the thinking of *Crises and Sequences* to the political development of Europe. On the other score, the books do tend to lack coherence; certainly this one



does but for the professional reader they also tend to warrant his overlooking this flaw and bringing his own order to the material, as he may find necessary.

### *Almond's static model*

I studied under Almond briefly at about the time that the series was initiated. The word in the air at the time was not so much 'functionalism' as 'explication', and whereas I was never sure of exactly what the former meant to its exponents, the significance of the latter term was made entirely clear to me.

Much of the talk about whether 'functionalism' does or could provide a viable model of the political system is a waste of time. The original models were inadequate, but the approach is sound. The question is, rather, whether Almond and those around him were guilty of a premature attempt to produce tight, rigorous models of political reality, thus leading the discipline astray and wasting its time and energy. There is little room for debate over the ultimate applicability of models such as Almond was developing. Every sound view of politics — or any other range of related phenomena, for that matter — must be of a 'functional' system. It must provide an encompassing conception of some segment or aspect of an ordered reality (whether contingent or strictly causal), and the model must therefore be correspondingly ordered, as a set of related parts of a system. The task is to arrive at an adequate systemic, or 'functional' model, and the complexity of the early models did not afford the required degree of approximation to real-world complexities. They had a limited range of application, but this outcome was to some extent inevitable. If those leading the movement for comparative politics in the late

fifties and early sixties fell into error, it was on the one hand more serious in principle than that with which they have been charged, and on the other hand, of less importance in the final analysis than their rivals have maintained. In their enthusiasm for science, Almond and others like him placed too much emphasis on the model and too little on corresponding realities. Consequently, the match between them was poor. It was not the approach to model-building, but the rush to get models built which rendered the attempt inadequate.

It is quite true to say Almond's model was 'static' and therefore unable to encompass system changes, but not because this capacity lay inherently outside the range of the approach or style of thought. It was just that the model was firmed-up or 'explicated' (and, more to the point, published) before all the mechanisms had been adequately appreciated. The levels of motion in Almond's model did not adequately represent the dynamics of the cases to be explained. "Inputs" and "outputs" were the moving parts and they were conceived of as cycling within a more or less rigid framework. But the study of development is obviously that of changes or motion in the framework itself and thus the moving parts of the model did not correspond to those of the phenomena being modeled. The model or family of models developed in this way was more than inadequate; formally speaking, it bore no relationship whatsoever to the cases being examined. This fact did not require the reams of paper and the critical virtuosity devoted to revealing it. Neither, in the intermediate run, is it a particularly damaging error. At worst it is a failure of timing based on a measure of naivety and another of professional rivalry. It now appears that the commission of insights to a rigorous, encom-

passing mold must come somewhat later in the over-all process of accumulation and ordering of information on development; but it must come eventually and in a form not fundamentally dissimilar to those of the systemic models we now have. The models of the last decade are of limited value but the methodological direction they imply is a perfectly sound one; indeed, if broadly defined it is identical with scientific method in general.<sup>4</sup>

In spite of their failings, the structurally static models of the 1960's have been enormously important in the over-all context of the discipline's explosive development. (By the 'Discipline' I mean political science, not comparative politics). Almond and the others with him in that aspect of the behavioral revolution did provide a way of ordering the insights which were emerging as the discipline's scope was extended to encompass all of the politically relevant aspects of social living. The profusion of techniques, insights and data were in crying need of order, for both professional scholars and students. I am sure that *The Politics of the Developing Areas* appeared on the reading lists of any number of University and College courses which had nothing to do with development, or even comparative politics, because of the systemic view which Almond's introductory chapter provided. The fact that the following, substantive chapters tended to pay more tribute than attention to the model attests to its being an instrument of consolidation rather than of the advance anticipated by its authors. In its light, the survey work being done at the University of Michigan,<sup>6</sup> or Truman's group-theory<sup>7</sup> could be placed in context and seen to relate to say Eulau's<sup>7</sup> work on legislative roles. Less explicit systemic works, such as those of Bagehot or Tocqueville could be more surely grasp-

ed and related to narrower concerns and findings.

### *Accounting for Development*

As it happened, however, there was no intrinsic provision for ordered consideration of the changes occurring within the framework of systems. The probably unconsidered assumption of the model builders was of fixed array of relationships to be explained. This was true of David Easton as well as of Almond. Most likely what each did was what he sensed to be most called for at the time. Although development was a formal concern, minds were not attuned to the process so much as to the final form. Once again, the criticism of this posture is both abundant and to a considerable extent unwarranted. A concern with final form implies a model of the final form, and for American scholars, the USA naturally provided the model. Critics were quick to point this out. The Committee (if not the entire discipline) has struggled hard to escape this cultural relativism, however, and the Princeton series in particular has evidenced this through its increasing concern for the serious methodological problem of how to conceive of and analyse a process of development which is *not* moving toward a preconceived final form. The focus now is clearly on the problem of development, and the model tentatively advanced in *Crises and Sequences* is cast at the level of the phenomena being examined.

It is illustrative to note in passing that Easton's *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*<sup>9</sup> did not recreate the enthusiasm elicited by his *The Political System*.<sup>10</sup> The insight or parts moving within a fixed framework had already been absorbed and exploited by the discipline when *A Systems Analysis* belatedly appeared. The painstaking

ing conceptual elaboration of the original view in *A Systems Analysis* rendered it a useful handbook or check-list for examining the operation of systems which do provide relatively fixed frameworks within which the day-to-day business of politics is carried on, but even while Easton was turning out this consolidation of an earlier position, his research in political socialization was based on assumptions which countered those of *A Systems Analysis*. The process of socialization and the patterns of potential behavior they support have to do less, with a given institution's operation than with whether it will exist at all, or with which institutions are likely to arise and survive. Thus an assumption necessary to underwrite research in political socialization (and political culture) is that institutions change in a discoverable manner.

Attempts were made to modify the initial static models and thus permit the strict analysis of system change. The term "system maintenance" for instance, came into general use regarding changes or potential changes in the framework, but the assumption of a fixed framework really remained central whenever the early models were applied. The very term "system maintenance" focuses attention on the framework — moving-parts dichotomy, the essentially single level of movement.

Against this backdrop, however, the Committee has continued to pursue the course apparent in the substantive chapters of the Almond and Coleman volume. Their concern for formal conceptualization, while genuine, has not been permitted to inhibit their pursuit of knowledge. As any engineer knows, formal conceptualization can carry you far toward your goal, but almost never all the way. Without it, you could not approach the task at all, but clinging

to it is just as sure to prevent success as is its neglect.

In this most recent volume of the Princeton series, a sense of balance between the extremes of formalistic theory and intuitive empiricism is more evident than it has been in any which preceded it. The rather amusing discontinuity between formal and actual approaches apparent in *The Politics of the Developing Areas* is much less in evidence now (though still a factor in at least two of the chapters) and The Committee stands entirely aside from the vastly overdrawn dichotomy between intuitive and formal approaches which characterized the lengthy aftermath of the behavioral revolution.

This restraint has been apparent in the tentativeness with which conceptual positions are advanced throughout the series, and perhaps most notably in this volume. There is a mood of caution about becoming prematurely committed to what might much later prove to have been the wrong approach. On the other hand, the most basic positions are quite clear and are consistently held throughout the series and the volume. The continuing faith in formal method itself is obviously unshaken, as is reverence for the anthropological and German-sociological basis of Almond's structural-functionalism. What we see in *Crises and Sequences* is another step, albeit a cautious one, in a direction set out some time ago toward a formal systemic or 'functional' view of politics.

### *Crisis as a mode of Development*

The Committee has chosen crisis for examination in the latest attempt to characterize the development process, but true to the spirit of the series, they avoid advancing a single fixed and elaborate definition of

the term, preferring to let each commentator set out from a common, broad understanding and refine the conception as his progress dictated.

The concept is an exciting one for the purpose, both because it may provide a vivid indication of system change and because it constitutes an intuitively satisfying point of view; one can even make a case that crisis is the only mode of change, although the argument is easily reduced to triviality. Obviously, any change in individual behavior constitutes novelty, and any novelty follows upon the exhaustion of previous means of coping with a given range of situations. The transition from habitual to novel means is embraced by the term crisis. In this sense, all changes of the sort being considered must be constituted of crises in individual behavior patterns. The notion is pleasing but most of The Committee's work will go forward at the macro-level and the crises examined in this volume are for the most part those of institutions, not individuals. They are focused on the exhaustion of conventional patterns of political action under the impact of new demands made by people who have already undergone changes in their own patterns of belief and behavior.

The authors break down the study of crises along lines which generally follow the past patterns of their work. In an introductory chapter Binder presents a paradigm of the modernization syndrome and the crises of political development, in the form of a matrix. There are five kinds of crises considered: those of identity, legitimacy, participation, distribution and penetration. Of these, the notions of penetration and distribution probably go back the farthest in the Committee's history, the notion of participation has emerged from among the unstated assumptions of Almond's earlier

work through the kind of concerns evident in *The Civil Culture*,<sup>11</sup> and the five-nation comparative study on which it was based.

Both the concern of the five-nation study and Pye's social-psychological orientation appear to have drawn the Committee into the circo-macro problem. In this volume Pye deals with identity and legitimacy, the former in particular being a long-time concern of his, while the latter notion goes all the way back to the Weberian roots.

On another axis of the matrix are the qualities which the committee takes to be characteristic of developed societies, "equality", "capacity" and "differentiation". The substantive chapters are devoted to consideration of the cells in the matrix generated by the impact of each crisis in each of these three areas.

However much one respects the Committee's concern to avoid the American cultural relativism of an earlier time, one has to pause for a moment with these three notions which so clearly describe American developmental aspirations. But it is hardly accurate today to see this as an uniquely American or Western aspiration. Development, as elaborated through these three terms, is the aspiration of almost all the areas emerging onto the world scene. If the Committee is guilty of cultural relativism, it is to a cultural trend which is likely to dominate, for better or worse, in every crisis of political change to be encountered in the balance of this century.

Returning to analytic concerns, the developmental matrix seems to meet the general canons of method, at least at first glance, but to go beyond a first glance would be quite an undertaking. Bringing clarity to the model would necessitate extensive unpacking and the introduction of

numerous assumptions. One can't help but be uneasy however, when, for instance, the top row of the matrix places side by side "politicization of identity" and "productive and administrative integration" One is social-psychological and by implication a concern of micro-analysis. The other is institutional-behavioral and a matter of macro-analysis. The difficulties of operationalization and the potential for conceptual error in such a matrix are obvious.

While the retreat from extreme concern with explicitness and rigor is reassuring, it is hard to escape the feeling that the Committee has now moved beyond the point of balance in the other direction. Its gestures also seem a bit staid as though, aware of its status in the discipline, it is dramatizing its position so as to provide unmistakables for those who are expected to follow it. The deliberate moderation in conceptual and technical rigor and the re-emphasis on intuition and regard for substance seems almost as pious as the earlier, extreme concern over rigor. The question arises as to whether flexible application of a sloppy model is preferable to flexible application of a more closely reasoned one. Surely, the more clarity there is in the model, the more readily it can be tested against the investigator's insights and, most important here, the more surely it can be grasped so as to be modified for particular views or cases. Unfortunately, the crudity of this model appears to have elicited crudity in its application, and the effect is not unlike that of the methodological failure in *The Politics of the Developing Areas*.

Lapolombara uses the terms 'penetration and 'distribution' so loosely as to encompass everything relating to administration on the one hand and the economic system on the other. Both his chapters abound in

insight but he makes no significant attempt to further differentiate phenomena under these two extremely generous headings, such that the formal model adds almost nothing beyond a certain tenuous orientation toward very broad aspects of national life. An air of conceptual disorder pervades both chapters.

Pye's chapters on the cultural bases make much more explicit and successful use of the concepts employed. He refines the notion and uses them to bring greater order to the information than does Lapolombara.

Weiner's chapter on participation and Coleman's on the entire syndrom fall somewhere between the others in terms of successful application of the model, but both are also rich in insight and information.

The introductory and concluding chapters warrant special attention because they set the conceptual pace and this is primarily a conceptual volume. The contrast in style is most striking. Binder's introduction is in a word, heavy, while Verba's concluding chapter is clear, simple and to the point. This may be due partly to the volume's nature. The other books in the series have had a conceptual introductory chapter and a series of more or less substantive contributions. In this case, all of the specific topics are themselves largely conceptual introductions to aspects of the approach and Binder's own introduction thus becomes something of a philosophical prolegomenon. Adding this to his rather difficult style, the range and depth he essays and his penchant for somewhat strained allusions makes it rather taxing to read. It is also hard to escape an impression of ostentatiousness in this chapter particularly.

In contrast, the real worth of the volume and the thought behind it becomes most apparent in reading Verba's essay on the problems and prospects of the approach (significantly perhaps, this straightforward paper was originally an internal document). It is in this concluding chapter that the advance in the state of the art become most apparent. More than anywhere else in the series, the reader is struck by the extent to which the scope of the Committee's thought has expanded since the work began. Not only have they succeeded in *formally* freeing themselves from the framework-moving-parts dichotomy and much of the cultural relativism with which it was associated, but they are working out the peculiarities of each level of motion within a system. The entirety is seen as permeable by outside forces, and in such a way that the times and points of impact, as well as the kinds and magnitudes are seen as variables. What could be the most important consideration of all

is that the sequence in which forces impinge is recognised to effect the subsequent form of the system. A crisis of identity preceding one of penetration will leave a different system form than will the opposite sequence, because in either case, the second crisis must strike a system already modified by the first and hence must have a different effect than it would otherwise have had.

The authors are not entirely successful in applying the view, but the Committee appears to be in the middle stages of some very exciting conceptual developments and one can hardly expect a finished product. What makes this book a particularly important one within the series is that it consolidates the key thoughts evident in earlier volumes, and in so doing, lays the groundwork for a potentially most fruitful view of the entire developmental process. Hopefully, subsequent volumes will fulfill the promise of this one.

## NOTES

1 Leonard Binder, James S. Coleman, Joseph LaPolombara, Lucian W. Pye, Sidney Verba, Myron Weiner, *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).

2 The Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Sciences Research Council.

3 Lucian W. Pye, *Communications and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

4 Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960).

5 Marion J. Levy, J, and Fransesca M. Cancian, "Functional Analysis" in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, David Sils, ed., (New York: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 21-9, make this point very well and also point out that attempts to understand political systems have traditionally been 'functional', although not self-con-

sciously explicit, like those which have emerged with the behavioral revolution

6 See for example Angus Campbell, Gurin, Miller and Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964).

7 David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1962)

8 See for instance John C. Wahlke, William Buchanan, Heinz Eulau and Le Roy C. Ferguson, "American State Legislators' Role Orientations Toward Pressure Groups," *The Journal of Politics*, V 22 (1960), pp. 203-27.

9 David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965)

10 David Easton, *The Political System* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953).

11 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).



# Reviews

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Elias Sam'o *The June 1967 Arab-Israeli War; Miscalculation or Conspiracy?* Medina University Press International, Wilmette, Illinois 60091, 1971.

Elias Sam'o, in putting together this selection of viewpoints on the 1967 war, has attempted to provide a mini-archive at the same time as a broad coverage of the various interpretations that have been offered as to the origins, conduct and results of the conflict. Hence we find Kosygin and U Thant in company with lesser names such as Simcha Flapan and Charles Burton Marshall. In one important sense Professor Sam'o has failed, for the full range of opinions inside Israel, the socialist countries, the USA and the Arab world is not presented, even though the articles are well chosen.

Many representative Israeli views are only presented in truncated form in Professor Sam'o's second article, whereas it would have been useful, at least for this reviewer, to have seen short statements from MAKI, MAPAI and GAHAL included. Similarly, Beirut's Arabic language press could have provided a more representative gamut of Arab viewpoints than Hisham Sharabi's article, sound though it is. Conceivably, such a system of shorter extracts might have given us a more encyclopaedic coverage, but it was clearly Professor Sam'o's intention to permit each of his protagonists their full argument.

The value of the book, therefore, must lie in the strength of each of its components, and here there is some ground for criticism. While some selections, such as

Kosygin's UN speech, are valuable source documents, others are not. The choice of Charles Burton Marshall, for example, as the spokesman for the pro-Israeli Western viewpoint is clearly unfortunate.

Nor is the collection without its own leanings. The anti-Soviet left peeps through, as in the choice of Isaac Deutscher's interview with the *New Left Review*, Simcha Flapan's reply, the unauthenticated *Nouvel Observateur* article "attributed to a high Soviet *fonctionnaire*", and Elias Sam'o's own leading article. Together, these four sources account for over one third of the text.

A chronology of the events leading up to the conflict, and a map, would have helped non-specialist readers to evaluate the opposing viewpoints rather more easily. For example, we have nothing concrete against which to evaluate Simcha Flapan's assertion that there was no Israeli troop build-up against Syria in early May.

The book, therefore, has value largely as a convenient source of reference for articles by Sharabi, Charles Yost, Isaac Deutscher and the editor himself. Two official statements, by Kosygin and U Thant, give it added value, as does the excellent post-1967 bibliography. A total of 180 pages, however, proved too parsimonious an allowance to permit Professor Sam'o to satisfactorily achieve his second stated objective, i.e. "to bring into focus the views and roles of



the parties directly involved in the conflict — the Arabs and the Israelis — as well as those of the parties indirectly involved — the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Nations.” His third objective, to raise “the possibility of a tripartite collusion between the United States, the Soviet

Union, and the United Nations”, i.e. to discredit the Soviet Union as well as the United Nations in Arab eyes, is prosecuted with energy but is far from convincing.

D. R. W. JONES

University of Calgary

S. Clement Leslie, *The Rift in Israel: Religious Authority and Secular Democracy*, Schocken 1971  
185 p. \$7.50

The title of this book is particularly unfortunate and misleading. One is led to expect a serious sociological analysis. Its English (Routledge and Kegan Paul) as well as its American (Schocken) publishers are usually associated with scholarly work in the social sciences. The level of “scholarship” in this book is only slightly superior to the nonsense one associates with the fundamentalist tracts of “New Testament Jews” like the ilk of Billy Graham. What a commentary on the book publishers of Britain and America that this pro-Israeli drivel can be published while more serious, but less pro-Zionist, books experience difficulties.

The very week that this reviewer heard a devastating analysis of Israeli justice by the Israeli chairman of the Israeli League

for Human Rights, he reads in Leslie’s quasi-journalistic account that Israel is “the most advanced of social democracies”.

Such crucial issues as “who is a Jew”, the status of reform Judaism in Israel, the separation of temple and state, the status of the second class Israeli Arabs, and the integration of Israel into the Middle East region are all treated in an incredibly superficial manner. All these topics still await serious scholarly consideration.

This book is virtually worthless. Arab Christians (particularly Catholics and Protestants) might finally begin to have doubts about the loyalty and intelligence of their brethren in the West.

George H. Weightman





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
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# MIDDLE EAST FORUM



# MIDDLE EAST FORUM

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## Editor's Note

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**T**he importance of the Middle East in world affairs derives from two factors: its location as a bridge connecting Africa, Asia, and Europe, and its great oil resources. So strategic is the location of the Middle East that the area has been contended over by every conqueror moving from one to another of its three neighboring continents. Today the area serves as a vital node of air and sea traffic for the ever increasing volume of communications and trade intertwining the three continents. The production of oil, however, overshadows the Middle East's geographical position. Oil from the Middle East provides power for much of Europe and Asia.

The Middle East's strategic position and great wealth in a commodity vital to industrial nations has made the area an arena of contention between the great powers. This issue of the *Middle East Forum* examines some aspects of the role of the Middle East in international affairs. The first two articles examine Soviet-Middle Eastern relations. "The Historical Origins of Russian Involvement in the Middle East," by Ahmad H. Joudah, places contemporary Soviet interest in historical perspective. During the second half of the 18th century, Syria and Egypt witnessed two violent movements in defiance of the Ottoman Sultan. These movements coincided with the Russo-Turkish War (1768-1774). To defeat the Sultan, Empress Catherine II exploited the turbulent situation in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire by concluding an alliance with both Shaykh Zahir al-'Umar of Acre and 'Ali Bey of Egypt. Both parties had benefited from the alliance; yet, to Russia, this was only a wartime expediency. After the conclusion of the war, Empress Catherine deserted her allies who were then annihilated by the Ottoman Sultan. Russia had no fixed, far-reaching policy towards the Arab provinces, but nevertheless, was interested in what was happening there. This episode signals the initial attempt of engaging the Middle East in world power-politics.

In the wake of the 1967 war, the degree of Russian involvement in Egypt reached a level unprecedented in the history of Arab-Soviet relations. It has been fashionable in the West to ascribe this turn of events primarily to Moscow's expansionist tendencies, but two American observers of Middle East-Soviet relations suggest that one of the overriding considerations has been Soviet determination to neutralize the impressive striking power of the U.S. in the Eastern Mediterranean. In "Soviet Policy in Egypt: An Assessment," Oles and Bettie Smolansky note that at first glance, the advantages which the USSR has secured in Egypt appear impressive indeed. What is often overlooked, however, is that in the process of entrenching itself in the UAR the Kremlin has drastically curtailed its room for maneuver and moreover that, in



the case of a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute, many of its apparent gains will probably evaporate.

The next article shifts the reader's attention from Soviet to American policy in the Middle East. Richard Pfaff, in "The American Military Presence in the Middle East," identifies three major American interests in the area: checking Soviet influence in the region; securing and promoting Western oil interests; and securing and promoting the well-being of the State of Israel. After concluding that only in regard to Israel have declared American interests been gained, the author examines some basic logistical, political and psychological factors that affect the American military capability in the Middle East and suggests what might be a relationship between that capability as it exists today and the proposed policy of surrogation that has been made necessary by virtue of regional developments and domestic American politics.

In his article, "The Arab States and China's U.N. Representation," Elias Sam'o examines the Arab states' voting behavior on the question of China's representation during the twenty-two year period the question was raised in the General Assembly. He delineates three stages the Arab states went through and determines the various levels of their cohesion and degrees of their participation. He analyzes the underlying causes for the changes in the Arab states' positions on this question, with particular emphasis on their conception of the United Nations, the nature of their relations with the great powers, and their individual interests.

In the final article, "The Role of an African Defense Strategy: An Essay in Geopolitics," David R.W. Jones argues, contrary to much geopolitical thinking which contends that Africa in general has a low strategic value, that the continent has become a major zone of contention between a wide range of outside powers. A unified defence strategy is therefore an urgent necessity. A model for a defence system is outlined, which include air-shields, strategic reserves and anti-tank installations, and is felt to be viable even in the context of severe political and economic constraints. The political prerequisites for such a low-cost defence system include concerted diplomatic pressure on offshore colonial possessions as well as counter-action to prevent a north-south split in Africa. Arab involvement is vital if these objectives are to be secured.

# Contributors

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# The Historical Origins of Russian Involvement in the Middle East

Ahmad H. Joudah

The Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire witnessed, during the 18th century, several defiant movements against the central authorities in Istanbul. Shaykh Zāhir al-'Umar, chief of a Bedouin clan called al-Zayādinah in north Palestine, led one of the most vigorous of these movements.<sup>1</sup> He successfully conquered and controlled territories extending from Sidon in the north to Gaza in the south, and from the Mediterranean in the west to the Jordan River in the east.

In 1770, at the height of his power, Zāhir allied himself with 'Ali Bey al-Kabir,<sup>2</sup> the Mamluk governor of Egypt, in defiance of the Ottoman Sultan, defeating his troops and occupying his strongest provincial capital, Damascus. Fully aware of the Russo-Turkish war (1768-1774), they

exploited the situation and sought assistance from the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean. Obviously, Empress Catherine II of Russia viewed this in most favorable terms. As a result of the destruction of the Ottoman fleet in the battle of Tchesme in July 1770, the Russian fleet was left with little to do; their engagements now were only small acts of piracy. Therefore, this new encounter would provide them lucrative opportunities

Thus for the first time the Arab East became internationally involved in what is better known as 'the Eastern Question.' Shaykh Zāhir al-'Umar was the first modern Arab ruler to insert a new dimension into the political arena of Greater Syria — namely foreign intervention. Three dates are worth mentioning: 1771 when Zāhir

and 'Ali Bey conquered Damascus, 1772 when a Russian squadron bombarded Jaffa, Sidon and Beirut, and 1773 when Russian marines occupied Beirut for five months. Syria became the major target of European intervention in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire. Hence the Russian occupation of Beirut from October 1773 to February 1774, established the precedent for continued European intervention in the affairs of the Middle East up to the present time.

The founding Sultans of the Ottoman Empire formed their fundamental policies in their Arab provinces according to the following principles: acceptance of the Sultan's suzerainty, transmittance of fixed annual taxes to Istanbul, maintenance of internal order, and safe conduct of the Pilgrimage caravan to the Hijāz.<sup>3</sup> The period 1740-1775 can be singled out in describing the reactions to Ottoman policies in the Arab provinces, particularly Syria, both from an indigenous viewpoint, hence the rise to power of Shaykh Zāhir, and in terms of foreign intervention especially the Mamluks and the Russians.

In regard to Zāhir's rise to power, it involved an incessant struggle against local chiefs and the Sultan's representatives in Syria, particularly, the governors of the provinces of Damascus and Sidon.<sup>4</sup> This was a struggle which began in 1730 and continued until his death in 1775. However, Zāhir's struggle against the Ottoman Pashas in Syria prompted Zāhir to seek alliance with 'Ali Bey of Egypt against the Sultan. This development in turn involved Zāhir with the Russians whose assistance was sought by 'Ali Bey during a power struggle between him and other Mamluk Beys in Egypt.

The Egyptian Mamluk intervention in Syria was motivated by historical, strategic

and economic factors. As to the historical motive, the Mamluks aspired to revive their Sultanate which was destroyed by the Ottomans in 1516-17, despite of which the Mamluks remained as the ruling class in Egypt. They penetrated the Ottoman garrisons stationed in Egypt and the administrative bureaucracy. By the 18th century they held the most influential positions of *Shaykh al-Balad* (Premier Bey or governor of Cairo) and *Amir al-Hajj* (Commander of the Egyptian Pilgrimage). Although in theory these positions were secondary to that of Pasha which was appointed by the Sultan, the Mamluk Beys deposed the Pasha whenever it was necessary. This success inspired the Mamluks to revive their Sultanate not only in Egypt but also in Syria. 'Ali Bey was the first of them to attempt that goal.<sup>5</sup> He frequently noted to his intimates that the previous kings of Egypt were Mamluks like themselves and that the Ottomans had taken it through force and conspiracy.<sup>6</sup>

From a strategic viewpoint it was indispensable for 'Ali Bey to secure the north-eastern gate of Egypt in order to protect himself against any potential Ottoman threat aimed at destroying his regime.<sup>7</sup> One might add that it had been, with one or two exceptions, a common practice of Egyptian governments to expand, whenever the opportunity lent itself, northeast into the Fertile Crescent and/or south and south-east into the Sudan, the Hijāz and the Yemen. Thus 'Ali Bey grasped this opportunity to conclude an alliance with Shaykh Zāhir who also defied the Sultan's authority and established himself in northern Palestine. Both defiants saw in 'Uthmān Pasha of Damascus a real menace to their quasi-independent movements. Besides it was in the interest of 'Ali Bey to have a buffer state such as Zāhir's that would help protect his regime in Egypt.

Economic interests promoted the Mamluk intervention in Syria. 'Ali Bey showed his interest in the British scheme to revive the Red Sea route between India and England.<sup>8</sup> He saw in this project a favorable opportunity to consolidate his economy, hence to further his expansionist policies. He must have realized that it was essential for his success to also control the land routes to India.

The Melkites in Palestine and Egypt were the moving force behind the Syro-Egyptian alliance because they had a vested interest in promoting trade between Egypt and Ottoman Syria. Both 'Ali Bey and Zāhir had influential Melkites in their courts.<sup>9</sup>

The international scene lends an understanding to the movements of 'Ali Bey and Zāhir, particularly their military operations against the Ottoman forces in Syria. In 1768 Sultan Muṣṭafā (1757-73) declared war too soon against Russia; his full force was not in readiness to make good his threats. This situation enabled Russia to strike successfully against the Sultan in both Europe and Asia. Empress Catherine II resolved to revive the designs of Peter the Great to arouse the Greeks against their Turkish Sultan. She brought back the aged Marshal Munnich from his exile in Siberia and placed him at her court. The Empress and her favorites, the Orlovs, decided to send a Russian fleet to attack the very heart of the Sultan's power while he was occupied on European and Asian fronts.<sup>10</sup> Besides aiming at the Dardanelles and Istanbul itself, the Russians also took into consideration the favorable political situation in Egypt and Syria. By the summer of 1769 a considerable number of Russian ships of the line, frigates and transports carrying troops headed towards the Mediterranean;

these ships were commanded by Admiral Spiridov. Count Alexis Orlov was the Commander-in-Chief of the expedition. The Commander-at-large was Admiral Elphinstone, assisted by several English officers. In addition there were some English ships serving as part of the Russian fleet. This English involvement in personnel and ships "must have been with the cognizance and approval of the British government, which at the time favored the aggrandizement of Russia."<sup>11</sup> Although rumors were rife at Istanbul about the arrival of the Russian fleet into the Mediterranean, the Turkish statesmen not only refused all credence to the rumors but they also would not believe that there could be any connection between the Baltic and the Mediterranean.

By February 1770 the Russian fleet was off the Morea. Their operations on land were less successful than at sea because of strong Turkish garrisons in large cities, and the fact that leadership was based in English officers who were better trained in sea warfare. On 7 July 1770, the Russian and Turkish fleets came in sight of each other near the Island of Chios. A battle ensued in which the Turks were worsted despite the bravery shown by Admiral Hasan Pasha of Algiers who fought yard-arm to yard-arm for some time with the Russian Admiral Spiridov. The remainder of the defeated Turkish fleet took refuge in the port of Tschesme which was situated in a narrow bay. The next night fire was set to a Turkish ship which spread easily to other ships in the closely packed bay. Thus the whole Turkish fleet, except one frigate, was burned and destroyed.

Thus the Russians took absolute command in the Mediterranean until the close of the Russo-Turkish war in 1774, and yet the Russian fleet did not effect much of importance. Admiral Elphinstone sug-

gested a swift attack on the Dardanelles and Istanbul, but Count Orlov declined, allowing him only to blockade the mouth of the Straits. The activities of the Russian fleet in the east of the Mediterranean demonstrated their limited ability to undertake any major operation without adequate land military force to complement its actions. However, the Russian fleet harassed the Ottoman authorities in the maritime provinces. They frequently captured Turkish and French merchant vessels, and interfered with the lines of communication between Istanbul and the maritime provinces. They also rendered limited support to 'Alī Bey of Egypt and his ally Shaykh Zāhir of Acre in their struggle against the Porte. It is this last aspect of the Russians' role in Ottoman Syria in which we are interested.

Some sources<sup>12</sup> suggest that Russia had incited 'Alī Bey to revolt against Istanbul; others<sup>13</sup> suggest that 'Alī Bey had informed Empress Catherine II of his intentions and requested military support in return for allowing their fleet to have access to the city ports of Egypt and Syria. This claim of Russian incitement of 'Alī Bey is unfounded. While the earliest recorded contact<sup>14</sup> between both parties was late 1771, it is quite possible that the Russo-Turkish War (1768-1774) encouraged 'Alī Bey to exploit the circumstances by waging a war against the Sultan to further his ambitions of independence in Egypt and expansion in the Ḥijāz and Syria. It was reported that 'Alī Bey was well aware of the Russo-Turkish war and displayed great interest in its course because of its effects on his movement.<sup>15</sup> Likewise Catherine II was aware of 'Alī Bey and Shaykh Zāhir's movements and showed her interest in their future in view of their potential threat to her enemy the Sultan. However

the Empress did not mention any kind of contacts with either one prior to December 1771.<sup>16</sup> At any rate their claim of Russian incitement could have been generated by these sources due to the later Russian fleet operations in Ottoman Syria on behalf of 'Alī Bey and Shaykh Zāhir in 1772-74.

In April 1771 an Egyptian army of 40,000 men led by Abu al-Dhahab left Cairo for Syria.<sup>17</sup> In Palestine he was joined by the troops of Zāhir and his ally Shaykh Nāsif of the Matāwilah. Thus an army of about 60,000 men marched on Damascus. The major battle took place on June 4, 1771. Although four Pashas with their armies were entrusted with the defense of Damascus, the Ottoman forces were thrown off balance and could not last in the field more than two hours. The Pashas panicked and fled Damascus each to his seat of government. The *wālī* of Damascus took refuge first at Hims then Hamah.

Two weeks after his easy victory over the Sultan's army and only ten days after his actual occupation of Damascus, Abū al-Dhahab decamped and abruptly retired to Cairo. There was no explicit pronouncement, either by Abū al-Dhahab or his master 'Alī Bey or his ally Shaykh Zāhir who was not even informed of the decision, as to the causes of the Egyptian withdrawal. Most reliable contemporary sources whether local chroniclers or foreign observers were baffled by the sudden decision and thus give no explanation except to express their astonishment and ignorance of the motives behind Abu al-Dhahab's retreat.

Probably the major motives behind the withdrawal were personal ambitions. Abū al-Dhahab was over confident by his several successes in the Ḥijāz, Upper Egypt, and Syria. Thus he aspired to his master's po-

sition. The Mamluks looked at their master as *primus inter pares*, therefore each could aspire for that position. This very principle was an inherent weakness in the Mamluk Sultanate. In addition the Sultan's agents in Damascus had successfully alienated him from his master 'Alī Bey by offering him the Sultan's pardon and the position of *Shaykh al-Balad* in Egypt. Furthermore Abū al-Dhahab found in the psychology of the Mamluk soldiers the best opportunity for his move. They became restless after being away from their homes for a long time. Of course his adversaries added that the reason for Abū al-Dhahab's retreat was treachery. He was in collision with other Mamluks who were against 'Alī Bey. They agreed to assassinate him and appoint Abū al-Dhahab in his place. They even claimed that the Sultan's representatives had bribed Abū al-Dhahab in return for his retreat.

Abū al-Dhahab quickly retreated. Along the road to Egypt, provisions, equipment, and even soldiers were scattered everywhere behind the retreating army. On 3 July 1771 he departed Gaza for Cairo. The arrival of Abū al-Dhahab at Cairo in early August precipitated a series of events. 'Alī Bey insisted that Abū al-Dhahab should return to Syria but he refused. This refusal convinced 'Alī Bey of the treachery of his general. Thus a period of "concealed hostility" developed between them during which each spared no efforts to eliminate the other.

Although 'Alī Bey was very much concerned about his conquests in Syria, his immediate and major interest was to protect his rule in Egypt itself which was challenged by his own general Abū al-Dhahab. He therefore decided to seek the military support of the Russian fleet which held

the edge over the Ottoman navy in the eastern Mediterranean.<sup>18</sup> On 2 December 1771, 'Alī Bey sent Ya'qub al-Armani to Count Alexis Orlov at the Island of Paros with a message expressing his desire to conclude an alliance with Empress Catherine II against their common enemy — the Ottomans. He offered to supply the Russian fleet with provisions, troops and money. In the absence of Orlov, his vice-commander Spiridov promised to transmit the message to his superior at Livorno. As soon as Orlov received 'Alī Bey's overture he went to Russia and discussed it with Catherine II herself who welcomed the offer. Unfortunately for 'Alī Bey the news of the favorable Russian reply reached him only in May 1772 after he had already been expelled from Egypt by his adversary Abū al-Dhahab. In April 1772 Abū al-Dhahab occupied Cairo and forced 'Alī Bey to flee to Syria where his only ally Shaykh Zāhir still maintained his paramourcy.

The flight of 'Alī Bey to Acre increased Zāhir's burden. However, Zāhir gave him a warm welcome and pledged his support to help him restore his position in Egypt. Meanwhile a storm was gathering over Shaiykh Zāhir. A great number of Ottoman troops poured into Damascus. The Druze of Lebanon threw their lot on the side of the Sultan's forces and marched to attack Zāhir's troops which had occupied their city Sidon October 1771. With the arrival of 'Alī Bey at Acre, a Russian squadron under the command of General-Adjutant Rizo appeared on the shores of Haifa. This squadron of about 15 vessels of different sizes was the Russian reply to 'Alī Bey's request in December 1771 for support against Abū al-Dhahab. The squadron had sailed to Damietta to find that 'Alī Bey was defeated and had fled to Acre. Subsequently they followed him there.



Zāhir requested that the Russian vessels sail to Beirut. His tactic of bombarding that city was to spread fear there and divert the Druze from besieging Sidon. Meanwhile Zāhir himself led an army of 7,000 men and marched to relieve his besieged forces in Sidon. As soon as the Ottoman forces and the Druze learned of Zāhir's march, they raised their siege and retreated to the plain of al-Ghāziyah, north of Sidon, awaiting Zāhir. On 11 June 1772, Zāhir arrived and defeated the Ottoman forces while those of the Druze broke and fled. Some sources blamed the Druze for the defeat; others attributed it to the disorder and disorganization of the Ottoman cavalry vis-à-vis the highly trained and organized forces of Zāhir and his allies.

The role played by the Russian ships in this battle is uncertain. The only two biographies of Zāhir mention nothing of the Russian participation, while the Lebanese chronicles Shidyāq and Shihab claim that the Russian guns forced the besieging forces to raise the siege and leave the town. Volney, the French traveler, also subscribes to the idea of the Russian involvement.<sup>19</sup> The fact that the Russian squadron arrived off Haifa in the beginning of June and reached Beirut on 18 June suggests that they left for Beirut only after the victory of Zāhir and his allies over the Ottoman forces. This cannot be, however, conclusive evidence of the Russian participation in the battle. The Russian bombardment of Beirut in itself did help to deter the Ottomans and the Druze from another attempt to conquer Sidon. In the meantime the Russian ships discouraged the Turkish vessels which were gathered off Beirut from sailing to Sidon to help the besieging Ottoman forces.

At any rate, on 18 June 1772 the Russian squadron appeared before Beirut and

bombarded the town until 23 June; at one time they besieged Beirut with heavy bombardment. This barrage helped the Russians to land on the morning of the 23rd. The marines burned 300 houses, destroyed a few towers, and sacked and pillaged the town. They looted merchandise worth 500,000 piastres and took 50,000 piastres. Faced with such a desperate situation Amīr Yūsuf Shihāb asked his uncle Amīr Mansūr, who was on good terms with Shaykh Zāhir, to appeal to the latter to order the Russians to withdraw from Beirut. In return the Lebanese ruler agreed to pay the Russians 25,000 piasters for the expenses of their operations. Zāhir accepted the appeal and thus the Russians sailed to Acre on 28 June and then to Cyprus.<sup>20</sup> French and Lebanese sources claim that the Russians withdrew only after they had realized that they were outnumbered by the Druze and expected the arrival of the Ottoman forces.<sup>21</sup> One may add that the four-month truce which was concluded between the Porte and Russia on 20 May 1772 prompted the Russian ships to sail from Beirut after they foiled the Ottoman plan to capture Sidon from their ally Zāhir. It was reported that the truce agreement took two weeks for Admiral Spiridov to deliver to the commander of the Russian squadron at Beirut.

As a consequence of Zāhir's occupation of Sidon, and the Russian bombardment and brief landing at Beirut in June 1772, Amīr Yūsuf of Mount Lebanon appealed to Damascus to help him protect Beirut against Zāhir and the Russians. Accordingly Damascus dispatched Aḥmad Bey al-Jazzār with a comparable force. Al-Jazzār fortified Beirut and eventually began to act independently from Amīr Yūsuf. He declared publicly that his only master was the Sultan. This statement aroused Yūsuf's

suspicious who complained to Damascus against al-Jazzār but to no avail. It was in the interest of Damascus to have control of Beirut because they needed it as a port since both Acre and Sidon were under Zāhir's authority. They also planned to use Beirut for their future military operations against Zāhir. This situation prompted Amīr Yūsuf to reconcile his differences with his uncle Amīr Mansūr, a friend of Zāhir. Amīr Yūsuf's intention was not only to deprive al-Jazzār of Zāhir's support, but also to count on Zāhir's help if needed.<sup>22</sup>

The French, too, played a role and by summer of 1772 French military intervention was suggested.<sup>23</sup> Their major interest in Ottoman Syria was trade, hence they always favored tranquility. The rapid change of leaders (Sidon changed hands four times between June 1771 and October 1772) was not in the interest of their trade. Thus in June 1772 the French consul in Sidon called for French government to intervene on behalf of the Sultan to recapture Sidon and Acre. The implication being that they would help the Sultan crush both Shaykh Zāhir and 'Alī Bey.

The French Minister of the Navy rejected the plan, but he did agree to send a frigate in case the French government knew that "the Porte preferred to have dissident subjects rather than submit to intervention by a strong, Christian, foreign power."<sup>24</sup> Istanbul realized that it would not be difficult to eliminate the local rebels after the settlement of the Russo-Turkish war.

Consul de Taulès' plan was the first time in modern history that a French military intervention in Syria was officially suggested. It was probably a sample for several comparable projects to flow in late 18th

century, one of which was Napoleon's expedition to Egypt and Syria.

The victory of Zāhir and 'Alī Bey in Sidon encouraged the latter to start his preparation for recapturing Egypt from Abū al-Dhahab. Thus he asked for Zāhir's support and wrote to Count Orlov requesting military help. 'Alī Bey's campaign to Egypt was faced with logistical problems. The coastal land route to Egypt was not secure. Both strongholds of Jaffa and Gaza were lost to Zāhir for the Ottomans. Accordingly 'Alī Bey and Zāhir marched against Jaffa in July 1772 and laid a siege which lasted until Jaffa surrendered on 16 February 1773. During their seven-month siege the troops, of 'Alī Bey and Zāhir captured Gaza and other minor posts on the road between. Also in September a Russian boat arrived off Jaffa carrying 'Alī Bey's messenger to Orlov, two Russian officers, and artillery and munitions. Orlov's reply contained, according to a contemporary observer, "many promises of speedy assistance but they were never fulfilled."<sup>25</sup> Orlov informed 'Alī Bey that his hands were tied by a four month truce. The two Russian officers lent 'Alī Bey three guns to bombard the garrison.<sup>26</sup>

In October 1772 the Russian ship sailed with a letter from 'Alī Bey asking more effective Russian military help. Two months later a Russian squadron, commanded by a Greek corsair, Panayotti, appeared in the waters of Acre, an action which raised the hopes and morale of Zāhir and 'Alī Bey. Shaykh Zāhir, who was then at Acre, asked Panayotti to sail to Jaffa to deliver munitions to the besieging army and Orlov's reply to 'Alī Bey. The Russian reply was not more than "compliments and assurances of friendship and assistance against the common enemy."<sup>27</sup> In addition, Panayotti landed 150 men to help 'Alī Bey at Jaffa

of whom only 50 escaped death. Shortly afterwards Panayotti retired to Acre and from there left for Paros. It was alleged that he was forced to disengage from fighting because he had no clearcut orders from Orlov to take part in the battle.

With the capitulation of Jaffa and the recapture of Gaza, the lines of communication with Egypt was safe for 'Alī Bey's campaign to regain Egypt. Shaykh Zāhir urged him to wait for the Russian forces being promised by Count Orlov who dispatched another ship in March 1773 with fresh promises of assistance to 'Alī Bey. Frustrated and losing faith in Orlov's promises, 'Alī Bey informed Zāhir that he had decided to march to Egypt on his own.<sup>28</sup>

In the first week of March 1773, 'Alī Bey marched to Egypt with a force of about 6,000 men; these troops were partly Mamluks and partly Zāhir's troops commanded by his eldest son Sulaybī and his son-in-law Karīm al-Ayyūbī. Shaykh Zāhir himself accompanied the campaign only as far as Gaza. By late April the forces arrived at al-Ṣālihiyah, the first post in the Delta on the main route from Gaza to Cairo. To their great disappointment they found that although small, the town had a garrison of about 11,000 Mamluks. They realized that Abū al-Dhahab had an overwhelming force that could defeat them once and for all. The ensuing battle lasted four hours and despite the unfavorable circumstances, Alī Bey was victorious.

Facing such a critical situation, Abū al-Dhahab decided to play politics. He assembled the grandees and the influential people of Cairo and urged them to defend their religion, property and honor against 'Alī Bey and his infidel allies — the Russians. He warned his audience, "as soon as these

Christians get possession of your country, they will take your properties, your wives, and your daughters from you; and above all will force you to change your religion."<sup>29</sup> Furthermore, Abū al-Dhahab reminded the notables of how their brethren, the Muslims of India, trusted the Christians who gradually not only became their masters but also robbed them of their wives, properties, raped their daughters and moreover spread their heathenistic Christian infidelity among them.

'Abū al-Dhahab's speech was very effective. He appealed to the religious sentiments of the people who pledged to fight against 'Alī Bey. Thus in less than a week Abū al-Dhahab recruited about 24,000 men and left Cairo to meet 'Alī Bey at al-Ṣālihiyah. A fierce battle took place in which 'Alī Bey's army was worsted and in which he himself was wounded, ultimately dying on 8 May 1773. Zāhir's son too, was killed in the battle.<sup>30</sup>

The distressing news of 'Alī Bey's crushing defeat and his death agonized Shaykh Zāhir who was still at Gaza. He immediately realized the extent and the far-reaching repercussions of this event. An eyewitness reported that as Zāhir heard the news he cried out, "from this day I am done."<sup>31</sup> His speculation came true.<sup>32</sup>

Having recovered from this grave shock, Zāhir reorganized his troops, stationed a garrison in Gaza and left for Jaffa. He also garrisoned and reinforced all the towns on the route to his capital Acre. The death of 'Alī Bey and the loss of Egypt to Abū al-Dhahab left Zāhir encircled with new enemies. In late June 1773, the long-awaited Russian assistance to support 'Alī Bey finally arrived at Acre. The Russian squadron was commanded by Kozhuchov

and was made up of 16 different vessels with 222 cannons and 1200 Albanian mercenaries equipped with artillery. Finding that 'Alī Bey was dead, the commander decided to return to his base in the Aegean Sea, but Shaykh Zāhir persuaded him to change his plans. Zāhir argued that his alliance with 'Alī Bey entitled him to receive their support. He requested that the squadron sail to Beirut to help his land forces which marched to help Amīr Yūsuf deliver Beirut from al-Jazzār. Zāhir promised the Russian squadron that Amīr Yūsuf would pay them in return the sum of 600 purses (300,000 piastres).<sup>33</sup>

Although the Russian ships appeared in the waters of Beirut on 6 July 1773, the actual military operations began only on 2 August. The delay was due to the negotiations concerning special arrangements for the payment of the agreed sum. The Druze besieged Beirut from the land, while the Russians shelled the city incessantly. It was reported that they fired 6,000 shells without pause, something so formidable that "the people thought that the Day of Judgement had come and the mountains were leveled."<sup>34</sup> Arabic and French contemporary sources state that the bombardment was heard as far as Damascus and Sidon. Despite the Russian heavy barrage, al-Jazzār showed strong resistance and refused to surrender. Consequently the Russian commander landed some batteries to be stationed on the eastern side of Beirut and resumed his continuous shelling from land and sea. Beirut was now completely cut off and faced starvation. After four months of such conditions al-Jazzār agreed to surrender but only to Shaykh Zāhir because he feared cruel treatment by Amīr Yūsuf and the Russians. Al-Jazzār and his troops obtained a guarantee of safety (amān) and marched with Shaykh Zāhir's

envoy to Acre.<sup>35</sup>

The Russians occupied Beirut on 13 October 1773 and remained in it until February 1774 when they received their full payment from Amīr Yūsuf. The Russian flag was over Beirut and the portrait of their Empress Catherine II was displayed over the main gate of the city for about five months.<sup>36</sup>

In the summer of the same year, July 1774, the Russo-Turkish war came to an end and the treaty of *Kuchuk Kaynarja* was signed. Thus the disengagement of the Sultan from war freed him to deal with his internal problems of which Zāhir was the most urgent one. On the other hand, Russia was now no longer interested in supporting Zāhir against the Porte. The major purpose of their alliance with 'Alī Bey and Shaykh Zāhir was achieved: namely to win the war. Thus, the Russians breached that alliance unilaterally and watched the annihilation of their former allies. Although Istanbul came out of the war weaker than before, the Sultan was able to eliminate the "rebels" one after another. After the liquidation of 'Alī Bey in May 1773, the Sultan played Abū al-Dhahab against Zāhir. The Porte urged Abū al-Dhahab to destroy Zāhir. He led a campaign against Acre in May 1775 in which he died of illness after he had occupied Acre and forced Zāhir to flee. Thus Istanbul restored its control of Egypt and sent the Ottoman fleet led by Qabūdān Ḥasan Pasha in August 1775 against Zāhir. They successfully occupied Acre, killed Zāhir and brought to an end Zāhir's autonomous state in northern Palestine and southern Lebanon.

Again in the 1780's Russia made an attempt to align herself with the Mamluk Beys in Egypt against the Sultan; these tac-

tics reiterated her involvement of 1771-1774 with Zāhir and 'Alī Bey. On the eve of the Russo-Turkish war (1788-92), Empress Catherine II established a Russian consulate at Alexandria with the purpose of inciting the Mamluk Beys against the Porte, encouraging them to seek independence and establishing strong ties with Russia. The Russian consul was somewhat successful in his mission. He gained the confidence of the duumvirs Ibrāhīm Bey and Murād Bey, who ruled Egypt until they were thrown out by Napoleon Bonaparte in 1798. However, the activities of the Russian consul in Egypt came to an end in 1787, when Ismā'il Bey, an opponent to the duumvirs, was appointed by the Porte as *Shaykh al-Balad*. He imprisoned the Russian consul and later had him killed at the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war of 1788-1792.<sup>37</sup> This was the last Russian involvement in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire until the middle of the 19th century.

It should be borne in mind that Russian military operations on the Syrian coast did not reflect any planned policy by the high central authorities. In all incidents only small squadrons took part. Their original mission was to help 'Alī Bey to recapture Egypt. After the death of 'Alī Bey, Zāhir made use of their services in helping the Shihābis deliver Beirut from al-Jazzār; the Russian marines' reward was booty and cash payments.

We safely can conclude that the alliance of Russia with 'Alī Bey and Zāhir was a temporary expediency with no plans for far-reaching goals. The Russian stake was in the European provinces of the Sultan rather than in the Arab provinces. Needless to say their mutual interests with 'Alī Bey and Zāhir were transitory. This alliance can be viewed as an expediency neces-

sitated by the Russo-Turkish war of 1768-1774. Empress Catherine II intended to foment troubles for the Sultan in his Asiatic provinces, hence she found in 'Alī Bey and Shaykh Zāhir her golden opportunity.

Russia had no fixed policy toward the Arab countries of the Ottoman Empire; her basic interest was in the Straits and the Ottoman provinces in Europe. This interest overshadowed all other interests<sup>38</sup> in that area and became a means to achieve Russia's first and foremost goal of defeating the Sultan and controlling the Straits which in turn would give them easy access to the Mediterranean, the "warm waters".

The significance of the alliance of Russia with Zāhir and 'Alī Bey was not as important in its military consequences as in its political repercussions. Those implications included the following ideas: First, Russia, a foreign power sided with local "rebels" against the Ottoman Sultan and used them to further her own ends, thus defeating the Sultan; Second, local Muslim rulers were engaged in an alliance with an infidel power against their Muslim Sultan; Third, an international rivalry developed — France was the first power to react to growing Russian interests in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire (this might have influenced Napoleon's campaign of 1798 into Egypt and Syria); Fourth, the Russian episode also helped to unearth the importance of Egypt and its place in European politics; hence Egypt became a primary target for European imperialism; Fifth, after this time, the internal affairs of Syria were not only the responsibility of local potentates and/or the Sublime Porte, but also of great concern to certain European powers. Thus Syria, too, became part of European spheres of influence in the Near East.

## NOTES

(1) For further details see A.H. Joudah, *A History of the Movement of Shaykh Zahir al-'Uma al-Zaydani (1690-1775)* (Unpublished dissertation, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1971).

(2) He also defied the Sultan's authority over Egypt and struggled to revive the Mamluk Sultanate. For more information consult John Livingston, *'Ali Bey al-Kabir and the Mamluk Resurgence in Ottoman Egypt, 1760-1772* (Unpublished dissertation, Princeton University, 1968); S. Lusignan, *A History of the Revolt of Ali Bey against the Ottoman Porte*. (London, James Phillips, 1783); P.M. Holt, "The 'Cloud Catcher' 'Ali Bey the Great of Egypt" *History Today*, IX (1959), 48-58.

(3) P.M. Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent 1516-1922* (Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1966), 42.

(4) The most prominent governors of Damascus and Sidon who attempted to suppress Zahir were Sulaymān Pasha al-'Azm and 'Uthmān Pasha al-Kurji. In addition to the author's dissertation, for further details see A. Rafeq, *The Province of Damascus, 1723-1783* (Beirut, Khayats, 1966); S. Sharmir, *The 'Azm Walis of Syria, 1724-1785* (Unpublished dissertation, Princeton University, 1960).

(5) A. al-Jabartī, *'Ajā'ib al-Āthar fī al-Tarājim wa-al-Akhhār* (Cairo, al-Matba'ah al-'Āmirah, 1904) I, 254-262, 307-311, 384; A. al-Sabbāgh, *al-Rawḍ al-Zābir fī Tārikh Zābir* (Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Ms. Ar. 4610) f. 15b; H. Shihāb, *Lubān fī 'Abd al-Umarā' al-Shihābiyyīn*, ed. by A. Rustum and F. al-Bustani (Beirut, The Catholic Press, 1933) I, 82.

(6) al-Jabartī, I, 384.

(7) It is very important to note that most of the campaigns launched against Egypt attacked that country from the northeast passage. Napoleon's campaign was one of the few exceptions.

(8) Livingston, *'Ali Bey al-Kabir*, 96-107.

(9) Zahir's main counsellor, Ibrahim al-Ṣabbāgh, was a Melkite. Likewise Mikha'il al-Jamal, another Melkite, served as the principal scribe at 'Ali-Bey's court. For further details on

the Melkites in Egypt see B. Qarali, *al-Sūriyūn fī Misr* (Cairo, 1928-33), 83-89, 105-110; Q. al-Bāshā *Tārikh Tā'ifat al-Rūm al-Kāthūlik fī Misr* (Ḥarīṣa, St. Paul Press, 1930), 14-20.

(10) On the Russo-Turkish war of 1774 see R.C. Anderson, *Naval Wars in the Levant, 1559-1853* (Liverpool, 1952), 292-307; M.S. Anderson, "Great Britain and the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774" *The English Historical Review*, LXIX (1954), 39-58; E.S. Creasy, *History of the Ottoman Turks*, New York, 1877), 380-414.

(11) Lord Eversly, *The Turkish Empire: Its Growth and Decay* (London, Unwin, 1918) 214

(12) Jawdat Pasha, *Tārikh Jawdat*, tr. by A. al-Danā (Beirut, 1890) 391; Y. al-Dibs, *Tārikh Sūriyah* (Beirut, 1893-1905), II, 223.

(13) H. al-Munayyir, *al-Durr al-Marjūf fī Tārikh al-Shuf*, ed. by I. Sarkis, *al-Mashriq*, vols. 48-51 (1954057), XLIX (1955), 259; Shihāb, *Lubnān*, I, 79.

(14) Livingston, *'Ali Bey*, 176 gives the date as November 1771, while L. Auriant, "Catherine II et l'Orient 1770-1774" *L'Acropole*, V (1930), 209 gives 2 December 1771 as the date of the first contact.

(15) J. Bruce, *Travels to discover the sources of the Nile in the years 1768-1773* (Edinburgh, 1790), I, 28-30.

(16) Auriant, 207-209.

(17) Our primary sources for the occupation of Damascus are Ibn al-Siddiq's chronicle, *Gharā'ib al-Bada'i' wa 'Ajā'ib al-Waqā'i'* Ms. Berlin, 9832, We (II) 417; S. al-Mahāsini, *Hulūl ata'ab-wa-al-ālām bi-wusūl Abi al-Dhabab ilā Dimashq al-Shām*. Ms. Princeton University, Yehuda Collection, 3760; British and French Consular reports dispatched from Sidon, Tripoli and Aleppo; and the prominent Egyptian Chronicle of al-Jabartī, *'Ajā'ib al-Āthar*.

(18) Most of the forthcoming material on the Russian activities is, primarily, based on local histories, British and French Archives, and secondary sources of which the most important are: L. Auriant, "Catherine II et l'Orient 1770-1774" *L'Acropole*, V (1930) 188-220; Lusignan,

*The Revolt of Alı Bey*; Wm. Persen "The Russian Occupations of Beirut, 1772-1774" *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, LXII (1955), 275-186. It is very interesting to note that the major Egyptian history of this period by al-Jabartı makes no mention of the Russian intervention in Syria or their alliance with 'Alı Bey of Egypt.

(19) *Akbbār al-A'yan*, II, 44-45; *Lubnan*, I, 93; C. Volney, *Voyage en Egypte et en Syrie, 1783-85* (Paris, 1823), II, 243.

(20) al-Bustāni, *Dā'irat, al-Ma'ārif*, XI, 406; Anderson, *Naval Wars*, p. 298; Auriant, p. 215.

(21) *Affaires Etrangères*, B<sup>1</sup>, 92, Aleppo, 10 July 1772; Shihab, *Lubnan*, I, 94; al-Shidyaq, II, 45-6.

(22) A. al-Ṣabbāgh, ff. 23a, 25a-25b; Shihab, *Lubnan*, I, 97, 98, 103-104; Shihab, *Tarikh al-Jazzār*, 59-60; al-Munayyir, 266-67, 271; *Affaires Etrangères*, B<sup>1</sup>, 1036, Sidon, 22 April 1773.

(23) F. Charles-Roux, *Les Echelles de Syrie et de Palestine au XVIIIe Siècle* (Paris, Librairie Orientaliste, 1928), 101-103; *Affaires Etrangères*, B<sup>1</sup>, 1035, Sidon, 28 June 1772.

(24) Charles-Roux, *Les Echelles*, 102-103.

(25) Lusignan, 130-131.

(26) *Ibid.*; Persen, p. 281.

(27) Lusignan, 135; Charles-Roux, 104; Auriant, 218.

(28) Shihab, *Lubnan*, I, 108-109; A. al-Sabbagh, ff. 23b-24b; M. al-Sabbagh, ff. 32b-33a.

(29) Lusignan, p. 146.

(30) *Ibid.*, 146-49; A. al-Sabbāgh, ff. 24b-25a; M. Ramaḍān, *'Alı Bey al-Kabır* (Cairo, 1950), 194-97.

(31) *Lusignan*, p. 151.

(32) In March 1775 Abū al-Dhabab led a punitive expedition against Zāhir and occupied his capital Acre and destroyed most of Zāhir's fortresses and defenses. Although this expedition failed to destroy Zāhir, it weakened his power and paved the way for the Sultan's *coup de grâce* in August 1775.

(33) A. al-Ṣabbāgh, ff. 26a-27b; Persen, 280-81; Shihāb, *Lubnān*, I, 98; Shihāb, *Tarikh al-Jazzār*, 53; al-Shidyaq, *Akbbār al-A'yan*, II, 48-50.

(34) Shihāb, *Lubnān*, I, 98.

(35) *Ibid.*, 98-99; al-Shidyaq, II, 49; al-Munayyir, 271-7; Shihāb, *Tarikh al-Jazzār*, 53; A. al-Ṣabbāgh, f. 27a, Charles-Roux, 212.

(36) Charles-Roux, p. 106.

(37) Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent*, 99-101; Persen, 284-85; P. Masson, *Histoire du Commerce Français dans le Levant au XVIIIe Siècle* (Paris, 1911) 311; Ramaḍān, *'Alı Bey al-Kabır*, 234. H. Déhérain, *L'Egypte Turque* (V. 5 in Hanotaux, *Histoire de la Nation Egyptienne* (Paris, 1931), pp. 194-97.

(38) In 1772 and 1773 the failure of the Russian fleet to provide adequate assistance to Alı Bey in time, resulted in his death and the loss of Egypt. Likewise Russia signed the Treaty of Kuchuk Kaynarja without considering the interests of Zāhir, thus enabling Istanbul to exterminate him and hence Russia lost her second chance of having a foothold in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire.



# SOVIET POLICY IN EGYPT: AN ASSESSMENT

Oles and Bettie Smolansky

In the wake of the 1967 war, when the USSR was forced to choose between cutting its losses and continuing the policy of support of the United Arab Republic, the Brezhnev-Kosygin "collective leadership" opted for the second alternative. The decision meant, at the very least, that Cairo's military potential would have to be restored to the pre-June, 1967 level. In addition, the Soviet commitment implied that the Kremlin would maintain an active interest in the continuation of the Nasir regime and thus had taken it upon itself to prop up its client against both external (i.e. Israeli) and domestic pressures.

## I

As the Soviet military equipment began flowing into Egypt, it soon became apparent that Cairo was being supplied with surface-to-air missiles, better known as SAM-2's, designed to intercept high altitude air-

craft. This weapon, which had proved itself in the downing of Gary Powers' ill-fated U-2 plane over the USSR and had been used with some effectiveness in North Vietnam, had not heretofore been deployed outside the Soviet-bloc countries. By 1970, however, SAM-2's had by and large outlived their usefulness. Flying at low altitudes, the Israeli bombers intensified their attacks on Egyptian troop concentrations and artillery positions along the Suez Canal while also staging deep penetration raids of the Egyptian heartland. In its decision to initiate and sustain the air attacks, the Israeli government appears to have been motivated by both military and political considerations. The air raids along the Suez Canal were bound to keep the Egyptian armed forces off balance. The deep penetration attacks were, however, specifically designed to expose President Nasir's weakness in order either to force him to accept the Israeli terms for negotiating a peace settlement or



to have him removed from power in the hope that his successor might be more amenable to negotiations.

Since neither of these alternatives was acceptable to Nasir and since he fully realized that his political survival depended on Egypt's ability to curtail the Israeli air-raids, his only hope lay in persuading the Russians to bail him out of his predicament. As it turned out, the USSR, though apparently with some reluctance, agreed on condition that it be put in charge of Egypt's air defenses. Given the circumstances, the UAR President had no choice but to accept.

The deal, consummated probably during Nasir's secret visit to Moscow in late January, 1970, set the stage for a large additional influx of Soviet men and material into Egypt. This new phase of Russian involvement (1970-71), was marked by the deployment of SAM-3's—low altitude anti-aircraft missiles—around Cairo and Alexandria, and in the Nile Delta area. In August, 1970, after the first three-months cease-fire agreement between Israel and Egypt went into effect, SAM-3 batteries were moved into the Canal Zone in violation of a verbal understanding reached between Secretary of State William Rogers and the two belligerents. The move into the Canal Zone was entirely predictable in the sense that the absence of Soviet anti-aircraft missiles from the combat area would have left the Israelis free to resume air strikes against the Egyptian positions at any time they so desired. There can be no doubt that it has been the deployment of SAM-3's and the appearance of Soviet pilots in planes patrolling the western bank of the Suez Canal rather than any political development which has forced the Israelis to discontinue their deep penetration raids against Egypt. In accomplishing this aim, the USSR effected a marked

stabilization of a heretofore fluid and, from Cairo's standpoint, critical situation along the Egyptian-Israeli front.

As mentioned above, Nasir's decision to seek the installation of SAM-3 missiles, a sophisticated weapons system with which the Egyptians were unfamiliar, necessitated an influx of large numbers of additional Soviet military personnel. It would also appear that the Russians requested and obtained Cairo's permission to station in Egypt several Soviet fighter squadrons and a substantial number of maintenance, repair and security personnel. In the process, what amounts, in effect, to Soviet air bases, manned and protected exclusively by members of the Soviet armed forces, were set up in Egypt in 1970-71. For Presidents Nasir and Sadat this signified a *de facto* abandonment of the doctrine of "positive neutralism" which, for over ten years, had served as the cornerstone of Cairo's foreign policy. It may also be assumed that the decision to place additional Egyptian naval facilities at the disposal of the Soviet Mediterranean squadron was made at approximately the same time.

In early 1971, the United Nations peace mission headed by Gunnar Jarring failed to show any substantive progress, the USSR installed additional missile sites along the Nile Valley, including the Aswan High Dam area, with the result that, at present, several hundred SAM-2 and SAM-3 batteries have been deployed throughout Egypt. To these have recently been added two or three battalions (each consisting of 27 rockets) of the mobile and more advanced SAM-6 missiles capable of intercepting both high and low flying aircraft. This impressive display of air power has, as noted, been recently supplemented by Russian-piloted squadrons of fighters and fighter-bombers. In addition to the four squadrons (consist-

ing of 12 to 16 aircraft each) dispatched in early 1970, the Russians have recently deployed four more, equally divided between MIG-21 and Sukhoi-II aircraft, thus doubling Soviet air strength in Egypt. These figures do not include aircraft handed over to Egypt under the terms of the Soviet military air program. It is noteworthy that the Egyptian airforce now consists of approximately 550 combat jets at a time when less than 350 qualified pilots are available to fly them.

This dramatic increase in Soviet air power in Egypt has alarmed both Israel and the Western powers, especially the United States. Western uneasiness concerning Moscow's motives has been further aggravated by the fact that Russian pilots in Egypt are rotated on a three to six months basis thus creating an impressive number of airmen trained to work in desert conditions. It may be safely assumed that, in case of emergency, these pilots would be available to fly the aircraft which have technically been handed over to Egypt.

Another cause for concern and an additional manifestation of Moscow's increasing entrenchment in Egypt have been provided by the signing, in June, 1971, of the fifteen-year Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. However, upon close examination, it is difficult to avoid the impression that its importance has been greatly exaggerated in both the United States and Israel. Stipulations to "regularly consult each other . . . on all important questions affecting (their) interests" and to "concert their positions," do not, as some commentators have suggested, confer upon the USSR the right to intervene in the internal affairs of Egypt or to dictate Cairo's foreign policy. This does not mean that the Kremlin may not

be able to do either or both but simply that the success or failure of future Russian policies in Egypt will be determined not by the provisions of the 1971 Treaty but by Moscow's ability "to get to" President Sadat, and, ultimately, his successors.

In any case, since most diplomatic agreements are entered into because, at that particular time, they serve the respective interests of the contracting parties, one may legitimately inquire as to what considerations prompted Moscow and Cairo to sign the 1971 Friendship Treaty. The Soviet government had for some time been concerned with American peace initiatives in the Middle East, fearing that a possible US success in mediating the Egyptian-Israeli dispute would exclude the USSR from participating in the negotiations and the implementation of the peace settlement. More precisely, Secretary Roger's 1971 trip to the Middle East and the unveiling of the so-called Rogers plan were seen in Moscow as indications of US determination to work with the belligerents without involving the Soviet government. Russian apprehensions were reinforced by Sadat's announcement that he was prepared in principle to sign a peace treaty with Israel and by his seeming eagerness, displayed in the spring of 1971 and subsequently, to adopt a more "evenhanded" approach in his relations with the superpowers. The Friendship Pact served as a measure of reassurance that the Kremlin would in fact be consulted in case of any major diplomatic breakthrough and that it would thus (directly or indirectly) participate in working out any peace settlement between Egypt and Israel.

President Sadat, in contrast, appears to have been motivated primarily by a desire to strengthen his hand in any future bar-

gaining with Israel and in his attempts to keep a tight rein on internal opposition advocating the resumption of hostilities along the Suez Canal. Sadat's insistence on publicly implicating the Russians in the decision to call off the attack on the Israeli positions in the Sinai which, he said, was scheduled to begin in December, 1971, serves as an excellent illustration of such reasoning. In any event, the treaty probably represented a compromise between the maximum demands of both parties: while Cairo was no doubt interested in a formal treaty of mutual assistance, Moscow was seeking formal recognition of Soviet influence over Egypt's foreign and domestic affairs. For obvious reasons, satisfaction of these maximum demands was mutually unacceptable to both parties.

It is doubtful that there was any direct connection between President Podgorny's June, 1971 visit to Cairo, when the treaty was signed, and the internal upheaval in Egypt which took place shortly before he arrived and which resulted in the removal from power of Vice-President 'Ali Sabri and others generally regarded as favoring closer ties with the USSR. Both Podgorny's trip and the signing of the document were probably accelerated by the Egyptian events, for there can be no doubt that the Kremlin was greatly concerned lest a pro-Western faction gain control in Cairo. Nevertheless, as noted, the main purpose of the treaty was to counter any possible US successes in negotiating an end to the Arab-Israeli dispute, and thus it had undoubtedly been in the works long before the political events in question took place.

## II

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, as a result of its involvement in Egypt, the Soviet government has found

itself in an embarrassing position: its political pressure has proved insufficient to obtain the satisfaction of the minimum Arab demand — the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories, yet the Kremlin cannot apply military pressure on Jerusalem for fear of a US-USSR showdown. This, it would appear, Moscow has been trying to avoid for, as the Soviet leaders realize, the Middle East is simply not worth provoking a military confrontation with Washington. Put differently, as a result of its entanglement in Arab affairs, the Russians have no doubt achieved some strategic gains, among them air and naval facilities in Egypt, but they have also incurred some serious liabilities. By being unable to shield its clients in the 1967 war with Israel, and, subsequently, to secure the satisfaction of their minimum demands, Moscow has openly exhibited military weakness *vis-à-vis* the United States. It has also demonstrated to all concerned that the Arabs cannot rely on Russia in recapturing territory lost to Israel in the Six-Day war. In addition, the Kremlin has weakened its laboriously created image as a benevolent and unintrusive supporter of neutral Third World nations by engaging in frequent public squabbles with their Arab clients over issues ranging from the socioeconomic path of development followed by the newly independent nations to repression by these states of their respective Communist parties. The recent Sudanese episode and the support extended to Khartoum by the Egyptian, Libyan and Syrian governments are but the latest manifestations of this periodically recurring problem.

One cannot appreciate Moscow's current predicament in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab East without an understanding of the historical context in which it developed. Generally speaking, the Soviet government,

like its counterparts in the rest of the world, is above all concerned with the problem of safeguarding Russia's national security. In the post-1945 period, this task was greatly complicated by Moscow's strategic nuclear inferiority to the United States. In light of these considerations, the permanent stationing of the US Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, followed by Turkey's admission to NATO; the formation, after years of failure, of the anti-Soviet regional defense organization known as the Baghdad Pact; the ensuing establishment by the United States of air and naval bases in Turkey, along with additional air bases in Pakistan; and, last but not least, the stationing in Turkey and Italy of US medium-range ballistic missiles all together presented a challenge which the Kremlin felt it had to meet as vigorously and rapidly as possible. What to Washington appeared as a legitimate concern for its Middle Eastern friends and allies, was viewed in Moscow as an unwarranted and provocative establishment of American power in areas contiguous to the southern borders of the USSR. It is quite possible that these Western moves in the Middle East, exposing as they did Moscow's relative military and economic weakness *vis-à-vis* the United States, were received in the Kremlin with an indignation and concern similar to those pervading official Washington at the news of the Soviet 1962 missile build-up in Cuba. There are, of course, obvious differences between the two situations but of importance in the context of this discussion is universal concern about the presence, in relative proximity to one's heartland, of enemy missiles capable of destroying one's major population and industrial centers.

In view of their pronounced nuclear inferiority to the United States at that time, Soviet policy-makers know that the direct

military steps necessary to neutralize this buildup of US power would be a slow and expensive process. For this reason, the Kremlin initially opted for *political* means in its attempts to undermine US positions in the Middle East. It simultaneously instituted crash programs designed to narrow the military gap, but hoped for short-term, inexpensive political gains in the interim

The first opportunity to enter Middle Eastern politics and to gain from within what Soviet threats had not achieved from without, presented itself when Egypt, which for reasons of its own had refused to cooperate with the Western powers, emerged as the leading Arab opponent of the Baghdad Pact. Khrushchev deserves credit for recognizing at this particular juncture (1955) that the tactical interests of the Soviet Union and Egypt coincided to a remarkable degree, and, thus, provided a viable framework for political cooperation between the two countries. In spite of serious differences and an obvious divergence of long-term interests, this relationship which he established has withstood periodic stresses and strains and, in the period following the Six-Day war, has led to a level of intimacy and cooperation unprecedented in Moscow's relations with the Third World.

In the late 1950's-early 1960's, a new element forced itself upon Soviet strategic calculations assuming, over the years, ever ominous proportions. In the late 1950's, the initial group of Polaris submarines, capable of firing medium-range nuclear missiles from underwater positions, were acquired by the US Navy. In the early 1960's, some of them were permanently deployed in the Mediterranean.

Generally speaking, from the very outset there could have been no doubt in the

minds of the Kremlin leaders that the advent of the Polaris could not but seriously and adversely affect Soviet efforts to reach nuclear parity with the United States. More precisely, even though at the time still far behind the USA in terms of land-based, permanently-stationed, nuclear delivery systems, the USSR, because of the "overkill" factor, could hope in time to neutralize the nuclear power of its American antagonist. But the advent of what amounted to floating nuclear bases introduced an entirely new and, from the Soviet perspective, destabilizing factor in the nuclear equation. For, even if the Russians succeeded in neutralizing the land-based first-strike capability of the United States, their efforts would prove of little consequence in light of Washington's superior second-strike capability derived from its underwater nuclear missile fleet.

The permanent deployment of nuclear submarines in the Mediterranean, from whence most of European Russia was brought within the range of the Polaris missiles, presented the Kremlin once again with a challenge it could not ignore. Hypothetically, this new threat to Soviet security could have been countered in two ways: through the productive and eventual deployment in relative proximity to the North American continent of a Soviet submarine nuclear delivery system for use as a deterrent and/or through development of an effective anti-submarine warfare (ASW) system in the hope of neutralizing the Polaris directly. On a practical level, the former task has borne some fruit while the latter, because of the tremendous technical problems involved, has not yet been accomplished.

Any hope of a possible neutralization of both US fleet-borne aircraft and nuclear

submarines in the Mediterranean was predicated upon establishing a Soviet naval and air presence in that area. This, then, was the first and the primary reason for the Soviet military build-up in the Eastern Mediterranean. It is only in the light of this consideration that one can even begin to sense the importance of Egypt to the Soviet decision-makers. After the loss of the Albanian military facilities in 1961, the Russians were left without any naval bases in the Mediterranean. Egypt, because of its strategic location and its relatively close association with the USSR, was the logical place to attempt to secure alternate facilities. Khrushchev's 1964 trip and Admiral Gorshkov's periodic visits to Cairo can be explained in large part by the Kremlin's desire to acquire the use of Egyptian installations for Russian naval units in the Mediterranean.

Nevertheless, prior to 1967, those Soviet initiatives were not successful. Aware of Moscow's intentions and jealously guarding Egypt's neutralist position in international affairs, Nasir refused to bow to Soviet pressure. The situation changed dramatically only when, in the wake of the 1967 war, uncontested Israeli control of the Egyptian sky exposed Nasir's inability to guarantee the security of the country's population. Aware of the domestic and international implications of the situation, the UAR President had no choice but to appeal for Soviet protection. As noted earlier, this led to the installation and manning by Soviet personnel of the more advanced SAM-3 missiles, along with the permanent stationing in Egypt of Russian planes, pilots, maintenance and security personnel, anti-aircraft defenses, and other related services. (Incidentally, the fact that this constitutes *de facto* rather than *de jure* foreign bases allows Moscow politically to

have its cake and eat it too.) It may be assumed that some of the facilities requested by the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean, among them the Alexandria naval base, were also placed at Russian disposal at about this time. The new base currently under construction in Mers al-Matruh probably also falls into this category. This was the price which Cairo had to pay to keep the Israeli Air Force confined to the eastern bank of the Suez Canal.

### III

There can thus be no doubt that Egypt has become the key to the Kremlin's policy in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Moreover, once the Suez Canal is reopened, Egypt may be expected to serve as an important staging area for similar Soviet naval expansion into the Red and, above all, Arabian Seas. (The USSR has, in fact, been making advance efforts in this direction.) In terms of the coverage of Soviet as well as Chinese targets, the Arabian Sea is another logical area for the deployment of the Polaris-Poseidon submarines.

It stands to reason that, having invested a substantial amount of money, material, expertise and prestige, the Kremlin will attempt to reduce Egypt to the position of a Soviet vassal. Cairo cannot, of course, be equated with Moscow's East European satellites but it will, at the very least, remain in a position of heavy dependence on the USSR for as long as the US position in the Arab-Israeli political equation is so strongly influenced by Israel. To reiterate, there can be no doubt that these substantial Soviet advances, to a point which few people in the Kremlin and elsewhere would have believed feasible even six years ago, have been made possible by the Israeli victory over the Arabs in 1967 and, even more

importantly, by Cairo's subsequent humiliation by the successful Israeli deep penetration air attacks on Egyptian territory.

Nevertheless, the Soviet position in Cairo is far less secure than is often assumed. President Sadat is aware of and undoubtedly discomfited by the fact that heavy reliance on Moscow has severely restricted Egypt's independence and impeded its ability to conduct an independent foreign policy. But his options are quite limited — Cairo's only hope to decrease its dependence on the Kremlin lies in reaching an accommodation with Israel. Sadat's predicament no doubt is appreciated in Washington, Moscow and Jerusalem. Yet while the United States appears to be genuinely interested in a resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute in the hope that it would result in a marked decline of both Soviet presence and influence in Egypt, Israel and the USSR, for reasons of their own, seem to oppose such a settlement. While Jerusalem's stand is motivated by complex political, strategic and socioeconomic considerations, Moscow, in its determination to neutralize the Sixth Fleet and the Polaris submarines, is opposed to a peace settlement and favors the preservation of the state of controlled tension along the Israeli-Egyptian cease-fire lines simply because of the leverage this situation gives it with Egypt.

### IV

In assessing the merits of Moscow's policy, it is as yet too early to pass a judgment about its relative success or failure. If effective anti-submarine warfare capabilities of the sort that depend on the use of air and naval bases become available and can be deployed in the Mediterranean in conjunction with Egyptian facilities, then the

heavy! Soviet investment there will have been worthwhile. If, on the other hand, future ASW systems come to be centered on what is known as the "hunter-killer" submarines not dependent on the above facilities, the efficacy of having spent enormous sums of money to maneuver oneself into a precarious political position where one became hostage to events partially beyond one's control may come to seem highly questionable. This is especially true when the building of a more conventional and balanced navy would probably have accomplished a similar objective with less long-term expense and greater control over the relevant parameters of the problem.

The above analysis of Moscow's position might help dispel some of the prevalent misconceptions regarding Soviet foreign policy in general and especially the role of the Middle East in that policy. For instance, some "Machiavellian" analysts maintain that the Russians are determined to exert pressure on America in Europe, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Latin America and other parts of the world in the hope of driving the United States out of these "vital regions." Others, more idealistically inclined, assume that a far-reaching settlement embracing all the major danger areas of the globe could be worked out by the superpowers if only the spirit of enlightened self-interest pervaded the councils of the Soviet and US decision-makers. Many simply wonder at the seeming paradox of the Kremlin seeking an accommodation with the West in Europe, while, at the same time, pursuing a seemingly aggressive, expansionist policy in the Middle East.

It would appear that the key to this "mystery" of Soviet policy is found in the relative strength of US-Soviet positions in the various parts of the world and in their

significance to the security of the USSR. More particularly, Europe and the Middle East, because of the presence of US military power *directed against Russia*, are of great importance to Moscow. Southeast Asia, where the US presence is being steadily wound down and, where, in any event, it was directed against Communist China — the Kremlin's main antagonist in the bloc — in contrast, is not. None of the aforementioned facts are meant to imply that Europe and the Middle East occupy equal positions in Soviet strategy, however. On the Continent the process of slow but unmistakable erosion of US preeminence has been set into motion by indigenous forces and can be speeded up more readily by a display of Soviet moderation and accommodation than by aggressive activities. Washington's Mediterranean presence, on the other hand, may or may not be seriously affected by the spirit of the continental detente. Thus far, the US government has shown no inclination to reduce significantly its positions in the Mediterranean, leaving the Kremlin leaders, in their own view, no choice but to proceed with the enormous task of establishing a credible counter-force to neutralize the impressive firepower of the Sixth Fleet and of US nuclear submarines in the area. It would be inconceivable for Moscow to exchange its gains in the Middle East for a settlement of the conflict in Southeast Asia. On the contrary, the Kremlin leaders probably see it as being in the Soviet interest to keep the United States — Moscow's main capitalist rival — bogged down in the wilderness of Vietnam, squandering its resources and undermining American morale in an area which is of no direct concern to the USSR. In sum, the Kremlin has been the chief beneficiary of the US-Vietnamese military and US-Chinese political confrontation in Southeast Asia. For this reason,

Moscow has even less interest in peace and tranquility there than in the settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute in the Middle East.

It could, of course, be argued that the expected US withdrawal from Vietnam might also lead to a curtailment of US power in the Mediterranean. Yet this is unlikely because, while most would admit that US military involvement in Southeast Asia has served no useful strategic or military purpose, the presence of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean is still regarded by US military and political leaders as performing a valuable defensive function.

In any event, it is unlikely that US dis-

engagement from Vietnam or a possible detente in Europe will, in any appreciable degree, diminish Washington-Moscow rivalry in the Middle East. (Indeed, American withdrawal from Vietnam will free additional military resources for use in areas like the Middle East.) In the latter, where both superpowers are playing for high stakes, it is unrealistic to expect the USSR to disengage itself as long as the United States maintains a position of strength. For this reason, the Middle East can be expected to remain an important arena of superpower competition in the 1970's, with all the attendant dangers that such a situation entails in the nuclear era.







# The American Military Presence in the Middle East

Richard H. Pfaff

For more than a quarter of a century there has been a significant American military presence in the Middle East. While the Sixth Fleet has been the most dramatic expression of this presence, the United States has maintained air and land forces in several Middle Eastern states as well, that is until just recently. In Turkey, for example, there were over 23,000 officers and men of the United States military establishment serving in that country in 1965. If one adds to this force figure American employees servicing the military, dependents living within the country, as well as diverse elements ranging all the way from Peace Corps volunteers to representatives of the U.S. Bureau of Public Roads, the total number of Americans living in Turkey at any particular time during the previous decade approached 100,000. In addition to this American presence in Turkey, and a similar NATO-linked presence in Greece, there was

also an American Military Assistance Advisory Group assigned to Iran, a United States Air Force training mission in Saudi Arabia, and a sizeable American force stationed at the giant U.S. Air Force base (Wheelus) in Libya. To the official force figures in each case must be added those Americans performing ancillary functions, dependents (where allowed), and other non-military but "official" elements. If one counts the 25,000 men serving aboard ships of the Sixth Fleet, an estimated 150,000 or more Americans gave form to our military presence in the Middle East during the heyday of the previous decade.

Today, much of that military presence has been removed, or at least muted. In Libya the 1969 military coup that ousted pro-Western King Muhammad Idris was followed the next year by the termination of the American presence at Wheelus. In Iran

the Shah has carefully, but progressively, reduced his dependence on American military and political support, and, as a result, has been able to embark on a more flexible foreign policy and secure political and military assistance from *both* the United States and the Soviet Union. The effect of this detente on the part of Iran with her northern neighbor, while retaining her friendship with the United States, has been to both lower the American presence in Iran and offset the remainder with Soviet representation.

The most significant reduction of American troops in the Middle East has taken place in Turkey, where, following the Turco-American agreement of July 3, 1969,<sup>1</sup> the American presence was cut drastically and the remaining presence made as innocuous as possible. In this case, the total number of military personnel was cut from 23,000 to less than 6,000, and even this number was concentrated almost entirely within three air bases.<sup>2</sup> Along with the lowering of force levels, the Peace Corps was first cut from over 590 to less than 50, and then terminated in 1970 and civilian military services involving American personnel trimmed to skeleton dimension. With these reductions went a commensurate reduction in the number of dependent personnel.

One very favorable consequence of the reduction of the American presence in Turkey has been the disappearance from public eye of those ubiquitous symbols of that presence, the PX and commissary facilities. Until a short time ago, for example, the main PX (technically a BX, or "base exchange") for the Air Force in Ankara was located in the heart of that Turkish capital's downtown section; and for years this peculiar location for an American military facility served to offend the Turk's

national pride. The existence of officer's and NCO clubs, APO mail service, medical facilities, and special theaters, schools, and sporting groups,<sup>3</sup> further deepened the Turk's suspicion that the American presence in Turkey was symbiotic, if not down-right imperialistic. Altogether, the American military presence was markedly visible and politically disturbing. The new "low profile" of that presence in Turkey opened the path for Turko-American relations to be defined in terms of a totally new idiom, one far more applicable to the contemporary situation within the Middle East. This point is mentioned at this time to give stress to the fact that along with, and partly in response to the lowering of the American military profile in the Middle East has also come a greater sophistication on the part of the U.S. military and recognition that nationalism is a factor of considerably more significance in this particular part of the world than might be the case elsewhere.

With the waning of the American military presence in the Middle East, or at least its transformation into forms more compatible with indigenous national sentiments, certain crucial questions emerge with regard to American foreign policy, or policies, toward the Middle East. First, why did this reduction in military presence come about? Second, given our interests within the Middle East, what policy reorientation is required to bring our military capabilities in this region in line with policy goals? It is the purpose of this paper to examine these questions, giving particular stress to the implications of any policy reorientation that may be adopted.

## II

Any number of explanations may be brought forward to give answer as to why

there has been a waning of the American military presence within the Middle East. Here only three major reasons need be mentioned. First, the military significance of the area has undergone a subtle transformation rendering unnecessary the type of military profile required only a few years previously. Thus, until the development of a reliable guided missile system, the Middle East constituted the most favorable *point d'appui* from which the United States could attack the strategic Donet's Basin, wherein some 40% of the Soviet Union's industrial production was concentrated at the time. Even in the early 1960's when IRBM's made up part of the American deterrent force, the Middle East was a militarily important area, as attested by the location of 15 Jupiter missiles in Turkey. But in reflection of the rapid pace of weapon technology, by the time of the Cuban missile crisis (October, 1962), the United States could decide that continued location of Jupiter missiles in Turkey no longer served any useful military purposes. In early 1963 all Jupiter missiles were withdrawn from that country.<sup>4</sup> Once ICBM's became operational, then the deterrent response could be made as effectively from Cheyenne, Wyoming as from Adana, Turkey. And once the Middle East was no longer necessary as a staging area for attacking the Soviet Union, then the *raison d'être* of the American military presence had to be modified accordingly.

The second reason why the American military presence has lessened in recent years has been in response to a curious blending of radical nationalism with a simplistic explanation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Within the Arab world the identification of Israel as an "imperialist dagger in the heart of the Arab world," or the Arab-Israeli conflict as an integral part of a larger conflict between the "imperialists" (i.e. the

United States, Great Britain, and when appropriate, even the Soviet Union) and the forces of national liberation, is understandable, if for no other reason than as a visceral response to an undesirable situation. What is striking is that this linking of radical nationalism with a particular interpretation of American "imperialism" is also part of the Turkish radical ideology too. Turkish displeasure over the role of the United States with regard to the Cyprus issue, particularly in 1967, as well as the American use of the Adana, Turkey Air Force Base as a staging area for any possible intervention in the 1970 Jordanian conflict made it difficult for the Turkish government to totally reject the arguments put forth by the radical left in that country. Ironically in this most secular Middle Eastern state, it is the nexus of Islam that has made the appeals of the radical left popular even in the countryside and among the urban lower classes, many of whom are but recent immigrants from the rural areas. To the rural Turk, and to many of his urbane, intellectual, and secularized brethren in the cities as well, the interventionist role of the United States to prevent a solution of the Cypriot problem along Turkish lines coupled with an apparent acquiescence to continued Israeli occupation of Arab lands seems confirmation of this simplistic explanation. While further comments on this point are made below, it is to be noted here that, to date, the radical left in Turkey has been very successful in giving a push to the reduction of the American military profile in that country.<sup>5</sup>

Perhaps the most important reason for the waning of an American military presence in the Middle East has been because of the growing shift within the United States towards a new form of isolationism, making it now almost anachronistic to ar-

articulate any sort of pro-consulship over the Middle East. President Nixon acknowledged this last development in his report to the Congress of February 9, 1972. In that report the President noted that there has been a "growth among the American people of the conviction that the time had come for other nations to share a greater portion of the burden of world leadership; and its corollary that the assured continuity of our long term involvement required a responsible, but more restrained American role."<sup>6</sup> This is but a euphemistic method of saying that interventionism enjoys the support of neither the American public nor of political leaders in the Middle East.

It appears that our military presence in the Middle East is to undergo a transformation commensurate with this reorientation of policy, too. A major re-examination of U.S. defense commitments around the world was spurred by the overwhelming passage of the "national commitment" resolution (70-16 vote) putting the President on notice that vague commitments leading to wars similar to Vietnam would meet with widespread congressional opposition.<sup>7</sup> Lacking any real alternative, the United States is now moving toward a policy that may be identified as one of surrogation. Under this policy the design is not to maximize our military capabilities within the Middle East, but to augment them by the utilization of local military forces. This policy of surrogation is not the same as that announced by President Truman in March 1947 whereby military and economic assistance was requested for Greece and Turkey to enable those two countries to resist "attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure,"<sup>8</sup> or that of President Eisenhower when he requested in January 1957 authorization to employ "in the general area of the Middle East" . . . "the armed forces of

the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of . . . nations requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international Communism."<sup>9</sup> It is, instead, a policy designed to add to the strength of existing U.S. military forces in the Middle East the *strength* of local military forces. The policy of surrogation is not a policy which seeks to create *ex nihilo* a military machine. The United States has supplied arms to dozens of countries throughout the world, but, with rare exception, the recipient state has not molded these arms into a sophisticated military machine. Only too often, instead, the recipient state has used its limited military abilities against some other ally of the United States in action void of any common interest with Washington.

The policy of surrogation involves the substitution for the American presence a local military machine of *proven* capability. Only two countries fit this formula in the Middle East, although several others may eventually be included. At the moment only Turkey and Israel have military forces of demonstrated effectiveness. Turkey, however, is pursuing a political future that must give first priority to alleviating certain internal political stresses, a situation that makes the Turkish military machine somewhat of doubtful use even in areas compatible with American interests. This leaves only Israel. But this country, too, has foreign policy aims that cannot automatically be equated with our own. It must be recognized that the policy of surrogation denies to the United States even less knowledge than it enjoys now of the force levels that will be available to back up any particular political move. Only after a policy position has been articulated and the force levels of those who would support such a

position in the case been ascertained can the United States ascertain the military support that may be brought to bear on a particular issue. Since Israel is the only Middle Eastern state with an effective military machine and is not burdened with internal strife, the policy of surrogation is limited to one state. Under these conditions the range of policy alternatives available to the United States is limited to those compatible with Israel interests. Of course, it would be advantageous for the United States to develop other militarily sophisticated allies in this region, and to a certain extent this is a corollary aspect of this policy; but the Arab-Israeli imbroglio, the legacy of Islamic feudalism, and a background of American interventionism since the close of World War II makes such a development difficult in the near future, although it does appear that Iran is being courted to play such a role in the Persian Gulf region.

The crucial question remains: given a reduced military profile in the Middle East and a policy of surrogation limited to Israel and Iran, can the United States mobilize the military force necessary to secure its vital interests? A brief review of these interests insofar as they relate to this question follows.

### III

American interests in the Middle East are manifold, ranging from those of military strategy to those of biblical research.<sup>10</sup> Over the past twenty-five years, three of these interests have predominated: to secure the area from Soviet penetration; to secure and promote American (and Western) oil interests in the region; and to secure and promote the well-being of the State of Israel. We have been unable to realize

the first of these interests and must now maximize the remaining two in light of a strong and widespread Soviet influence.

In part, our failure to prevent Soviet penetration into the Middle East was a reflection of some naivete on our part relative to dealing with the peoples and the problems that characterize this region. Such naivete is understandable in view of the fact that until the close of World War II, the United States largely accepted the area as a British preserve, restricting American interests to missionary and educational activities, with only occasional concern voiced about maintaining an economic "Open Door" policy for American commerce. In this regard it is worthwhile noting that despite the magnitude of U.S. naval power during the World War II neither U.S. battleships nor aircraft carriers ever entered the Mediterranean Sea, with the single exception of the carrier *Wasp* when that vessel brought a load of British "Spitfires" to Malta.<sup>11</sup> When we did become involved, we were neither psychologically nor politically equipped to work our way through the labyrinth of Middle Eastern politics without offending someone at each turn. With proposed defense treaties and lavish outlays of economic and military assistance, the United States sought to overcome the guile and the bazaar mentality of the Middle Easterner. A poor contest indeed.<sup>12</sup>

The irony of all this is that the United States has had a very long history of interaction with the Middle East, dating from the very beginnings of the American republic. As early as 1804, the U.S.S. *Argus* visited Alexandria, Egypt, to land Captain Easton and a detachment of marines preparatory to their subsequent trek all the way across North Africa to attack Tunis

from the rear as a belated military operation during the Barbary War.<sup>13</sup>

This early amphibious operation was followed later, in 1815, by the creation of a Mediterranean Squadron, a naval force that was quite active during the Greek War of Independence (1821-1829). But after this more than a century would elapse before the United States found interests sufficiently significant in the Middle East to reestablish her presence there. Even then, however, the burden of constructing a presence in this region was only reluctantly shouldered.<sup>14</sup>

But Russian pressures on Turkey and Iran, the post-war rise of petroleum as a major interest in the Middle East, and the idea of a homeland — now read state — for the Jewish refugees of the world was simply too much for the United States to ignore. Domestic pressures, oftentimes quite contradictory, demanded that the United States assume an active role in the Middle East, although each group only interpreted that role in terms of maximizing its own interests. In any case, we did become active in this region and still remain so commensurated with our capabilities.

Of all our interests in the Middle East none has enjoyed the domestic political support as that of Israel. Few countries have enjoyed the continuous and deep support of another country as Israel has of America. As early as 1922 the United States Senate registered its support of the Balfour Declaration and virtually every leading American politician since that date has voiced his support of the Jewish state. President Truman, for example, granted recognition to Israel within minutes after the Jewish state declared her independence, even before such recognition was request-

ed. Almost without exception the Presidential candidates of both parties, but particularly of the Democratic Party, have publicly stated their support of Israel. Thus, Senator Hubert Humphrey states that "we have a responsibility and a duty to supply Israel with direct economic relief so as to permit her to maintain her defense posture — *a posture which is defending our national self-interest as well;*" and Ray Vickers quotes Presidential hopeful Senator Jackson as saying, "Israel is serving as *the front-line of Western defense in the Middle East.*"<sup>15</sup> Senator Montoya was even less humble about Israel's role, concluding that "Israel is the only democracy in that part of the world. She is also our only reliable ally."<sup>16</sup> With such as this abounding within the walls of the Senate, it is no wonder that a letter submitted to the Secretary of States on June 1, 1970 requesting that the Administration supply Israel with military aircraft was signed by no less than 73 out of a total of 100 Senators, including all the Democratic Party Presidential hopefuls.<sup>17</sup>

The reason for this support of the State of Israel is complex and beyond the scope of this article.<sup>18</sup> Such support, however, must not be interpreted as the manifestation of some nefarious conspiracy. The United States is already under the alleged control of the military-industrial complex, the Italian Mafia, and Wall Street financiers. There simply is no room for either the Jewish community or, for that matter, a cartel of international oil companies!

Fortunately for the United States the security of the State of Israel has not required any particular effort on our part beyond that of providing financial support and, in the past few years, some military hardware. Initially the United States joined France and Great Britain in an arms

embargo for both the Arab states and Israel with the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950. But the United States did agree to supply Israel with anti-aircraft missiles in 1962, with Patton tanks in 1965 and with Skyhawk bombers in 1966. These arms supplementing the arms Israel was able to purchase from France were more than sufficient to destroy the Soviet-equipped military machine the Egyptians put into the field in the June, 1967 war.

After that engagement the United States again imposed an arms embargo on Israel, but this was relaxed following negotiations that started in October 1968. In December of that same year the United States approved the sale of 50 Phantom jets to Israel. Additional aircraft under a \$500,000,000 loan agreement made available to Israel by means of the Defense Procurement Act were shipped to the Jewish state in 1971 and in early 1972. In general, Israel receives those arms necessary for her to maintain an effective posture over the military power that can be mustered by Egypt. Thus, when Russia deployed some 80 surface-to-air missile installations in Egypt, together with over 16,000 Soviet technicians and advisors, the United States provided further military hardware to Israel, particularly electronic gear. What is central to this paper is that such military hardware has been effectively used by Israel to further her policy aims at no significant cost to the United States. If the security of Israel is to continue *as one of America's major foreign policy aims*, then the policy of surrogation in this case has paid off. If, however, it is decided that the security of Israel is secondary to some other interest in the Middle East, then we have strengthened a disturbing force in that region.

Our interests in Israel is political and

emotional and reflects certain domestic political constellations. Our interests in Middle East oil, by contrast, is strictly a matter of economics and military strategy. The United States can survive without Israel; it cannot survive without access to Middle Eastern oil. Our support of Israel is a reflection of desire; our efforts to secure our oil interests in the Middle East is a matter of necessity. Unfortunately, the oil-rich countries, with the exception of Iran, are Arab states hostile to Israel. And with each passing year the significance of Middle Eastern oil to the United States will increase. Unless peace can be established between Israel and her Arab neighbors, the United States cannot secure its oil interests within the Arab World. The nationalization of the IPC by Irak, an oil company partly owned by American oil companies, and the precarious tenure of American oil companies operating in Libya is evidence that within the Arab World the United States wields no clout and can exert military pressure only at great peril and with great difficulty.

It is partly in response to the extremely weak position of the United States within the Arab World that Iran has been encouraged to strengthen her military hegemony over the Persian Gulf, the security of which is absolutely vital to the West. Every day *one half* of the total petroleum consumed by the non-Communist world passes through the Strait of Hormuz at the head of the Persian Gulf. This means that a tanker loaded with Gulf oil leaves the Persian Gulf every twenty minutes, twenty four hours a day. For a country such as Japan who receives over 88% of her domestic petroleum needs from the Persian Gulf,<sup>19</sup> the security of the region is a matter of national necessity. If Israel was justified in attacking Egypt for the latter's closing



of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping, imagine Japan's reaction to some regional power closing the Persian Gulf ships carrying oil to Japan! In addition to Japanese dependency upon oil from the Persian Gulf, Great Britain draws 66.1% of her oil from the Gulf, France 51.1%, Italy, 84.5%, West Germany 62.0%, and Australia 69.0%.<sup>20</sup>

American dependency on Middle Eastern and North African oil is not as apparent as it is with respect to other Western countries. Nevertheless, it is real. Total United States reserves are estimated at 40 billion barrels, including the oil of Alaska. However, consumption of petroleum has skyrocketed over the past two decades in the United States and now exceeds 15 million barrels daily. With no new reserves and at current consumption rates, the United States has less than a ten year supply of oil. Even when presumed new discoveries of oil are taken into account, our reserve position is expected to deteriorate over the next decade because by 1985 consumption of petroleum will have increased to 24 million barrels per day.<sup>21</sup>

Western Europe, too, is heavily dependent upon Middle Eastern oil imports, with such imports making up more than two-thirds of Europe's oil needs.<sup>22</sup> And in both the case of Japan and the case of Western Europe the demand for oil as a source of fuel energy has almost *doubled* in less than a decade.<sup>23</sup> Even if the United States could survive for a time without Middle Eastern oil, it is another matter to consider the political implications of allowing an unfriendly power to exert military hegemony over the oil-rich lands that are vital to our allies in Europe and the Far East.

Reference is often made to the vast sums of hard currency earned by American oil

companies in the Middle East. There is no doubt that these operations produce a net inflow of funds into the United States that goes a long way toward easing American balance of payments problems, and such earnings surely constitute one of America's "interests" in this region. This is a complex argument, however, for alternative ways always exist to cover balance of payments deficits. Still, some regard should be given the fact that it costs \$1.53 to bring one barrel of oil to the well-head in the United States, but only \$0.15 per barrel in the Middle East. And a word should be said here also about Israel's annual deficit, much of which is covered by capital transfers from the United States. This deficit is always considerably less than the amount of net inflow of funds to the United States as earnings on our oil operations in the Middle East.<sup>24</sup> One is tempted to suggest that our support of Israel is financed by Arab oil!

The policy of surrogation may be used to secure the Jewish state; it is less operable in securing the oil-rich lands of the Middle East and North Africa, save insofar as Israel neutralizes the political and military energies of radical Arab states, energies that might otherwise be employed against the oil-rich, but conservative regimes along the Persian Gulf. In the case of the oil-rich, but radical Arab states of Algeria and Libya even this limited role is not possible. In fact, in these countries oil income has been used to purchase aircraft designed ultimately to be used against Israel (Libya) or the continuation of exploitation rights given a political price (as in the case of Algeria with France).

In all of these cases, the flexibility of American foreign policy is severely limited. It is not entirely facetious to suggest

that the Arab-Israeli imbroglio is a *method* of securing American oil interests in the Persian Gulf area, in part, because it precludes widespread subversive operations on the part of the radical nationalist Arab states designed to overthrow pro-Western regimes in the oil-rich states of the Persian Gulf. But in any case the capability of the United States military presence in the region to "influence" internal developments in the oil-rich states in our favor is by no means what it was a decade ago when American troops could land in Lebanon, or in the early 1960's when British troops could be parachuted into Kuwait to protect that state against Iraqi aggressive intentions. Those days are gone forever. Now the United States must either work its will through the policy of surrogation or it must function within the confines of its own limited capabilities.

In summary, three major American interests in the Middle East were identified: checking Soviet influence over the region; securing and promoting Western oil interests; and securing and promoting the well-being of the State of Israel. To date, the United States has not been able to check Soviet influence and has only marginally been able to provide an umbrella of security for American oil interests (or Western oil interests). Only with regard to Israel have declared American interests been gained — in this case at some political cost in the Arab world and gained through little American effort. The question now is in what has our shift towards a policy of surrogation affected the American military capability in the light of this rather disappointing record?

#### IV

It is not within the scope of competence for a political scientist to engage in an

exercise more properly falling within the rubric of military science. Rather, this section is designed to bring to the reader's attention some basic logistical, political, and psychological factors that affect the American military capability in the Middle East and then to suggest what might be a relationship between that capability as it exists today and the proposed policy of surrogation that has been made necessary by virtue of regional developments and domestic American politics.

From the close of World War II until 1949 the United States enjoyed a monopoly with regard to the atomic bomb, our military forces were still incredibly powerful despite the rapid demobilization that followed V-J day, and our economic power was unmatched. Russia was still reverberating from the shock of Hitler's invasion and her machinations in the Balkans and the Middle East were as much a factor of political momentum as real military power. Germany and Japan had been crumbled and Great Britain was in desperate economic straits. It took little effort on the part of the United States to force Russia to withdraw her claims on Turkey and her troops from Iran.

From 1949 until the early 1960's the American military presence in the Middle East, particularly in the form of the Sixth Fleet made that region virtually an American, or at least Anglo-American preserve. Our landing of 14,000 troops in Lebanon with no opposition from the Russians, or any one else for that matter, marked the apogee of American military capability in the Middle Eastern region. Subsequent domestic political events in Iran led that country to open a detente with Moscow, the 1964 Cypriot issue drove Turkey away from its earlier very pro-American position,<sup>25</sup> and the introduction into the Medi-

terranean Sea of the Russian Mediterranean Naval Squadron sharply curtailed that capability once enjoyed by the United States. Then in the mid-1960's the rise of a vigorous anti-American faction in Turkey made it increasingly embarrassing for the United States Sixth Fleet to visit Turkish seaports.<sup>26</sup> After the 1967 war and the Israeli raid on the Beirut airport (December, 1966), Americans of the Sixth Fleet were not welcomed in Lebanon either.

Following the June, 1967 war Russia also strengthened her Mediterranean Squadron, particularly with the helicopter carrier, *Moskova*. The United States no longer enjoys hegemony over the waters of the eastern Mediterranean. At the present time the Sixth Fleet consists of some 48-50 combat ships, including 2 aircraft carriers, two heavy cruisers, and some 200 aircraft. The Soviet Union, for its part, has a fleet in the Mediterranean of about the same number of ships, although of quite different composition. In the case of the Russian fleet the make-up is built around a helicopter carrier, two missile cruisers, and 12 destroyers, with 10-12 submarines operating to monitor the movements of the American Sixth Fleet. Four of the Russian ships are amphibious ships capable of landing troops onto the beaches. It is difficult, however, to imagine *either* the United States or the Soviet Union enjoying the privilege of effecting an amphibious landing against hostile forces without any interdiction on the part of the other power. This means that the primary purpose of either of these fleets is *not* to function as a naval force prepared to launch an amphibious invasion when the opportunity arises. Instead, these fleets perform two major functions. First, each fleet serves as an unmistakable instrument of communication between two super-powers. Thus, for example the Egyptian charge

made immediately after the Israeli attack on Egyptian airfields on June 5, 1967 that American aircraft were involved could easily be refuted since the Russians *knew exactly* where our carriers and our planes were at all times. Similarly, President Johnson reveals that during that June war, the Russians at one point decided to threaten Israel with Russian intervention. The United States immediately communicated to the Russians that any such move would bring about a confrontation with the United States by the simple expedient of shifting the cruising range of the Sixth Fleet from 100 miles off the Syrian coast to only 50 miles.<sup>27</sup> The orders given to move the fleet *closer* to the Syrian coast in response to the Russian threat were immediately relayed to Moscow by Russian submarines monitoring the Sixth Fleet. This was exactly what was intended to happen. The Soviet Union got the message. This communicative function of the Sixth Fleet, which serves as a sort of signal flag is reciprocated by the equal communicative function of the Russian fleet.

Second, each fleet functions to prevent the other from exercising undue hegemony over the eastern Mediterranean. The United States is reluctant to turn that body of water over to the Russians; while the Russians, in turn, have no intention of retreating from their newly gained naval position counterbalancing the Sixth Fleet. Even though the U.S. Department of Defense continues to envisage the role of the Sixth Fleet in terms of a rapid response capability, that role is built around the Fast Deployment Logistic Ship (FDLS) to service and provide cargo movement for the fleet and the program is still to be funded by Congress! If the Sixth Fleet is to have any credibility as an attack force (other than as part of an all-out nuclear confrontation), it cannot rely upon the 20 or so C-5 aircraft assigned to the Mili-

tary Airlift Command.<sup>28</sup> As matters now stand, the American naval capability has been checked by the countervailing power of the Russian fleet, as the Sixth Fleet checks the Russian Mediterranean Squadron.

This leaves for our purview the small naval units that operate in the Red Sea (one destroyer, a tender, and several small craft), the three air bases in Turkey, and our military forces in Greece. The Red Sea contingent is merely there to "show the flag" and is of minor military value. The American forces in Turkey must function under severe restrictions and the military forces in Greece are too distant to exert any significant influence in the further reaches of the Middle East. The supreme irony of it all is that if the Russian fleet were not in the Mediterranean—which was the case for some twenty years—there would be no real justification for keeping a permanent American naval force in that region at all!

## V

The Vietnamese conflict has underscored the truth that military expeditions carried out in distant lands are costly in both men and treasure. In view of this fact, the American public is loathe to embark on any new "Vietnam." The question then arises as to just why do we have a military presence in the Middle East at all. This question, of course, is one involving a number of variables too complex to be introduced at this time. Rather, a corollary question is posed: assuming a confluence of policy exists, and the Israeli navy perform surrogate functions for the United States in the eastern Mediterranean, and in similar fashion the Iranian navy for the United States in the Persian Gulf?

The Iranian navy has been significantly

bolstered in recent years to enable the Shah to establish Iranian hegemony over the Persian Gulf as soon as the British withdrew their military forces from that region. The Russian navy could not deploy effectively into the Persian Gulf so long as the Suez Canal was closed, the British were pulling out, and the Americans had no base of operations anywhere near the Gulf region, save for the small contingent at Bahrein. Since no single Arab state could muster any serious naval force in the Gulf, the Shah was free to reach his goal of hegemony without contest.

To establish a real naval force in the Gulf the Shah boosted the number of corvettes in the Iranian navy from 3 to 5, and added four new frigates (armed with Seacat missiles) to the Persian Gulf fleet. These vessels, together with some 18 smaller craft permit the Iranian navy to dominate the Gulf with comparative ease. The Iranian seizure of the islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tumbs at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz at the end of 1971 gave testimony to Iran's uncontested position in this regard.

Iranian domination of the Gulf is quite compatible with American interests and accords with a policy of surrogation, *provided radical Iranian nationalists do not come to power in Tehran*. So long as moderate or conservative forces wield power in Iran the basic interests of the United States (and the West, in general) are served through the actions of the Iranian navy. A change of regime in Tehran would completely alter this situation, however. The domestic political scene in Iran is more brittle than it appears on the surface, however. A change of regimes could render the Iranian naval force in the Gulf a threat rather than a surrogate for American military might.

The Israeli navy, for its part, is small and tailored to meet the specific maritime requirements of that Jewish state. As of October 1967 the Israeli navy consisted of three destroyers (including the former Egyptian warship, Ibrahim al-Awal, which was captured by the Israelis in 1956<sup>29</sup>), four submarines, nine torpedo boats, two high-speed gun boats, and eleven smaller craft.<sup>30</sup> Then on October 22, 1967 an event took place that brought about a new focus to the Israeli navy and may have extraordinary significance, as well, for the American military presence in the Middle East. It is a date the Israelis will not forget; it is a date that may also have marked the demise of Great Power naval operations against the smaller states of the Middle East.

On July 11, 1967 the Israeli destroyer "Elath" (or "Elat") was cruising 16 miles off the coast of Sinai when she engaged in hostilities with two Egyptian motor torpedo boats. The Egyptian torpedo boats were unable to reach attack position (about 5,000 yards). But three months later the Elath was once again cruising off Egypt. On that date, October 22, 1967, two Russian-provided "Komar-class" PT boats of the Egyptian navy fired four Styx-missiles sinking the Israeli destroyer. Although the range exceeded 20,000 yards, all four missiles struck their target. And the Egyptian boats never left port!! It was the first surface-to-surface missile attack in naval history by one warship upon another.<sup>31</sup>

The sinking of the Elath made Israel acutely aware of the fact that ships of destroyer size (or larger) are defenseless against missile attack unless equipped with the latest shipboard air defense systems.<sup>32</sup> In the light of this fact, the Israelis promptly shifted their emphasis of smaller vessels such as the 240-ton "Saar-class" motor tor-

pedo boats. These boats are French-built,<sup>33</sup> equipped with eight Gabriel missile launchers.

The Israeli "Gabriel" missile is Israel's response to the October 22, 1967 incident. This Israeli-built missile was first displayed in May, 1970. It is an automatic homing ship-to-ship missile "utilizing a sophisticated electronics guidance system and delivering a powerful high-explosive warhead accurately and reliably."<sup>34</sup>

The Israeli navy is thus being developed to perform limited functions as required by *Israeli* military considerations. The limited range of Israeli naval craft makes it difficult to ascribe any other function to the Jewish state's navy. In light of this, again the policy of surrogation means little more than letting the State of Israel defend herself.

Adding another disturbing element to the limited military options available to the United States in the Middle East is the growing suspicion, if not fact, that Israel is now a nuclear power. Although that state has repeatedly pledged not to be the first to "introduce" nuclear weapons into the Middle East, most analysts feel that Israel had a number of components for a nuclear weapon as early as 1970, components that could be swiftly assembled in an emergency and used to arm "Jericho" missiles as well as F-4 fighter-bombers. Some affirmation of this was given in March of 1972 when the London Express Service reported that Israel's nuclear capability was first discovered by an American U-2 spy plane while "accidentally" flying over Israel's Negev Desert.<sup>35</sup> Although the Israelis vigorously denied the charge at first, when confronted with the actual evidence gathered by the United States, they agreed that they were engaged in "nuclear weapons research." If it is true

that Israel is now a member of the nuclear "club", then debate about the security of the Jewish state is academic. More serious would be how politically disturbing a nuclear-armed Israel might be. Such a state would be totally independent of American support. Then the American military presence would be incongruous, indeed. We would be of no real value to our friends and of little threat of our enemies.

## VI

A military policy of surrogation is weak,

indeed, for a country as powerful as the United States. The present mood of the American public will allow no other, however. If one wishes to contend that such a military policy is no policy at all, no protest will be raised by this writer. In fact, the virtue of continuing *any* American military presence in the Middle East is put to question. Perhaps a flexible *political* policy toward the Middle East would be far more effective than pretending military prowess armed with an emasculated military presence or banking on a continuing confluence of interests with Israel and/or Iran.

## NOTES

(1) This agreement combined 56 separate status-of-forces agreements into one comprehensive pact.

(2) Even here a reduction was made with Cigli Air Force Base being turned over to the Turks, although American aircraft still use it.

(3) In Istanbul, American boys could join full-fledged Little League baseball teams.

(4) For a discussion of this point see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days* (Cambridge, 1965), pp. 807-808.

(5) The radical Turkish Labor Party (TIP) has used the American presence as a major political weapon. In 1971 radical leftists in Turkey finally managed to bring down the government of Prime Minister Demirel, in part, by fanning anti-Americanism.

(6) *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: The Emerging Structure of Peace* (Washington, 1972), p. 3.

(7) Congressional Quarterly, *Global Defense* (Washington, 1969), p. 79. In February, 1969, a Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad was established under the direction of Senator Stuart Symington to study U.S. defense commitments.

(8) For full text see U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *A Select Chronology and Background Documents Relating to the Middle East* (Washington, 1969), pp. 93-97.

(9) *Ibid.*, pp. 144-150.

(10) In this regard see George Lenczowski, ed. *United States Interests in the Middle East* (Washington, 1968).

(11) Stephen G. Xydis, *Greece and the Great Powers, 1944-1947* (Thessaloniki, 1963), p. 76.

(12) Surely the most bizarre example of this involved the "al wa'ef rusfel" in Cairo. The funds for this "tower" (sic!) is discussed by Miles Copeland in his book *The Game of Nations* (N.Y., 1969), p. 177.

(13) David Finnie, *Pioneers East* (Cambridge, 1967), p. 258.

(14) See Xydis, *op. cit.*, passim.

(15) Emphasis added. For the Humphrey quote, *Near East Report*, September, 1971. The occasion was Senator Humphrey's address before the Jewish War Veterans, August 11, 1971. In that same speech the Senator called upon the Department of State to abandon its "traditional Near East policies based on oil and the Suez Canal." For the Jackson quote, see *Wall Street Journal*, February 12, 1970.

(16) U.S. Senate, 92d Congress, First Session, *Congressional Record*, March 24, 1971, S 3805.

(17) *Congressional Quarterly*, June 5, 1970, p. 1475.

(18) See the author's study, "Perceptions, Politicians and Foreign Policy: U.S. Senators and the Arab-Israeli Problem" *Middle East Forum* (Summer, 1971), pp. 39-49.

(19) United States Naval Institute, *Proceedings* (May, 1970), Naval Review Issue, p. 189.

(20) *Ibid.*

(21) In the single year, 1968, Kuwait improved her reserve position by some 10 billion barrels, roughly the total amount of reserves making up the highly touted Alaska north slope find. Hanson W. Baldwin, "The Stakes are Oil" *Army* (August, 1971), p. 12.

(22) Lenczowski, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

(23) G. Barrows, *International Petroleum Industry*, vol I (The Hague, 1965), pp. 30-31.

(24) Relating the figures from Lenczowski, *op. cit.*, p. 41 and *Area Handbook for Israel* (Washington, 1970), p. 280.

(25) During the Cuban crisis Turkey actually mobilized her troops in support of the United States.

(26) In July, 1968 a Sixth Fleet visit to Turkey set off riots and demonstrations in both Ankara and Istanbul. Then in the following February the arrival of the aircraft carrier Forrester, plus her escorts touched off violent student riots across Turkey that left 2 dead and over 100 injured.

(27) Lyndon B. Johnson, *The Vantage Point* (N.Y., 1971), p. 302.

(28) B.B. Schofield, "Maritime Affairs" *Army Quarterly* (London) 102 (October, 1971), p. 13.

The U.S. navy's new turbine-powered "roll-on, roll-off" cargo ship is more than thirty times as efficient as the c-5A and at only 65% of the cost.

(29) Few naval vessels have had the checkered career of this ill-fated ship. Originally HMS "Mendip", the destroyer served with the British navy 1940-1948. She was then turned over to the Chinese (Nationalist) navy and renamed the "Lin Fu". The following year she was returned to the British who, in turn, transferred her to the Egyptian navy where she was first dubbed the Muhammad Ali al-Kabir and then renamed the Ibrahim al-Awal. On October 31, 1956 she was captured off Haifa, commissioned in the Israeli navy as the Elath and finally sunk in October, 1967. Altogether she served under four flags and carried five different names. At the end, she attained a sort of fame as the first ship to be sunk by surface-to-surface missiles.

(30) R. Blackman, ed. *Jane's Fighting Ships, 1967-1968* (N.Y., 1967), p. 146.

(31) There are a number of accounts of this event. One of the most informative is Commander R.D. Calvin's "Aftermath of the Elath," United States Naval Institute, *Proceedings* 95 (October, 1969), pp. 60-66.

(32) In addition to Egypt, Syria and Algeria have also been equipped with "Komar-class" PT boats and Styx-missiles. Since 1964 Egypt has also been receiving the more sophisticated "Osaclass" PT boat.

(33) These are the boats—five of them that made international headlines in December, 1969 when they were spirited out of France and brought to Israel.

(34) J. Taylor, comp. *Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1971-1972* (N.Y., 1971), p. 536.

(35) As cited in the *Rocky Mountain News*, March 18, 1972.

# THE ARAB STATES AND CHINA'S U.N. REPRESENTATION

Elias Sam'ó

The question of China's representation was before the United Nations, "since 1 October 1949 when salvoes from the guns in the Square of Celestial Peace in Peking announced to the whole world the triumph of the socialist revolution in China and the birth of the People's Republic of China."<sup>1</sup> In a cablegram dated 18 November, 1949, to the President of the General Assembly, Mr. Chou En-lai, the Foreign Minister of the Government of the People's Republic of China, repudiated the legal status of the National Chinese delegation and held that it could neither represent, nor speak for, the Chinese people in the United Nations. This question was first raised in the Security Council late in December, 1949, and at later dates in 1950, and then at the opening of the Fifth Session of the General Assembly. An Indian draft resolution which would have entitled the People's Republic of China "to represent the Republic of China in the General Assembly,"<sup>2</sup> was re-

jected by the Assembly by a roll-call vote. Two similar Russian-sponsored draft resolutions were also rejected by the Assembly.

Thus, the question of China's representation began a long and arduous journey which was to end finally on October 25, 1971, when the General Assembly by a roll-call vote of seventy-six in favor, thirty-five against and seventeen abstentions, decided "to restore all its rights to the People's Republic of China and to recognize the representatives of China to the United Nations, and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations related to it."<sup>3</sup>

For twenty-two years, the question of China's representation was debated in the General Assembly. The debates were lengthy and impassionate at times and acrimonious at others. From 1951 to 1960 the question was a procedural matter in which the de-



bates in the Assembly centered around a United States-backed proposal not to add the item to the agenda of the Assembly. In each session the proposal was adopted.

A second stage began in 1961 when the item was finally placed on the agenda of the Sixteenth Session. During this session the United States decided to drop its opposition because of the increased membership of the United Nations and the rise in support for considering the China question.<sup>4</sup> However, the United States successfully backed a resolution which made any change in the representation of China an "important question." Although this "important question" resolution required a simple majority for its passage, its adoption meant that the seating of the People's Republic would require a two-thirds majority. Subsequently, that same year, the Assembly rejected by a roll-call vote the U.S.S.R. draft resolution according to which the General Assembly would have seated the People's Republic delegation and removed the Nationalist delegation.

This procedure was repeated each year in the Assembly until the Twenty-Seventh Session in 1971. At this time the United States-backed resolution to make the question an "important question" was defeated, and the General Assembly adopted the twenty-three power draft resolution to seat the People's Republic and unseat the Nationalist delegation.<sup>5</sup>

When the last vote was taken on the question of China's representation, of the fourteen Arab states<sup>6</sup> eleven cast favorable votes, as opposed to only one unfavorable vote cast by Saudi Arabia, and two abstention votes cast by Jordan and Lebanon.<sup>7</sup> This was a far cry from the position taken by the Arab states on this question when it

was first introduced in the Assembly in 1950. During that session there were only six Arab members in the Organization. When a vote was taken on the Indian draft resolution to seat the delegate of the People's Republic, none of the Arab states voted for it, only Iraq opposed it, and the remaining five, Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen abstained.<sup>8</sup> Between these two extremes—from an almost unanimous abstention in 1950, to an almost unanimous support to seat the People's Republic in 1971—the Arab states went through various stages

This study analyzes the Arab states' voting behavior in the General Assembly on the question of China's representation. From this analysis, some answers may emerge concerning first, the general trends of the Arab states policy on this question, i.e. to identify the various stages these states went through during the twenty-one year period, second, the level of cohesion of these states on the question, i.e. to determine their bloc-like behavior and third, the degree of their participation, i.e. how active a role the Arab states played with regard to this question.

A total of nineteen roll-call votes were selected for this study all of which were taken in the Plenary Sessions. One vote was taken in 1950 on the Indian draft resolution to seat the People's Republic of China. Eight votes were taken during the 1951-60 period on the procedural question: not to place the item on the agenda. The remaining ten votes were taken during the 1961-71 period on the substantive question: to seat the delegation of the People's Republic and unseat the Nationalist's delegation.<sup>9</sup> Table I gives the Arab states voting record on this question during the whole period

Table I

The Arab States' Votes on the Question of China's Representation †

	50	52	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	65	66	67	68	69	70	71
Algeria											F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Egypt	A	U	A	A	F	F	F	F	F	F	F*	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Iraq	U	U	U	U	U	U	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Jordan					A	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	A
Kuwait														A	A	A	A	A	F
Lebanon	A	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Libya					A	U	A	A	A	U	U	U	A	U	A	A	F	F	F
Morocco					U	U	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	A	A	F	F	F	F
Saudi Arabia	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	U		U	U	U	U
So. Yemen																F	F	F	F
Sudan					F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Syria	A	A	A	A	F	F	#	#	#	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Tunisia					A	A	A	A	A	F	F	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F
Yemen	A	A	A	A	F	F	F	F	F	F	U	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F

F: favorable to the People's Republic.

U: unfavorable to the People's Republic.

A: abstention.

†Only the Arab states who were members of the United Nations for at least one full year are included. Thus Bahrain and Qatar are excluded.

\*Although the Egyptian delegate did not participate in the vote, he made a speech during the course of the debate in support of the People's Republic.

#Syria was part of the United Arab Republic during these years.

The method used in this analysis was originally developed by Professor Thomas Hovet in his pioneering work, *Bloc Politics in the United Nations*.<sup>10</sup> However, since Hovet's method was used to analyze a large number of votes, it was modified to take into account the more limited number of nineteen roll-call votes under consideration. Three terms will be used to describe the nature of the voting cohesion of the Arab states in the United Nations on the question of China's representation: "unity," "solidarity," and "divided" votes. "Unity" votes denote the number of Arab states voting identically on a roll-call vote provided that this number constitutes a majority or plurality of these states. For example, if six Arab states of a total of ten, voted in favor of a draft resolution, the level of "unity" of the group would be six out of ten or sixty per cent. If we further assume, in the previous example, that three of the remaining four states abstained, while the fourth one opposed the draft resolution, the level of "solidarity" votes would be nine out of ten—three plus six—or ninety per cent. Thus solidarity votes are the "unity" votes plus the number of those states who declined to agree or disagree completely with the majority (or plurality), thus casting abstaining votes. The "divided" votes, on the other hand, occur when some members disagree with the "unity" group, thus casting their votes against that position.<sup>11</sup>

Table II shows the various levels of cohesion of the Arab states on the question of China's representation.

The U column represents the level of unity of the Arab states during every session in which a roll-call vote was taken on the question. The S column represents the level of their solidarity. Column D represents the percentages of the Arab states

who disagree with the majority. These same percentages are represented in Figure I.

Tables I and II and Figure I show the various stages of development of the Arab states voting behavior on this question. They indicate three stages in the Arab states' voting behavior during the twenty-one year period.

The first stage which lasted from 1950 to 1955 could be described as a period of "passive unity." It was a reflection of the Arab states perceptions of their role in the international political arena. During this period a large segment of the Arab people were still under western colonial rule. Even the sovereign Arab states, though politically independent, had not yet broken away from the tutelage or influence of their former colonial rulers in particular and the West in general. Although their relations with the West were beginning to deteriorate, the socialist world had not yet made its move in the area, and its doors seemed closed to the Arabs. For the Arabs it was a period of uncertainty. They seemed ambivalent and cautious as demonstrated through their voting behavior on the Chinese question. Most of them refused to get involved in this question which had become a symbol of the cold war rivalry and declined to take positions. Thus, for the most part, the Arab states abstained during the voting process and rarely participated in the debates. For example, in 1950, five of the six Arab states abstained on the question. Although only three of six states abstained in 1952, the number of abstentions rose in 1954 and 1955 to four out of six in both years. What is perhaps as important as their voting behavior during this first period was their almost unanimous lack of participation in the debates in the General Assembly on the procedural question of placing the item on


Table II

Arab States Cohesion on  
the Question of China's Representation

	U	S	D
Year	unity %	solidarity %	divided %
1950	83	100	0
1952	50	100	0
1954	67	100	0
1955	67	100	0
1956	36	73	27
1957	45	64	36
1958	50	80	20
1959	50	80	20
1960	50	80	20
1961	64	82	18
1962	58	75	25
1963	58	83	17
1965	58	92	8
1966	46	77	23
1967	50	92	8
1968	57	86	14
1969	64	86	14
1970	64	86	14
1971	79	93	7

Figure I

The Arab States' Cohesion on the Question of China's Representation



U: unity; S: solidarity; D: divided

the agenda. During this period no Arab delegate spoke on this question<sup>12</sup> except for Mr. Al-Jamali, the Iraqi delegate, who raised a point of order concerning the procedures followed in the Assembly with regard to the question of China. He further noted: "In the view of my delegation, the best thing to do is to postpone the discussion of the subject for this session."<sup>13</sup> Due to this sense of uncertainty and cautiousness the Arab states followed a "hands-off" policy on this question.

The second period, 1956-57, which could be described as a period of "active disunity" was a reflection of the Arab states' perception of their new role in the international scene. If the post World War I period signaled the beginning of the Arab awakening, and the post World War II period witnessed the achievement of political independence for many Arab states, the 1955-56 period signaled the rise of Pan-Arabism and its liberation from great power tutelage. This period which was probably the most important and intense period for the Arabs in the post WWII era, was initiated by the Baghdad Pact. Patrick Seale notes:

to many Arabs the West seemed the main obstacle to the independence, unity, and reform of their homeland. A defense pact [Baghdad] directed against Russia, such as the West was insistently advocating, seemed both a distraction from their local quarrel with Israel and a new form of veiled colonialism. Under pressure to join, they retreated into neutralism.<sup>14</sup>

While the opposition to the Baghdad Pact was an anti-western anti-imperialist step, the Arabs needed a positive move for liberation. This was proved by the Bandung

conference and Czech arms deal. Again to quote Seale:

In Arab eyes, Bandung and the arms deal represented a victory for the forces of good over the forces of evil as seen in the Baghdad Pact, the Gaza raid, and in French arms deliveries to Israel . . . non-alignment was no longer merely conceived as a guarantee of sovereignty, as Nehru taught, but had become a positive instrument in the continuing struggle against imperialism.<sup>15</sup>

While the West was closing its doors to the Arabs, the socialists were opening theirs. Simultaneously the Arabs were gaining greater confidence in themselves and flexibility and maneuverability in their relations with the world. The West retaliated against this and the Arabs reciprocated. In July 1956, the United States withdrew its offer to lend Egypt funds to partially finance the first stage of the Aswan Dam. Nasser's response was the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. The western moves and Arab counter moves created an upward spiral in the deterioration of relations between them reaching a climax in October, with the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt. "The 1956 invasion," notes John Badeau, "was the most disastrous piece of post war Western diplomacy in the Middle East."<sup>16</sup> It was commonly believed in the Arab world, notes Charles Cremeans, "that the attack was directed not against Egypt alone but against all Arabs, or, more specifically, against Arab nationalism."<sup>17</sup> Even the rise of American popularity in the Arab world due to her opposition to the tripartite invasion was short-lived. Early in January 1957, President Eisenhower proclaimed a new American policy for the

Middle East. This new policy, known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, was viewed by many Arabs as further evidence of American imperialist intentions in the Arab world. Simultaneously there was an increase in the rivalry among the Arab governments. Cairo and Baghdad were the centers of this rivalry. The former under the leadership of Nasser was opting to move further toward Pan-Arabism and non-alignment. The latter under the leadership of Nuri es-Said was trying to freeze the waning pro-western *status quo*.

The rise of anti-western sentiments and inter-Arab rivalry was reflected in the Arab states' voting behavior on the Chinese question. Their behavior on this question during this second period had two characteristics. First, it was a period of active participation on the part of the Arab states on the Chinese question in terms of both taking a definite voting position—either pro- or con- and actively participating in the debates on this question. Unlike the previous period in which the preponderance of the Arab states abstained during the voting on the question (five of six in 1950, four of six in 1955), in 1956 sixty-four per cent of the Arab states took definite positions on the question, and the remaining thirty-six per cent abstained. In 1957, eighty-two per cent of the Arab states took positions and only eighteen per cent abstained. (The corresponding figures for 1950 were almost exactly the reverse. In that year eighty-three per cent abstained while only seventeen per cent took a position on the question.) The Arab states' active role on this question was also indicated by their participation in the debates. While no Arab state participated in the debates on this question during the first four years, 1951-54, and only the Iraqi delegate spoke in 1955, three Arab states participated in the debates in 1956. The

Iraqi delegate, in voting against placing the item on the agenda stated: "We have no proof that Communist China represents the Chinese people." He further noted: "Nothing has happened since last year which would lead us to change our stand."<sup>18</sup> The Sudanese delegate observed that, "...the solution of the question of the representation of China is one of the factors which will contribute to the establishment of world peace." He went on to say: "The General Assembly will be failing in its duty if it does not consider this problem and give a decision on whether or not the People's Republic of China should be admitted to this body."<sup>19</sup> The Syrian delegate was more explicit in stating his Government's position on this question. He noted: "In previous sessions, when the same question was under consideration, my country found it fit to abstain in the vote. Since the last session, however, my Government came to the conclusion that the Central People's Government governs China effectively and is, for all international purposes, the proper Government of the great Chinese people."<sup>20</sup>

The second characteristic of this period was the disunity among the Arab states on this question. Unlike the first period, in 1956 there was no united majority; only pluralities. Thirty-six per cent of the Arab states favored placing the item on the agenda, twenty-seven per cent opposed it, and thirty-six per cent abstained. Similarly, in 1957, thirty-six per cent favored placing the item on the agenda, forty-five per cent opposed it, and eighteen per cent abstained. Thus during this second period, the Arab states assumed a more active role on the China question in terms of taking definite voting positions as well as participating in the debates. However, their level of cohesion declined markedly, and their disunity became more pronounced.

The third period, which began in 1958 and lasted until the rancorous end in 1971, could be characterized as a movement toward "active solidarity." This period was initiated by the unification of Syria and Egypt into the United Arab Republic, followed by the Lebanese civil war in the spring of 1958, and the over-throw of the Iraqi monarchy in July of 1958. The western response was the landing of American and British troops in Lebanon and Jordan respectively. "From 1959 onwards," notes Malcolm Kerr, "the crucial decisions governing Arab affairs lay in Arab hands."<sup>21</sup>

Although these events lead to further inter-Arab political polarization, in the United Nations there was a rise in Arab states' unity and solidarity and an increase in participation in the debates on the China question. The level of unity votes, below fifty per cent during 1956 and 1957 (thirty-six and forty-five per cent respectively), climbed to fifty-five per cent in 1958. Similarly, the level of solidarity votes rose to eighty-two per cent in the same year. This substantial rise in both unity and solidarity votes was caused by three Arab states changing their positions on the question. Iraq, which had consistently opposed placing the item on the agenda, changed in favor of its inclusion. The Iraqi delegate asserted during the debates on this question in 1958 that: "The Government of the People's Republic of China is the only Government that can claim authority over the huge country of China and its population. . ." The delegate concluded that ". . . the inclusion of the question of the representation of this great country in the agenda of the General Assembly is both appropriate and necessary."<sup>22</sup> Similarly, Morocco changed from opposing to favoring the inclusion of the item. Libya, which was the least consistent of the Arab states on the question,

having changed her position six times between 1956 and 1969, abstained in 1958.

The level of Arab unity and solidarity during the following thirteen years, (1958-71) was never to drop below fifty per cent and seventy-five per cent respectively except for 1966 when the level of unity was forty-six per cent. In fact, in 1971, the level of unity was seventy-nine per cent, the highest since 1950, and the level of solidarity was ninety-three per cent, the highest since 1955.<sup>23</sup> During this period the Arab states participated increasingly in the debates on this question. Also a growing number of Arab states' delegates argued in favor of seating the Government of the People's Republic of China, and some of these delegates sponsored resolutions to this effect. Interestingly, the Arab states who opposed the seating of the People's Republic of China rarely participated in the debates.

This study reveals that the general trend of the Arab states' policy on the question of China's representation was toward a higher level of cohesion and participation in favor of the right of the People's Republic of China to occupy its seat in the United Nations. This policy went through three stages. The first, which lasted until 1955, was characterized by a high level of cohesion but a low level of participation in terms of both voting and speaking on the question. During the second period, which lasted until 1958, the characteristics were reversed. The Arab states' level of cohesion dropped, while the degree of their participation increased. During the third period, which lasted from 1958 to the end in 1971, the level of cohesion and the degree of participation went hand in hand: both were rising—with few exceptions. Although the Arab states demonstrated a fairly high level of cohesion, especially in the later years, it was by no means overwhelming.<sup>24</sup>



The Arab states' policy on this question, as it was on many other questions, was influenced by various factors. First, the Arab states, as well as most Afro-Asian states, conceive the United Nations to be a universal and non-exclusive organization. For these states, an effective United Nations could better protect and serve their interests. However, for the United Nations to be effective, the third major power — China — would have to be represented in the Organization. To the Arab states China is an Asian revolutionary state, which supports national liberation fronts and the rights of people for self-determination and opposes colonialism and imperialism. Such a state is a potential supporter, particularly in the arena of superpower confrontation and cooperation.

Second, the nature of the Arab states' relations with the great powers significantly influenced their voting behavior on the China question. In the early 50's, although the Arab states were closely associated with the western powers, they nevertheless resisted the temptation to get involved in the cold war, for which the Chinese question had become a symbol. Thus they abstained, trying not to antagonize either camp and hoping to avoid becoming entangled in the webs of the cold war. In later years the Arab states' foreign policy had two goals: to curtail the western influence in the region, and simultaneously to expand their scope of international relations to include the socialist camp. The rise of anti-

western sentiments and feelings among the Arabs was symbolized by their opposition to the Baghdad Pact, indignation at the American refusal to help finance the Aswan Dam, and outrage at the tripartite aggression.

While the western presence and influence were being curtailed in the region, the Arabs were increasing their contact with the socialist camp. Diplomatically, the Arabs were receiving strong socialist support on such Arab issues as Palestine, Algeria, Suez, and Southern Arabia. Economically, trade relations were being established, and increasing amounts of economic aid and technical assistance were being offered by the socialists to their Arab friends. Militarily, the Arabs received substantial amounts of modern weaponry from the socialist camp. The socialist offers were reciprocated, among other things, by a rise in the number of Arab states recognizing the Government of the People's Republic of China, and supporting her right to occupy the China seat in the United Nations.<sup>25</sup>

Thus, individual Arab states in the United Nations are subject to various pressures as demonstrated by their voting behaviors on the China question. The two most important sources of pressure are the Arab group and the superpowers. Each Arab state operates within a context in which she must reconcile these two sources of pressure and simultaneously serve her particular interests.

## NOTES

1 The Albanian Representative. General Assembly Official Record (GAOR), Eighteenth Session, 1242nd Plenary Mtg., 16 Oct. 1963, p. 1.

2 GAOR: Fifth Session, 277th Plenary Mtg., 19 Sept. 1950, p. 2.

3 *United Nations Monthly Chronicle*. November 1971, p. 61.

4 While in 1952 only seven members were in favor of consideration and forty-two were opposed with eleven abstentions, in 1960, thirty-four members favored consideration and forty-two were opposed with twenty-seven abstentions. Winberg Chai. "China and the United Nations: Problems of Representation and Alternatives." *Asian Survey*, Vol. X, No 5, 1970, p. 401.

5 It should be noted that for the years 1962 and 1963, the question of China's representation was not made an "important question." Hence a simple majority would have sufficed for the seating of the People's Republic.

6 Only the Arab states which have been a member of the United Nations for at least one full year, were included in this study. Thus Bahrain and Qatar were not included. Both of these states abstained on the twenty-three power draft resolution.

7 Although the Saudi Arabian delegate cast an unfavorable vote, he was not opposed to the seating of the People's Republic, but to that part of the draft resolution expelling the representation of Chiang Kai-shek from the Organization. In fact the Saudi delegate submitted a proposal which would in effect have restored the China seat to the People's Republic with the condition that Nationalist China would retain her seat in the United Nations as a separate state. Also, Lebanon's abstention was due to the same reason. *United Nations Monthly Chronicle*, November 1971, pp. 35 and 60.

8 GAOR: Fifth Session, 277th Plenary Mtg., 19 Sept. 1950, p. 15.

9 No roll-call votes were taken on this question in the Assembly during the Sixth, Eighth, and Nineteenth Sessions.

10 Thomas Hovet Jr., *Bloc Politics in the United Nations*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1960). A multiplicity

of methods for the study of bloc voting behavior have been "Bloc voting in the General Assembly," *International Organization*, (Feb. 1951). For more recent works in the field see Hanna Newcombe, Michael Ross, and Alan G. Newcombe, "United Nations Voting Patterns," *International Organization*, (Winter 1969-70); Jack E. Vincent, "The Convergence of Voting and Attitude Patterns at the United Nations", *The Journal of Politics*, (Nov. 1969); Edward T. Rowe, "Changing Patterns in the Voting Success of Member States in the United Nations General Assembly: 1945-1966," *International Organization*, (Spring 1969); James E. Todd, "An Analysis of Security Council Voting Behavior," *The Western Political Quarterly*, (Mar. 1969); Bruce M. Russett, "Discovering Voting Groups in the United Nations," *The American Political Science Review*, (June 1966); Hayward R. Alker, Jr., "Dimensions of Conflict in the the General Assembly," *The American Political Science Review*, (Summer 1964); Arend Lijphart, "The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly: A Critique and a Proposal," *The American Political Science Review*, (Dec. 1963); Leroy N. Rieselbach, "Quantitative Techniques for Studying Voting Behavior in the UN General Assembly," *International Organization*, (Spring 1960).

11 *Ibid.*, pp 49-51. The author recognizes the fact that various criticisms have been raised with regard to the usefulness of Hovet's and other similar approaches, especially when the results are used to compare the level of cohesion of different blocs of various sizes. However, the purpose of this paper is not to compare the level of cohesion of the Arab states to that of other blocs, but rather to study the development of their policy on the Chinese question.

12 The assertions with regard to participation of the Arab states in the debates on the Chinese question is based exclusively on research into the General Assembly Official Record.

13 GAOR: Tenth Session, 516th Plenary Mtg., 20 Sept. 1955, p. 8. It should be noted that the Syrian delegate, the late Mr. Faris El-Khoury during the debate on the Chinese question in the Assembly in 1950, proposed that the Assembly postpone the taking of a vote on the question until the following day.

14 Patrick Seale, *The Struggle for Syria*, (London, Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 231.

15 *Ibid.*, p. 236.

16 John Badeau, *The American Approach to the Arab World*, (New York, Harper and Row, 1968), p. 7.

17 Charles Cremins, *The Arabs and the World: Nasser's Arab Nationalist Policy*, (London, Praeger, 1963), p. 13.

18 GAOR: Eleventh Session, 579th Plenary Mtg., 15 Nov. 1956, p. 57.

19 *Ibid.*, 580th Plenary Mtg., 16 Nov. 1956, p. 73.

20 *Ibid.*

21 Malcolm Kerr, *The Arab Cold War 1958-1967*, 2nd ed., (New York, Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 7.

22 GAOR: Thirteenth Session, 75th Plenary Mtg., 23 Sept. 1958, pp. 94, 95.

23 See footnote 7.

24 The Arab states have demonstrated higher levels of cohesion on questions in which they were directly involved, i.e., Palestine, UNEF and Algeria, or on questions which were not within the context of superpower competition, i.e. apartheid in the Republic of South Africa, the status of South West Africa and the questions of trust territories. For further information see this author's doctoral dissertation: *The Arab States in the United Nations: A Study in Voting Behavior*. (The American University, Washington, D.C.) 1967.

25 For analysis of the Sino-Arab relations see Joseph E. Khalili, "Sino-Arab Relations," *Asian Survey*, (August 1968); George S. Masannat, "Sino-Arab Relations", *Asian Survey*, (April 1966).



# The Role of an African Defense Strategy: An Essay in Geopolitics

David R.W. Jones

Academic global geopoliticians have traditionally denied any strategic significance to the African continent, seeing it neither as the seat of a major power nor as a "shatter-zone" where such great powers conflict. Saul B. Cohen<sup>1</sup> conceived of Africa as being unable to achieve continental geopolitical unity, while extracting Egypt and the Sudan into his "Middle East Shatterbelt" and the Maghreb into a unit with "Maritime Europe". Nonetheless, several geopolitical approaches do exist which allot considerable importance to the control of Africa, and which are more consonant with the massive post-World War II influx of West European capital. One of the most influential of these theories, but ignored by most of the literature, was devised by Sir Oswald Mosley, pre-war leader of the British Union of Fascists.

Mosley's global concepts were expounded in 1950;

"My original suggestion to secure natural spheres of influence for three power blocs in a realistic equilibrium was the linking of North with South America; of Europe, home and overseas, with Africa; of the Soviet powers with Asia."<sup>2</sup>

This concept had emerged from his earlier (1948) Mosley-Pirow<sup>3</sup> proposals for a partition of Africa into "white and black" areas wherein the white areas were to include the East African highlands, most of southern Africa, and the Maghreb. The latter was seen as a "safe bridgehead to Africa, where lay enormous possibilities for the whole European future"<sup>4</sup> and Mosley under-

standably supported the French in Algeria to the bitter end. The position of the Arabs in this schema was as a string of intermediary states, wherein European and Soviet blocs could compete for influence, but which would essentially be funnels for European influence to penetrate Africa.

This short essay similarly accepts the geopolitical importance of African and the Arab north, and is based on a number of hypotheses which can be briefly stated as;

- \* Africa, by virtue of the massive influx of foreign capital, the rapid discovery of significant mineral reserves, and its international political weight, has already become a field for competition between North American, West European, Far Eastern and East European powers.
- \* Africa may well be seen as the next suitable area for the conduct of mini-wars provoked and supplied by non-African powers.
- \* The vast majority of Africans prefer to envision a future that is not influenced by either of the preceding propositions.

We have rejected the dependent assumption that Africa can afford to remain demilitarized.

#### *The Current Military Position*

At present, sub-Saharan Africa is totally defenceless, to an extent unparalleled anywhere else in the world. A breakdown of the number of military helicopters in use in 1970 may be used as an index.

Exactly similar patterns emerge in the disposition of tanks, warships military aircraft and other forms of material. Even

the numbers of regular infantrymen in no real sense change the picture, except that the more technologically-advanced states of South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal can make do with a lower proportion of men per unit of military hardware. Map I shows the size, in men, of a number of African armies.

Table 1. *Military Helicopters in Africa in 1970*

A. The Arab North	234
Morocco	17
Algeria	40
Tunisia	6
Libya	20
UAR (Egypt)	141
Sudan	10
B. The Minority Regimes	242
South Africa	117
* Portugal	117
Rodesia	8
C. The Rest of Africa	113
Central African Republic	1
Chad	1
Congo	1
Zaire	32
Ethiopia	19
Gabon	3
Ghana	9
Guinea	1
Ivory Coast	6
Kenya	2
Malgasy Republic	4
Nigeria	3
Senegal	2
Togo	1
Zambia	5

Source: *Flight International*, 7 October 1971, pp. 574-581.

\* Portugal is included by virtue of its heavy military involvement in Africa.

Distinct patterns emerge from current African military statistics;

- \* The ex-French colonies of sub-Saharan Africa show the lowest level of military preparedness.
- \* U.S. interest in Zaire and Ethiopia has given these two countries relatively well-equipped forces.
- \* The ex-British colonies have levels of preparedness up to 3 times that of the ex-French colonies.
- \* The Arab north, in spite of weak spots, e.g. Tunisia, represents the only serious military concentration outside Southern Africa.
- \* South Africa has a military force much superior to its neighbours. Sub-Saharan Africa, possessing diminutive armed forces, finds its position further weakened by three factors;
- \* Limited and obsolescent equipment
- \* The heavy use of military forces in administration and police duties
- \* An almost total lack of inter-African cooperation.

Thus unprotected, at least by its own forces, sub-Saharan Africa presents a power vacuum in terms of classical strategic analysis. More significantly, in modern terms, it is subject to wanton interference by even third-rate military powers such as South Africa and Portugal. The object of this paper, then, is to examine the costs and possibilities of creating a defensive shield *capable of at least preventing armed interference in domestic African political processes*. Defense against a serious attack

by a major power is not seen as feasible given the present level of African incomes.

### *Political Pre-requisites to the Creation of a United Command*

Lasting defense pacts between poor nations have not been achieved so far in the long and tortuous history of human violence. Even the modern military pacts and organizations such as NATO, SEATO and the Warsaw Pact cloak client-patron relationships, with current Nixon doctrine in Asia transforming the client states into a collection of forward pawns in a metropolitan defense strategy.

Thus, a realizable programme for African military integration would necessarily be minimal, both in terms of its objectives and its effects on national sovereignty. A severe budgetary constraint must also be recognized. The main, and generally acceptable, goal would therefore best be defined as the exclusion of non-African military interference. Three, and three only, impositions would then be made on each individual African government, relating to the following areas;

- \* The right to accept or purchase hardware from non-African sources
  - \* The right to commission advice or training from non-African sources
  - \* The right to share intelligence with non-African networks.
- Each of these would clearly require a degree of control to be exercised by a permanent committee, in that deviance from an agreed policy would imply that the state concerned had deliberately created a gap in the collective defense sys-

tem that could only be cauterized at considerable expense. Of the three areas, the last would clearly be the most important,<sup>6</sup> and it is only in this respect that counter-intelligence officers of an All-African defence organization would need to be stationed in the various member states.

### *The Air Shield*

The first step in erecting an effective air shield involves the removal of continental and offshore airbases and airstrips capable of being used by non-African forces. This is clearly not yet possible in the case of the south European bases, or the South African bases, although Libya's 1971-1972 attempt to neutralize Malta is a positive step. The important bases still held by powers potentially hostile to African states are;

1. Spain; Ceuta, Melilla (Morocco)
2. Spain; El Aioun (Spanish Sahara)
3. Spain; Canary Islands
4. Portugal; Bases in Mozambique, Angola, Cabinda and Guinea
5. Portugal; Cape Verde Islands, Sao Tome and Principe, Azores (U.S.)
6. Britain; Ascension; St. Helena
7. Britain; Indian Ocean Territory, incl. Seychelles
8. France; Comoro Islands, Djibouti

A second step, to follow the removal of non-African bases from the continent and offshore, would comprise the interdiction of portions of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans to military vessels. The 12-mile limit, and the South American 200-mile

limit are both designed to protect natural marine resources; neither of them are effective in interdicting air strikes from carrier vessels or missile strikes from surface vessels or submarines. A realistic target given the present level of technology would be to declare a 500-mile zone prohibited to foreign warships and submarines. This would make the use of helicopters immensely risky, as few have a range in excess of 500 miles; e.g.

AH-1	HueyCobra	420 miles
SH-2D	Seasprite	480 miles
CH-47	Chinook	220 miles

Similarly, the risk of overland combat and resultant fuel problems would make use of both V/Stol craft, such as the Harrier, and conventional aircraft carrier-based planes less likely.

Given a situation where staging points for military aircraft are, except for the northern tier and the South African front, at least 500 miles from the continent, a relatively cheap surveillance system backed by strategically placed interceptor squadrons would suffice to deprive any invading force of appreciable air cover.

Map 2 illustrates a simplified model for an air-shield. The sectoral divisions are determined by range and interception time, and are roughly equivalent in area to Japan's three-sector "Badge" system. Interception capabilities are concentrated most heavily in sectors facing the south European and South African bases, and give way to aerial reconnaissance in the seaward extensions. Complete tactical radar systems, such as those packaged and marketed by electronics firms such as Marconi, would be necessary in the more concentrated sectors, while oversea and ASW (Anti-sub-

marine warfare) surveillance could be as effectively and more cheaply carried out by a small force of Lockheed S-3A planes or their equivalent, even though these are expensive units.

Map 1 demonstrates that offshore air-strips, such as those on Ascension and Mauritius, would be vital anchor points in an effective air surveillance system.

The classical geopolitical concept of the heartland may have relevance to Africa, in that a relatively safe inland base or bases would be preferable as the site for an overall control centre, housing nothing more complex than, say, an H 330 B digital computer to process data fed in from three-dimensional radar installations.

The cost of an interceptor force adequate for incursions of the scope outlined in this paper need not be excessive. Thus, some 300 modern Mirage Mach-2 interceptors could be purchased for \$ 300 m. Alternate planes, such as the highly manoeuvrable Soviet Su-11, are currently deployed in the United Republic against the Israeli threat, and might be obtainable on even more favourable terms.

The total capital cost of an adequate air-shield for the African continent would be in the nature of \$ 770 m. broken down as;

* Interceptor aircraft	\$300 m.
* S-3A or similar ASW aircraft	\$70 m.
* Multi-sector complete tactical radar system	\$200 m.
* Ground installations and armaments	\$200 m.

Optional extras would be surface-to-air missile systems. These, however, are not

likely to cost less \$150 m. *per year*, and already escalate African defence capabilities to a level approaching one needed to repel a major attack by a major power, which is not anticipated in this model.

### *Ground Defences*

Again, in order not to intrude an all-African defence force into domestic politics and even inter-African warfare, the shield concept should be applied, i.e. the main role would be to prevent penetration from outside the continent, or from South Africa. There are thus two main areas of concern.

- \* prevention of land attacks, e.g. across the Sinai Bridge, or from South Africa
- \* prevention of seaborne landings on the African coastline.

In the first case, tanks and supporting aircraft could be expected to spearhead any movement of troops or supplies into Africa. An anti-tank system would thus be the natural complement to the air shield already discussed. Here, the cost of African tank forces would be astronomical, and not necessarily effective, as was demonstrated in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Infinitely cheaper, and probably more effective would be the supply of large numbers of anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, such as Aerospatiale's new HOT missile, for which is claimed an over 90% hit ratio at distances of 4000 yards in unfavourable weather conditions. These can be launched from helicopters, tanks and ground emplacements, and can be re-deployed rapidly. Smaller wire-guided anti-tank projectiles, such as are manufactured by almost every arms-producing country, should become standard equipment for African infantry units in the "tank-prone" areas.



A second line of defence could be provided by regular forces trained and concentrated in one or more inland base areas, selected for their distance from the sea and for reasons of natural protection. The Hombori mountains of Mali, the Ruwenzori Mts. and other massifs offer themselves readily to the geopolitician. A corollary system of infiltration routes to coastal areas should be prepared well in advance, thus assuring any attacked African state of an eventual stiffening from well-equipped troops should any prolonged occupation be attempted by a non-African power. Such a pattern of rear-area concentration also has the advantage of keeping all African forces sufficiently removed from the various national forces. These suggestions are also incorporated in Map 1.

In the areas most prone to attack, i.e. the coastal areas, the current Yugoslav concept of a protracted "people's war" is probably the most viable, and would serve to heighten the political consciousness of the African villagers during the preparation stage.

Currently only Egypt and Algeria possess any significant arms-manufacturing capability, with Egypt having reached an advanced stage in rocket technology and electronics. As early as 1957 the UAR was producing serviceable "burp guns" together with their ammunition, and during the Lebanese Civil War of 1958 Beirut mechanics' shops were producing an impressive array of light arms and ammunition. The overall low level of technology in most of sub-Saharan Africa, however, precludes any serious contribution along these lines in an emergency situation, thus necessitating the implantation of small-arms and ammunition plants and technical training centres. Difficulties of external supply

other than through the immediately proximate seaport, the most likely point for an invasion, make domestic arms production especially important in Africa. This, together with village "self-defense" methods, appears to be the basic requirement in preparing for a "people's war" riposte to external aggression.

Formally-constituted militias, as a complement and occasionally as a counter-weight to standing military forces, must remain the decision of individual governments because of the delicate political balances involved. In any event, these need not be centrally co-ordinated by an all-African command.

#### *The Arab Role*

Consistent attempts have been made, initially by European administrations and latterly by a number of ideological tendencies within sub-Saharan Africa, to drive a wedge between the Arab north and black Africa. The two major levers have been the traditional slave trade, and the influence of Levantine merchants in a number of mainly West African economies. Successes in this strategy have included the Anya-Nya rebellion in the southern Sudan, and the civil war in Chad. Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Ethiopia are all subject to similar tensions. By 1971, the Anya-Nya position in the southern Sudan had hardened appreciably;

"For hundreds of years Southern Sudan was a hunting-ground for Arab slave-traders from the North whose raids into the area spread death and destruction among the local population. The four million people of Southern Sudan belong ethnically, linguistically and culturally to black Africa."<sup>6</sup>

In their search for sub-Saharan allies, the Anya-Nya and other Southern Sudanese political organizations had begun to oppose any concept of African unity that would include any of the North African countries;

"Since the Arabs of North Africa seem to look to the Middle East rather than southwards down to the Sahara, are they not likely to be caught in a clash of loyalties between Pan-Arabism and African unity?"<sup>7</sup>

A recent example of the continuing attempt to sow divisions along racial lines emerges in Alfred Gerteiny's *Mauritania*, where he refers to the Fulbe, Bambara, Toucouleur and other minorities as;

"a permanent Black African bridgehead in what has become the southernmost part of white Africa in the west"<sup>8</sup>

Further south, the attempted division is along religious lines, where Islam is confronted by Christianized and animist populations. This conflict has reached serious proportions in Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Camerouns

Thus, the major political task of the Arab north, as well as of continent-minded black Africans, would be to defuse these potential and actual conflicts. The March, 1972, agreement between the Sudanese government and southern Sudanese organizations must be seen as a major gain. Algeria's consistent posture as an African power, as well as that country's continued hosting of African exile organizations should also be seen as a positive stance

A secondary task would lie in combined diplomatic pressure to remove the off-

shore and continental bases or potential bases still remaining in non-African hands. Primarily, the Indian Ocean Territory, which is a fully militarized UK-US threat to the Middle East and South Asia as well as to East Africa, must be dismembered, preferably to be placed under UN trusteeship. Similarly, the British South Atlantic possessions, although currently at a very low level of military preparedness, should also be removed from that country's sphere of influence regardless of the exaggerated loyalty the handful of inhabitants may feel towards Britain. The two main French bases in Africa, the Comoro Islands and Djibouti, are disfunctional as francophone Africa lies on the other side of the continent. Their continued control by France is understandable only as way-stations to the still important Oceanic possessions of New Caledonia and the New Hebrides. Djibouti is held politically only because of the antagonism felt by more northerly Muslim tribes to the Somali minority; here Arab intercession could be instrumental in forging a common front against continued French control

Continued support is also necessary to bolster PAIGC's position that the Cape Verde Islands are part of Guinea (Bissau), and to oppose their possible separation.<sup>9</sup> Finally, Spanish commercial interests in Africa have now grown to such a proportion that they may be used as a lever to pressure Spain's withdrawal from its African bases.

A third important role is the provision of the northern edge of Africa's air shield for the Sahara is no longer a real barrier to cargo and troop-carrying aircraft. Even the heavy Guppy — 201 vehicle carrier now has a range of 2000 miles. The nascent Arab air defenses require immediate

strengthening, and a degree of co-ordination similar to that of Japan or Australia. Added costs of two additional air-defense sectors covering the Red Sea and Somalia can be avoided if the growing US presence in the Persian Gulf is checked by concerted diplomatic activity.

### *Conclusions*

In geopolitical terms, Africa is rapidly being converted into an arena for competing non-African powers. The intensity of the conflict is greater than in other developing areas, as it involves European antagonisms that are no longer a serious factor in the Caribbean, South America, Southern Asia and the Middle East. Chinese, Soviet and various East European interests are

also active to a degree of complexity matched only in South Asia, while a Japanese trade offensive is building up rapidly. Paradoxically, the sheer pressure of external interests with its concomitant political interference may mean that a favourable situation may soon exist for the creation of an all-African defense formula with limited objectives, such as that outlined in this paper. Whether or not the divisiveness induced by a situation of intense non-African involvement can be overcome, the initial tactical moves should be undertaken to lay the basis for a continental defense system. It is here that the Arab role can be decisive, in the exercise of concerted diplomatic efforts, in the supply of training facilities, and in the maintenance of a serviceable northern air-defense shield.

## NOTES

1 Saul B. Cohen, *Geography and Politics in a World Divided*, Random House, 1963.

2 Sir Oswald Mosley, *My Life*, Nelson, 1968, p. 469.

3 Oswald Prow, an extreme right-wing South African of German descent was Minister of Defense in that country in 1939.

4 Mosley, *op. cit.*, p. 471.

5 A growing belief exists that this same

consideration triggered the Warsaw Pact intrusion into Czechoslovakia.

6 *An Appeal from the People of Southern Sudan to the Nations of the World*, flysheet distributed by Anya-Nya National Organization, circa 1970.

7 *Grass Curtain*, Vol. 1, No. 2, August 1970, p. 2.

8 Alfred G. Gerteiny, *Mauritania*, Pall Mall, 1967, p. 88.

# Documents:

## INTRODUCTION

E. Burke Inlow

In the years immediately prior to the Iranian Revolution of 1906, a large body of literature began to appear in Calcutta, Istanbul, Cairo, London and Paris which addressed itself critically to the conditions within the country of Iran. Censorship within the country made it impossible to print the materials within Iran itself. The names of many of these publications are well known but they are also significant in another way. *Hbu'l-Matin*, for example, which began publication in Calcutta in 1893, is a term which means "The Firm Bond." The appeal was the strength of purpose and unity of endeavour. *Parvarish*, emanating in Cairo between 1898-99, is a word meaning "education, training for living." In short, the publications, described in their titles, were directly concerned with particular aspects and needs seen by the authors to be essential for the rehabilitation of the corrupt and fearful government of Iran.

Two years ago I was in Iran for an extended visit, much of the time in Tehran. The name *Yek Kalama* kept cropping up in conversations with professors at the University of Tehran and elsewhere. My interest in comparative legal theory was well known, and the few of my friends who knew of the document felt that it would be of great importance to me. It wasn't, however, available in bookstores and it was not on the shelves of the library — it was not even at that time listed in the file indices. However, persistence paid off and I finally came into possession of this document. It was all that I had been told it would be — perhaps

the most important single document to appear prior to the Revolution.

*Yek Kalama* made its appearance in 1871, a good 20 years before the great rash of revolutionary documents pertaining to Iran began to emerge from the underground. The title means "one word." That one word is law. In short, it was the first attempt on the part of an Iranian national to write and publish a creative study invoking the rule of law for Iran. It had two main objectives. The first was to reconcile the theory of the rule of law as that term is understood in the West with the law of Islam. The second was to make a critical analysis of the French law — which later, of course, formed the basis for the modernization of Iranian national law — thereby providing a comparative study which is both early and unique in the field of comparative law. The document, therefore, easily divides into 2 parts and it is the first half which is provided here in translation for the first time as being of more significant and general interest than the second half.

The author's name sets him in a pious Islamic tradition. His diplomatic assignments — first in Russia and then in France (with 4 trips to London) — broadened his education and converted him to a western orientation in the field of law and government. He was a keen observer and a clear analyst. Yet he remained a loyal son of Islam and in his task of reconciliation as between classic Islam and western modernization, he served both causes well. This is a remarkable document for its time and the wonder is that it has received so little notice from scholars.

E. Burke Inlow

RESOLEHYE MOSOOME BE  
YEK KALAM (ONE WORD)

Translated by E. Burke Inlow

In the name of the Great and Merciful God, I, Yousef, the son of God Blessed Haji Mirzakazem Tabrizi in the year of 1270 have been assigned as the counsel of Haji Tarkhan by the order of His Majesty the Shahinshah of Iran, Naseredin Shah, may God bless him. I resided there for eight years and in the year of 1278 with the permission of the Imperial Government of Iran, returned to Iran and had the honor of having an audience with His Majesty, the Shahinshah of Iran.

After staying seven months in Tehran I was ordered to return to Haji Tarkhan again. I stayed in Haji Tarkhan for three months and took a tour from there to Moscow and St. Petersburg. I performed my duties in the capacity of the charge-de-affaire of Iran in St. Petersburg for six months. Then in the year of 1280 (Hejri) I was honored by being given the position of general counsel of Teflis (Russia). I stayed there the whole of four years. While staying there witnessing the discipline of the army, comfort of the people, development of the country, I was wishing that my country, Iran, would have the same discipline of the army, comfort of the people, and development of the country. Toward the end of the year of 1283 I was assigned as the chargé d'affaires of the Imperial Iranian Government in Paris by the order of His Majesty. I went through Istanbul on route to my destination. I arrived in the city of Paris and saw the exposition of the year of 1267 (A.D.). During my three years of residence in Paris I visited London four times. I witnessed the fact that in France and England, the discipline of the army, the develop-

ment of the country, the wealth of people, the art and education, and comfort and freedom of the public is one hundred times more than what I witnessed in the previous country (Russia); and if one would not think I was exaggerating, I would say that what I saw in Russia was only a sample of the whole that I saw in the European countries. In my understanding, the discipline of the army, development of the country, and the comfort of the people is due to the presence of justice; as no kingdom, no wealth, no development can progress unless it is based on justice. As the saying goes, "No king can be a king without wealth; no wealth can be made without development; and there can be no development without justice."

I was sure that the cause of all this development was nothing but justice and the reason for all this wealth and comfort of the people is the fair policy of the government. I was thinking and saying to myself that even though the foundation of the Islamic religion is based on justice and fairness and even though in few verses of the Koran, the Holy Book of Islam, the Great God has admired justice and just men and the kings and rulers of Islam never denied justice; then why is our country so backward and underdeveloped and why are we so far away from the world of progress? I was thinking about these things for a whole day and the gravity of the thoughts tired me so that I fell asleep. I dreamed that someone from the West who was suspended between earth and sky was coming to the Islamic country (Iran) and shouting out loud, "You the residents of Islam, you the two callous leaders of Islam... Why are you so careless? Why don't you take lessons from the progress of other countries? Your neighbors have brought the wild residence of mountains into the

circle of civilization. And still you deny the progress of the European countries. In the smallest cities of your neighbor countries, there are hospitals and good schools for boys and girls but still there isn't one hospital or school in your greatest city. The alleys of the villages of your neighbor countries are smooth, orderly, and clean; but in your biggest and greatest cities the traffic is impossible due to the narrowness, the litter, and the many holes in the streets. They are building railroads in your neighbor countries; you still don't have secondary roads suitable for horse and carriage traffic. Your neighbors settled the problems of the people in orderly courts of justice and in accordance with rights of the people and law; but in your justice departments there is not even one book of law written from which judges can base a judgment. Your neighbors pay their debts and taxes to the relevant offices, but in your country the government assigns a man to obtain the same by force, etc., etc. These acts of carelessness and lack of consideration will be a source of deep regret for you and for future generations. And on Judgement Day you will not only be responsible in the eyes of God, but also embarrassed. Arise from this sleep of indifference! Have mercy on yourself and on future generations. Assist the authorities in your government and help co-ordinate these government authorities and the religious leaders to work toward progress."

When the man in the apparition was through talking, I woke. My body was shaking with fright from the severity of his speech. After I became calm I decided to contact a friend of mine who was an authority on the history and events of Islam and ask him why other nations have progressed so far but we have remained

backward and disorganized. I did contact this man and I put forth my question to him and this was his answer. He said, "The basis of the discipline and order of life in Europe is only one word. Whatever progress and well-being you see there is a result of this one word." He added, "The people of your country have become distant from the principle of things." I asked him, "How?" He answered, "Some of you think that the order and progress of Europe is because of the science and industries such as telegraph systems, ships, steam machines, weapons, . . . . But these are the result and not the cause. You look at it in a simple manner and ignore the real principles behind these things. When you want to establish a path of progress and civilization in Iran you forget that "one word." If and when one of the Islamic scholars of Iran, in order to serve his country, writes a book on the history and industries of Europe he ignores the principle and basis of their progress. As a result the books and publications of Islamic countries will have no effect, and the authors of them will be forgotten. I asked him to explain to me about that "one word." I inquired, "How can one word be the cause of all this progress? What is this one word? Explain it to me please." He said, "I'll explain it to you and you may write it in your book." That friend explained the matter to me in this way:

That one word, which contains all the discipline of Europe, is the Book of Law. In it are written all the terms and disciplines concerning the life in this world. But governments and people abide by that book; thus no individual in the countries of France, England, and Austria refuse to abide by the law. Nor would they try to inflict their own opinions on the judiciary

system. The King, the beggar, the farmer and the soldier all abide by that rule. No one would dare to oppose this Book of Law and say, "I disagree with this". And you should know that the law in French is called "lewe'" and that consists of several books and each one is called "code." These codes to the French people are like the Holy Books in the eyes of the Moslems.

There are great differences between these two books. The first difference is that the codes are written with the acceptance and approval of both government and populace and not written for individuals. The second difference is that the codes consist of all the current laws of the country; the rights of minority, etc., are included. But the jurisprudence of Islam also reserves the right of the minority groups, and each verse can be interpreted differently in a way that recognition of right from wrong could be difficult, even if the judge (religious) is authorized and competent. It would be advisable that all the learned persons combine and with mutual consultation write a book of law, seal and sign, and have it approved by the government as well as by the representatives of the people. Seal it and keep it in the treasury. Have many printed copies of it made so that all the rulers, sherifs, and judges, great and low, realize that the principles of judicial operation is based on a solid book of law so that no one would be able to execute anything against the book of law.

The third difference is that the French Code (law) is written in the vernacular and it can be understood by all without needing further explanation. This fact is also acknowledged in the Koran (the Holy Book of Islam) that the books of law

should be written in a simple language understood by all so that if anyone reads it, he can understand what he is to do.

The fourth difference which is the most important one is that the French Code is concerned only with the problems of the temporal world; so the French Code is relevant to anyone of any religion. There is a separate book for the religious matters but in the Holy Book of Moslems the problem of the temporal world and the spiritual world such as praying, fasting, and pilgrimages to Mecca are not separated from each other. Thus such a book be used as a reference book is harmful to the public because the non-Moslems among the Islamic people would not be interested in studying such matters as praying, fasting, and pilgrimages to Mecca, khoms (giving 1/5 of income to the representatives of the Imam), and zahut (religious taxation). They would not have any meaning for non-Moslems; and they consequently would not abide by that. Whereas the French rules that concern problems of the temporal world are relevant to people of all religions. Therefore, like old writers of law, if different books could be written concerning the temporal world and the spiritual world, there would be no harm to humanity. These old writers, as written in Hadeis, were more aware of the problems of the world.

The fifth difference is that the French code contains the common law as well as the general law. But among the Moslems there are numerous problems that are the result of tradition and handed down from generation to generation by word of mouth and not of book. As long as the common law is not written in a book, it is easy to commit cruelties in the name of tradition. When the principles the Moslem people

practice are not in accordance with that which our prophet Mohammad, peace be upon Him, said, it is advisable to write the rules and regulations of the religion. For example, whenever the Emperor imposes a rule, if this rule concerns the taxation, it should go to the Senate first and then to the House of Parliament, and vice versa, if the law does not concern the taxation, it should first go to the House of Parliament and then to the Senate. And this is quite in accordance with this verse of the Koran: "Whenever you have a problem, consult with each other." Following this procedure should leave no doubt in the mind of any wise man.

Since the French and other civilized nations through their representatives of the populace decided what is right and wrong, their decisions cannot be opposed since it is written in law. Since they made the laws themselves, the Emperor is also protected. Because they are written, they can be protected from the tricks of influential and corrupt people. So whatever is decided upon among the representatives of the people can have no opposition and all the government authorities would have no worries in regard to the law.

Aside from the law other judicial matters are executed by the approval of the government as well as the populace. Whoever carefully studies these five differences will understand that no one in Europe has despotic power. It means that no one person, because of his own power or personal needs, can interfere in the affairs of the other individuals, unless it is in accordance with the written law. In short, everyone is bound by the same laws. As a result of the written laws, in countries where there is not anarchy, people feel it is their duty to proceed within the limits of the

law. No one has the right to be unjust and no one need fear unjust behavior toward him. Since there is protection within the law, the need to operate outside the law does not exist because the law was made by the government and the people. Therefore, the survival of the law is like the survival of the life and property of the people.

Now I can say that the "one word" is the LAW, but the law that has these five differences. All this fairness, comfort, and wealth is the result of justice as Ali the Moslem Imam has said, "Justice is the principles or base of development."

I asked, "Do you think the codes are really just and have the best interest of the people in them?" He said, "Though the codes are completely righteous and many civilized nations have adopted these laws, I don't ask that you should copy it for our country. My hope is that a complete book of law, written in the colloquial language, easily understood by all and is approved by the people should be established. (Such a book should include the five differences) Such a book should be written and should be used by judicial officers who are wise and know completely the policies and procedures of the law.

"So the 'one word' as I mentioned previously is the Law, and to write such a book in the way I mentioned above (that is, on the basis of consultation and discussion) is not unheard of in the Islamic religion. It is registered in the Book of News that in the beginning of Islam, the disciples of the prophet had arranged the army book and the book of judicial problems based on the ancient 'Law of Force.'"

As my friend talked about these problems with complete awareness and solid in-



formation, he finished the discussion with me as follows, "If you read and study the French law or the law of other civilized nations you will see that most of the practices and the experiences of the different countries of the world are similar to those in the Islamic religion. You will understand that whatever good law is now in force in France and Europe and which has resulted in the highest degree of progress and comfort for the people was pronounced by your prophet 1280 years ago to the people of Islam.

When I finished my talk with my friend, I spent some time in research and study of the principles of the French laws. After studying them very carefully, I found they were all in accordance with our Holy Book the Koran; praise the Islamic religion that after 1280 years its laws and thoughts are still up-to-date. Now to acquaint my countrymen with the French law, I will discuss the principles of French law.

### THE SECTION OF FRENCH COMMON LAW

If you carefully search the French law, you will know that the principle of the French law is called constitutional law. The constitutional law which was announced in 1781 is the principle of the French Common Law. I studied those principles and they are written in 21 sections. I have translated them and included them in this book.

### THE GREAT PRINCIPLES OF THE FRENCH LAW

1. Equality in courts and the execution of law.
2. Anyone who has no criminal record can obtain an authoritative position in the government.

3. Individual freedom (that means that everyone is free and independent and no one has the right to be aggressive toward them unless it is in accordance with the French Code.)
4. Security of life and property of people.  
(5. and 6. apparently omitted.)
7. Self-defense is the right of the individual.
8. Freedom of the press (that means anyone is free and authorized to write and publish his thoughts and opinions unless it is opposed and harmful to the French Code.)
9. Freedom to assemble (that means people are free to meet in society and discuss if their discussion is not opposed to the French Code.)
10. The policies of the rulers should be accepted by a majority of the populace.
11. Political freedom (that means an individual has the right to select his representative to the legislative body, that is, the high council of legislation.)
12. Just taxation according to the wealth of the individual.
13. A written report should be made of the income and expenses of the government.
14. Any official is responsible if he confiscates property or money of the government.
15. The center of the writing of the laws and the center of the enforcement of the law should be separate.
16. The members of the court cannot be dismissed.
17. Guards should be present at the interrogation of the defendant (so that he cannot be abused).

18. To write and publish the political assignment in the government and publish publicly events and murder cases in the daily official paper (that means any new assignment in the government or any kind of punishment upon a condemned person or any law approved in the House of Commons should be published in the official newspaper of the country.)

19. No one has the right to torture another.

20. Freedom of industry and business.

21. Building schools for poor children.

Now I want to write my own comments on the French laws to acquaint my countrymen with my opinions.





# Reviews

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Robert L. Daniel, *American Philanthropy in the Near East, 1820-1960*. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University, 1970. 322 pp. \$10.00.

Joseph L. Grabill, *Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East: Missionary Influence on American Policy, 1810-1927*. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota, 1971. 395 pp. \$13.50.

Roger R. Trask, *The United States Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform, 1914-1939*. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota, 1971. 280 pp. \$11.50.

There is a frequent, and sometimes justified, complaint about the quality of the studies dealing with the Middle East which are published in the United States. This appears to be especially true of works which deal with the development of American policy and interest in the Middle East. While there is a plethora of popular, propaganda works, to say nothing of the "instant histories," which often dominate the scene the books noted above carry on the scholarly tradition of well-researched, well-grounded, well-balanced works which should prove helpful in bringing light to a number of darkened corners. They all deserve a careful reading on the part of those who have both an interest in the Middle East and an interest in the broader and long-term character of the American concern with the area.

Robert L. Daniel's *American Philanthropy in the Near East* is the first comprehensive account of the American missionary-educational-philanthropic enterprise, covering the period of 1820 to 1960, and it is

based on the essential published and archival material now available. Mr. Daniel covers not only the Turkish, Arabic and Iranian parts of the area, but the Greek and Balkan as well. After starting with the "Grecian Adventure," he takes up the story of the missionary enterprise in Malta (1820-1861) and Turkey proper (Constantinople and Anatolia, 1831-1861). Here one finds in basic detail the story of Robert College (1863), now taken over by the Turkish Government, Istanbul Women's College (1871), and the American University of Beirut (Syrian Protestant College, 1866) Accounts of International College (Izmir, 1891; Beirut, 1934), Athens College, Pierce Junior College and a host of other institutions follow. Somewhat detailed attention is given to the establishment of The Near East Relief in the wake of World War I (1919-1920) and of its successor, The Near East Foundation (1930). As Professor Daniel well observes, the positive American record in the Near East with some \$100,000,000 invested in the Near East Relief alone, has rested on the quiet and

humanitarian enterprise as it has on commercial relationship and official United States Government assistance. The author makes very interesting comparisons between unofficial and official assistance, noting the political under- and overtones of the latter, and the fact that prior to 1941 there seemed to be no inherent advantage in government sponsorship, although the relationship to the Middle East changed basically after the Second World War, when the United States, partly in response to Soviet advances in the Middle East, made binding commitments in the area, especially to Greece, Turkey and Iran. Private American philanthropy continued to show much vitality, was put on a more secular foundation, thanks to the advent of the great foundations (Ford, Rockefeller, etc.), and faced its greatest challenges and opportunities.

While Professor Grabill, of Illinois State University, has exploited much of the same material, his emphasis is much different from that of the Daniel volume. *Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East* relates the missionary influence on American policy in the Middle East during 1810-1927—i.e., from its beginnings in the early Nineteenth Century through World War I and the immediate period which followed—discusses the work of the missionaries in and around Istanbul and on the Anatolian plateau and in Lebanon, and traces a bit of the Eastern Question during this period. Like Daniels he insists that there was much "prelude to Point Four" in the educational and training programs developed by the missionary educators. He devotes considerable attention to the impact of the missionaries on the non-Turkish minorities and the stimulation which they gave, inevitably, to the national movements in Greece, Albania and Bulgaria and among Armenians and Arabs in Asia. Grabill's account of the friendship

of the New York financier, industrialist and philanthropist, Cleveland H. Dodge, who was much involved, both with the Syrian Protestant College and Robert College, and President Wilson, is of much interest. Intimately concerned with the Middle East, Dodge was President of the Board of Trustees of Robert College, and was influential in preventing an ill-considered American declaration of war on either the Ottoman Empire or Bulgaria in 1917, when the United States entered the lists against Imperial Germany. Grabill traces some of the pressures which leading members of the American missionary "establishment" brought to bear in behalf of American mandates, and especially in favor of an independent Armenia, with ample American assistance, during 1919-1923. The account of these pressures, which prevented approval or ratification of the Turco-American Treaty of Lausanne, signed on August 6, 1923, is very well told. There can be no doubt of the influence which was exerted and of the fact that many Americans gained a quite inaccurate picture of Middle Eastern peoples through missionary eyes. Except when people like Caleb F. Gates, President of Robert College, or John Kingsley Birge, wrote or spoke of them, the Turks were seldom presented in favorable light. Christians generally were. Mr. Grabill has written well of all these matters, although his strictures against President Wilson during the period of the Paris Peace Conference seem much overdrawn, and is impossible for this reviewer to accept his negative view of the King-Crane Commission. As Mr. Grabill has observed, the heroic age of American Protestantism in the Middle East ended with the Senate's rejection of the Turco-American Treaty of Lausanne, although there was an enduring and remarkable heritage which is still at work. The volume concludes with a comprehensive bibliography which will

guide students into examination of similar problems in the American relationship with the Middle East. Along with the Daniel volume, this work must be perused by all thoughtful people who are concerned with the development of American policy and interest in the Middle East.

Roger R. Trask, of Macalester College, in his *The United States Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform, 1914-1939*, treats a more limited period in American diplomacy, beginning with the onset of World War I in 1914 and ending with World War II in 1939. Following a brief introductory note, he plunges into the essence of the political, economic, social, cultural and philanthropic aspects of the American-Turkish relationship. As the title indicates, however, the book centers on the American response to the efforts of the Turkish people, under the leadership of Atatürk, which looked toward nationalism, reform and even revolution. As Mr. Trask observes, except for a very few, historians have generally neglected the history of American-Turkish relations—a remark that is also true of the Middle East as a whole—largely until the period of World War II, when the United States developed an enduring politico-strategic interest. The author treats the period of World War I to the Lausanne Conference (1914-1923) and indicates the basic role which the Armenian problem played in blocking approval of the American-Turkish Treaty of 1923—reminiscent of the Zionist movement in the Palestine problem. While he traces the slow development of American commerce with Turkey, American investments and technical assistance, he lays special stress on “Un-named Christianity” in the educational en-

terprise in the interwar period and the sometime troubled relationships with the Turkish nationalists. There are very good analyses of special problems—the status of citizens, minority problems, the Montreux Conference, in all of which the United States played a role. Generally, the author feels that American officials and the American people adjusted well to the thrust of Turkish nationalism and reform, partly because of the basic understanding of official representatives like Ambassadors Joseph C. Grew and John V.A. MacMurray, and President Caleb F. Gates, of Robert College. A very useful bibliography concludes the volume.

One gains, not only much knowledge from a reading of these volumes, but much understanding as well. They should take their well-earned places on the library shelves of all students of the Middle East, especially as they are concerned with the historical development of American policy. And they should be read and pondered along with James A. Field's *America and the Mediterranean World, 1776-1882* (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University, 1969, 485 pp.), which provides the best account of the early history of the American association and concern with the Middle East. There are still other works, of course, such as those of John A. DeNovo, David Finnie, A.L. Tibawi, and Laurence Evans—but this is not intended to be a bibliography.

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*Books on Asia from the Near East to the Far East:  
A Guide for the General Reader.*

Selected and annotated by Eleazar Birnbaum.  
University of Toronto Press, 1971. 341 pages.  
\$15.00.

*Books on Asia* is a bibliography in octavo format compiled by Professor E. Birnbaum of the Department of Islamic Studies of the University of Toronto. Printed on high-quality paper and well bound, the volume is a selective listing of only slightly more than 2,000 entries. Including the index of authors and the index of titles at the end in the calculation, one finds an average of less than a mere six entries to a page, not because of the abundance of information but owing to a lay-out which wastes space. The type fonts used are not only unduly large, but the typography is a hindrance to finding the most important information at a glance. Roughly one-third of the titles are in French, the rest in English.

Only approximately 1,800 works are actually represented in the listing because of duplication, mainly between English and French editions, but also because of multiple translations from Asian languages (as four translations in each English and French of *The Thousand and One Nights*). The English-French duplication is not explained. The bibliography is obviously intended for English readers; it is not a bilingual publication according to normal Canadian usage, as the prefatory and introductory material is only in English and even the commentary on French titles is only in English. The phenomenon seems to reflect the idea of an inventory list for English-speaking Canadian librarians desiring to implement the official bilingualism of Canada. The compiler's former role as a university librarian supports this explanation, as well as other

aspects of the book. His own explanation (p. viii) that English and French titles are the only ones listed because they "are the most internationally known" is quite insufficient.

The titles listed are presented in four major categories, according to subject: "Asia as a Whole" (101 entries), "The Islamic World" (851 entries), "India, South and Southeast Asia" (498 entries), and "The Far East" (567 entries). Each of these major sections has appropriate subdivisions, as "Reference works," "General works," "History, social sciences, and law," etc., and the third and fourth major sections also have subdivisions according to country. In many cases the subdivisions are further divided. None of the divisions, great or small, however, corresponds to the "Near East," a term found in the title of the bibliography. Works relating primarily to the pre-Islamic Near East are not included, except for several presenting the notion that the State of Israel is the rebirth of an ancient commonwealth; a few books on ancient India, Japan, and China are included. The selection has been aimed almost exclusively at books on history and civilization (though not culture in the sense of the behavioral sciences), and the overwhelming concentration is on recent centuries.

The most curious inclusions are 64 entries in separate small categories on areas outside of Asia, including Egypt, other parts of North Africa, and even Spain! Except for the first of the four major sections,

each has a special introduction of from two to five pages. These are mainly quite elementary, and clichés, some of them not only tired but misleading, were not avoided, as (p. 20), "Islam . . . arose in the full light of history . . ."

This bibliography is intended, according to the preface, to serve as a guide indicating to the "intelligent general reader" those books which "are likely to meet his needs." The compiler sought to achieve this goal through avoiding on the one hand popular and unreliable books and on the other the "learned tomes, which are too erudite and detailed for the non-specialist." Further clichés appear in the general introduction, as (p. xii): "Controversial or ephemeral works are excluded on principle . . ." The semantic range of *controversial* is rather great, and the meaning applied in the present case is not empirically clear. As is well-known, selection and interpretation of data frequently give rise to scholarly disagreement. Quite obviously works have been included which may be challenged by other scholars or which in fact have been. If alternatively by *controversial* the compiler meant "polemic in tone or structure," then he has likewise erred in principle, for some books which are argumentative contain more information and ideas than books which uncritically present only one view of a problem as though no other existed.

More significantly, books have been included which are controversial in the second sense as well as in the first. Two examples suffice. Meinertzhagen, an aggressive Christian Zionist, in numerous passages contained in his *Middle East Diary* argued openly for a pro-Zionist British policy while belittling Arabs and berating Britons seeking Anglo-Arab cooperation. The compiler euphemistically described (p. 114) the ar-

gumentative partisanship of this book as a "distinctive angle." Eban's *My People* is plainly not history as described (p. 53), but a collection of speeches, many (if not most) of which are aimed directly at certain ideas and even individuals. Who could seriously argue that "The Toynbee Heresy" or "The Arab Refugees—A Record in Obstruction," for example, are not polemic in character?

The subject of Zionism and Israel appears, indeed, to have been the downfall of Birnbaum's critical selectivity, and this defect is manifest clearly in the two sub-headings entitled "Israel, Palestine" (pp. 52-55; 125-130), as well as occasionally elsewhere. Of the 59 entries under "Israel, Palestine," nearly all are written from distinctively Zionist-Israeli viewpoints; several are quite tendentious. About half a dozen works display studied avoidance of obvious partisanship and contain some information and ideas not in the Zionist repertory. Astonishingly, 7 of the 59 entries are by Ben Gurion or biographies of him. There is not one title about Palestine, i.e., the interests and fate of the non-Jewish native population of the geographical region! Missing are in-print standard studies like Nevil Barbour's *Nisi Dominus*, Maxime Rodinson's *Israel and the Arabs* (original French title: *Israel et le refus arabe*), John H. Davis' *The Evasive Peace*, the collective effort *Reflections on the Middle East Crisis* edited by Herbert Mason, and other titles which are serious, factual, and non-polemic.

In addition, since partisan Israeli works are listed, as a balance Palestinian books of equal (or superior) merit should have been included, such as Henry Cattán, *Palestine, The Arabs and Israel*; Sabri Jiryis, *The Arabs in Israel* (to offset the Landau book with the same title which presents the



view of the Israeli establishment); and Hisham Sharabi, *Palestine and Israel*. Birnbaum's unfair selection on this topic would incorrectly suggest that the "general reader" is committed to the Zionist state and that "meeting his needs" means sparing him the anguish of being exposed to alternative interpretations.

The brief (from three-word to eight-line) annotations which conclude most of the entries in *Books on Asia* obviously taxed the compiler's ingenuity to avoid constant repetition. Though some comments are descriptive, others range from redundant, through insipid, vague, and unnecessary, to simply inaccurate. When the title of a book (p. 218) is *Histoire de la littérature chinoise: prose*, the intelligent reader hardly needs to be told that this is "A general historical account of artistic prose." Elsewhere, "A noted selection" (p. 159) or "A scholarly version" (p. 234) does not stir the interest or provide information. "Inexpensive" (p. 268) is vague: prices could have been listed. "Brief but helpful" (p. 180) is both vague and unnecessary. Numbers of pages should have been given for each entry, and the preface stated that books were selected because they were helpful. More unnecessary is the comment (p. 126) on *Ben Gurion Looks Back: Reminiscences of the Israeli statesman*.

One example of inaccuracy is the description (p. 28) of the *Cambridge History of Islam*: "New large standard work on all aspects of Islamic history and civilization, written by a team of experts." A cursory examination is sufficient to ascertain that the work is almost exclusively political history. Careful study reveals that the

various contributions are of uneven quality and that the experts did not work as a team to provide an integrated whole and thereby avoid overlapping and gaps.

There is no need to discuss the details of *Books in Asia* further, for the essential question is the conception and execution of the volume. First of all, specialized bibliographies are found in innumerable books, including textbooks, to which an intelligent reader has normal access; a comprehensive bibliography is redundant. Secondly, nearly all general readers make use of public libraries and would therefore find a standard card catalogue to be more useful than this limited bibliography. Thirdly, this volume contains only books which were in print at the time of compilation (this suggests that it is in fact a buyer's guide, not a reader's guide). Within five years of that date, a significant percentage of the titles listed will have joined sometimes even more useful ones which were omitted simply because they were no longer available at the publishers (but in many libraries and some bookstores). Thus, the compiler has paradoxically produced a publication which is of such ephemeral use that by his own principle of selection (p. xii) it would have been excluded from its own pages. One must indeed question the judgment of the publisher of *Books on Asia* in providing expensive and permanent library format for a bibliography which has at best only tentative value.

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Spuler, Bertold, *History of the Mongols*, London:  
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972, 221 pages  
£ 3.00 net

The long awaited English translation of Bertold Spuler's "History of the Mongols" has finally been published in England. Purists might object to the fact that the book is translated from the German rather than being translated anew into English from the original sources, but the translation has been well done by Helga and Stuart Drummond and the text does not seem to suffer thereby.

The "History of the Mongols" is actually a collection of documents from the 13th and 14th centuries, some of them previously translated. For example, Juvaini, "History of the World Conqueror" translated by J. H. Boyle is extracted as is the Hakluyt Society's "Travels of Ibn Battuta." Over all, however, the source material used is drawn from a widely varied group. Mongolian, Persian, Arabic, Syrian and Latin sources are all used. There are also literary references from works previously accomplished in German — including Spuler's own "Die Goldene Horde," and "Die Mongolen in Iran" — Italian, French and Russian. There has been, of course, very little work done on this period in English other than the two mentioned above and some travel accounts.

"History of the Mongols" is divided into five sections. The first deals with the founding of the Empire: Chinggis Khan and his immediate successors. As expected, much of this is martial in nature. There are excerpts on the important generals, the structure of the Army, and some of the campaigns. The Persian Campaign is spelled out in gory detail. The author of this selection, Ibn al-Athir, states at the beginning,

For several years I put off reporting this event. I found it terrifying and felt revulsion at recounting it and therefore hesitated again and again. Who would find it easy to describe the ruin of Islam and the Muslims. . . . Oh would that my mother had never borne me, that I had died before and that I were forgotten...  
(p. 29)

Readers of the *Cambridge History of Iran*, Volume 5, will, of course find the same story spelled out in parallel detail in Chapter 4 by J. A. Boyle himself, editor of the volume. Suffice it to say that it was a brutal campaign that left its enduring mark on Iran. This reviewer recalls many years ago in Iran hearing it said that mothers frightened their children into silence by invoking the terrible memory of the Mongols.

Section 2 consists of reports of envoys from the west as they viewed the Mongols. To some extent these reports are adulatory — the Mongols by this time having established themselves as lords and masters. It is clear from the excerpts that merchants were hastening to the presence of the Great Khan "from all parts of the world." "Having concluded very large deals," they were "paid by drafts on the lands of the East and the West" (p. 113). The great palace in Karakorum, miraculous healings, the charming of the weather, all accounts attest to western belief in the extraordinary qualities of the Mongols. There is an interesting account of the place of religion at Mongka's Court. Armenian and Nestorian priests were constantly trying to baptize

Mongka Khan but he avoided it all the while encouraging the great Christian feasts such as the Epiphany.

There are also in this section accounts of the duties of women, of men, of marriage, etc. as well as descriptions of their clothing, hairstyle, foods and hunting practices. A brief paragraph on Mongolian justice indicates very little approximation to western practices although it is interesting that capital punishment was apparently not inflicted unless one were taken in the act or confessed.

Section 3 deals with the Ilkan Dynasty in Persia (1335/54). There is a further account here of the Conquest of Baghdad, but largely the section deals with the comings and goings of important nobility, the administration of Iran, taxation practices, the introduction of paper money and finally the conversion of Ghazan Khan and his Emirs to Islam. There is also an interesting exchange of letters between Philip the Fair of France and Oljaitu.

The picture of the occupation of Iran by the Ilkhan Dynasty is one of the remarkably knowledgeable administrative practices for the time. Measures against usury were spelled out. Accounts were kept in the treasury of receipts and expenditure. Expenditures and allowances for the Court were moderate. Detailed arrangements obtained for the breaking of new land and the procurement of cattle. Soldiers were paid (unheard of in older times). An effective gendarmerie was set up and the highways thereby largely cleared of robbers. In short, a very high premium was placed on efficiency and public knowledge — "It was required that this order should be made known everywhere." (p. 153). Some of the later Shahs might well


have continued the enlightened policies of the Ilkans. It should perhaps be remarked here that a deficiency in Spuler's book is a lack of introductory comments to his sections. It is sometimes difficult, therefore, to properly assess the source material in an over-all context. This section is an example. Chapter 6 of the *Cambridge History of Iran* deals in much greater detail and with better perspective than is to be found in Spuler's section 3, valuable though the latter is. The Cambridge chapter, titled "Socio-Economic Conditions of Iran under the Il-Khans" was written by I. P. Petrushevsky, Professor of Near and Middle Eastern History at the University of Leningrad. It is a fine piece of historical reconstruction and evaluation and Spuler's section is well read in parallel to it.

Chapters 4 and 5 deal with the Mongol Khans in China and the Empire of the Golden Horde. As such they are of less interest to those whose primary concern is with the Middle East. Further, Marco Polo's marvellous accounts have pretty thoroughly exposed this period of Chinese history to the western reader.

Professor Spuler provides a short introduction that is an excellent recounting of the Mongol invasion and its aftermath which places the chapters of his book in balance and affords a rapid, brief survey of the period. Sources and editions are listed. Finally it should be said that this book is a volume in "The Islamic World" series under the general editorship of Professor G. E. Von Grunebaum.

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# MIDDLE EAST FORUM





# MIDDLE EAST FORUM

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## Editor's Note

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This double issue of the *Middle East Forum* contains a diverse collection of articles, ranging in subject matter from politics to literature. The first article, by Willard A. Beling, examines the political ecology of Arabism. Distributed geographically, people are as much geographic objects — either individually or in groups — as nonhuman geographic objects like mountains and rivers. Relationships between different human groupings within a geographic habitat, therefore, are valid ecological relationships, as real as those between human and nonhuman objects of the environment. This is political ecology.

Identifying the Arab world first as an envired entity surrounded by nonhuman and human objects, the author then defines Arabism as its most important entity-attribute. It affects relationships between the Arabs and all enviring peoples, both non-Arab and non-Islamic. He also treats certain countervailing characteristics - i. e., enviring conditions — of the enviring peoples. Some of these almost guarantee hostile inter-relationships between the envired Arab world and its milieu, e. g., between the Arabs and Israelis.

Are these characteristics fixed? Does the ecological framework suggest a deterministic pattern? Given the characteristics of the envired entity and its milieu, for example, what are the prospects for Arab-Israeli peace? The author treats these sorts of problems within the framework of political ecology.

Kamil al-Chadirchi stands unique among professional politicians because he possessed certain aptitudes which may well qualify him to be regarded as an intellectual politician. However, during most of his life, he was so involved in the activities of political parties and in pursuing political objectives that goals were often subordinated to methods — a characteristic quality of professional politicians; therefore, he appeared to differ but little from other politicians. Majid Khadduri's article is designed to assess his role in Iraqi politics.

In an abridged version of a chapter from a book manuscript in progress, Glen W. Swanson describes in detail the relationship between the powerful sultan of the Ottoman empire, Abdülhamid II, and the general who helped to depose him. He stresses the service given by Mahmud Şevket to the sultan prior to 1909 and the course of events that brought Şevket to the pinnacle of fame.

Having benefited from the Hamidian military school system, Şevket worked diligently in the fields of education, ordinance, and administration.



Then, in 1908, the Young Turk revolution altered the pattern of life for both Sevket and Abdülhamid. Although he was not a Young Turk, Sevket received command of important army units in European Turkey. When the Revolution (or Counter-Revolution) of April 1909 occurred in Istanbul, Sevket, not fully aware of what was happening in the capital, acted quickly to subdue the uprising. Swanson concentrates on the confused nature of the situation that faced Sevket and Abdülhamid and the steps taken by both men to conclude the affair.

Zionism is often called an offshoot of Jewish religious messianism. However, Thomas Flanagan's analysis of the works of Moses Hess, the first Zionist thinker, reveals another source of millenarian fantasy, namely the widespread notion of a coming "third age" of peace, freedom, equality, abundance, and happiness. This chiliastic construction of history, running through all of Hess's works, is the *idée fixe* to which his Zionism was attached at a later date.

Messianic visions of the future are found in many varieties of nationalism, particularly in the early stages of ideological formation; but they cannot be sustained indefinitely, since the millenium cannot be realized. Nationalistic passion, however, survives after the demise of millenarian fantasy, and an ethic of national self-assertion replaces an ethic of universal salvation. The evolution of Zionism thus corresponds to a typical pattern of development in aggressive nationalist ideologies.

The terms "Iran" and "Persia" are commonly accepted as synonymous and used interchangeably by the general Western public as well as by Western Orientalists. "Persian" and "Iranian" are also used interchangeably. Jan W. Weryho examines the origin and history of these terms, establishing the similarity between "Persia" and "Iran" and the legitimacy of their current usage as synonymous. He argues that the terms "Persian" and "Iranian" have quite different meanings, however, and examines carefully the distinctions between them and how they are correctly used.

The independence struggle in Aden was typical of Third World nationalist movements against colonial domination. Great Britain attempted to halt Adeni nationalism by political negotiations and military force. Janice J. Terry examines the Adeni nationalist movement as it evolved through stages of colonial domination, growing nationalist agitation, the isolation of the so-called moderate nationalist elements, and, ultimately, the ascendancy of the nationalists. The final stage led to the independence of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen under a leftist regime committed to a socialist, revolutionary transformation of Adeni society and institutions.

With 1972 an election year in the United States, the question of Zionist influence in American politics is an important one for the Middle East. Odeh Aburdeneh's article examines the influence of American Jewry on the two political parties by analyzing the voting strength of American

Jews, their financial contributions to candidates aspiring for the presidency, and the relationship between Israel and those American Jews who play an active role in the Democratic and Republican parties. In the following article, Alan Balboni traces the influence of the American Zionist lobby on the formulation and conduct of United States foreign policy from the period of World War I to the present and discusses the reasons for its varying degrees of success with the various presidential administrations from 1914 to 1968.

Arabic literature is little known to the Western reader due to the scarcity of translations. Mohammed Bakir Alwan, with a long introduction discussing both the play and the author, translates Tawfiq al-Hakim's contemporary play *Urid an Aqtul*.

The final article by A. L. Tibawi, examines the shortcomings of *The Cambridge History of Islam*. Because of the prestige of the institution, many in the Western world will look upon this work as *the* authoritative work on Islam. Professor Tibawi quickly dispels the aura of scholarship and objectivity that the Cambridge title invests. Not only does he point out many factual errors and unfounded generalizations, but also the inherent bias of Western scholars towards Islam.





# Contributors

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MOHAMMAD BAKIR ALWAN received his B.S. from Manchester University, England, his M.A. from the University of Wisconsin, and his Ph.D. from Indiana University in comparative literature. He is currently an Assistant Professor at Indiana University. He has written a number of articles on ancient as well as modern Arabic literature. He has rendered many poems and other fictional writings from Arabic into English, and translated numerous poems from English into Arabic. He has just received a fellowship from the American Research Center in Egypt to spend the year 1972-1973 in Egypt to complete his work on Ahmad Faris ash-Shidyaq.

A. L. TIBAWI was educated at the Arab College in Jerusalem, the American University of Beirut (B.A. in history) and the University of London (Ph.D. in education). He served as chief education officer in Palestine, and went to London to study the English educational system before the disaster of 1948. Since then he devoted himself to study, research and teaching at the University of London Institute of Education except for three years at Harvard. In 1962 the University of London conferred upon him the degree of D.Lit. in recognition of his works on Middle East History and Education. He has several works in Arabic. Apart from numerous articles and reviews in learned journals, his works in English include four monographs and the following books: *Arab Education in Mandatory Palestine; British Interests in Palestine 1800-1901; American Interests in Syria 1800-1901; A Modern History of Syria including Lebanon and Palestine; and Islamic Education - Its Traditions and Modernisation into the Arab National Systems.*

E. BURKE INLOW, has been Professor of Political Science at the University of Calgary since 1961. He has also taught at Princeton University and at Vanderbilt University. Professor Inlow holds the A.B. degree from Washington State University, the M.A. degree from the University of California (Berkeley) and the Ph.D. from the Johns Hopkins University. Professor Inlow was with the Military Assistance Program of the U.S Department of Defence from 1956 to 1961 during which time he travelled extensively in the Middle East. His publications relating to that area have appeared in the *Journal of Indian History, Law Asia* and the *Osgoode Hall Law Journal*. He is a member of the British Institute of Persian Studies and the Royal Central Asian Society. During the academic year, 1970-71, he was in Iran on sabbatical leave.





# Arabism: A Study in Political Ecology\*

Willard A. Beling\*\*

The term ecology derives etymologically from a Greek word meaning the study of the house and, by extension, the study of the environment in which something lives. All definitions are concerned with three elements that form an integral ecological framework which will collapse if any single element is removed: environment, envired organism(s), and interrelationships. This is the ecological triad.

Departing from a tendency of general ecologists to envisage the environment in nonhuman terms—that is, limited to the physical environment—political ecologists use the term environment more broadly to embrace both nonhuman and social phenomena. They frequently substitute, therefore, the French word *milieu* for environment, because it conveys social implications more clearly. Living people

emerge as both the envired organism(s)—treated individually or collectively—and as part of the milieu (or environment). Relationships between different human groupings within a geographic habitat, therefore, are valid ecological interrelationships, as real as those between humans and their nonhuman environment.<sup>1</sup>

## THE ENVIRONED ORGANISM

Selection of any geographical region and, within it, particular human groupings to focus on, of course, is an arbitrary matter. One could select any number of communities in the Middle East. There, for example, both the Arab world and Israel lend themselves to the role of envired organisms. For purposes of this study, however, the Arab world has been selected for this role. It has been involved over a very long period of history with its non-



Arab milieu, thus providing a variety of political interactions from which to draw observations, plus a period long enough to test these observations. Of equal significance, the Arab world can also be identified as a distinct political community within the international political system.<sup>2</sup>

Although frowned upon theologically in classical Islam, Arabs were an elite grouping in the early days of Islam. They subsided subsequently and completely disappeared as the elites within the Islamic community, but then re-emerged in the late nineteenth century totally à-la-mode as Arab nationalists pitted against Ottoman Turks. Arabism won international legitimacy during the Arab Revolt of World War I, and also during World War II, when Arab nationalism again served British interests in the Middle East.

In the meantime, Arabism has come to predominate as a nationalist phenomenon, distinct from Pan-Islamism and in many ways opposed to it. That Arabism is a higher form of Islamic elitism (and Pan-Arabism an elite form of Pan-Islamism) may be overstating the case. Nevertheless, Arabism as a distinct nationalist phenomenon *within* Islam and, of course, *within* the Middle East is a reality.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, Arabism marks the region as indelibly as its geographic characteristics. This is the *Arab World*! It is the thesis of this paper that as an ecological variable (political rather than physical, to be sure), Arabism plays a very important role in the politics of the Middle East.

#### ARAB-MILIEU INTERRELATIONSHIPS

In ecological terms, Arabism is a clear-cut case of an *entity-attribute*, in fact, the most important political entity-attribute

of the Arab world. It affects relationships between Arabs and all environing peoples, both non-Arab and non-Islamic.

To illustrate the term within a general ecological framework, one can point to the failure of tropical fruit trees to grow in northern climes. But while one could say that the failure stems from the fruit trees' intolerance of the cold, an entity-attribute, another could argue that it is the climate which is at fault, an *enviroming condition*.<sup>4</sup> Both are involved, in fact, just as both entity-attributes and enviroming conditions are involved in the interrelationships between the Arab world and its milieu.

#### 1. Arabism: Entity-Attribute

Sometimes dismissed as mere Arab xenophobia, Arab intolerance of Israel or the West is more than this. It is also more than just the nationalism that is common to all nations which seek to win their sovereignty, or to maintain it, after it has been won. In the Arab world, the struggle to rid the Middle East of alien forces derives from the peculiar nature of Arab nationalism.

#### a) Non-Islamic Intrusions

Being in large measure Islamic, Arabism is naturally intolerant of *non-Islamic* intrusions in the Arab world. In the Islamic Community of the past, this had been articulated theologically for community implementation (e.g., in the *jihad*). In the contemporary "secular" Arab world, on the other hand, it has been implicit rather than explicit. Articulation is, in essence, unnecessary; it would be redundant. For intolerance of non-Islamic intrusions is as much an accepted fact within the Arab Nation as it was in the earlier theological

"Islamic Community" (*al-Ummah al-Islamiyyah*). The latter has provided, as is well known, inspiration as well as etymology to the "Arab Nation" (*al-Ummah al-Arabiyyah*).

Arabism in an all-pervasive political entity-attribute; it exists throughout the Arab world. For some Arab states, it has meant commitments against intrusions wherever they occur in the Arab world, as reflected in Nasser's oft-repeated analogy: "If there is a hole in the bottom of the boat [i.e., a threat to Arabism anywhere in the Arab world]..." For others, such as Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia or Tunisia, it has not meant the same conspicuous commitment that Syria, Egypt, Libya, or Algeria have made. Nevertheless, these so-called conservative Arab states subscribe to the same Arabism, albeit in a more reserved fashion. All have opposed non-Islamic intrusions in the area, most obviously those from the West that had dominated the area for years.

#### *b) Non-Arab Intrusions*

Arabism is by its very nature also xenophobic toward all *non-Arab* intrusions, be they Moslem or otherwise. Observers tend sometimes to forget, for example, that Arab nationalism's original spark derived from the struggle against the Moslem Turks, rather than from anti-Westernism. While the present Turkish-Arab antipathies grew out of Ataturk's policy of turning one's back on the former Ottoman provinces in the Arab world and Islam, the Turkish annexation of Alexandretta, designs (real and imagined) on territory in the Fertile Crescent, and Turkey's NATO alliance, they also derive in some measure from Arab memories of the relatively recent Ottoman hegemony in the Arab world.

Turkey now falls, therefore, almost completely within the European, instead of the Middle Eastern, clustering.<sup>6</sup> In the subsystemic Arab-Israeli conflict, moreover, Turkey has maintained relations with the Israelis.

Arabism as an entity-attribute also helps explain Arab-Iranian dissonance in international affairs, particularly relative to Israel and the West. When the Arabs refused to sell Israel crude oil, for example, Iran supplied them with it. Similarly, Iran associated itself with the Western defense system which the Arabs had rejected. Arab Moslems (Sunnis) regard Persians as second-class Moslems, of course, because they are Shi'ite Moslems. Moreover, they are non-Arabs. The North African Berbers and other non-Arab communities had been Arabized, for the most part, as well as Islamized. Thus, they became Arabs (*must'aribah*). The Persians, on the other hand, had rejected Arabization. Indeed, they have an intense pride in their own rich historical and cultural pre-Islamic past; e.g., the lavish 2500th anniversary celebration in 1971 of the reign of Cyrus the Great. In more recent years, Persians have also been turning from Islamic, and thus Arabic, given names to classical Iranian names. This again distinguishes them from the Arab world. For the Arab world focuses logically on Islamic rather than pre-Islamic beginnings, since these represent the "time of ignorance" (*al-jahiliyyah*), particularly for the Arabs as Arabs. Limited physically to Arabia, Arabs *per se* were indeed comparatively few in numbers and without any history to speak of prior to Islam. In essence, the emergence of the Arabs not merely as Moslems but as Arabs coincided with the coming of the Prophet Muhammad. An Arab himself, he brought them into their own. Deriving from these apoli-

tical beginnings, religio-political Arabism has developed occasionally at the expense of good relations with non-Arab Islamic states like Iran and Turkey.

## 2. Israeli Environing Condition

The religio-nationalist phenomenon, of course, also prevails in Israel where it triggers crises from time to time, with concomitant responses in international Jewry.<sup>6</sup> Obvious cases in point are the who-is-a-Jew incidents.<sup>7</sup> But these are only the overt symptoms of a much larger problem that concerns not only citizenship for immigrating Jews (the Law of the Return), but also the class of citizenship one is entitled to in Israel. Non-Jews, for example, do not enjoy first-class Israeli citizenship. Without the fuss or world-press coverage that accompanies the first, the Israelis have used a time-honored process to deal with this second problem.

To cope with the personal legal status of its non-Jewish citizens who do not fall under the religious (rabbinic) law of the state, Israel applies in modified form a *millet* system which they inherited from the British. In earlier times, the Moslems had devised the *millet* system to cope with non-Moslems, particularly Jews and Christians, within the Islamic community. It is somewhat ironical, therefore, that Israel now applies a similar system to its own Moslem and Christian minorities. It is also anachronistic, of course, since the *millet* system has essentially disappeared elsewhere in the Middle East.

The point to be made, of course, does not concern the validity or morality of the Israeli *millet* system. Rather, it illustrates the nature of the state. Related ecologically to the environed Arab world, Israeli religio-nationalism is an environing condition

that is equally as intolerant as Arabism, the entity-attribute of the Arab world. Together, of course, they practically guarantee hostile interrelationships at the international level between Arabs and Israelis. Indeed, peace in the Middle East between Arabs and Jews is remote, if not impossible, when considered within this framework alone.

## 3. Third World Environing Condition

Interrelationships between the Arab world and the Third World can also be analyzed within this same ecological framework. While attempting to woo the Third World to its side in its struggle against Israel, for example, the Arab world frequently finds that Arabism unhinges its best conceived efforts. A clear case in point occurred at the Pan-African Cultural Congress which Arab Algeria sponsored in July 1969. Irrepressible Arabism asserted itself over against *négritude*, an environing condition of the African milieu, and an open conflict between Arabism and *négritude* undid much of what the Arabs hoped to achieve at the congress.<sup>8</sup>

## 4. Arab Entity-Attribute Vis-à-Vis the Soviet Union

Most popular political treatments of the Middle East place it within a Cold War framework, particularly as the Soviets enhance their position in the Middle East at the expense of the West. Israel and the Arabs are then cast as the good guys and bad guys, respectively: In essence, Israel represents the United States, while the Arabs represent the Soviets. But the ecological framework provides still another perspective. As an entity-attribute, for example, Arabism practically precludes fraternal interrelationships with the non-Islamic/non-Arab milieu, be it Israeli, West-

ern, or Soviet. Even while using Soviet weapons and support in its attempt to rid the Middle East of Israel, therefore, the Arab world is unlikely to embrace either the Soviet Union or its ideology.

Arab antipathy toward Soviet intrusions in the Middle East has not been articulated, of course, to the same degree as it has been vis-à-vis the Western Powers and Israel. But then the Soviet role in the area has also been somewhat dissimilar. The Russians have never occupied any Middle Eastern area, for example, even though they might want to (e.g., their abortive attempt to take over Persian Azerbaijan in 1945). Moreover, the Soviets have been actively aiding the Arabs against Israel. Yet, while the Arab world appreciates Soviet assistance in its subsystemic struggle, Arabism is very strongly opposed to the penetration of Soviets and Soviet ideology in the Middle East.

The grip that Arabism holds even on revolutionary Arabs confuses the Soviets and, in fact, the Left in general. The achievement of Algerian independence in 1962, for example, was due, at least in part, to moral and material support from the Left. In turn, the Left expected a positive response from the Algerians. But their revolutionary Algerian colleagues endorsed "old fashioned" Arabic instead of French as the national language of independent "revolutionary" Algeria, and "regressive" Arabism as Algerian national policy—all leaving the French Left, among others, aghast.<sup>9</sup> Amar Ouzegane, former General Secretary of the Algerian Communist Party, was an excellent example of this phenomenon. Published during this period, his *Le Meilleur Combat* was intended to be a defense of socialism, but turned out instead to be a pure and simple apology for Arabism over against Maxism.<sup>10</sup>

Another case in point of Arab-Soviet ideological conflict occurred in 1957 when Syria appeared to be on the verge of slipping into orbit as a Soviet satellite. At the behest of the Syrians, Egypt bailed Syria out by creating the United Arab Republic. More recently, a bloody anti-communist putsch took place in the Sudan in 1971, after the Sudanese Left, apparently with tacit Soviet approval and support, had seized power. In the meantime, of course, the Arab states had long since outlawed their local communist parties.

What level of Soviet interference is tolerated in the domestic affairs of those Arab states, where the Soviet military presence is particularly high, is not entirely clear to outside observers. From all available evidence, however, the Soviets appear as frustrated as the Western powers had been in the area.

## RESTRUCTURING ECOLOGICAL IMBALANCES

Unappreciated by many observers, the Arab world has really been phenomenally successful over a relatively short span of time in restructuring the disadvantageous interrelationships which it faced at the turn of the century.

### 1. Western Intrusions

Non-Islamic/non-Arab intrusions have in large measure been eliminated from the Middle East. Turkish hegemony of the Arab world passed away in World War I, and the subsequent Western occupations were lifted from large areas of the Middle East during and after World War II. Only vestiges of the former colonial empires still remain in the Middle East. Pitting in the meantime the major actors of the international system against one another, the Arab world has successfully resisted most subse-

quent attempts at occupation (or re-occupation) of the Middle East. Whether or not it should be considered in the same framework, the United States has nevertheless also relinquished almost all of the bases it had established in the Middle East during the height of Soviet-American tensions.

Western economic intrusions in the area have also been reduced considerably since the days of the Ottoman Empire. Capitulations to foreigners, which became the rule during the Ottoman Empire, continued in effect for some time in various Middle Eastern states even after its demise. In the meantime, however, western-owned operations have been gradually Arabized. Egypt took a major step in this direction when it nationalized the Suez Canal Company and, in the wake of the Anglo-French attack in November, 1956, most of the foreign-owned companies and banks. Syria and Iraq have been equally effective in eliminating foreign-owned operations. While the Arabs had not nationalized on a significant scale foreign-owned oil operations, they had taken over the domestic marketing of petroleum products in a number of states. In a less dramatic, but equally effective move, they Arabized large areas of the manning patterns of foreign-owned oil operations. Up until the 1970's, Arab nationalists had hesitated to move impetuously, or alone, to nationalize foreign-owned oil interests in the Middle East, since the very real problems implicit in Iran's failure to nationalize its oil operations in the early 1950's were still valid. In the meantime, the trend toward nationalization is building in the Arab world; e.g., Iraq nationalized IPC in 1972.

Achieving independence later than most in 1962, Algeria has nevertheless been more effective in Arabizing its economy than almost any other Arab state. The *colons* had

themselves opted to vacate their agricultural domains and quit Algeria on the eve of Algerian independence, as did most of the French entrepreneurs in the Algerian economy. Algerians merely took over what they left behind. When they then negotiated their oil concession agreement with the French in 1965, the Algerians took advantage of the past experiences, and talents, of their Arab colleagues. Planning ahead in the meantime at an even more sophisticated level, the Algerian government next employed an American consulting firm to help nationalize the domestic marketing of petroleum products, a domain dominated by foreign-owned companies (among them American companies). Continuing its drive toward Algerianization of the oil industry, they then nationalized in 1971 fifty-one per cent of the French oil operations that remained.

Elsewhere in the Maghreb, Libya has also won significant gains from the foreign-owned oil operations, yet nationalizing only one company's operations (British Petroleum) so far. Although Tunisia has reversed major areas of its economic policies since the ouster of Ahmed Ben Salah as head of Planning in the fall of 1969, nationalization and rigorous Destourian Socialism had already eliminated most foreigners from the Tunisian economy. Of all the Arab states, Morocco retains the largest colony of foreigners in the local economy.

## 2. The Arab-Israeli Imbalance

Arab success vis-à-vis Israel, however, is an entirely different matter. Their own contributions to the fact apart, the Arabs had seen the non-Arab Turks driven from the area during World War I, and their non-Islamic/non-Arab successors in the process of leaving the Middle East during,

and following, World War II. From the Arab point of view, therefore, the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 was particularly ironical. It portended involvement with a new—at least to them—"intruder" in the Arab world, the non-Islamic/non-Arab Israelis, plus the possible return of the Western powers in the wake of the Israel intrusion.

Failing on their own in 1948 to eliminate Israel, the Arabs went to the only armorer available to them in the international political system, the Soviet Union. This act catapulted the Middle East into the Cold War framework. Added to another very important input, *viz.*, from the American domestic political system, it assured Israel of American military, financial, and moral support. In the meantime, the Arabs have suffered two more military defeats at the hands of Israel, which has indeed enlarged its area at the expense of the Arabs. While quite successful against the Western powers, therefore, Arab efforts to restructure the disadvantageous interrelationships with Israel have so far obviously failed.

#### THE POTENTIAL FOR CHANGE IN THE ENVIRONED ORGANISM

While one speaks of "natural balance" in general ecology, this concept does not apply in human ecology because of the human factor. Man's potential, indeed, his propensity to change the environment, of course, was the spark that ignited popular interest in general ecology in the 1960's. Needless to say, his ingenuity carries over into man-milieu interrelationships, where flux rather than the status quo is the norm.

Various means to measure the potential of a given nation exist. Many analyses begin, for example, with an inventory of a

nation's resources. A more feasible approach, perhaps, is to evaluate the limitations on achievements vis-à-vis the Arab-milieu interrelationships.<sup>11</sup>

#### 1. Technological Limitations

In terms of technological limitations, of course, the Arab world itself is currently unable to restructure disadvantageous interrelationships in its favor. Technological limitations in the military are a case in point. France's decision after the Six-Day War to supply Libya with a large number of jet fighters was not really meaningful, for example, since Libyan pilots were unavailable, and will not be available for a long time in the future, to fly the sophisticated aircraft. Nasser candidly admitted that Egypt lacked trained personnel to operate the military hardware which the Soviet Union had lavished upon it since 1955. This was obvious, of course, in the confrontations of 1956 and 1967. Maneuvering within this reality, the White House justified its refusal on several occasions to provide the additional jet aircraft that Israel insistently demanded to restore the arms "balance" in the Middle East.

But this sort of limitation is not absolute. Tools can be acquired, as both Arabs and Israelis have so clearly demonstrated, and skills can be developed in both envired and environing human organisms. Although the Arabs acquired military hardware more quickly and in greater abundance than the Israelis, they have been slower in achieving the skills to use the material effectively. To cope with the technological imbalance, Egypt moved in two different directions: (1) It avoided jet combat with the Israelis, even dispersing its jet aircraft around the Middle East out of range of Israeli bombers, until it too could train a corps of skilled pilots. The

Israelis sought to provoke the Egyptians into premature air combat, in turn, in order to eliminate Egyptian pilots before they reached skill levels that matched those of the Israelis. (2) Egypt imported skills to offset Israeli technical superiority. Soviet pilots, for example, substituted in certain situations—some still unclear to outside observers—for unskilled Egyptian pilots, thus injecting a new variable into the equation.

## 2. Perceptual Limitations

Perceptual limitations are also very important. The lack of Arab opportunity to perceive limiting factors which, if perceived, could be avoided and, in equal part perhaps, Arab failure to perceive the perceivable as such have both contributed to disadvantageous interrelationships. Ecologically, the former is an enviroing condition, unperceivable, while the latter is an entity-attribute inherent in the enviroined organism.<sup>12</sup>

Concealment, of course will always limit perception. This is an enviroing condition within the environment/milieu. The ability to perceive the perceivable, on the other hand, is an entity-attribute which can be developed within the enviroined organism. The Arabs, for example, have sharpened their perception since 1948. Prior to the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, Arabs in general had blamed the Western Powers for Zionist successes. But following the 1948 defeat, they began to see that they themselves were the cause of their failure. Musa Alami and other nationalists urged,<sup>13</sup> therefore, and Arab politicians embarked upon, one reform after another—frequently undone, to be sure, in one military coup after another—to the end that Arabs would be able to stand up to the Israelis as their equals.

In the wake of the 1967 war, they finally recognized that neither the West nor the Arabs were the real cause of their failures. Instead, the Israelis were the cause and, even worse, there was little prospect that the Arabs would either catch up or defeat them in a head-on confrontation. Within this framework, Cecil Hourani's analysis shortly after the Arab defeat in 1967 is significant. Since the Arabs cannot catch up with the Israelis, it implies, relax and let the area catch up with them until they too become orientals like the Arabs!<sup>14</sup>

## 3. Inadequate Resources

Finally, limitations deriving from inadequate resources are the most obvious. But while resources represent at any given moment absolute limitations, they are subject over time—sometimes relatively short periods—to transformation and change, particularly under the impact of dynamic human ingenuity. This, of course sets man apart from all other enviroined entities. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Libya—all are excellent cases in point in the Arab world. Unimportant in the relatively recent past, they have in the meantime become important actors in the Middle Eastern subsystem through the exploitation of petroleum reserves.

## CONCLUSION

Arabism has been the major factor in the politics of the Middle East since the late nineteenth century; first vis-à-vis the Turks, then the French and British, followed by the United States, and now Israel. Entity-attributes are not immutably fixed—nor, for that matter, are enviroing conditions—particularly in human ecology, thus providing some hope for a peaceful resolution of the Middle Eastern conflict situation. Nevertheless, dramatic changes

are unlikely in either the Arab entity-attribute or the Israeli enviroing condition in the foreseeable future.

Deploring, or moralizing about, the nature of the Arab world will not change it any more than they would change the physical entity-attributes of enviroined organisms, such as tropical fruit trees. Rather, nations must deal with the Arab world as it is. Committed to the defense of Israel, on the one hand, the United States has followed essentially a moral line. It hopes against hope that the Arab World will ultimately relent and accept Israel's presence in the Middle East. Dealing with the political realities of the area pragmatically, on the other hand—to the point of turning its back quite often on the local communist parties—the Soviet Union has achieved significant advantages in the Middle East at the expense of the Western Powers. But that Arabism will suddenly become non-operative in Arab-Soviet interrelationships is also a complete misunderstanding of the situation.

The key to both American- and Soviet-Arab interrelationships at present, therefore, is obvious, *viz.*, a correct attitude toward Israel. Withdrawal of its support of Israel will, for example, improve American-Arab interrelationships. But that this withdrawal of American support will also improve Arab-Israeli interrelationships does not follow. This is, of course, the dilemma of Washington's policy makers. Nor, ironically, will Soviet-Arab interrelationships necessarily deteriorate if the United States withdraws its support of Israel, since this is only one side of the coin—and another input into the dilemma of Washington's policy makers! For so long as Israel exists, the Arabs will object to it as an alien intrusion and welcome outside support to eliminate the Israeli intrusion.

As nation-statehood develops and blooms in the Middle East, one might expect it to replace Arabism. In essence, Egyptian, Syrian, and other forms of local nation-state nationalism will replace Arabism. Admittedly, it may well undo attempts at *institutionalized* Pan-Arab regional unification. But this is only one manifestation of Arabism, which exists as an entity-attribute of the Arab world whether or not institutionalized Pan-Arab unity exists.

The Palestinians are a good case in point of the relationship between burgeoning nationhood and Arabism. Like the earlier Algerians, they also had some difficulty in self-identification as a nation. Only through their experiences in refugee camps *outside* Palestine have they finally evolved into full-fledged "Palestinian" nationalists rather than merely Arab nationalists. But this reinforces, rather than eliminates, "Arab" involvement in the conflict with Israel. The Arab world logically continues, therefore, to use "Arab" instead of "Palestinian", even when referring to the guerrillas who are for the most part Palestinians. Western news media also use "Arab" instead of "Palestinian", to the apparent disservice of the Palestinians as such, albeit in unwitting recognition of an important political reality of the Middle East, Arabism.

Identified as an ecological phenomenon, Arabism becomes then as real as pigmentation or some other physical entity-attribute of a people. Frequently mislabeled anti-semitism, Arabism would be what it is even if there were no Jews. This is the nature of the Arab world—and the dilemma it poses for American policy makers, not to mention all proponents of Arab-Israeli peace!



## NOTES

\* An enlarged treatment will appear in a book edited by the author, *The Middle East: Quest for an American Policy*, tentatively scheduled for publication by the State University of New York Press.

\*\* The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of C.M. Lynch in preparing the final draft of this article.

(1) The author has found particularly helpful the various studies of Harold and Margaret Sprout; e.g., *An Ecological Paradigm for the Study of International Politics*, Research Monograph No. 30, Center of International Studies, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968); *The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs, with Special Reference to International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965); *Toward A Politics of the Planet Earth* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1971); and their many articles. See also Bruce M. Russett, *International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political Ecology* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1967).

(2) Relative to this last point, when Bruce M. Russett embarked upon his study of international political regions, he noted that he had no *a priori* judgments as to the number of regions, what they are, or where they should be found. (Russett, *op. cit.*, delineated international regions on the basis of the following five criteria: relative cultural homogeneity, similar political attitudes and UN voting patterns, sharing membership in international organizations, trade relations, and geographical contiguity.) Indeed, his first question was "What is a region?" He acknowledged that the notion of a region may well be valid, but he correctly observed that a region varies according to the definitions given to it, as Roderic H. Davison illustrated so well in his article, "Where is the Middle East?" (*Foreign Affairs*, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 4 [July 1960], 665-675.) Using an entirely inductive method, Russett suggested that his groupings would probably be equivalent to geographers' *regional types* rather than the regions of the regionalists. But significantly, the Middle East emerged as a distinct region in his quantitative study, as it also had in Leonard Binder's earlier, but quite different, traditional study. ("The

Middle East as a Subordinate International System," Chapter 9 of his *The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East* [New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1964], pp. 254-278, which had appeared earlier in *World Politics*, Vol. X, No. 3 [April 1958], 408-429.) Both Russett and Binder also found an *Arab cluster* within the Middle East, although the latter concerned himself primarily with the larger Middle East itself. He used the existence of a *religious alternative to nationalism* as the major criterion for delimiting the Middle East as an international political subsystem. Accordingly, his Middle East embraced everything from North Africa to Afghanistan and Pakistan. But one can refine further the Middle Eastern subsystemic phenomenon; there is an Arab cluster which derives from both Binder's and Russett's criteria. For Arabism is also a distinct religio-nationalist phenomenon. (Islam is inalienably associated with Arabism, for example. Being Arab means being Moslem, according to Morroe Berger, *The Arab World Today* [New York: Doubleday, 1962], pp. 335-336. See also Michel Aflaq, the *Christian Ba'athi* leader, in this regard: *In the Cause of the Ba'ath* [Published in Arabic—*Fi Sabil al-Ba'ath*—Beirut, 1963], pp. 50-60.) Binder hints at the Arab clustering—his thrust, of course, was regional—but Russett's quantitative analysis clearly identifies an Arab clustering within the Middle East.

(3) See Adel Daher, *Current Trends in Arab Intellectual Thought*, RM-5979-FF (The RAND Corporation, 1969), p. 5 f., who notes the ideological conflict between the two nationalist ideologies (i.e., between Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism) and the attempts of Arab intellectuals to rationalize Pan-Arabism over against Pan-Islamism.

(4) See the Sprouts, *loc. cit.*, for an enlargement of this figurative parallelism.

(5) See both Binder and Russett, *loc. cit.* Further to apparent Arab elitism vis-à-vis non-Arab Turks or other Moslems, see Abd al-Rahman al-Bazzaz, "Islam and Arab Nationalism," in Sylvia G. Haim, *Arab Nationalism: An Anthropology* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962), pp. 172-188. He notes regarding the Turks, for example, that "the Moslem Arabs were... in spite of external appearances, his [the Moslem Turk's] real colo-

nizers, mentally, spiritually, and culturally." (p. 185)

(6) See Binder, *loc. cit.*, who posits the religio-nationalist phenomenon for the entire Middle East. It should be pointed out, of course, that some observers hold another point of view. Dudley Kirk, for example, in Hans W. Weigert *et al* (eds.), *Principles of Political Geography* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc. 1957), pp. 405-439, notes that Israeli nationalism is almost indistinguishable from secular nationalism in Western Europe and that Arab-Israeli conflict is almost exclusively a political, national, and cultural, rather than religiously sponsored, phenomenon—a reading which is inadequate, in the author's opinion.

(7) See the *Los Angeles Times*, January 25, June 17-19, 1970, and September 27, 1971, regarding who-is-a-Jew crises in Israel.

(8) Cf *Le Monde Diplomatique*, Vol. XVI, No. 185 (October 1969).

(9) See *L'Express*, 1962, *passim*. In this re-

gard, see also Damien Helie, "L'Autogestion Industrielle en Algérie," *Autogestion*, Cahier No. 9-10 (Sept.-Dec. 1969), 37-57, who, while pleased that Algeria had adopted a socialist format, notes: "Up to the present, Algerian socialism is much more colored by the specific [i.e., Arabo-Islamism] than by Marxism."

(10) (Paris: René Julliard, 1962). It had been written originally, quite significantly for the Algeria of that period, in Arabic. See the author's review of the book in the *Maghreb Digest*, Vol. IV, No. 1 (January 1966), 53.

(11) For this approach, the author is indebted to the Sprouts, *An Ecological Paradigm*, *op. cit.*, pp. 35 ff.

(12) See the Sprouts, *idem*.

(13) See Musa 'Alami, *The Lesson of Palestine* (Published in Arabic—*Ibrat Falastin*—in Beirut, 1949).

(14) "The Moment of Truth," *Encounter*, Vol. XXIX No. 11 (November 1967), 3-14.





# Kamil Al-Chadirchi

Majid Khadduri

Kamil al-Chadirchi was born in 1897 to a well-to-do family and belonged to what may be regarded as an aristocratic house, since his father served in the Ottoman administration and was Mayor of the City of Baghdad. The Chadirchis claimed descent from an Ottoman, if not from purely Turkish, stock; but they were assimilated, since they resided in the country for some three centuries, and came to be regarded as indigenous and as fully identified with the religious and social traditions as any native family. Since religion was the primary loyalty, they professed Sunni Islam, the faith of the ruling class. Possessing ample wealth to afford a decent living, Chadirchi suffered neither deprivation nor social insecurity—indeed he made use of some of the estate he had inherited to promote his political activities.

After World War I, when nationalism began to supersede religious loyalty, and many Arab leaders became staunch

advocates of pan-Arabism—some of them claimed Arab tribal origin, real or imaginary—Chadirchi did not adopt the fashionable pan-Arab ideal, although he and his family had just as much right to claim pan-Arabism as their mode of loyalty as other local leaders.<sup>1</sup> Like some other young men who fell under the spell of liberal doctrines, he chose a liberal symbol of loyalty and advocated socialism rather than a traditional symbol, religious or national, which shook some members of his family.

Born before World War I, Chadirchi's early education was neither systematic nor very profound; he received his primary and high school education before the British occupation and served for a short while in the Ottoman army during World War I. After the war, when Iraq passed under British occupation, young Chadirchi and his father seem to have taken part in some anti-British activities during 1919-20 and fled the country to escape trial or im-

prisonment. They spent the next two years in Turkey. Chadirchi entered the Istanbul Medical College but before completing his studies he returned to Baghdad in 1921 when a national regime was established and amnesty was given to all who had taken part in the revolt of 1920. Chadirchi entered the Baghdad Law College graduating with a law degree after three years of study.<sup>2</sup> Thus Chadirchi's formal education could barely provide him with more than professional training to serve at the bar or the bench, but his self-education made him quite familiar with most of the books that were then published in Cairo and Beirut. Although his knowledge of English was at first elementary, he pursued his study of English works with the assistance of friends, especially works dealing with contemporary social and political problems.

Before he entered politics, Chadirchi worked for a short while in the Municipality of Baghdad where his father had served as Mayor and then in the Department of Finance, in charge of the parliamentary division, during 1926-27. This short administrative experience gave him a certain insight into governmental processes as well as it opened his eyes to his country's bureaucratic practices and abuses. It also gave him an opportunity to meet some members of Parliament, with whom he was later to be involved in political activities, when he acted as liaison between the Legislature and the Ministry of Finance.

In 1927, Chadirchi entered Parliament when he was hardly 30 years old; his entry into politics had nothing to do with the personal views he held at the time, since elections were then held under complete governmental control—he won the election because his older brother was then a member of the Government. In Parliament Chadirchi decided to join the oppo-

sition under Yasin al-Hashimi's leadership which demanded immediate independence. In the 1930 elections he lost his Parliamentary seat. He did not enter Parliament again until 1936, after independence, when he crossed to the left and participated in the coup d'état of 1936 which brought to power the members of his newly adopted political group, and held a Cabinet post for some eight months. He resigned in protest against the army's interference in the business of government and remained in relative solitude until World War II. He entered Parliament for the last time in 1954, but he lost his seat when Parliament had hardly held one meeting. To the end of his life, he never again held a public post, even when his party cooperated with other groups to form coalition governments. He preferred to delegate his party's representation to other members of the party—Muhammad Hadid and Husayn Jamil—rather than to take direct responsibility.<sup>3</sup>

Neither in his membership in the Cabinet nor in Parliament should we examine Chadirchi's participation in political activities—his impact on his country's politics must be sought first in his leadership of the Ahali group and the National Democratic Party to which he devoted the best part of his life and then in the editorship of *Sawt al-Ahali*, his party's organ, in which he expounded his ideas and carried his party's message to the people.

Before he entered Parliament in 1927, Chadirchi had been watching the political scene with a keen interest and decided to join al-Hashimi's opposition party. His choice to work with the opposition was indicative of the fact that he did not expect an immediate return from participation in politics. He stood for certain nationalist demands which were then shared by most

young men of his generation. He remained loyal to Yasin al-Hashimi for some six or seven years before he crossed party lines. During the first three or four years after he entered politics, Chadirchi's chief pre-occupation was with such questions as British control of domestic affairs and the ways and means of achieving independence. Intellectual curiosity led him to read some literature on political thought and he became fascinated with the idea of democracy which he adopted as a political creed. In one of his articles on sovereignty and democracy, he advocated the necessary participation of the public in a truly parliamentary democracy in order to achieve progress.<sup>3</sup>

Two years after independence, the party to which Chadirchi had belonged began to compromise with Iraqi rulers. One of the leading members, Rashid Ali al-Gaylani, became Chief of the Royal Palace in 1933 and the leader of the party, Yasin al-Hashimi, became Prime Minister in 1934 after tribal uprisings.<sup>5</sup> In protest, Chadirchi left the party in 1934 (although he was not the only one who left the party in protest against political compromise). It may seem strange indeed that Chadirchi should leave a party in the approaching hour of victory when he, with other leaders, would share the spoils. But Chadirchi was thinking about other things. He felt keenly that his party had abandoned its opposition to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, which in his opinion compromised Iraq's sovereignty, and violated its promise to the public that its members would not accept government posts unless that treaty was revised in Iraq's favor. Apart from that, the party had no plans to deal with the country's social and economic problems after independence. Nor could Chadirchi influence older leaders to move into that

direction since he was a relatively young member, and he despaired of their outmoded methods and self-seeking motives.

In 1931 the Ahali group, a band of young men who advocated liberal reforms, was organized and their views had excited many younger political figures.<sup>6</sup> They appeared to be the promising leaders of the future, but they had not yet been able to entrust leadership to experienced hands. Chadirchi, impressed by the ideas of this group, aspired to play the role of a leader of young men rather than to remain a junior partner among older politicians. He joined the group in 1934, two years after independence. Very soon Chadirchi proved to be the most outstanding leader of the Ahali group and became editor of the Ahali paper, organ of the group. More experienced in politics, he reorganized the group and gave it a sense of cohesion and direction, although he came into personal conflict with one of the founders who left the group in protest.<sup>7</sup> Under his influence, a number of older politicians, who had been disillusioned with the ruling oligarchy, joined the group in order to enhance its prestige and spread liberal views in wider circles. This quick enlargement of the group brought a sudden and an unexpected support from army officers who promised to carry out the Ahali ideas by an overthrow of the ruling oligarchy and entrusting power to Ahali hands.<sup>8</sup> Resort to the army as an agent for reform brought disastrous results and it distorted the group's goals—it taught the Ahali leaders a lesson to pursue peaceful methods. Chadirchi began to urge the founding of a political party which would advocate reform through legal channels, but political parties were not permitted by Iraqi rulers until after World War II.

Before the Ahali leaders were able to

organize a political party they held several meetings during 1942 to reformulate political goals. They learned that Sir Stafford Cripps, the newly appointed Viceroy of India, was to stop in Baghdad on his way to India, and they prepared a memorandum to be presented to him, hoping that the Labor leader might be interested in proposals for democratic freedoms and the establishment of a political party advocating liberal views that he might pass it on to the British Government for possible consideration. Sir Stafford, however, did not stop in Baghdad and the memorandum was never presented.<sup>9</sup> But the meetings of the Ahali leaders bore fruit in the decision to resume the publication of the Ahali paper. Under the name *Sawt al-Ahali* (Voice of the People), it was issued on September 23, 1942. Its aims were to assert the people's constitutional rights—the rights of free expression of opinion, free elections, organization of societies, trade unions and political parties in order to create an enlightened public opinion which would respect laws and maintain internal stability. Perhaps more important was the decision that the paper would discuss the country's principal problems, especially those relating to land, health, economic, social and educational matters.<sup>10</sup> After the publication of the Ahali paper, these problems were discussed by a number of Ahali members, especially by Chadirchi, who contributed in no small measure to arouse interest in the resumption of political organizations after the war.<sup>11</sup>

Some of the Ahali leaders urged to resume political activities even under war restrictions and censorship, but Chadirchi could see no real gain from open or clandestine activities which might end in arrests, imprisonment and detainment under war regulations. He therefore suggested first to prepare the public for liberal views

and to awaken it to its responsibility before political activities should be resumed. This suggestion, although adopted by the majority, alienated some extremists who left the group to join communist organizations.

In 1945, when the war was over, the Ahali as well as other democratic elements often met in Chadirchi's house to discuss ways and means for organizing a political party which would include all persons desiring to work through democratic processes. There seems to have been no disagreement among them for they all stood in opposition to older professional politicians; but they failed to agree on a common platform. Some desired to adopt radical social and Marxist doctrines while others insisted on moderate views. No common ground could be found despite Chadirchi's attempt to propose a compromise that each one might continue to hold his own personal views and work with others to carry out only the views agreed upon collectively. Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim, though a radical, agreed with Chadirchi, but personal conflict on leadership prevented the two men from working together and he left the group.<sup>12</sup>

When political parties were allowed to be reorganized in 1946, three political parties rather than one were founded, resulting in the weakened position of all democratic elements. Chadirchi's group, holding moderate views, stressed democracy and economic planning but fell short from asserting socialist principles, although Chadirchi himself was in favor of socialism. As a result many young men either organized other left-wing parties or joined the unlicensed Communist Party.<sup>13</sup>

A year after political parties were reorganized, Chadirchi submitted a memorandum to his party embodying specific

socialist proposals for possible adoption. Three fundamental reasons, Chadirchi pointed out, prompted him to present these proposals. First, apart from the unlicensed Communist Party, there were four other political parties which formally asserted liberal principles like those of his own, especially democracy; two of them were in reality Marxist and did not seriously believe in democratic processes, while the other two parties were essentially nationalist and not really interested in social reform. Nevertheless, Chadirchi said, all of these parties declared similar programs and therefore, appeared in the public eye as holding the same principles. Since his party had certain leanings toward socialism—some members were more outspoken about it than others—Chadirchi argued that the time had come to formally adopt socialist principles which would distinguish his party, the National Democratic Party, from other parties.

Secondly, there was the need to stress the implementation of socialist principles by democratic and peaceful methods in contradistinction to communist and revolutionary methods. Chadirchi, who accepted democracy early in his political career, began to see its shortcomings without an association with other principles. After he joined the Ahali group, he sought to combine democracy with socialist doctrines under the name Democratic Socialism (*al-Dimuqratiya al-Ishtirakiya*), a form of social democracy comparable to the program of the British Labor Party, to be carried out by peaceful methods.

Thirdly, Chadirchi's experiences in Iraqi politics taught him that young men were often attracted by reactionary movements whenever nationalist symbols were used to disguise reactionary principles. He witnessed how the Ahali movement itself

was eclipsed by the upsurge of pan-Arabism when Fascist and Nazi ideas invaded nationalist circles before World War II, and only after the victory of democracy over dictatorship did Arab nationalists dissociate themselves from Fascist ideas. In 1946, when the ruling oligarchy began to resist the progress of liberal thought, Chadirchi again became deeply concerned about the possibility of a reactionary revival under the guise of some form of Arab nationalism. More specifically, he was alarmed when Sami Shawkat, a former Minister of Education and leader of the Futuwa (a militant youth) movement, whose activities prompted many young men to participate in the Rashid 'Ali uprising in 1941, reappeared to organize a new National Resurrection Party.<sup>14</sup> Chadirchi, first in a leading article entitled "Iraq's Moseley"<sup>15</sup> and then in a series of articles on "The Resurrection of Fascism in 'Iraq," launched an attack on Shawkat and called the attention to a reactionary movement which, he said, might impede the development of democratic institutions and enhance the power of the ruling oligarchy.<sup>16</sup> Meanwhile, Chadirchi's own views had undergone some changes and he moved further toward the left when Fascist ideas were discredited after the war. His name became closely identified with socialism—indeed, even with communism—in conservative circles. By 1947 Chadirchi thought that the time had come for his party to adopt socialist principles.

In a memorandum to the Executive Committee, dated August 15, 1947, he proposed socialism as a basic principle. The memorandum bears the evidence of a man who observed the political scene with a keen eye and proposed a "philosophy" which would distinguish his party from Marxists and communists, on the one hand,



and from other right-wing political parties, on the other. That philosophy, he said, should be called Democratic Socialism. But there were other circumstantial reasons, he added, which prompted him to propose this philosophy. One of the leftist parties, headed by 'Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim, he said, had decided to dissolve itself and he hoped that his party might attract its members if socialism were formally adopted. Another reason, he said, was the need to acquaint liberal and socialist parties in other countries with his party's role if it stated its aims clearly by a well-defined philosophy of its own. More specifically, he had in mind the British Labor Party which was then in power in England. He suggested that his party should establish close contact with some British Labor leaders who might influence British representatives in Iraq to appreciate his party's concern about democratic freedoms and influence Iraqi rulers to remove restrictions on his party's political activities, since the former were in a close alignment with the British government.

Chadirchi did not spell out fully in his memorandum what he meant by "democratic socialism," but both from oral conversations with him and from other published works it is possible to sum up his views about it. Chadirchi made it clear that he was neither a communist nor a Marxist, although some may have often labeled him as a communist. Nor did he believe in class struggle; he did, however, recognize the existence of a class structure in Iraq and consciously tried to secure public support from both the middle and lower classes. Workers and peasants, he said, were not sufficiently organized to form the backbone of his party. Its appeal, he said, should be to the people at large in principle, but especially to the intelli-

gentsia, the lower middle class, and workers and peasants. Its principal opponents, he held, were tribal chiefs and landowners. Just as the British Labor Party derives its support from the labor and the lower middle classes, so he thought should his party do in Iraq.

Committed to peaceful methods long before he joined the Ahali group, Chadirchi became an even more confirmed believer in democratic and peaceful processes toward the end of his life and repudiated the use of force in principle. I had put to him on more than one occasion the question: how would he justify support given by his group to the military uprisings of 1936 and 1958 in which two former regimes were overthrown by force? Chadirchi invariably replied that force would be justified only to overthrow regimes that crucified freedom. In the memorandum, he stated his position briefly as follows: We pursue democratic procedures to achieve democracy, but if Iraqi rulers should obstruct democratic processes, resort to force would then be justified. Earlier he had expressed himself in this cryptic phrase: the "revolutionary right to achieve democracy."<sup>17</sup> These views were reiterated in his memorandum with the warning that force should be used only when all possible means to achieve democracy were denied by Iraqi rulers.<sup>18</sup>

Democratic Socialism recognizes private ownership and limited free enterprise in principle, but it also admits the qualifying principles of the nationalization of industry and government ownership of essential utilities. Chadirchi expressed no opinion on the banking system but Muhammad Hadid, second in command of the party to Chadirchi, stated that banks should remain in private hands. Limited free enterprise should be encouraged, said Cha-

dirchi, because Iraq needed economic development by private initiative, provided it came under government supervision. It is clear that Chadirchi wanted a moderate brand of socialism which would neither impede economic development nor limit the rights of workers and peasants.

However, when Chadirchi's memorandum was scrutinized at a meeting of the Executive Committee (November 8, 1947), it was accepted in principle not without reservations by only two members—Muhammad Hadid and Husayn Jamil, Vice-President and Secretary of the Party—while it was rejected by all others especially Zaki 'Abd al-Wahhab and Tal'at al-Shaybani, two right-wing leaders. These opponents argued that Iraq's social and economic conditions were at such a backward stage that socialism was too inadequate to cope with development. What Iraq needed, the right-wing leaders held, was to restrict landownership and the power of tribal chiefs in order to relieve workers and peasants from oppressive conditions. Chadirchi's proposal to secure the support of British Labor leaders to influence Iraqi rulers to give concessions was rejected on the ground that the British Labor Party was just as imperialistic in foreign policy as the Tory Party. It is not realistic to maintain that Labor leaders would approve of the just demands of an Iraqi party, Chadirchi's critics contended, since British interests were best protected by the present Iraqi rulers. The only way to achieve their party's aims, they added, was to reduce British influence—a step toward the achievement of the party's goals. Hadid and Jamil, in support of Chadirchi, proposed to accept "democratic socialism" as a guiding principle without adopting it formally, but their compromise was rejected.

On the following day, November 6, 1947, Chadirchi submitted his resignation from leadership of the party because his proposals were rejected. The resignation was not accepted. However, Zaki 'Abd al-Wahhab and Tal'at al-Shaybani submitted their resignations, because it became clear that Chadirchi would have no confidence in them, if he were to continue as leader of the party. Since these two opponents left the party, Chadirchi felt free to give more liberal (i.e., socialist) interpretation to the party's program; indeed, the unofficial socialist stamp continued as long as Chadirchi remained leader of the National Democratic Party.

In 1948 and 1952, when liberal and nationalist elements challenged the ruling oligarchy publicly, the National Democratic Party joined these groups presumably because they sought to induce the government to relax restrictions on free expression of opinion, but whose activities culminated in the overthrow of the government by popular *coups d'état*. In 1958 Chadirchi was unwittingly drawn into the support of a military uprising. His participation, even if justified on the ground of defending free expression of opinion, encouraged in effect opposition leaders to pursue objectives which had little or no regard for liberal principles. To the end of his life in 1968, he continued to preach democracy and socialism, notwithstanding that the fact that he often supported leaders whose objectives ran contrary to these principles.

No less significant in Chadirchi's political career was the editorship of the Ahalī organ and the articles he contributed to it. He followed his country's politics closely—indeed, he was well-informed about

almost all that went on behind closed doors in Baghdad's political circles—and wrote commentaries on questions of the day which were widely read. He wrote critical remarks about Premiers when they were in or out of office—these were often so blunt that it led to judicial proceedings and imprisonment. Perhaps Chadirchi's most trenchant attack was against Arshad al-'Umari—an engineer whose brilliant work as Mayor of Baghdad elevated him to a Cabinet position—who became Premier in June 1946, and tried to govern in a high-handed manner which brought him into conflict with political parties. On the morrow when 'Umari formed a government, Chadirchi wrote a leading article, in which he said:

"Many Iraqi citizens are aware that Arshad al-'Umari's actions are carried out too quickly, almost on the spot—because he is an unbalanced and erratic person—and therefore they never believed he would ever become an important figure in politics, regardless of how high the position he may occupy. Consequently, when they learned that he formed a government, they received the news with obvious coolness—indeed, with cynicism—especially when they heard how quickly he formed it. It is said that he ostentaciously declared that he was able to form his government by telephone calls within half an hour [after the royal summon] !<sup>19</sup>"

These rather uncomplimentary words having been said, Chadirchi went on to explain that 'Umari, a product of Ottoman despotism, was entrusted with the power by the ruling oligarchy to enforce restrictive measures against the newly formed political parties. The purpose of his government, therefore, was unworthy and it was the duty of all democratic elements to oppose it. Because of this and several other

articles,<sup>20</sup> Chadirchi was brought to trial on the ground that his articles were seditious, intended to create dissension and stir disturbances among the people. He was condemned to imprisonment for six months, although by an appeal to high courts and by subsequent change of government,<sup>21</sup> in which Chadirchi's party was represented,<sup>22</sup> the case was finally dropped by the Government.<sup>23</sup> After 'Umari had fallen from power, Chadirchi labeled him as the "pocket dictator," because 'Umari pretended to play the role of a dictator while he failed to carry out dictatorial orders!<sup>24</sup>

But this was not the only instance in which Chadirchi tried to debunk political figures who appeared to him to be vain and self-seeking. He called Shawkat, as we noted before, the Mosely of Iraqi and General Nuri al-Said the Smuts of Iraq, presumably on the ground that General Nuri was an ally of the British Empire; he also nick-named several others by some undignified labels which gave the impression that he sought not merely to debunk but to undermine political opponents by a resort to character assassination.<sup>25</sup>

Some of Chadirchi's writings and commentaries were constructive and quite suggestive, although they were not always welcomed by the authorities.<sup>26</sup> When the *Abali* paper was suspended, he either published his commentaries in other daily papers or distributed them in pamphlets or in mimeographed circulars.<sup>27</sup> In all his writings he was taken very seriously and his views were commented upon both in official and non-official circles.

Chadirchi's own "salon," frequented by friends and visitors, provided a forum for remarks and commentaries on questions of the day which spread beyond the

walls of his house and often embarrassed men in high authority. Some of his remarks described brilliantly the personality and character of political figures, but others were often harsh, unfair, and undignified.<sup>28</sup> While his political satire often amused foreign visitors, it also prejudiced native citizens by unfriendly remarks about political opponents.

Effective in journalism and political pamphleteering, Chadirchi never cared to appear in public to address a public meeting or harangue a crowd. True, he gave speeches in party congresses, but these were given almost in closed doors and could hardly be regarded as addresses to sway audiences. Chadirchi was not a good public speaker; therefore he tried to rely more often on individual and private conversations than on public speeches to influence followers. Nor did he possess sufficient flexibility. From the very beginning when he joined the Ahali group he came into conflict with some followers and refused to accept leaders of other political parties who were prepared to cooperate with him. Had he agreed to cooperate and

form a broader political organization, the ruling oligarchy would perhaps have been unable to suppress political parties and deal with them separately. Chadirchi, keen on a firm control over his party, preferred cohesion and solidarity within a smaller body than to tolerate differences among many followers. As a result, Chadirchi's influence remained confined to a relatively small following and could hardly have been expected to achieve power by peaceful methods. In moments of despair, when his own freedom was restricted, he allowed his party to participate in two military coups—in 1936 and 1958—the first undermined his party and the other destroyed it. Nevertheless, the principles for which Chadirchi stood remain unchallenged as watchwords of moderate and liberal groups to this day. Above all, the strength of his character and loyalty to his party make him stand unique among the professional politicians of his generation. Had he been endowed with flexibility and popular appeal he might have been able to overcome solitude and lead his party in pursuit of popular support.

## NOTES

\* Adopted from a book, *Arab Contemporaries*, scheduled to be published shortly by Johns Hopkins University Press.

(1) For Chadirchi's views on Sami Shawkat's claim to pan-Arabism (Shawkat being of non-Arab origin) see Kamil al-Chadirchi, *Ba'ib al-Fashriya Fi al'Iraq* [Resurrection of Fascism in Iraq] (Baghdad, 1946), p. 18.

(2) In 1935 the period of study was extended to four years.

(3) For an account of Chadirchi's participation in those events, see my *Independent Iraq* (London, 2nd. ed., 1960), Chap. 9; and *Republican Iraq* (London, 1969), Chap. 6.

(4) Kamil al-Chadirchi, "al-Siyada wa al-

Dimuqratiya" [Sovereignty and Democracy] *al-Bilad* (Baghdad), August 28, 1931.

(5) For an account of these events, see my *Independent Iraq*, pp. 37ff.

(6) For the Ahali movement and its political ideas, see my *Independent Iraq*, pp. 96ff; and *Political Trends in the Arab World*, pp. 105-107.

(7) 'Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim, an outstanding member of the Ahali group and author of some of its publications, left it shortly after Chadirchi had become the dominant leader (see my *Independent Iraq*, p. 73).

(8) See *Ibid.*, Chaps. 5 and 6.

(9) For text of the memorandum, see Chadirchi's *Mudbakkirat*, pp. 78-83.

(10) For these aims, see Chadirchi, *Mudbakkirat*, p. 55.

(11) For a summary of the leading articles, see Fadil Husayn, *History of the National Democratic Party* (Baghdad, 1963), pp. 15ff.

(12) For conflicting views among these elements, see Chadirchi's *Mudbakkirat*, pp. 72-76.

(13) For an account of the new political parties, see my *Independent Iraq*, pp. 299-302.

(14) For Shawkat's youth movement and "integral nationalism," see my *Independent Iraq*, pp. 166-168; and *Political Trends*, pp. 177-179.

(15) "Mosely al-'Iraq," *Sawt al-Ahali*, Baghdad, January 2, 1946.

(16) See note I, above.

(17) Chadirchi, *Ba'th al-Fashbiya Fi al-'Iraq*.

(18) Chadirchi, *Mudbakkirat*, p. 210.

(19) Chadirchi, "al-Ghaya al-Khafiya Wara' Khittat al-Hukuma al-Hadira" [The Hidden Motive behind the Plan of the Present Government], *Sawt al-Ahali*, Baghdad, July 10, 1946, pp. 1 and 4. See M. Hadid, "Conditions in 'Iraq," *New Statesman*, London, September 4, 1946, p. 186.

(20) See *Sawt al-Ahali*, Baghdad, July 15 and 18, 1946.

(21) A new Government was formed by General Nuri al-Sa'id in November, 1946.

(22) Muhammad Hadid, Vice-President of the National Democratic Party, became Minister of Supply.

(23) For the documents relating to this case, see Chadirchi, *Mubakamat Kamil al-Chadirchi* [Trials of Kamil al-Chadirchi] (Baghdad, 1946).

(24) The author heard Chadirchi on more than one occasion using these words. See Chadirchi, *Ba'th al-Fashbiya Fi al-'Iraq*, p. 529; and "Bayan al-Hizb al-Watani al-Dimuqrati Bimunasabat Istiqlalat Wazarat al-'Umari," *Sawt al-Ahali*, Baghdad, November 27, 1947. For an account of 'Umari's Cabinet and the country's reaction to it, see my *Independent Iraq*, pp. 256-258.

(25) Chadirchi's sarcastic criticism of Rafael Butti, editor of *al-Bilad* and fellow member of a former political party, incited Butti to reply in seven severely, often profanely, worded articles which exposed Chadirchi's early career. For Chadirchi's article on Butti, see *Sawt al-Ahali*, Baghdad, December 13, 1946; and for Butti's reply, see *al-Bilad*, Baghdad, December 26, 1946—January 10, 1947.

(26) See *Sawt al-Ahali*, Baghdad, December 2 and 20, 1946; February 9 and 21, 1947; December 2, 1948; al-Hiyad, Baghdad, December 28, 1953 and others.

(27) See my *Republican Iraq*, pp. 227 and 231.

(28) For remarks about King Faysal II and Brigadier Qasim, see my *Republican Iraq*, pp. 46 and 185.



# Mahmud Sevket Paşa and Abdulhamid II

Glen W. Swanson

Late in the evening of April 28, 1909, a hunched, elderly, suspicious man stepped from the train that had brought him to Salonika. He was bound for his new residence in the Alatini palace, situated outside the city. The scant attention paid to him and his entourage contrasted markedly with what he had learned to expect during the decades he had spent in Istanbul as sultan of the Ottoman empire. From 1876 to 1909, his name had drawn the acclaim of millions of subjects. Now, with his dynastic burden recently removed, Abdülhamid could relax and enjoy a quietude granted him by the new Young Turk government, and speculate as to why formerly loyal generals and other citizens had deserted him during the critical month of April 1909.

The man who had arranged his passage had not accompanied Abdülhamid to Salonika, but had remained in Istanbul to

superintend other chores that followed the sultan's deposition. By the rules of revolutionary logic, this man, Mahmud Şevket Paşa, should not have been where he was. He hardly fit the image of the youthful conspirator that came to mind when the term "Young Turk" was used, for his career as an army officer spanned, not three decades of rebellious activity, but thirty years of dedicated service to the sultan whom he had just helped to depose.

The paradox of this relationship between the sultan and his general began in the nineteenth century. Mahmud Şevket was born in Baghdad about 1858, the son of Kethüdaoglu Süleyman Bey. His father, in keeping with the established pattern of family service to the Ottoman dynasty, at that time governed the Müntefik division of the Basra province. After spending his early years in Baghdad, Şevket moved to

Istanbul to continue his education.<sup>1</sup> A year or two after Abdülhamid became sultan, Şevket gained entrance to one of the ruler's prized institutions, the Mekteb-i Fünun-u Harbiye-i Şahane (Imperial School of Military Science), called simply Mekteb-i Harbiye or the Harbiye. Şevket now became a member of the select group of school-trained officers known as the *mekteblis*, in contrast to the *alayî* officers, who advanced from the ranks. Şevket completed his three-year Harbiye course in 1880 at the head of his class, and went as a second lieutenant to the staff college (Erkân-i Harbiye-i Mektebi) where he again displayed the diligence that earned him first place in the 1882 graduating group.<sup>2</sup>

Şevket's first official encounter with Hamidian imperial problems came the year after graduation. After serving with the general staff in Istanbul, he was assigned to field duties with a division gathering in Crete. Its mission was to suppress the 'Ura-bi (Arabi) insurrection in Egypt. When the British grew tired of Abdülhamid's vacillation and unilaterally resolved the crisis by landing troops in Egypt, there was no longer any need for an Ottoman force, and Şevket returned to Istanbul to teach "firing theory" and "technical weapons" courses at the Harbiye.<sup>3</sup>

Among the instructors then at the academy was the German general Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz, whom Abdülhamid had summoned to help reorganize the Ottoman military institution. Mahmud Şevket was one of those Ottoman officers whose skills von der Goltz engaged at an early date. A major reason for Şevket's association with the German general was the Ottoman army's need for translations of French and German scientific and technical military literature into Turkish.<sup>4</sup>

Şevket's work in the field of litera-

ture led to talks between Şevket and Abdülhamid about Şevket's book manuscript entitled *Osmanlı Teşkilat ve Kıyafet-i Askeriyesi (Devleti Osmanîyenin Bidayeti Te'sisından Şimdiye Kadar)* [The Organization and Uniforms of the Ottoman Army (From the Beginnings of the Ottoman State to the Present)]. When Şevket petitioned Abdülhamid for permission to publish the manuscript, the sultan gave him an equivocal response. Abdülhamid glanced at the material Şevket presented, expressed appreciation, rewarded Şevket with a medal, and granted permission for publication some time in the future. But Şevket failed to receive Abdülhamid's final approval for the printing of the book, and it was only after the 1908 Young Turk revolution that Şevket did succeed in having two parts of his work published.<sup>5</sup>

The diligence and patience, as well as the non-political nature of Şevket's service in the Hamidian system were manifest in another activity, that of weaponry. Since Şevket's specialty was knowledge of ordnance, he joined von der Goltz in the 1880's on a commission that decided which model of rifle should be purchased for the Ottoman infantry. It was Şevket, the junior member of the commission, who eventually convinced the board that the Mauser should be accepted. After 1886, Abdülhamid's desire for more and better weapons provided the basis for various ordnance assignments that took Şevket to Germany and France. Şevket's intense application to work in Germany, however, culminated in a nervous breakdown and his involuntary retirement for over a year. This prevented any military service on his part in the Greek-Turkish war of 1897. Upon his recuperation Şevket returned to active duty at the Tophane, the imperial arsenal of ordnance and artillery.<sup>6</sup>

While Şevket officially remained in the testing and experimental department at Tophane from 1898-1905, he assumed another task for Abdülhamid, namely, service with the Hijaz railway and telegraph project. The war with Greece had brought victory to Abdülhamid's army, but with it came the increasing realization that the Ottoman railway system required further refinement and development. For religious, economic, political, and strategic reasons, Abdülhamid turned his primary efforts to the Syrian-Arabian region. The sultan summoned Şevket for the initial phase of operations, the establishment of telegraph service from Damascus to Medina by way of as-Salt and Ma'an. By this time Abdülhamid was not only aware of Şevket's perspicacity, but also appreciated his family ties to an Arab land and his knowledge of military sciences. His secret orders to Şevket were to learn the truth about intrigues in Egypt, Syria, and Hijaz and to find a remedy for them. Şevket executed his duties and submitted detailed reports to Istanbul. The dilatory nature of Ottoman bureaucracy, however, negated his work, and his recommendations were never acted on. Perhaps Şevket was learning too much about conditions in the area, or perhaps the local leaders were suspicious of any probing from Istanbul. In any case Şevket met with opposition from the Emir of Mecca, Avnülrefik Paşa, and the governor-general of the Hijaz, Ahmed Ratib Paşa, and was forced to return to the imperial arsenal in the capital.<sup>7</sup>

In 1905 Abdülhamid again had occasion to benefit from Şevket's services. To meet internal problems and to satisfy great power pressures for reforms in Macedonia, the sultan appointed capable officers, such as Şevket, to fill administrative posts in the area. Şevket became governor

of the strategic province of Kosovo. Like most Ottoman officials in Macedonia, Şevket was caught in the middle of local strife. He attempted to answer the complaints of various parties and to calm long-standing differences among ethnic and religious groups, but his rational approaches had minimal effect. Most Balkan leaders by the twentieth century were impervious to the recommendations, no matter how valid, of a Turkish governor. Despite the political difficulties, general social and economic conditions did improve in Kosovo and by 1908, Şevket, now in his fifties, could take pride in his record of service to the sultan in the fields of ordnance, education, and administration.<sup>8</sup> Then, suddenly, the advent of the Young Turk revolution altered the routine pattern of life for both Şevket and Abdülhamid.

When news of the revolution reached Şevket, he had to decide quickly whether or not to join the Young Turk movement. The decision to remain loyal to the sultan or to give his support to a mutinous group whose declared intention was to bring about the unity and progress of the state was difficult for Şevket because of ties and interests in both camps. Şevket received an anonymous letter, which was really an ultimatum, inviting him to join the Young Turk movement or suffer the fate of other officers opposed to the Young Turks. Evidently, Şevket had no illusions as to the consequences of a negative answer. The humiliations and indignities heaped upon a number of officers who had refused to cooperate with the Young Turks, including Hüseyin Remzi Paşa, the commander of the Usküb (Skoplje) military zone, clearly indicated what was in store for Şevket. His answer, made on July 17, seems to have satisfied the Young Turks, for he remained undisturbed in his office.<sup>9</sup>



Just when it seemed that the Young Turks would prevail, the master politician of the Ottoman empire, Abdülhamid, assumed the role of reformer. News had reached the sultan that the usually loyal Albanians had joined the Young Turk cause at Firzovik and were now demanding the re-establishment of the 1876 constitution and the opening of parliament. On July 22 the sultan learned that the ten battalions he had sent to crush the revolt also had gone over to the Young Turks. The following day brought over dispatches from Monastir about a threatened march on the capital, a move which the sultan believed would mean his deposition. His countering act was a political masterstroke which dumbfounded the Young Turks. The ministers met through the night. On the following day, July 24, the sultan proclaimed the re-establishment of the 1876 constitution.<sup>10</sup>

The official announcement in Usküb of Abdülhamid's proclamation produced both jubilation and fear. With banners flying, delegations flocked into the city where Şevket recounted the sufferings of the people during the previous thirty years. Then a complication arose: since everyone was openly expressing happiness, the Albanians in the area also decided to celebrate—a disturbing idea to Şevket because of the size of the group making their way toward the city. His actions to ward off the threat of Albanian unrest and check the potential danger to the Austrian colony in Usküb were successful, and for his service, Şevket received the Austrian Order of the Iron Cross First Class.<sup>11</sup>

Şevket's activities during the 1908 revolution gave little evidence of his later importance in the Young Turk movement. He had no part in the direction of the movement, but he had permitted continuance

of the events and did defend the results. In a letter to von der Goltz dated July 28, 1908, he stated that although he did not believe the Ottoman people were ready for constitutional rule, such a system of government still had merit, providing as it did better opportunities for the Turkish people to gain experience in government. As for the participation of the military in the revolutionary movement, this was undesirable, but what other instrument did a suppressed people have against both Abdülhamid and the possibility of foreign power intervention? The army, Şevket argued, had to involve itself in the Young Turk uprising. But with the goal achieved, Şevket believed, perhaps a bit naively, that the officer corps, as a matter of military discipline and professionalism, should withdraw from politics. Only if Abdülhamid attempted to cancel the new reforms, should the military act; otherwise, it ought to remain passive. On the other hand, Şevket disliked the continuing unstable conditions in Istanbul which were damaging to the prestige of the empire, and deplored the signs of radicalism that were evident there.<sup>12</sup>

Despite his conservative appraisal of the revolution, Şevket was one of the officers who profited much from the 1908 unrest. He assumed command of the Third Army on August 29, 1908, and was appointed acting Inspector-General of the three European provinces in November of that year. He remained outwardly unperturbed, as he dealt with such momentous problems as the Bulgarian declaration of independence, the Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the guerilla activities that increased alarmingly in the Balkans between October 1908 and February 1909. Then, all at once, these problems were eclipsed by a new factor—the Revolution (or Counter-Revolution) of 1909.

After their success in July 1908 the Young Turk policy of indirect and tolerant rule facilitated the organization of various opposition groups in Istanbul. While some vocal groups gathered around the new premier of the Ottoman empire, Kâmil Paşa, the more emotional but less politically active resistance to the Young Turks was found in the popular religious circles whose supporters included peasants, merchants, government officials and army personnel. Of special importance were the *alaylîs* (officers who had achieved their rank without going to the military academy) and troops of the Second Division of the First Army Corps. Acting as the sultan's bodyguard and being stationed near Yıldız palace, these soldiers of the Second Division were Abdülhamid's favorites. They had been carefully chosen, taken to Istanbul from their Albanian and Syrian lands of origin, and imbued with a sense of loyalty to the sultan and caliph of the Islamic world. The popular religious devotion to Abdülhamid and the *Şeriat* (Muslim religious law) manifested itself on several occasions in late 1908 and early 1909. The Muslim political militant and agitator, Hafız Derviş Vahdeti, published a paper called *Volkan*, which became a major propaganda weapon against the Young Turks and their foreign and secular ideas. The Society of Muhammedan Union (*İttihad-i Muhammedi Cemiyeti*), organized with the help of Vahdeti, used the paper to spread its message about the merits of traditional Islam and the *Şeriat*. Among the targets for the Society's propaganda were units of the Second Division imperial guard in Istanbul, commanded by *alaylî* officers. The Young Turks attempted to weaken this element by pensioning off the *alaylîs* and replacing them with young *mekteblîs* (academy officers).<sup>23</sup>

The retirement and assignment of of-

ficers carried mixed results. In theory the army should have benefited from the replacement procedure. In reality, the engagement of young officers in politics and the chance to obtain a post in the attractive city of Istanbul led to rivalry among officers and a let-down in discipline, as well as insubordination and slackness in the officer corps.

A step towards military reorganization at the end of March only worsened the situation. When the Arab battalions of the palace guard refused to accept Turkish recruits from Anatolia, the commander of the First Army area, Mahmud Muhtar Paşa, ordered soldiers to surround the unruly Arabs and the Albanian guards who had joined them. The insurgents obeyed Muhtar's orders to return to barracks. During the following week several units of Salonika troops were transferred to Yıldız to replace many of the Arab and Albanian guards removed to Rumelia or to other places in the city. The final episode came when Mahmud Muhtar ordered that troops have nothing to do with religion. The reaction was sharp. On the evening of April 12 and morning of April 13, ex-officers and religious leaders exhorted soldiers of the Salonika battalions stationed in Istanbul to rise against the enemies of Islam. Within hours the counter-revolution of April 1909 was triumphant in the streets of the capital.<sup>24</sup>

No other event had such crucial meaning for Abdülhamid and Mahmud Şevket as this uprising of April 1909. It represented the last moment in Ottoman history that a sultan could have protected that religio-political authority and prestige upon which the rule of the sultanate had traditionally been based. The hypothesis that Abdülhamid himself had plotted and supported the aborted revolution is difficult

to prove. More valid and meaningful is the theory that the April revolt was not so much a scheme of Abdülhamid as it was the natural culmination of decades of national disillusionment, frustration, and fear.

The greatest initial difficulty that Şevket had to overcome as commander of the Third Army was the breakdown in communications between Salonika and Istanbul, which made it difficult to ascertain the validity of reports and rumors.<sup>15</sup> First learning of the uprising on April 14, Şevket was forced to depend on private messages from the capital routed via Salonika to foreign countries; their somber news of lives being endangered in Istanbul drove Şevket to further inquiry. His telegraphed questions to Istanbul went unanswered, and the official policy of the government concerning the muting remained unclear to him.<sup>16</sup>

Lacking information and uneasily aware that further unrest would likely result in civil war or an intervention by the great powers, Şevket made his decision. Replying to the grand vizier's order that he should maintain calm in the three Macedonian vilayets (provinces), Şevket announced that he was going to march to Istanbul with the Third Army to punish the mutineers and save the capital.<sup>17</sup>

His task was to gather and advance forces toward Istanbul as quickly as possible to forestall any further act by either the Istanbul garrison or foreign countries. Believing as he did that time was of the essence, Şevket made preparations for rapid movement of troops on the railway from Salonika to *Dedeagaç* (Alexandrouples), and secured funds to finance the operation.<sup>18</sup>

One cause for concern was the attitude of the officers and men of the Second

Army which, from its strategic location in Edirne, could block movements along the main routes from Greece and Macedonia to the capital. The Young Turk officers' resolution to support Şevket's counter movement had failed to stir the Edirne garrison, and public opinion in the city did not fully share the Young Turk contention that the constitution was in danger.<sup>19</sup> The apathy of both the troops and the populace, and their distrust of their leaders contributed to a passiveness in the city, which the lack of information about events transpiring in Istanbul did nothing to relieve. The British consul had attempted to inform influential Young Turks that the Ottoman ministry had in fact voluntarily resigned and had not been summarily dismissed by Abdülhamid. Edirne moderates recognized this fact, but the Unionists refused to accept this version and increased their agitation.<sup>20</sup>

To meet a possible threat from the Edirne troops, Şevket entered into negotiations with their commanding general, Salih Paşa, who explained by telegraph to Şevket that he was still vague about what had happened in Istanbul and that the soldiers of the Second Army were uneasy. Salih's indecision was finally set at rest; by April 16, Salih was prepared to provide support and placed in readiness a mixed brigade of infantry, artillery, and cavalry under the command of Şevket Turgud Paşa. While despondency and civil indifference did continue, Edirne at least had been neutralized.<sup>21</sup>

The political climate of Üsküb, which had been Şevket's base of operations during the three years he governed the province of Kosovo, differed little from that of most other cities of the empire in the general unwillingness of the inhabitants to accept the Committee of Union and Progress (C.U.P.) as savior of the empire. Although

a few judicial and civil officials and some junior officers indicated their sympathy for the Unionists, higher ranking officers remained detached and aloof.<sup>22</sup> When Şevket instructed the commander of the 5th Division in Kosovo vilayet to send three battalions toward İstanbul, the commander vacillated. The latter replied that he could not send more than one battalion without weakening the frontier defenses; it seemed unlikely that any force would come from that province. When finally an army unit did leave Üsküb on April 18, it marched to the station with a singular lack of fanfare and unaccompanied by any popular enthusiasm.<sup>23</sup>

Despite the many difficulties, Şevket and his colleagues organized an expeditionary force with the aid of Greek and Bulgarian bands, loyal troops, and sympathetic civilians. To counter the threat of support for the mutineers from units in Asia, Şevket turned to the Asian part of the area he commanded. (In the Ottoman empire at this time the term "army" was misleading when referring to the *ordu* for the latter was better designated as a territorial district in which certain units were located. The Third *Ordu*, often referred to as the Third Army, included the western half of European Turkey and part of the western section of Anatolia. The city of İzmir was in this section.) Şevket sent two trusted battalions from İzmir to the strategic location of Eskişehir to stop any movement to İstanbul of pro-Hamidian troops from Konya.<sup>24</sup>

While Şevket remained in Salonika a few more days to complete preliminary dispositions, the first Rumelian elements advanced under the command of Hüseyin Hüsnü Paşa. The unit that Hüsnü led during the first few days of the operation was to become famous under the name of *Ha-*

*reket Ordusu*: an army of movement, or army of operation, which was really a group composed of Rumelian soldiers, irregulars, and volunteers. Turks, Greeks, Serbs, Jews, Bulgars, and members of other national groups made up this patchwork force. Officers wore no identification of rank to quiet the suspicion among the enlisted men of their *mektebli* Young Turk superiors.

The *Hareket Ordusu* moved toward the capital with speed and efficiency. By April 19, Yeşilköy (San Stefano) had fallen to the Salonika troops and Hüsnü notified Şevket that on April 21 he would proceed to İstanbul.<sup>25</sup>

For some reason the news of Hüsnü's plans created consternation at the Committee of Union and Progress center in Salonika, and the Unionists decided to give Mahmud Şevket general command of the movement. With this endorsement Şevket moved from Salonika to Yeşilköy where the Ottoman Chamber and Senate gathered in a National Assembly.<sup>26</sup> Şevket carefully prepared his plans, and on April 21 ordered the occupation of a hamlet overlooking one of the gates to the capital.

Reports had reached İstanbul three days previously that a large army was on its way from Rumelia to take care of the Counter-Revolution.<sup>27</sup> With communications between Salonika and İstanbul cut off, the confusion and disorganization within the capital became critical. The frustration of officers in İstanbul increased, and some turned their feelings against Abdülhamid: the minister of war and the chief of the general staff going so far as to accuse the sultan of being a traitor and of having broken his oath to the Constitution.<sup>28</sup> As for the rump parliament still meeting in İstanbul, the members voted to

leave the capital and proceeded to Yeşilköy.

While the National Assembly was meeting in its new political center, a functionary informed them that Mahmud Şevket had arrived in the town with his army and desired to speak with the leader of the Young Turks, Ahmed Rıza Bey. The general and the politician met together in an evacuated house to discuss the deposition of Abdülhamid. Şevket urged caution, for he had heard from soldiers in his entourage that they, the soldiers, would punish persons who wanted to remove either the constitution or the sultan. Şevket informed Rıza that the army would rebel and destroy the Young Turk movement if the soldiers felt that the sultan had been deposed through Young Turk efforts. Considering the timing inopportune, Şevket recommended that Rıza explain Şevket's view secretly to the deputies and senators and that he would inform Rıza when the right moment came to discuss the matter.<sup>29</sup>

Şevket then spoke before the National Assembly and repeated his message that he had come to punish the mutinous soldiers and to save the country, sentiments which the delegates welcomed heartily. But when he continued that he and his comrades had no view toward deposing Abdülhamid, Şevket met with silence. The result was a delay by the assembly in their decision concerning the sultan.<sup>30</sup>

Possibly one reason for Şevket's action at the assembly was the long period of service he had given to Abdülhamid. But a more meaningful explanation lay in the situation at hand, with its rumors and faulty communications, the possibility of reaction in his own ranks, and the unknown power of the sultan in the capital. The *Şehir Emîni* (Prefect) of Istanbul reported to Şevket that the sultan was ready to unfold the flag of the Prophet and summon the Muslims

for the defense of the throne. Other messages told of danger of a massacre of non-Muslim inhabitants in the capital.<sup>31</sup> Bulgaria was taking advantage of the critical moments to gain Turkish recognition of its independence. All indications led Şevket to the belief that time was of the essence.

From his headquarters near Yeşilköy, Şevket pursued his attempts to communicate with the capital. While the Porte had no formal relations with the *Hareket Ordusu*, the chief of the Ottoman general staff, Ahmed İzzet Paşa, and the commander of the army in Istanbul, Nazım Paşa, tried to negotiate with Şevket's approaching army in order to insure the maintenance of order in the capital.<sup>32</sup> Şevket informed Nazım that his purpose was to punish the offenders in the mutiny who had killed many of the sultan's officers and innocent citizens, to conciliate the troops in the city, and to re-establish order and normal government. He sent reassurances to the sultan and his generals that he remained loyal, but warned them not to put up any resistance.<sup>33</sup>

Abdülhamid, through his secretary Ali Cevad, expressed his pleasure with Şevket's declarations and said that he willingly placed his life in the hands of his army. As Şevket requested, the sultan did nothing to stop the military occupation of the capital. Abdülhamid ordered Şevket's declaration to be published in the city newspapers and presented to the foreign ambassadors at religious ceremonies, the *Selamlık*, on April 23.<sup>34</sup> Apparently, Abdülhamid, by this time, was becoming anxious about the mutinous soldiers still near the palace and was afraid of being caught between two military groups, which would account for his being so strangely amenable to Şevket's request and assurance.<sup>35</sup>

The understanding reached between

Şevket and the capital facilitated Şevket's plans for taking the city. Upon Şevket's demand for railway transport of his troops, Abdülhamid gave authorization and the troops moved toward the capital. The minister of war, Edhem Paşa, exhorted the Second Army in Edirne to unite with Şevket's force and to submit to his orders which were now also those of the legal and established government in Istanbul.<sup>36</sup> Nazim and Edhem arranged for the supply of provisions and tents to the investing army.<sup>37</sup>

Although Nazim argued that the press attacks against Abdülhamid had agitated the Muslim population and that any action against the sultan would compromise the military situation, Şevket made final preparations for the seizure of the city. Apparently Şevket and Nazim reached an agreement on April 23 that the army of occupation would not undertake any action against the sultan; the objects were punishment of the guilty, disarmament, and dislocation of the Istanbul garrison.<sup>38</sup>

Even as the crowd shouted the traditional "Long live the Padişah" at Abdülhamid's last Selamlık on April 23, the army from Macedonia was closing its cordon on the city. One by one, the obstacles fell before the forces of Şevket, and by the evening of April 24 the city was largely in the hands of the investing army. Mahmoud Şevket was now able to establish his headquarters at the war ministry in Istanbul.

Şevket rightly gambled that the Yıldız garrison would remain inactive. Probably the reason why the palace guard offered no resistance was that Abdülhamid feared the mutinous soldiery as much as, or more than, he distrusted Şevket's protestation of loyalty to the throne. As Şevket later related the affair, the sultan and several cabinet ministers had requested Şevket to send troops

to occupy Yıldız because they believed that mutineers in the garrison constituted a threat to the person of the sultan.<sup>39</sup> Abdülhamid ordered a few officials to remain at the palace from Friday evening to Sunday, April 25, and exert themselves so that they would prevent the Yıldız troops' entering into battle. While the sultan and his officials were able to curb the belligerency of the garrison, they could not calm the panic among the troops.<sup>40</sup>

Abdülhamid's first secretary, Ali Cevad, recounted the events that transpired during these crucial days. Şevket had sent a telegram from Yeşilköy informing the palace that he had no desire to overthrow the sultan. However, he warned that the army accepted no responsibility if violence against Christians or foreigners in the capital occurred before he reached Istanbul and someone acted against Abdülhamid as a result of this violence. According to Ali Cevad, when the troops at Yıldız learned that the *Hareket Ordusu* was approaching, they became greatly agitated and repeatedly demanded arms and ammunition, crying out that they did not want to die like women. The assurance of Abdülhamid's palace officials that the army from Macedonia was not intent upon a massacre fell on deaf ears. Some of the Yıldız troops broke into the weapons room and armed themselves, but by Saturday morning they saw that the Macedonian irregulars had surrounded Yıldız.

From Abdülhamid's standpoint, the situation was getting out of hand. The sultan and his officials again tried to persuade the Yıldız soldiers to lay down their weapons and not attempt resistance. Ali Cevad states that the sultan even told some soldiers that he preferred them to kill him before opening fire on brother soldiers. One by one, then in groups, the troops of

the Second Division discarded their weapons that evening and Sunday and left their positions to make their escape. On the morning of Monday, April 26, Şevket's troops began to occupy Yıldız.<sup>41</sup>

Although Şevket considered his duties discharged with the seizure of Abdülhamid's palace, he was to be a principal participant in one more momentous event—the deposition of Abdülhamid. Any judgment about Şevket's motives must be weighed in the context of his character and in light of his own privately expressed views. As late as April 25 he had proclaimed that the *Hareket Ordusu* was not connected to the Young Turk Committee of Union and Progress, that the army had come to protect the constitutional government, and that any mixing of military personnel in politics was forbidden.<sup>42</sup> He maintained that his purpose for the march was to restore military discipline and punish the mutineers—a promise he kept by quickly establishing military tribunals in the city.

Şevket later explained that he had not acted treacherously towards Abdülhamid, arguing that the power to depose a sultan lay with parliament and the religious leader of the community, the Sheikh ül-Islâm. Şevket's duty, as he saw it, was to enable the parliament to deliberate without interference. Until the National Assembly pronounced otherwise, he continued to recognise Abdülhamid as his sultan to whom he owed fealty. With the occupation of Istanbul accomplished, the army simply stood by as the preserver of the peace, obedient to the orders of the Assembly, and detached from political life in the capital.<sup>49</sup>

Meanwhile, the Assembly had taken up the matter of Abdülhamid's deposition. Ahmed Rıza and the hero of the 1877-78 war with Russia, Ahmed Muhtar Paşa, went to the war ministry for talks with Şevket.

When they requested from Şevket the cooperation of the army for the execution of the deposition, Şevket refused and referred to his proclamation enumerating the reasons that brought him to Istanbul. He considered that his move had nothing to do with the deposition of the sultan and that any other way of handling the situation went against his soldierly honor. Discussions with other officers on the evening of April 26 did not shake his resolution: the army would remain aloof from the matter.<sup>44</sup> But by keeping the army apolitical and by remaining neutral in the decision-making process, Şevket permitted the National Assembly to conclude its premeditated act. On the afternoon of April 26, the Assembly resolved to depose Abdülhamid, but waited until the following morning to apply to the Sheikh ül-Islâm for the religious ruling.

Having made its decision, the Assembly asked Şevket to notify the sultan of the result, a suggestion which Şevket refused.<sup>45</sup> Thereupon a delegation proceeded to Yıldız to inform Abdülhamid of his deposition and another parliamentary deputation went to tell the next sultan, Mehmed Reşad, of his elevation to the throne as Mehmed V. Mahmud Şevket had responsibility for one final task. Swiftly he arranged transportation for Abdülhamid's safe transfer from Istanbul to Salonika.

No longer was Abdülhamid the feared and powerful ruler of the Ottoman empire. Now, the Young Turk politicians and army officers could turn to plans for the future, thanks in part to the actions of a formerly obscure general who had served Abdülhamid faithfully for so many years. But one personal problem remained. By emerging as hero of the 1909 revolution, Mahmud Şevket, an enigma to both Young Turks and Old Ottomans, could not esca-

pe the political and military responsibilities that accompanied his newly-won fame. While Abdülhamid relaxed in luxurious quarters, Şevket found himself caught up in a turbulent chapter of Ottoman history that ended, tragically for him, in June 1913.

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## NOTES

(1) For differing dates on Şevket's birth see Ibrahim Alaettin Gövsa, *Türk Meşhurları Ansiklopedisi* [Encyclopedia of Turkish Notables] (Istanbul: Yedigün Neşriyatı, n.d.), p. 237, hereafter referred to as *T.M.A.*; Mahmud Kemal Inal, *Osmanlı Devrinde son Sadriazamlar* [The Last Grand Viziers of the Ottoman Period] (3 vols.; Istanbul Maarif Matbaası, 1940-1953), p. 1869, hereafter referred to as *Son Sadriazamlar*; Ziya Sakir, *Mahmud Şevket Paşa* (Istanbul?: Muallım Fuat Gücüyener Anadolu Türk Kitap Deposu, n.d.), p. 12; *Neue Freie Presse* (Vienna), May 7, 1909, p. 3. The official Ottoman almanac for 1287/1871, *Salaame-i Devlet-i Aliye-i Osmaniye*, p. 156, still listed a Suleyman Bey as *mutasarriif* of Basra

(2) *Son Sadriazamlar*, p. 1869, *Neue Freie Presse*, May 7, 1909, p. 3; Muharrem Maslum [Iskorta], *Erkânıharbiye Mektebi (Harp Akademisi) Tarihi* [History of the (War Academy) Staff College] (Istanbul, 1930), p. 21; Mehmet Esat, *Mirat-i Mekteb-i Harbiye* [Mirror of the Military School] (Istanbul, 1310), p. 570.

(3) *T.M.A.*, p. 237; *Son Sadriazamlar*, p. 1869; Generalfeldmarschall Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz, "Erinnerungen an Mahmud Schewket Pascha," *Deutsche Rundschau*, CLVII (October-December, 1913), p. 32.

(4) Von der Goltz, "Erinnerungen," pp. 32, 36-37, Generalfeldmarschall Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, edited by Wilhelm Leopold Colmar von der Goltz (2nd ed.; Berlin: E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1932), pp. 106 ff. On Şevket's relations with the German military mission to Turkey, see Glen W. Swanson, "Mahmud Şevket Paşa and the German Military Mission to Turkey, 1882-1913," in M. E. Yapp (editor), *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East* (forthcoming).

(5) Mahmud Şevket Paşa, *Osmanlı Teşkilat ve Kıyafet-i Askeriyesi*, I, Introduction. Only the first two volumes were published, the third volume remains as a manuscript in the Yıldız palace library collection of the Istanbul University library.

(6) Von der Goltz, "Erinnerungen," pp. 34-36; *T.M.A.*, pp. 237-8; "Laufbahn des verstorbenen Grossveziers Mahmud Schefket Pascha," *Militär Wochenblatt* Nr. 83 (1913), columns 1916-1917; *Son Sadriazamlar*, pp. 1869-70.

(7) *Son Sadriazamlar*, p. 1870; Tahsin Paşa, *Abdülhamid ve Yıldız Hatıraları* [Abdülhamid and Yıldız Remembrances] (Istanbul: A. Halit Kütüphanesi, 1931), p. 285.

(8) Public Record Office, Foreign Office (F.O.) 294/34, Uskub, Ryan to Graves #44, July 19, 1905; #47, August 3, 1905; #50, August 27, 1905; F.O. 195/2263, notes from the commercial report for Uskub for year ended February 28, 1907.

(9) Gustav Hubka, *Die Österreichisch-Ungarische Offiziersmission Makedonien, 1903-1909* (Vienna: Verlag von F. Temsky, 1910), pp. 96-7; F.O. 195/2363, "Turkey. Annual Report for 1908," p. 41.

(10) Bonn, German archives, Auswärtiges Amt (A.A.), Türkei 201, #A14514. See also Ernest Edmondson Ramsaur, Jr., *The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908* (Princeton, N.J., 1957), pp. 135-7.

(11) Ministère des Affaires étrangères, *Documents diplomatiques français, 1871-1914*, 2nd series, XI, 719; Hubka, *Offiziersmission*, pp. 100-104.

(12) Von der Goltz, "Erinnerungen," pp. 39-41.



(13) See David Farhi, "The *Şeriat* as a Political Slogan—or the Incident of the 31st *Mart*," *Middle Eastern Studies*, VII, 275-299.

(14) Austrian Military Archives (Vienna), Ö.-U.K.A., Mil. At.-Konst., Bd. 58, #218, Giesl to Conrad, April 5, 1909; F.O. 195/2323, Constantinople, Surtees to Lowther, April 7 and 10, 1909; Francis McCullagh, *The Fall of Abd-ul Hamid* (London: Methuen, 1910), pp. 68-70.

(15) Kâzım Nami Duru, *İttihat ve Terakki Hatıralarım* [My Remembrances of the Union and Progress] (Istanbul: Sucuoglu Matbaası, 1957), p. 40.

(16) The source for von der Goltz's account of the 1909 Counter-Revolution was a private report that Şevket prepared for von der Goltz entitled "Kurze Geschichte meiner Salonikier Tage," and what he learned from Turkish officers. Von der Goltz quotes extensively from Şevket's report. See von der Goltz, "Erinnerungen," p. 44

(17) *Ibid.*, pp. 44-45.

(18) *Ibid.*, pp. 184-5; F.O. 195/2328, Monastir, Ceary to Lowther #19, April 19, 1909.

(19) F.O. 195/2304, Adrianople, Samson to Lowther #47, June 30, and #26, April 16, 1909.

(20) F.O. 195/2304, Adrianople, Samson to Lowther #27, April 18, 1909.

(21) Von der Goltz, "Erinnerungen," p. 185; F.O. 195/2363, "Turkey. Annual Report for 1909," p. 35; F.O. 195/2304, #47.

(22) F.O. 195/2328, Uskub, Satow to Lamb #21, April 16, 1909.

(23) *Ibid.*, #22, April 17, and #23, April 19, 1909.

(24) Von der Goltz, "Erinnerungen," p. 186; F.O. 195/2331, Smyrna, Barnham to Lowther #35, April 20, 1909

(25) Ahmed Bedevi Kuran, *Osmanlı İmparatorlugunda İnkılap Hareketleri ve Millî Mücadele* [Revolutionary Movements in the Ottoman Empire and the National Struggle] (Istanbul, 1956), p. 466.

(26) *Ibid.*, p. 466.

(27) McCullagh, *The Fall of Abd-ul Hamid*, pp. 169-198.

(28) A.A., Türkiye 134, #A7092, Constantinople, Stempel to Kriegsministerium, April 18, 1909, and #A6835, Marschall to A.A., April 18, 1909.

(29) "Ahmet Rıza Beyin Hatıraları," [Remembrances of Ahmet Rıza Bey] *Cumhuriyet*, February 3, 1950, p. 2.

(30) Von der Goltz, "Erinnerungen," p. 189, extensively using and quoting from Şevket's private report; A.A., Türkiye 134, #A7810, Constantinople, Stempel to Kriegsministerium, April 27, 1909.

(31) Von der Goltz, "Erinnerungen," p. 189; A.A., Türkiye 134, #A8048, Pera, Marschall to A.A., May 7, 1909, and #A9264, Thera, Marschall to Bulow, May 25, 1909.

(32) A.A., Türkiye 134, #A7008, Pera, Marschall to Bulow, May 25, 1909.

(33) Youssouf Fehmi, *La Révolution Ottomane* (Paris, 1911), pp. 200-201.

(34) Von der Goltz, "Erinnerungen," pp. 189-190, with direct quotation from Şevket's private report

(35) Alı Fuad Türkgeldi, *Görüp İşittiklerimiz* [Things I Saw and Heard] (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1949), pp. 35-6.

(36) Fehmi, *La Révolution Ottomane*, pp. 200-201.

(37) F.O. 421/251, Surtees to Lowther #26, April 26, 1909; Ö.-U.K.A., Mil. At.-Konst., Bd. 58, #270, Giesl, April 29, 1909.

(38) Von der Goltz, "Erinnerungen," p. 191, A.A., Türkiye 134, #A7160, Pera, Marschall to A.A., April 23, 1909.

(39) McCullagh, *The Fall of Abd-ul Hamid*, pp. 215-223, 245.

(40) Alı Cevat Bey, *İkinci Meşrutiyetin İlanı ve Otuzbir Mart Hadisesi* [The Announcement of the Second Constitutional Government and the Incident of March 31], ed. by Faik Reşit Unat, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınlarından II. Seri No. 19 (Ankara, 1960), pp. 72-3; A.A., Türkiye 134, #A7323, Pera, Marschall to A.A., April 26, 1909.

(41) Cevat, *İkinci*, pp. 68-78; A.A., Türkiye 134, #A8048, Pera, Marschall to A.A., May 7, 1909.

(42) A.A., Türkiye 134, #A7297, Pera, Marschall to A.A., April 25, 1909; Ö.-U.K.A., Mil. At.-Konst., Bd. 58, Giesl #268, April 25, 1909.

(43) McCullagh, *The Fall of Abd-ul Hamid*, p. 212; von der Goltz, "Erinnerungen," p. 196, quoting from Şevket's private report.

(44) "Ahmet Rıza Beyin Hatıraları," *Cumhuriyet*, February 3, 1950, p. 2; Ö.-U.K.A., Mil. At.-Konst., Bd. 58, Giesl to Conrad, May 10, 1909; von der Goltz, "Erinnerungen," p. 196.

(45) Von der Goltz, "Erinnerungen," pp. 196-7.

# Moses Hess: Millenarian Fantasy and the Origins of Zionism

Thomas Flanagan

One of the most intriguing topics of investigation in political theory is the relation between fantasy and realism in political beliefs. An ideology, if it is to be useful, must contain a reasonably reliable blueprint or guide to reality, while if it is to be believed, it must have emotional appeal, which is often attained through improbable or untrue conceptions. This paper studies the role played by fantasy in the Zionism of Moses Hess (1812-1875), the first secular Jewish thinker to advocate the establishment of a Jewish state on Palestinian soil. The specific fantasy is a belief in an imminent millenium, or a realm of peace, freedom, equality, abundance, and happiness for all mankind. In Yonina Talmon's definition, the millenium

"symbolizes the metahistorical future in which the world will be inhabited by a humanity liberated from all the limitations of human existence, redeemed from pain and transience, from fallibility and sin, thus becoming at once perfectly good and perfectly happy. The world will be utterly, completely and irrevocably changed."<sup>1</sup>

As a well known religious symbol, the millenium has played an important role in the high religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, as well as in more primitive cults. Here I extend its meaning to include belief in secular millenium, an age of perfection which is similar in principle to a religious millenium, except that it is not described in religious terms and its coming is not attributed to divine intervention.

Zionism is a species of nationalism; and nationalism, it is often said, has many of the properties of a religion. Carlton Hayes made his comparison the subject of a book, in which he argued that the secular creed of nationalism can appeal, like transcendental dogmas, to man's "religious sense." Nationalism can become "a substitute for, or a supplement to, historic religion."<sup>2</sup> On this basis, a number of similarities are evident: both nationalism and religion appeal through faith to the emotions; both depend on public ceremonies, symbols, and sacred monuments; both develop pantheons of saints and heroes; and as beliefs, both exist in the dual form of a speculative system for intellectuals and a cruder mythology for the masses.

This comparison between nationalism and religion is correct as far as it goes, but it must be made more precise. The affinities of nationalism are chiefly to a specific type of religion, namely the millenarian belief in an imminent transformation of history. This has been treated in some detail in the recent study of J. L. Talmon, *Political Messianism: The Romantic Phase*, with particular reference to Lammenais, Michelet, Mazzini, and Mickiewicz. According to Talmon, it is characteristic of messianic nationalism to conceive the nation as a chosen people with a world-historical mission. The "deification of the nation" necessitates "the apotheosis of universal history and the oneness of mankind. Otherwise the uniqueness of the single nation [would be] a freak and could claim no absolute significance."<sup>3</sup>

The connection between nationalist ideologies and religious millenarianism actually is twofold. It implies, first of all, a correspondence in structure between political ideology and religious beliefs, with the nation corresponding to the chosen

people, the heroic leader to the Messiah, the new age of world history to the millennium, etc. This approach, which is followed by Talmon, amounts to an analysis of formal similarities between belief systems of differing content. But it is also possible to approach the question from another direction, by showing that nationalist ideology has directly grown out of, or at least has been influenced by, currents of religious millenarianism. Studies of this type have been carried out by historians concerned with the development of American,<sup>4</sup> Polish,<sup>5</sup> and Russian<sup>6</sup> nationalism. Such historical research has recently been impressively reinforced by anthropological data on millenarian movements in the under-developed countries, such as the famous "cargo cults" of Melanesia or the prophetic sects of black Africa. Several studies show that millenarian enthusiasm, which is originally almost devoid of political content, can be subsumed into secular nationalism in pursuit of political goals.<sup>7</sup>

Zionism appears to be an obvious instance of the congruence between Messianism and nationalism. Numberless commentators have suggested that the Zionist program of recovering the Holy Land is only an updated and secularized version of the ancient hope for the appearance of the Messiah and the end of the Diaspora. To quote a distinguished exponent of this viewpoint, the Jewish historian Simon Dubnow:

"Political Zionism is merely a renewed form of messianism that was transmitted from the enthusiastic minds of the religious kabbalists to the minds of the political communal leaders. In it the ecstasy bound up in the great idea of rebirth blurs the lines between reality and fantasy. Here too we find the continuing effects of secularization. In the same

way that the Jewish national idea in its completeness now divests itself of its religious form and takes on a secular form, so messianism passes over from the religious to the political sphere.”<sup>8</sup>

Yet the link between political Zionism and Jewish messianism is not as clear-cut as might superficially appear. The creators and propagators of Zionism were largely secularized intellectuals who were in many ways less affected by Jewish traditions than by contemporary currents of Western thought. To the extent that their versions of Zionism exhibit messianic characteristics, one should look not only to the influence of Jewish tradition but of contemporary millenarian ideologies. Indeed it has even been suggested by a recent anti-Zionist author (Jewish) that the messianic rhetoric of Zionism was largely propaganda:

“Zionism also is frequently depicted by its supporters as a political means toward the realization of two thousand years of Jewish yearning for redemption. The extravagant, pseudo-Messianic mythology which has been created around this notion should be recognized for the propagandistic device which it is. It has served a useful purpose in enlisting the support of fundamentalist Christians, in particular, for the Zionist cause, and has legitimized Jewish attachment to the movement by establishing a vivid, albeit spurious continuance between the aspirations of the World Zionist Organization and those of traditional Judaism.

In reality, however, Zionism’s drive did not stem from Messianism but from an utterly mundane and openly avowed desire to ‘normalize’ the situation and personality of the Jewish people.”<sup>9</sup>

This opinion contains a good deal of truth, but overlooks one important aspect of the question: Jewish messianism is not the only

belief system of chiliastic inspiration. There is also the important secular millenarian tradition within nationalism whose impact must be evaluated.

To discuss the millenarian aspects of Zionism in general would go beyond the confines of a single essay, for Zionism, like all ideologies, has been advanced by a variety of proponents whose views do not always coincide. Hence I will confine my remarks to Moses Hess, in whom the millenarian impulse is especially prominent. Hess is often accounted the first Zionist thinker, but perhaps “proto-Zionist” would be a better term, for *Rome and Jerusalem* (1862) was an isolated book without any immediate effect. The other two classics of Zionist literature, Leo Pinsker’s *Auto-Emancipation* (1881) and Theodor Herzl’s *Judenstaat* (1896) were written without any influence from Hess. Indeed Herzl, as we know from his diary, did not begin to read Hess until 1898, and did not finish the book until 1901:

“The 19 hours of this round-trip were whiled away for me by Hess with his *Rome and Jerusalem*, which I had first started to read in 1898 in Jerusalem, but had never been able to finish properly in the pressure and rush of these years. Now I was enraptured and uplifted by him. What an exalted noble spirit! Everything that we have tried is already in his book.”<sup>10</sup>

Herzl’s enthusiasm was not entirely justified. There is a world of difference between the approach of Herzl, which is really an imitation of the *Realpolitik* of the Great Powers, and that of Hess, which is decidedly messianic. Herzl was concerned, in more or less realistic fashion, with providing a refuge for persecuted Jews; Hess was concerned with the salvation of humanity. Herzl thought that a Jewish state

was necessary precisely because the salvation of mankind from bigotry was so unlikely, but for Hess the Jewish state was only the first step in the final redemptive age of history.

Hess's reputation has suffered in the past from a series of misinterpretations. As a socialist theorist of some stature, and a one-time friend of Marx and Engels, he had the misfortune to encounter their notorious unfairness towards erstwhile associates. Succeeding generations of socialist scholars have studied Hess, but treated him chiefly as a transient influence on Marx and Engels.<sup>11</sup> Hess's Zionism is never taken seriously, and is seldom even discussed, by socialist historians. The only scholarly book in English which is devoted entirely to Hess does not even mention that he is the author of *Rome and Jerusalem*.<sup>12</sup> On the other side, Zionist historians have adopted Hess as a national hero, but sometimes without a thorough study of his career and his writings.<sup>13</sup> Today, however, the patient scholarship of Edmund Silberner has produced a bibliography of Hess's works as well as a sympathetic but objective biography based on documentary evidence.<sup>14</sup> Silberner's work gives students of the history of ideas a reliable basis from which to evaluate Hess in relation to nineteenth-century currents of thought.

In the remainder of the paper, after briefly sketching the career of Moses Hess and his relation to Judaism, I will discuss the role played by the millenium in his Zionist ideology. I will then trace the continuity between Hess's Zionism and the chiliastic enthusiasm of his earlier, non-Zionist works. This finally will lead to an evaluation of the millenarian component of Zionism in comparison with the millenarian traits of other Western ideologies, and re-

flections about the irrationality of the Messianic hope.

### *Hess and Judaism*

Moses Hess was the son of a prosperous Rhineland merchant. Although his father quite naturally wished him to enter the family business, Moses had little interest in it and worked only enough to give himself the means to study and write. Ultimately, Moses sold his share of the family inheritance to his brothers in return for the guarantee of a modest annuity. His only real career was as a writer and journalist; throughout his life he supplemented his meagre pension with royalties from his books and honoraria from contributions to newspapers and journals. In spite of his many and varied writings, Hess remained fundamentally an autodidact. He had received an orthodox Talmudic education as a small child living in Bonn with his grandfather, but the curriculum did not include modern learning. As an adolescent, Moses still spoke Yiddish rather than High German, and he had to educate himself while working in his father's business. While he attended lectures for a while at the University of Bonn, and later in Paris, he never received a formal degree, even though his contemporaries, with a Germanic love of rank, often referred to him as "Dr. Hess."

Hess's writings fall into three main categories: socialist, cosmological, and Zionist. It is erroneous to suppose, as is sometimes done, that Hess went through distinct phases, and that by the time he became a Zionist he had ceased to be a socialist. The three stages in his intellectual progress should be considered successive and complementary attempts to develop a millenarian philosophy of history promising a redemptive finale to the drama of human

development. By 1862, when Hess published *Rome and Jerusalem*, he was not only a Zionist but still a convinced communist as well as an advocate of an evolutionary, organic theory of the cosmos. The unity of all three aspects of his thought was the hope for a secular millenium interpreted as the final age of history.

Hess's role in the development of communism in Germany has been thoroughly studied in recent years so there is no need to cover the same ground. Suffice it to say that his *Heilige Geschichte der Menschheit* (1837) was the first book published in Germany to espouse a communist view of society. Later Hess was instrumental in bringing Karl Marx onto the staff of the *Rheinische Zeitung*, and in winning over both Marx and Engels to communism. As late as 1845, Hess was still close to Marx and Engels, and contributed two short sections (one now lost) to the *German Ideology*. But even though Hess was converted to Marx's novel doctrine of historical materialism, his relations with Marx and Engels gradually deteriorated, particularly through the machinations of Engels, who apparently seduced Hess's wife and was in any event not eager to have rivals for Marx's favour. The final rupture came in 1848. Afterwards, Hess remained a socialist, and was always willing to give generous acknowledgement to Marx's theoretical achievements; but he steered his own course in politics and eventually became an active member of Ferdinand Lassalle's *Allgemeiner deutscher Arbeiterverein*.

Hess's ventures into cosmology are much less well known than his socialist activities. He first became interested in the natural sciences in the 1850's, when, after the collapse of the revolutions of 1848, opportunities for political agitation vanished. He attempted to develop an integrated

view of the evolution of the universe, proceeding from the cosmic through the organic to the social sphere, positing the future socialist age not only as the arbitrary creation of human will but as the necessary culmination of cosmic evolution. Such speculations sound quaint today, but it must be remembered that they were common in the nineteenth century, whether in the form of the *Naturphilosophie* of Schelling and Hegel, or the evolutionism of Spencer. In socialism, too, the same tendency has been widespread: witness Engels' *Dialectics of Nature*. Lenin's late interest in Hegel, and ultimately the Stalinist creation of dialectical materialism. Hess, the self-taught journalist, was not really able to achieve much in this direction; the net result of his labours was a few articles, now forgotten, and a book which his wife published privately after his death because no commercial publisher could be found.

Far more important is the Zionist world view which became the final element in Hess's millenarian philosophy of history. The most famous expression of Hess's Zionism was *Rome and Jerusalem*, written in 1860-61, and published in 1862. But this was by no means his sole Zionist publication; in the years after 1862 he wrote intermittently for several journals on Jewish and/or Zionist questions, the most important result being the ten "Lettres sur la mission d'Israël dans l'histoire de l'humanité," published in *Archives israélites*, which stood near to the influential *Alliance israélite universelle*.<sup>15</sup>

Since Hess had not previously appeared in print as a Zionist, he found it necessary to explain in the opening paragraphs of *Rome and Jerusalem* that he had returned home after "twenty years of alienation" from his people, and once again was moved by a sense of Jewish nationality, a

feeling which he had thought forever dead in his heart.<sup>16</sup> Ostensibly, Hess embraced Judaism with all the ardour of the returning prodigal son; and yet his new brand of Judaism had little in common with any of the conventional schools of that religion.

Hess's relation to his childhood religion is so important that we must look at the facts in some detail. After a strict Talmudic education, the adolescent Hess gave up his Jewish orthodoxy. Leaving his religion furnished, in a way, the model for all his later attempts to analyze the world-historical meaning of Judaism; without exception, even as a Zionist, he treats Judaism as a phase which must be transcended on the way to a higher level of consciousness. This is apparent even in his earliest comments on the subject in the diary he kept in 1835-36. There, while expressing admiration for the tenacity of the Jews in the Diaspora, he treats the Jewish faith itself as historically obsolete. One must go beyond Judaism, he argued, and beyond Christianity for that matter, to the spiritual religion of the future which will unite all men.<sup>17</sup> The same kind of ambivalence towards the Jews is apparent in his first book, *The Sacred History of Mankind* (1837). Here Judaism and Christianity are conceived as successive, and now outmoded revelations, to be followed by a third and final revelation of the Holy Spirit, a non-dogmatic and non-denominational "religion" of love and brotherhood. But even if Judaism is a historically obsolete stage of consciousness, which must be consigned to the "garbage heap of history," he thinks that the Jews have a singular role to play in the process of man's increasing awareness of himself. According to Hess, each of the three great revelations is vouchsafed to a Jew: the Old Covenant

is made with Moses; the New Covenant is manifest in Christ; and the third "revelation" is the rationalist philosophy of Benedict de Spinoza, the great Jewish philosopher who taught that God can be known directly by human reason rather than by faith. This notion of a special role of the Jews is the seed of the Zionist Messianism which Hess espoused after 1860.

Politically, Hess's earliest view was that the Jews ought to be emancipated by the state. His writings before 1860, insofar as they touch on Jewish questions at all, complain about unequal treatment of the Jews and demand that they receive equality before the law as individual citizens. Hess himself counted as an assimilated Jew in those years; he left home, married a Gentile, did not practice his religion, and never affixed the name "Moses" to his publications, preferring Moritz Hess, Maurice Hess, or most commonly M. Hess.

Although Hess's viewpoint from adolescence to the publications of *Rome and Jerusalem* generally remained one of emancipation, his opinions were not entirely static. In the years of his close connection with Marx and Engels, he adopted the contemptuous attitude of his friends toward Judaism (and Christianity).<sup>18</sup> In his essay "Über das Geldwesen," (1844) he wrote:

"Money is the blood of society, but externalized—it is blood which has been shed. The Jews, who in the history of man's animal existence had the world-historic mission of making man a predator, have now fulfilled their calling. The mystery of Judaism and Christianity is revealed in the modern, Jewish-Christian world of the merchant."<sup>19</sup>

Judaism is still a stage in human development which must be overcome, but it is an evil and oppressive stage, not a bene-

ficial one. The special role of the Jews still exists, in a way, but only inasmuch as Judaism represents an especially acute form of degradation.

There was, however, another side to Hess's feelings about Judaism which did not appear in the publications of these years. His manuscripts show that he was deeply shaken by the Damascus Affair of 1840, when Jews in that city were accused of the hoary calumny of ritual murder (a French Franciscan priest disappeared after being seen in the Jewish quarter around Easter time) and were, at the behest of the French legation, put to the torture in an attempt to extract a confession. Hess's notes<sup>20</sup> show that, at least for a short time, he reflected bitterly on the value of emancipation. Yet the Damascus Affair was not enough to destroy totally his belief in emancipation and assimilation, and he kept his reservations to himself until they poured out in *Rome and Jerusalem*.

What finally brought Hess to abandon his standpoint of individual emancipation, and to become an advocate of Jewish national rebirth? Three factors shed some light on the question. First is anti-semitism (to which Hess was personally often exposed in the socialist movement). An outstanding instance was the Mortara case of 1858, in which the government of the Papal States removed a Jewish boy from the home of his parents because a Catholic nurse, unbidden by the parents, had baptized the child while he seemed near to death in a hospital. A second factor is the political history of the end of the decade of the 1850's, especially the intervention in 1859 of Napoleon III on the side of Cavour against Austria, which contributed greatly to the unification of Italy. To Hess's romantic mind, the resurrection of one great people of antiquity, the Italians, fol-

lowing the liberation of the Greeks a generation earlier, seemed to predict the rebirth of the third great nation of antiquity, the Jews. As he wrote in the preface to *Rome and Jerusalem*: "With the liberation of the eternal city on the Tiber begins the liberation of the eternal city on Mount Moria; with the rebirth of Italy begins the resurrection of Judea."<sup>21</sup> Such comments from his pen appear as early as August 4, 1860, in a newspaper article.<sup>22</sup> Finally, one must not ignore the tangled state of Hess's personal life at the time. In 1861, he returned from Paris to the Rhineland, separated from his wife, who was apparently involved with another man. Estranged from his Gentile wife, Hess was impressed with the stability of Jewish family life and gave it favourable comment in *Rome and Jerusalem*. Indeed he witnessed an outstanding example of devotion within his own family. When his brother Samuel's wife, Emilie, died, leaving him a widower with two small children, her sister Josephine Hirsch took over the care of the children and subsequently married their father. Josephine is the enigmatic female personage to whom are addressed the letters which make up *Rome and Jerusalem*, and who is identified as the "unhappy feminine being" who gave Hess the courage to strike a new course.

#### *Hess's Millenarian Zionism*

Anyone familiar with the literature of Zionism, which is filled with discussions of sovereignty, international law, and great-power politics, will be surprised to see just how little space is taken up by such questions in *Rome and Jerusalem*. With a sublime indifference to detail, Hess simply takes for granted the process of settlement and the creation of a Jewish state (nowhere in Hess's works is mention even made of the Palestinian "minority" already dwelling in Zion). Another anomaly is that Hess's



opinions do not fit into the distinction made by Achad Ha'am (Asher Ginzberg) between Zionism whose purpose is to provide a refuge for *Jewry*, or Jews as individuals, and Zionism whose purpose is to provide a "national centre" to revitalize *Judaism* as the culture and religion of all Jews, regardless of where they happen to live, Hess's writings are addressed neither to the problem of Jewry nor to the problem of Judaism, but to the problem of the entire human race. He clearly believes that the emergence of a Jewish state on Palestinian soil marks the final stage of human development, the consummation of history.

This belief is cloaked in what appears to be the traditional language of Jewish messianism. Thus Hess writes:

"The end of days, which Judaism has always foretold since the beginning of sacred history... is not, as other peoples have misunderstood, the end of the world, but the completion of the historical development and the education of the human race.

"We stand at the eve of this 'sabbath of history' and must prepare ourselves for our last mission through the understanding of our traditional religion."<sup>23</sup>

Further citation would be redundant; the point is that throughout *Rome and Jerusalem*, as well as his other Zionist essays, Hess takes pains to emphasize the unity between Jewish history and world history at large. The completion of the one is the fulfillment of the other; redemption of the Jews implies salvation for all peoples.

Selective quotation could almost make Hess appear to be a Zionist of the Orthodox Jewish stripe, like the Rabbi Zvi Hirsch Kalischer, who taught that the return to the Holy Land would bring the coming of the messiah in the literal Biblical sense. But the

position of Hess, the onetime assimilated Jew who had been both a Spinozist and an atheist, is far more complicated. Hess never unequivocally affirms the literal truth of the Jewish prophetic and messianic faith. He repeatedly attacks Reform Judaism as an imitation of Protestant Christianity, and he repeatedly praises the social cohesiveness of the ancient Jewish beliefs; but he never acknowledges them as *true*. The following is a fair sample:

"I recognize only one Jewish community, the ancient synagogue, which happily still exists and hopefully will continue to exist until the national rebirth of Judaism is complete. I myself, if I had a family, would not only publicly join a pious Jewish community but would observe in my own house all days of mourning and celebration, just as prescribed—in spite of my dogmatic heterodoxy."<sup>24</sup>

Hess posits the continued existence of traditional Judaism only "until the national rebirth of Judaism is complete." As he says in another place, at that time, when the ancient fatherland is regained, a great Sanhedrin will be selected to modify Judaism "according to the needs of the new society,"<sup>25</sup> i.e. the messianic society of the sabbath age of history. Faithfulness to Judaism is, for Hess, a means of ensuring the cohesion of the Jewish people until their mission can be consummated; but this is quite different from believing in a religion because it is true.

Hess's messianism is genuine enough, but it stems from another source than Jewish religious beliefs. The real source is mentioned, but not discussed at length, in the pages of *Rome and Jerusalem*. There Hess refers to the *Weltanschauung* which is to be found in all his works: "I have had no other since my first appearance as a writer." This persistent belief Hess iden-

tifies as the doctrine of the three ages or revelations:

"The time of the Messiah is the present age, which began to germinate with Spinoza and came into world historical existence with the great French Revolution. With the French Revolution began the rebirth of peoples...

The social sphere of life develops, like the cosmic and organic, in three epochs, which are entirely analogous in each of the three spheres of life [i.e. cosmic, organic, social].

The first historical revelation, that of ancient Judaism and paganism, is the paleontological epoch of social life. It corresponds to the embryonic stage of organisms in the history of the earth, which ended in the tertiary period with the birth of the organisms now existing. It also corresponds in the history of the heavenly bodies to the embryonic stage of worlds, the age of comets and nebulae, which lasted till the birth of the stars.

The second historical revelation, that of medieval Judaism, Christianity and Islamism, is the birth epoch of modern society. It corresponds in the organic world to the birth epoch of organisms now alive and in the cosmic world to the birth of the stars which are now luminous.

The third historical revelation, the contemporary world of the social sphere of life, corresponds to the period of developed organisms in the organic sphere and to the age of completed planetary systems in the cosmic sphere.

...There are developing today in social life the last struggles between races and classes, which will lead to the re-

solution of all conflicts, to the balance between production and consumption, and to that perfected circulation of life which always characterizes the age of maturity."<sup>26</sup>

In these few paragraphs Hess refers the reader back to his lifetime of speculation on the three ages, but the reference is so condensed as to be rather confusing. The essential structure of the ideas will be clearer if we describe the various layers in Hess's triadic construction of history.

The first notion developed by Hess is that of the three revelations, which bears a striking resemblance to the theology of history of Joachim of Fiore. Hess's doctrine of the three revelations is contained in his first book, *The Sacred History of Mankind*. There he writes:

"Whatever is born in time develops in three periods. In the first it germinates, is unified, and lives internally — this is the root of life. In the second it develops, is divided, and lives externally — that is the flowering of life. In the third it extends itself, is reunited, and ripens — that is the fruit of life."<sup>27</sup>

With this tripartite model, Hess attempted to develop a sweeping description of history which, with inordinate naiveté, he called "the first attempt to comprehend world history in its entirety and regularity."<sup>28</sup>

The principle of Hess's sacred history was the progression of consciousness from imagination (*Phantasie*) through emotion (*Gemuth*) to a realm of reason (*Verstand*). According to Hess, this third age has existed in embryo since Spinoza, and is now striving for maturity.

"Everything can be summed up in a few words. For the pure imagination God or

Life is manifested in unity, as for pure reason, but still in images, limited with temporal attributes. In emotion, the eternal idea of God struggles with the limited representation of Him, so that pure emotion is... a never stilled yearning and hope that the difference will be overcome. By pure reason, finally, God is again grasped as the one, as by the pure imagination, but as eternal truth, without temporal, mortal qualities."<sup>29</sup>

These three eras of increasing consciousness are characterized as successive revelations of the Holy Trinity. The age of imagination, which corresponds to the Old Testament, belongs to the Father; the age of emotion, corresponding to the New Testament, belongs to the Son; and the final culminating age of reason is under the aegis of the Holy Spirit. This last "revelation" makes further revelations impossible, for it sets reason on an independent footing, seeing clearly "face to face" and not "through a glass darkly". Myths and creeds can now, after the philosophical achievement of Spinoza, be given up in favour of the direct knowledge of reason.

This third age of reason is a common feature of German idealistic philosophy, and Hess's version is particularly close to that found in Lessing's *Education of the Human Race*. For both, the third age is a Spinozistic realm of reason replacing earlier modes of knowledge. Yet Hess's construction of history also goes considerably beyond postulating the attainment of a realm of reason by suggesting that this new age would have particular social characteristics, vaguely socialist in character, which will produce the liberation of man. In general, state power will be guided by a sense of humanity. It will create modern laws for the emancipation of women; it will take over the education of children, revitalizing

family life. Church and state will no longer conflict, for "in this new sacred covenant, religion and politics will again become one."<sup>30</sup> Law and the constitution will be obeyed by all without question, and the state will not be torn by factional antagonism. Making all of this possible will be a redistribution of wealth to overcome the opposition between rich and poor, for "it is no longer the nobility which is the enemy who can destroy our future, but the rich."<sup>31</sup> The third age, since it possesses all these mundane features, will have to be introduced by earthly means. At this point, Hess is more a radical reformer than a revolutionary, for he believes in the persuasive power of his "third revelation"; but it is still inescapable that radical, if not violent politics, will be required. "It is from France," writes Hess,

"the land of political struggles, that genuine politics will come, as the true religion will come from Germany. And through the union of both the new Jerusalem will arise. The trumpet of the ages will sound for the third time, and the realm of truth will be founded."<sup>32</sup>

This threefold sequence issuing in a realm of truth or "new Jerusalem" always remained the basis of Hess's millenarian view of history, but to it he added other elements which expanded the content in new directions while leaving the structure undisturbed. Thus his interest in natural science resulted in a millenarian theory of cosmic evolution. Hess expanded his philosophy of history to include natural as well as human history, in order to show that the achievement of the third age of human development was a product of universal necessity. Once again the triadic division plays a central role. Hess divides the universe into three progressively more complex spheres, cosmic, organic, and social,

which follow each other sequentially. Within each sphere, moreover, there is a parallel evolution following a rhythm of three stages, rise, growth, and maturity. At this moment in history, the evolution of the cosmic and organic spheres is essentially complete; the universe has reached a stage of harmony in the galactic and planetary system, as has the organic sphere in the present equilibrium of life on earth. Only the social sphere has not yet reached equilibrium; it has gone through two stages of its evolution, the first two "revelations" discussed above, and is now in process of entering the third and final age. At this point, Hess can retain his earlier triadic scheme *in toto*, simply inserting it in the larger matrix of cosmic and organic development.

The constant factor in these different theories is the chiliastic scheme of three ages, which situates the present moment at the end of the second and thus on the verge of the third and culminating age. This structure is in itself neutral; it can be used as a receptacle of ideological content of the most diverse sort. Thus Hess is successively and/or simultaneously a Spinozist, atheist, Young Hegelian, socialist, and cosmic evolutionist. Almost any belief is acceptable as long as it can lend support to the fantasy that humanity now stands at the threshold of a realm of peace, freedom, equality, and abundance. It is thus not surprising that Hess should have added still another symbolic dimension to the expression of his chiliastic hope, based on the "mission" of the Jewish people. Several factors suited the Jews to play the role of Chosen People in Hess's scheme. There is, first of all, the ancient Jewish self-interpretation of being an elected people, constituted by a covenant with God and waiting for the messiah. Even if Hess did not believe this

in any literal sense, he could and did view it as precursor to his own millenarianism. Secondly, the Jews, like the industrial proletariat, could pass as an oppressed people; and the apocalyptic scheme always demands a group, humiliated in this age, which is to be exalted in the age to come. Thirdly, it is possible, with a considerable effort of the imagination, to see certain "socialist" features in Jewish life, particularly in the communitarianism of the people which has a collective covenant with God. Earlier, Hess had seen Judaism as an archetype of capitalism, as had Marx; but now, to be both millenarian socialist and millenarian Zionist, he pictures the Jews as an instinctively socialist people. Finally, certain features of Jewish belief lend themselves to incorporation in Hess's scheme. The third revelation of the Holy Spirit is to be a non-dogmatic "religion" of reason, love, and brotherhood; and Hess viewed Judaism as also a non-dogmatic religion. Furthermore, Judaism contained, at least originally, no doctrine of an afterlife, no systematic distinction between body and soul, no disjunction between church and state, but rather a message of collective, this-worldly existence under God in waiting for the messiah. In this internal simplicity and harmony of Judaism, Hess sees prefigured the dialectical equilibrium which will characterize the third age, the "sabbath of history."

The above should not be misunderstood as "arguments" in defense of a "position," although they are used by Hess in that fashion. Essentially, Hess, like other utopian visionaries, has no position which can be defended by rational argument; he has hope, and fantasy, which are expressed in symbols masquerading as arguments. All who came in contact with Hess, and who have studied him since, have been impres-

sed by the extreme fluidity of his thought, and his ability to tolerate sublimely the most glaring contradictions. One recalls Jenny Marx's characterization of him as the "ehrlichen Confusionarius."<sup>33</sup> This predilection for confusion is usually attributed to a personal weakness in Hess, or to his lack of formal education; but it is equally a property of the millenarian vision as a variety of social thought. The shifting contours of Hess's ideas resemble the fluidity of myths, which are properly used as expressions of religious experiences; and this is appropriate, because Hess's redemptive urge is fundamentally religious. In essence, Hess has appropriated an ancient eschatological myth, that of the coming third age, and embroidered it with political motifs, socialist and Zionist. The result is an ideology which is an extraordinarily poor guide to the real world of politics because, while using political concepts, it is more akin to theology. The world is perceived only through the conviction that history is a process of three stages with a glorious finale embracing the entire human race. All knowledge, whether gained by study or first-hand experience, has to be fitted into the *idée fixe*. The result is a series of ideological phases in Hess's development which seem to imply intellectual growth but which in fact never depart from the original millenarian structure of thought. Political ideology becomes the projection of an intense inner longing for redemption; from time to time, a new instrument of salvation is discovered—the proletariat, Hegelian philosophy, natural evolution, the Jews—but the longing is always the same.

This diagnosis of Hess's Zionism as a projection of his inner needs was made as early as 1861 by his old friend, the Jewish novelist Berthold Auerbach. After Hess had sent him the manuscript of *Rome*

and *Jerusalem*, Auerbach wrote back:

"You are miraculous saints, you world-reformers. You pretend so easily that your personal stages of development and your momentary point of view are the developmental phases of time and the world. One can tolerate that in a great poet like Goethe; he himself is his own world by virtue of what his subjectivity creates. But to wish to design the given world according to changing moods goes beyond the limits of what is justified in subjective thought."<sup>34</sup>

### Conclusion

The symbol of a millennial third age, which figures so prominently in Hess's philosophy of history, is also a ubiquitous item of modern political discourse.<sup>35</sup> Here I can do no more than refer summarily to the major instances: (1) In German idealism, the third age appears as a future realm of heightened consciousness, self-awareness, and freedom (*Reich der Freiheit*). With minor modifications, sometimes in the religious guise of a "third revelation" or "third testament," it will be found in the writings of Lessing, Schiller, Hegel, Schilling, Krause, Heine, and others. Hess's early works belong in this category except that he also gave the third age a socialistic content. (2) In French positivism, the third age also refers to a new era of consciousness, but construed as a scientific, not philosophical, achievement. At the same time, however, the notion of a new religion tends to reappear; and the third age is also ordinarily endowed with utopian social features. Among those preaching the third age in these various senses were Saint-Simon and the Saint-Simonian school, Auguste Comte, as well as several other important thinkers affected by positivism, e.g. Louis Blanc, Pierre Leroux, George Sand. (3) From both French and German sources,

the third age is adopted as a symbol by nationalist visionaries. In Italian nationalism it emerges as the *Roma terza* of Mazzini, later vulgarized by Mussolini. In Polish nationalism the doctrine is espoused in one form or another by the philosopher Cieszkowski, the poet Krasinski, and the charlatan Towianski. In Russian thought there is the populist socialism of Mikhailovsky, building on French positivism, as well as the mystical Third-Testament Christianity of Merezhkovsky and Berdyaev, reinforced by the ancient Muscovite notion of Moscow, the Third Rome. And finally there is the devastatingly effective symbol of the Third Reich, popularized by Arthur Moeller van den Bruck and borrowed by the Nazis, which illustrates the popular appeal that millenarian symbols can exercise. This profusion of guises in which the third age appears—philosophical, positivist, socialist, nationalist—parallels the variety in Hess's writings; or to put it another way, Hess reflects in microcosm the wider tendency of nineteenth-century political thought to develop different, but structurally similar variants of the millenarian hope. Throughout the various schools of thought, which usually regarded each other as enemies, the same pattern of thought can be detected: the belief in the coming third age of peace, freedom, equality, and abundance. Hess's Zionism thus must be classified as yet another variant of this typical pattern: the Jews can play the role of chosen people of the third age just as well (or poorly!) as the Italians, Germans, Poles, or Russians.

But fantasy, no matter how elegantly expressed or how widely shared, still remains fantasy. I start from the presupposition that an earthly millenium is fundamentally unrealizable. This does not mean that great social upheavals are impossible,

nor that any given society might not be thoroughly corrupt and badly in need of change. It does mean that no matter what changes do take place, whatever emerges will not have the properties of a millenium; it will not offer sufficient peace, freedom, equality, and abundance to satisfy man's insatiable longing for perfection. Recent anthropological studies have made clear that, among primitive peoples at least, millenarian movements arise in response to conditions of hardship and periods of cultural change or bewilderment; thus the famous cargo cults of Oceania are a response to the shock of colonisation. Reasoning by analogy, one may suggest that the proliferation of millenarian ideologies in nineteenth-century Europe was related to the cultural crisis and disorientation caused by industrialisation; and of course the unique burden of the Jews would give them an extra impulse to create salvationist images of the future (Zionism as a mass phenomenon dates from the pogroms of Russia and Rumania in the 1880's). But even though there are good and understandable reasons why a whole series of millenarian beliefs, and Zionism in particular should have arisen, this does not make them, or it, more rational.

It is impossible to develop a practicable plan of action if one's starting point is the mistaken belief that the nature of man and society is about to undergo a glorious transformation. Hence the air of unreality which surrounds *Rome and Jerusalem*. There is in the book no discussion at all of the most obvious political problems surrounding Hess's proposal. What is to be done with the present inhabitants of the Holy Land? How is the consent of the Sultan to be won over? How many Jews can realistically be expected to want to move to Palestine? How are they, coming as they

do from the most varied cultures, to get along with each other once they are there? What impact, if any, will the creation of a Jewish state have on those Jews who do not choose, or are unable, to immigrate. None of these are unanswerable questions, and history has provided solutions of a sort to all of them. Indeed they, and other practical questions like them, form the main themes of subsequent Zionist literature. But it is more than a little curious that Hess should not have attempted to ask the questions, let alone provide any answers.

"This," it may be objected, "is simply the mark of a far-sighted man, who paints his vision with large strokes, and leaves others to fill in the details." There seems to me, however, to be a more important explanation. The millenarian attitude absolves one from dealing in a realistic way with the problems of the future, for by definition the future will be utterly changed, and difficulties which now appear to have no resolution will be worked out. Marx and Engels were the great masters of this technique, and have given it a certain respectability. By labelling all attempts to discern the lineaments of the future socialist society as "utopian," they gave their successors a convenient way to deal with objections. But the mode of argument is not peculiar to Marxism; it is intrinsic to any millenarian construction of history which posits a radical disjunction between all previous history and the transformed future. The evocation of a magically triumphant coming age, in this case the third or "sabbath age of history," is joined to profound silence about the actual obstacles in the way. Unfortunately the lion never seems to lie down with the lamb as easily as expected.

If the millennial hope is incapable of realization, what then remains in its wake?

Only the spirit of nationalism which was originally bound up with the expectation of universal renovation. After Hess, the true millenarian spirit involving the total redemption of mankind largely disappears from Zionist thought, except perhaps in religious thinkers like Martin Buber, who expressly calls it Hess's greatest merit that he had a universal millenarian perspective.<sup>36</sup> But apart from this prophetic, religious element, later Zionist thought has been far less concerned with the regeneration of all mankind than with the actual problems of overcoming international opposition, building a state in Palestine, and defending it against hostile natives and neighbours. Human redemption is replaced by Jewish survival, and universalism by aggressive nationalism. This is, perhaps, the deeper meaning of Hess's remark in *Rome and Jerusalem* that "one must be a Jew first and human being second." In context, Hess meant to emphasize that in a world of nationalistic peoples, the Jews could gain respect, both from others and from themselves, only by also becoming nationalistic. But the words express the underlying problem of millenarian creeds. By itself, the fantasy of the millenium cannot long sustain a system of beliefs; for it is too far removed from reality, and predictions of its advent are too easily falsified. The pursuit of a redemptive future must be tied to some more palpable drive, like the yearning for freedom of a persecuted people. As long as the millennial hope persists, it lends an aura of universalism to the ideology in question; messianic regeneration by definition embraces all mankind. But when the millennial hope can no longer be maintained (and scepticism must eventually set in), the basic drive of national survival or aggrandizement is released from the constraints of integration into a larger scheme for the salvation of humanity. Millenaria-

nism is unrealizable, and therefore a fantasy; but its sweeping view can give it a certain moral simplicity and grandeur. If that element of moral guidance is lost, nationalism easily becomes a form of *Realpolitik* whose only morality is self-interest.

The descent from the altruism of millenarian fervour into an ethic of self-interest is one of the recurrent processes of millenarian movements. As a religious phenomenon, it is visible in the transition from primitive Christianity to the Roman Church, or in the evolution of a sect like the Latter Day Saints. As a political phenomenon, it

may be seen in the development from primitive Bolshevism, with its belief in world revolution, to Stalin's more practical goal of socialism in one country. As a frequent pattern of evolution within nationalism it has been rehearsed over and over. After the Declaration of the Rights of Man came Napoleon; after Mazzini, Mussolini; after Woodrow Wilson, Lyndon Johnson. It is thus not surprising that millenarian fantasy played an important role in the writings of the first Zionist thinker, even though the subsequent development of Zionism was away from universal salvation and towards national self-assertion.

## NOTES

(1) Yonina Talmon, "Pursuit of the Millennium: The Relation between Religious and Social Change," *Archives européennes de sociologie*, 3 (1962), p. 130.

(2) Carlton Hayes, *Nationalism: A Religion* (New York, 1960), p. 176.

(3) J. L. Talmon, *Political Messianism: The Romantic Phase* (London, 1960), p. 29.

(4) Ernest Tuveson, *Redeemer Nation* (Chicago, 1968).

(5) Hans Kohn, *Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology* (2nd ed.; New York, 1960), pp. 29-49.

(6) Alexandre Koyré, *La Philosophie et le problème national en Russie au début du XIXe siècle* (Paris, 1929)

(7) E.g. Roger Bastide, "Messianisme et développement économique et social," *Cahiers internationaux de sociologie*, 31 (1961), p. 5; Peter Worsley, *The Trumpet Shall Sound* (2nd ed.; London, 1968), pp. 262-63.

(8) Simon Dubnow, *Letters on Old and New Judaism, in Nationalism and History*, ed. K. S. Pinson (Cleveland, 1958), p. 157.

(9) Michael Selzer, *Zionism Reconsidered* (London, 1970), p. xii.

(10) Theodor Herzl, *Complete Diaries*, ed. Raphael Patai (New York, 1960), Vol. III, p. 1090, May 2, 1901.

(11) Georg Lukacs concluded that Hess

ceased to have any historical importance after Marx's formulation of historical materialism; cf. "Moses Hess and die Probleme der idealischen Dialektik," *Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung*, 12 (1926), pp. 105-155. Thus also Auguste Cornu, *Moses Hess et la gauche hégelienne* (Paris, 1934). Cornu and Wolfgang Monke, who in 1961 edited an East German edition of Hess's work, did not include material written after 1850, thus excluding anything on Jewish or Zionist topics: *Moses Hess, Philosophische und Sozialistische Schriften 1837-1850* (Berlin, 1961).

(12) John Weiss, *Moses Hess, Utopian Socialist* (Detroit, 1960).

(13) An outstandingly bad example is the popular biography by Mary Schulman, *Moses Hess, Prophet of Zionism* (New York, 1963), which is filled with factual inaccuracies.

(14) Silberner, *The Works of Moses Hess* (Leiden, 1958); *Moses Hess: Geschichte seines Lebens* (Leiden, 1966). Silberner has also contributed a series of articles and notes in various journals which I do not list here.

(15) M. Hess, *Rom und Jerusalem, die letzte Nationalitätsfrage* (Leipzig, 1862). I have used the second German edition of 1899. Maurice [sic] Hess, "Lettres sur la mission d'Israël dans l'histoire de l'humanité," *Archives israélites*, 25 (1864), pp. 14-17; 102-106; 145-149; 198-202; 240-244; 287-292; 336-340; 377-382; 432-436;



472-477. The student of Hess's Zionism must go to some lengths to find his articles on the subject. The best collection, Moses Hess, *Judische Schriften*, ed. Th. Zlocisti (Berlin, 1905) is now long out of print. As mentioned in note 11, the Cornu-Monke edition of Hess's works does not include any Zionist writings. There is a third collection recently published, Moses Hess, *Ausgewählte Schriften*, ed. Horst Lademacher (Köln, 1962), which contains a condensed German translation of the "Lettres" but none of the other Zionist articles. Also of value is Silberner's edition of Hess's correspondence, Moses Hess, *Briefwechsel* ('s-Gravenhage, 1959).

(16) *Rom und Jerusalem*, 2nd ed., p. 1.

(17) The diary, which would be of great interest, has not been published. The manuscript is in the Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis in Amsterdam. It is copiously excerpted in Silberner's biography, ch. 1.

(18) For the attitude of Marx and Engels toward the Jews, see Silberner, *Sozialisten zur Judenfrage* (Berlin, 1962), pp. 107-159.

(19) Hess, "Über das Geldwesen," in *Philosophische und Sozialistische Schriften*, p. 345. Jochanan Bloch has argued that *Rome and Jerusalem* should be understood as Hess's refutation of Marx's opinion in "Zur Judenfrage" that capitalism was the apotheosis of Judaism. Bloch, "Moses Hess, *Rom und Jerusalem*: Jüdische und menschliche Emanzipation," *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, 16 (1964), pp. 288-313. Quite apart from the practical question of whether Hess would have bothered, sixteen years later, to write a detailed refutation of an obscure article by Marx, the author seems blissfully unaware that Hess shared Marx's views at the time. The oversight is probably due to Bloch's use of the condensed version of "Über das Geldwesen" included in Lademacher's edition of Hess's *Ausgewählte Schriften*, from which references unflattering to Judaism have been expunged.

(20) When writing *Rome and Jerusalem*,

Hess rediscovered these notes made in 1840 and, after stylistic revision, included them in the text of his book.

(21) *Rom und Jerusalem*, p. xiii.

(22) *Pariser Zeitung*, August 4, 1860. Mentioned in Silberner, "Einige Manuskripte von Moses," *International Review of Social History*, 11 (1966), p. 113.

(23) *Rom und Jerusalem*, p. 4.

(24) *Ibid.*, p. 41.

(25) *Lettres sur la mission d'Israël dans l'histoire de l'humanité*, p. 477.

(26) *Rom und Jerusalem*, pp. 70-71.

(27) *Die heilige Geschichte der Menschheit* in Cornu and Mönke (eds.), *Philosophische und Sozialistische Schriften 1837-1850*, p. 15.

(28) *Ibid.*, p. 42.

(29) *Ibid.*, p. 40.

(30) *Ibid.*, p. 69.

(31) *Ibid.*, p. 62.

(32) *Ibid.*, p. 65.

(33) Cited in Cornu-Mönke introduction to Hess's works, p. LXIX.

(34) Auerbach to Hess, April 8, 1861. Moses Hess, *Briefwechsel*, ed. Ed. Silberner ('s-Gravenhage, 1959), p. 375.

(35) The third age also has a long history, which we cannot discuss here, extending back to Joachim of Fiore (c. 1145-1202). Cf. Marjorie Reeves, *Influence of Prophecy in the Later Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1969); Alois Dempf, "Das Dritte Reich: Schicksale einer Idee," *Hochland* 29 (1931-32), pp. 36-48, 158-171; Eric Vogelin, *The New Science of Politics* (Chicago, 1952), pp. 110-121.

(36) Martin Buber, *Israel and Palestine*, tr. Stanley Godman (London, 1952), pp. 111-122.

# « Persian » Versus « Iranian » The Word Fārs As An Ethnic Term

Jan W. Weryho

*Comment peut-on être Persan ?  
Montesquieu*

On March 21, 1935 the Shah of Persia, Rezā Pahlavī officially notified all governments with which he was maintaining diplomatic relations that henceforth he wished his country to be called "Iran" and his subjects "Iranians". Stamp collectors noticed the replacement of the inscription "Postes Persanes" by "IRAN" on Persian stamps. Thus arose the commonly held but erroneous idea that the reformer-Shah had changed the name of his kingdom from "Persia" to "Iran". As a matter of fact Reza Shah had never changed the name of the country. "Iran" was the name which the people of that area had always used for their homeland. Almost a thousand years ago it was glorified by the great patriotic poet Ferdawsi. It is derived from Pahlavi *Eran* and, more remotely, from Avestan

*Airyanem Vaejo*, "Land of the Aryans". Thus Reza Shah had merely insisted that the native form "Iran" be used for all diplomatic purposes instead of the foreign name "Persia". The demand was somewhat unusual. After all we say "Greece" not "Hellas", "Hungary" not "Magyarország", "Japan" not "Nippon". Neither the Greek, the Hungarian, nor the Japanese Government had ever to my knowledge raised any objections. Moreover the Iranians themselves do not reciprocate in their nomenclature of foreign countries. A Scotsman whom I knew in Tehran was very indignant at being called *Englisi* and his country *Englestan* by Iranian officials. In 1949 the Iranian Government announced that it would no longer object to the term "Persia" (or its variant forms) in foreign languages. We

can therefore use the terms "Persia" or "Iran" as synonyms, whichever we prefer in our context. Nevertheless, if the words "Persia" and "Iran" are synonymous, "Persian" and "Iranian" are not necessarily so. It is the purpose of this essay to examine and try to explain this difference.

Let us begin by examining the origin of the Latin word "Persia" by which Iran has been known in European languages. (Variant forms like French *Perse*, German *Persien*, etc. are all derived from the Latin form). Latin *Persia* is derived from Greek *Persis*, itself derived from Old Persian *Parsa*. *Persis* or *Parsa* however did not apply to the whole empire of the Achaemenid Kings who had unsuccessfully tried to include Greece in it, but to their home province where was located their capital, Persepolis. The name *Parsa* survives to this day as the Province (*Ostan*) of *Fars* in south-western Iran. The change from P to F came under the influence of the Arabic language which lacks the P sound. The purer form *Pars* also exists in modern Persian, but is more rare. It is preferred by those Persians who are trying to purify their language of foreign Arabic influence. Unlike the European term "Persia" the word *Pars* or *Fars* is never used for the whole of Iran but only for the province along the northern shore of the gulf called by the Persians *Khalij-e Fars* (Persian Gulf) and by the Arabs *Khalij al-'Arabi* (Arabian Gulf).

If the country is called "Iran" and its people "Iranians" its official language is not called "Iranian" but "Persian" (*Farsi* or, more rarely, *Parsi*). I had heard some foreign visitors to Iran, trying to avoid the controversial word "Persian" asking me "Do you speak Iranian?" Actually there is not a single language called Iranian. There is on the other hand an Iranian group of languages, including, alongside with Per-

sian, Tajik, Kurdish, Baluchi, Pashtu, Ossetic and some minor languages and dialects spoken inside and outside the political boundaries of Iran. The term *Farsi* has been used since the Arab conquest of Iran, but an earlier form, *Parsik* had existed in Pahlavi. *Pablavik* however, a derivative of Old Persian *Parthava*, "Parthian" was a term preferred to *Parsik* in pre-Islamic Iran. Anyway the Iranian Government had never objected to the use of the term "Persian" to describe the language even when the words "Persia" and "Persian" used to describe the country and its people were officially banned.

This brings us to the question of the word "Persian" as a national or, to avoid political connotations, ethnic term. If the word "Persia" is a translation of Persian *Iran*, "Persian" is a translation not of *Irani* but of *Fars* (plural *Fars-ha*). We have explained the geographical meaning of the term *Fars* and the philological meaning of the word *Farsi*. There is however another meaning of the word *Fars*, commonly used in Iran today, meaning a native-speaker of Persian as opposed to an Azerbaijani, a Turkman, a Kurd, a Baluch, an Armenian, an Assyrian or a member of any other national minority of Iran. "Shoma Fars ya Turk hastid?" (Are you a *Fars* or a Turk?) I was asked in a *qahveh khaneh* in Tabriz. Of course the term "Turk" had meant here a Turkish-speaking Azerbaijani, not a citizen of Turkey. Thus the term "Persian" or *Fars* has a narrower meaning than the term "Iranian". Every Persian is an Iranian, but not every Iranian is a Persian, just as every Englishman is a Briton, but not every Briton is an Englishman. (That is why my Scottish friend had objected to being called *Englisi*). As far as I am aware no foreign Orientalist has mentioned this difference between the terms "Persian" and "Iranian"

or noticed this third, ethnographical meaning of the word *Fars*, besides its use as a geographical and philological term. The only mention of this word in an ethnic sense I have found in Edward Browne's *Literary history of Persia*: "As applied to a man... *Farsi* means a native of the province of Fars."<sup>1</sup> This meaning is quite different from the commonly accepted use of the word *Fars* meaning a native speaker of Persian. Firstly, Persian-speakers calling themselves *Fars-ha* form the majority of the population of the whole of Iran, not only of Fars; secondly, in Fars itself reside Turkish-speaking Qashqa'i (Kaska'i) and Arabic-speaking Khamsa tribesmen.

The use of the word *Fars* as an ethnic term, so common in conversation, is exceedingly rare, almost non-existent in Persian literature. Perhaps this is the reason why it has not been noticed by Western Orientalists. It is however very ancient. Darius the Great in his inscription at Naqsh-e Rostam calls himself *Parsa*, *Parsahya puthra*, *Ariya*, *Ariya chithra* ("Parsa, son of a Parsa, an Aryan, of Aryan lineage") (DNa 13-15). Early Arab writers call the Persians *al-Furs*. This term is more specific than the more common *al-'Ajam* since the latter can be applied to all non-Arabs, not necessarily to Persians. A people linguistically related to the Arabs, the Syria-speaking Assyrian Christians call the Persians *Parsaye*. In India the Zoroastrians whose ancestors had come to that country as refugees from Iran are still known as *Parsees*. In the Persian language it is much more difficult to find the word *Fars* or any of its variant forms (*Farsi*, *Pars*, *Parsi*) used as an ethnic term. Modern Persian writers often use the plural form *Parsiyan*, but only when referring to the ancient Persians of the Achaemenid period. Dr. Mohammad Mo'in in his Persian dictionary under the entry *Fars* does say "Nam-e qawm-i az aqvam-e Irani" (name

of a people from among the Iranian peoples)<sup>2</sup>, but does not explain whether he means the ancient Persians, the inhabitants of the province of Fars, or the Persian-speaking Iranians. Edward Browne in his *Press and poetry of modern Persia* publishes a poem entitled *Andaz Parastesb* ("On Worship") by a young nationalist poet named Ebrahim Pur-e Dawud, who many years later was to become a famous scholar in ancient Iranian studies and whose classes in the University of Tehran I was privileged to attend. The poem ends with the line:

اگر پرس ز کیش بور داود  
جوانت بارس ایران برستد

"Agar porsî ze kish-e Pur-e Dawud /  
Javan-e Parsi Iran parastad."

(If you ask the religion of Pur-e Dawud,  
The *Parsi* youth worships Iran).<sup>3</sup>

This is the only example I know of the word *Parsi* or any of its variants being used as an ethnic term in Persian poetry.

Who is a *Fars*? Is language the only criterion? I was assured by Assyrian Christians that to be considered a *Fars* or *Parsaya* one has to be not only a native speaker of Persian but also a Muslim and a Shi'a Muslim at that. It is logical that my Assyrian friends should have come to this conclusion: There are no *Fars* Christians, therefore a *Fars* is never a Christian, therefore a *Fars* is a Shi'a Muslim. But do the *Fars-ha* themselves define themselves this way? Is a Persian-speaking Jew a *Fars*? The majority of Iranian Jews speak Persian as their mother tongue. Only a minority residing in the mountains of Kurdistan speaks a dialect of modern Aramaic, very close to Syriac. Before the introduction of Zionist ideas from Europe the Persian Jews had considered themselves and were considered by the Persians a religious, not a national

minority. It is significant that the usual Persian term for a "Jew" is not *Yabudi* but *Musavi*, a follower of Moses, or *Kalimi*, a follower of *Kalim Allah*, "he who speaks with God", a name given by Muslims to Moses. If there is any doubt as to whether a Persian Jew can be considered a *Fars* no such doubt can be entertained about the Zoroastrians. Indeed all Persians except the most fanatical Muslims respect the Zoroastrians as the truest representatives of the ancient Persian culture, more purely Persian than the Muslim majority. As regards language the majority of the Zoroastrians of Yazd and some of the Zoroastrians of Kerman speak a special Persian dialect which they themselves call *Dari* and which is called *Gabri* by hostile Muslims. (It is unfortunate that the insulting term *Gabri* has been used by some Western Orientalists to describe the dialect).<sup>4</sup> *Dari* is sufficiently different from standard Persian to be unintelligible to a Persian-speaker, at least at first. Philologists however classify it as a dialect of Persian, not a separate language. It is never written. Unlike Zand (Avestan) and Pahlavi it is not regarded as having any religious significance. Thus the Dari-speaking Zoroastrians can be accepted as *Fars-ha* like the speakers of Gilaki, Semnani and other Persian dialects. Further problems pose themselves: Can the term *Fars* be applied to a speaker of Persian from outside the political boundaries of Iran? Is a Persian-speaking Afghan a *Fars*? Is a Tajik from Soviet Tajikistan a *Fars*? Although Soviet Orientalists insist that Tajik is a separate language from Persian the main difference is the Cyrillic alphabet adopted in 1940 (the Roman alphabet had been adopted in 1927) and the number of Russian loan-words, mostly technical and political terms. This article does not propose to answer all questions posed by the meaning of the word *Fars*. It merely asks some ques-

tions which, as far as its author is aware, have never been asked. Perhaps some sociologist will care to investigate the problem further.

The investigator will need a lot of tact, especially if he is a foreigner. The term *Fars* is for internal use only. If I was asked whether I was a *Fars* or a Turk in the Tabriz café it was of course because my interlocutor had not realised I was a foreigner. Anyway he himself was a Turkish-speaking Azerbaijani, not a *Fars*. A Persian would find a foreigner's interest in who is a *Fars* and who is not somewhat suspect, an attitude similar to that of the modern Greeks towards the word *Romios*. The modern Greek language has two terms to describe a Greek: *Hellenos* and *Romios*. *Hellenos* or "Hellene" evokes all the glory of ancient Greece. It was adopted as their official name by the Greek people when they had regained their independence from the Ottoman Turks. Before that the Greeks had called themselves *Romioi* and still do unofficially. The word *Romios* (originally *Romaïos*) literally means "Roman". Of course the Rome meant here is the Eastern Rome or Byzantium. Patrick Leigh Fermor in his book *Roumeli: Travels in Northern Greece* has a very interesting chapter entitled *The Helleno-Romaic dilemma*. Apparently the word *Romios* may have a derogatory sense in modern Greek. True, it evokes the splendours of the Byzantine Empire, but also, more recent, the years of humiliation under Ottoman rule after the fall of that empire. It sounds too much like *Rum*, the Turkish word for a Greek. Greek intellectuals have argued as to whether the name *Romios* should be considered honourable or shameful. What is most interesting however is that the Greeks object to the term being used by a foreigner. Mr. Fermor ends the chapter with the footnote:

"It [the word *Romios*] is now strictly for internal use; not for foreigners, however fluent and seasoned. A few days ago, a blacksmith friend cut short the involved rigmarole of a customer with the words: '*Pes to romeika re adelphé, dia na se katalavoume*' ('Say it in Romaic, brother, so we can understand'—meaning, 'put it simply'). Later I asked him whether a passer-by were Greek, using the word '*Romios*'; and got a black look. Modern times have made it suspect in a stranger's mouth; but, still more, the word is too loaded, precious and private for foreign use. I was an outsider usurping a secret family password."<sup>5</sup>

This is how many Persians would feel, for different reasons, about a foreigner's use of the word *Fars* as an ethnic term. I had an experience, similar to Mr. Fermor's, not with a simple blacksmith, but with a Tehran University professor whom one would have expected to be more tolerant in such matters. I had asked him whether the philosopher Abu Sahl Masihi, a Christian as is indicated by his *nisba*, was a *Fars*. *Fars* Christians being so few, especially after the Islamization of Iran, I thought he might have been an Assyrian, or a Soghdian perhaps.<sup>6</sup> The professor evaded the question and merely told me that Abu Sahl was Iranian. When I pressed the question further he became obviously nervous and repeated angrily: "Irani bud! Irani bud!" By then I understood I had made a faux pas.

Similarly, when speaking English or French Persians insist on calling themselves "Iranians" or "Iraniens" rather than "Persians" or "Persans". I was told by a Tehran printer who spoke some English that he objected to the term "Persian" because "Persians" meant "servants of the English". Of course it was no use trying to explain to him that, however nefarious

role British imperialism may have played in Iran, the word "Persian" had no derogatory sense in English. Most Englishmen would probably associate it with the name of 'Omar Khayyam, a Persian poet greatly admired in England. French nomenclature is even more interesting than English in the fact that it distinguishes between "un Persan" and "un Perse". "Les Persans" are the modern Persians, while "les Perses" are the ancient Persians of Achemenian times known chiefly through classical scholarship. Thus the famous play by Aiskhylos about the Persian invasion of Greece, *Persai* is called in French not "Les Persans" but "Les Perses".

What is the reason for this shunning of the term *Fars* or "Persian" as opposed to "Iranian"? To use this term is to admit what everybody knows, but which few would openly admit to a foreigner, namely, that Iran is not a homogeneous country, that there are Persian Iranians and non-Persian Iranians. To admit this is to deny the nationalist ideology of Reza Shah and the Pahlavi dynasty. (The other unmentionable subject is of course the Baha'i religion). The modern Iranian state was founded in the beginning of the 16th century by Shah Esma'il Safavi. Nationalism in the modern sense did not exist at that time and the ideological basis for patriotism and loyalty to the Safavi state was the Shi'a faith professed by the overwhelming majority of the Iranian people in a hostile Sunni world. Christian, Jewish and Zoroastrian minorities were treated with the traditional Muslim tolerance for *Abl-e Ketab* or People of the Book, although there was some doubt as to whether the Zoroastrians were entitled to that status owing to the uncertainty whether their Avesta was a genuinely revealed book like the Torah and the Gospel. They had of course a second-class status in a theocratic state although under the later

Safavis some Christians came to occupy very high position and the last Safavi governor of Afghanistan was a Georgian Christian, Vokhtang Gorgin Khan. (Perhaps the Shi'a Persians wanted to humiliate the Sunni Afghans by giving them a Christian governor). Language was not important. The court language of the Safavi Shahs was not Persian but Azerbaijani Turkish and Shah Esmā'il himself composed poetry in that language. Shi'a theocratic theology survived the fall of the Safavi dynasty in the 18th century and remained the political ideology of the Iranian state till the end of the nineteenth. European ideas about nationalism reached Iran in the second half of the nineteenth century but did not become widespread until the beginning of the twentieth and the revolutions of 1906 and 1908. Eventually nationalism found its champion in a strong and ambitious army officer named Reza Khan, who in 1921 marched on Tehran and seized political power. Four years later he proclaimed himself Shah of Iran and adopted the surname Pahlavi, claiming descent from the ancient Parthians. (Modern Persian *Pahlav*, "a hero" is derived from Old Persian *Parthava*, "a Parthian"). Reza Shah's nationalist ideology was founded not on the Shi'a faith, although Shi'a Islam continued to be the state religion, but on a historical consciousness inspired more by pre-Islamic than by Islamic traditions, on "Aryan" racial pride and on the Persian language as a unifying factor. Reza Shah sought to achieve this linguistic unity by forcibly assimilating the national minorities. This policy has been followed, although perhaps a little less ruthlessly, by his son, Mohammad Reza Shah. Schools, even at an elementary level, in the minority languages are forbidden. So are publications of books and newspapers in those languages. Of course Kurdish books from Iraq or Turkish books from

Turkey or from Soviet Azerbaijan are not allowed into Iran. Thus for example in the Turkish-speaking city of Tabriz you will not see a single shop sign in Turkish or buy a Turkish book or newspaper except "under the counter". Radio Tabriz does have a Turkish programme because otherwise Iranian Azerbaijanis would be listening to Radio Baku!

To be fair we must admit that three minority languages are tolerated in Iran, and indeed given opportunities for literary development: Armenian, Assyrian (modern Eastern Syriac) and Arabic. Armenian and Assyrian are the languages of the two Christian minorities of Iran. Both Armenians and Assyrians are allowed to have their own schools and to publish books and magazines in their own languages. A visitor to Tehran will not fail to see the number of shop signs in Armenian characters. There is even a Department of Armenian Studies in the University of Esfahan. Why such generous treatment in comparison with the other minorities? The most probable reason is that, the secularist tendency of Pahlavi nationalism notwithstanding, Armenians and Assyrians, being Christians, are regarded as immune to assimilation attempts. Also both Armenians and Assyrians regard their languages as a sacred part of their religious identity as Christians. In the West we have an example of a similar attitude expressed by the French-Canadian motto "La langue gardienne de la foi". A Papal Legate to Iran, an Italian Monsignore ignorant about Oriental Christianity, invited to preach in an Assyrian Catholic church, had almost caused a riot by beginning his sermon with the words: "Je regrette infiniment que je ne peux pas vous adresser dans votre belle langue persane." Any attempt at forcible linguistic assimilation would be protested as religious persecution. This might affect the good relations

of Iran with supposedly Christian Western powers. But let us not be so cynical. Perhaps the Iranian Government, in the best tradition of Islamic tolerance, sincerely does not wish to interfere in something its Christian subjects regard as sacred. There is a certain sympathy for Armenian culture among some Persian intellectuals. Armenians are "Aryan" by race. Their language contains many Middle Persian loanwords which have disappeared in Modern Persian. (Hence it was at one time regarded as an Iranian language). Before their conversion to Christianity Armenians were Zoroastrian by religion. The beautiful Armenian churches of Esfahan, built in Safavi Persian style, are rightly regarded as part of the artistic heritage of Iran. Yefrem Khan, an Armenian, one of the leaders of the 1908 Revolution is revered as a national hero of Iran. This sympathy is not extended to the non-Aryan Semitic Assyrians who are merely tolerated. In the popular mind, as opposed to that of the intellectuals, both Armenians and Assyrians, being Christians, are regarded as aliens. Symbolically they are usually addressed as "Monsieur" and "Madame" instead of "Aqa" and "Khanom".

The Arabic language is spoken by more than half of the population of the oil-rich province of Khuzestan.<sup>7</sup> Formerly the province was called *Arabestan*, and of course such a name was unacceptable to Reza Shah. Naturally the Iranian Government would wish to assimilate the Khuzestan Arabs along with the other linguistic minorities. Here however a problem poses itself. Like Syriac and Armenian Arabic is a sacred language, sacred not only to the Arab minority but also to the Persian majority of Iran. In his secularising reforms Reza Shah had never gone as far as the President of Turkey, Kemal Ataturk. Unlike the case of Turkey Islam remained the state religion of Iran and the defense of

Shi'a Islam is among the first and foremost of the Shah's official duties. And Arabic is the sacred language of Islam. In Ataturk's Turkey attempts had been made to detach Islam from its association with Arabic language and culture. No such attempt was made in Iran and the call to prayer was never intoned in Persian from the minarets of Tehran. Thus Arabic language, far from being banned, is highly respected. It is taught in all Iranian schools. Many Iranian theologians, graduates of Najaf, publish their works in Arabic as well as in Persian. The existence of native Arabic-speakers in Iranian territory however is not willingly admitted by the Government of Iran.

This tolerance granted to the Armenian—and Syriac—speaking minorities and to the Arabic language should not make us forget the suppression of Turkish, Kurdish and other minority languages of Iran. Of course persecution of minority languages or refusal to admit the existence of certain national groups is not an Iranian invention. Sixteenth-century Spain not only forcibly converted the Moriscos to Catholicism but passed laws forbidding the use of the Arabic language. In our times General Franco has followed the enlightened example of his predecessors by forbidding teaching and publications in the minority languages of Spain, Catalan, Basque and Gallego-Portuguese, his own mother-tongue. (Fortunately this law has now been repealed). Tsarist Russia had tried to suppress the Polish and Ukrainian languages. As a reaction to this policy the constitution of the U.S.S.R. guarantees all non-Russian minorities the right to use and develop their native languages and literatures and even to secede from the Soviet Union should they so desire. In theory the Soviet law regarding nationalities is most admirable and could serve as a model for all multilingual states.



In practice the picture looks more gloomy, at least since the death of the founder of the Soviet state, Lenin and the accession to power of Joseph Stalin. We may doubt whether the adoption of the Cyrillic alphabet by almost all the languages of the U.S.S.R. (with the exception of Georgian, Armenian, Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian and Yiddish) was not without Russian pressure. I also doubt whether some at least of the Soviet minorities would not like to make use of their constitutional right to secede from the Soviet Union. But what is most sinister is how certain nationalities like the Kalmyks, the Crimean Tatars, the Volga Germans, the Chechens, the Ingush ceased to exist by Stalin's orders and it became dangerous to mention their very names. Examples from other countries are not lacking. In Indonesia Chinese schools, Chinese-language publications, even the highly decorative shop signs in Chinese characters are forbidden by the Suharto régime. There were no Arabs in French Algeria, only "Musulmans français". There are no Kurds in Turkey, only "Mountain Turks". There are no Palestinians if we are to believe Mrs. Golda Meir, Israeli Prime Minister. So, with the exception of the Armenians and Assyrians there are no linguistic minorities in Iran. It is ironical that the best-known poem by Hafez, almost unanimously accepted by the Persians as their greatest poet begins with the line:

اگر آن ترك شیرازی بدست آرد دل مارا  
 بجال هندویش بخشم سمرقندو بخارارا  
 "Agar an Tork-e Shirazi be-dast arad del-e  
 ma-ra Be-khal-e Hindu-yash bakhsham  
 Samarqand o Bokhara-ra."

(If only that Shirazi Turk / would take my  
 heart into her hand For the black mole  
 upon her cheek / I'll give Bukhara,  
 Samarkand).

I have been assured by many Persians

that the linguistic minorities of Iran, although continuing to use their various languages and dialects in conversation were not interested to use them for literary expression, preferring the use of the obviously superior Persian language. This is true of the speakers of different Persian dialects. Poetry, composed in the dialects, usually by illiterate poets, is passed from mouth to mouth and seldom, if ever, written.<sup>8</sup> It may be true of the Baluchis, although Baluchis in Pakistani territory do write their language. It is certainly not true of the Kurds and Azerbaijanis who are not prepared to renounce their literary heritage, dating back hundreds of years, even if it is not as rich as that of the Persians.

What is strange, and in my opinion deplorable, is the fact that this chauvinistic intolerance of linguistic minorities and consequent shunning of the term *Fars* or "Persian" is shared by left-wing opponents of the Pahlavi dynasty. Allowance must be made here for the fact that opponents of the Pahlavi régime cannot express their views openly in Iran and we do not know all the shades of public opinion in that country. The American diplomat Richard W. Cottam who had used clandestine Persian press for his research says in his work *Nationalism in Iran*: "Even liberal Iranians favor compulsory education in Persian and the banning of publications in the local languages."<sup>9</sup> To this I can only say that these are very strange liberals. In fact I wonder what is liberal about such an outlook! But even a revolutionary writer like Professor Bahman Nirumand whose book (written in exile of course) *Iran, the new imperialism in action*,<sup>10</sup> a passionate denunciation of Mohammad Reza Shah whom he accuses of most oppressive tyranny and sell-out to American imperialism, has nothing to say about his policy towards national minorities. The reason is that Iranian left-

ists, like many leftists in other countries, are nationalists first and leftists afterwards. What is more strange is that, although they would hate to admit it, they have all been influenced by Reza Shah's brand of nationalism. It is indeed astonishing that an uneducated man (Reza Khan had not learnt to read and write until he became an officer) could have formulated an ideology which has inspired a nation and continues to influence even declared opponents of the dynasty he had founded.

Now, how does all this affect the foreign Orientalist? His first problem is that of terminology. Should he say "Persia" or "Iran"? "Persian" or "Iranian"? As we have shown above "Persia" and "Iran" are

synonyms, although they may carry a slightly different emotional colouring. We may use either, although "Iran" is preferable since the term has become widely accepted since 1935 and the people of that country prefer it. "Persian" and "Iranian" however are not synonyms and in our choice of words we should be guided by what precisely we want to say. If we mean an inhabitant of Iran speaking any language we should say "Iranian". If we mean a native speaker of Persian we should say "Persian". If we wish to avoid getting involved in the controversy (although I do not see how we can if we are to keep our intellectual integrity) we should stick to the word "Iranian" as the term "Persian" cannot apply to all subjects of the Empire of Iran.

## NOTES

(1) Edward G. Browne. *A Literary history of Persia*. Cambridge, University Press, 1951. (First published 1902). vol. I, p. 4, n. 2.

(2) Mohammad Mo'in. *Farhang-e Farsi*. Vol. 5 (Proper names). Tehran, Amir Kabir, 1966. Entry *Fars*. p. 1289.

(3) Ebrahim Pur-e Dawud. *Andar Parasitesb*. In Edward G. Browne. *Press and poetry of modern Persia*. Cambridge, University Press, 1914. p. 295.

(4) For my theory regarding the origin of the term *Gabr* see my article *Syriac influence on Islamic Iran: the evidence of loanwords* forthcoming in *Folia Orientalia*, Krakow, 1972. So I am informed by the Editor, Professor F. Machalski.

(5) Patrick Leigh Fermor. *Roumeli: travels in Northern Greece*. [London] John Murray [1966] p. 147 n.

(6) For information about Abu Sahl al-Masihi see Georg Graf. *Geschichte der christlichen arabischen Literatur*. 2. Bd. Vaticano, Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, 1947. p. 257-8.

(7) *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. 1970 ed. Chapter on *Khuzistan*.

(8) For examples of poetry in a Persian dialect (in this case Sistani) see my article *Sistani-Persian folklore in Indo-Iranian journal*, vol. V, nr. 4. The Hague, 1962. pp. 276-307.

(9) Richard W. Cottam. *Nationalism in Iran*. University of Pittsburgh Press, [1964] p. 32.

(10) Bahman Nirumand. *Iran, the new imperialism in action*; translated by Leonard Mins. New York [Monthly Review Press, 1969] (Modern Reader paperbacks). Originally published as *Persien, Modell eines Entwicklungslandes; oder, Die Diktatur der Freien Welt*. Hamburg, 1967. The book appeared on the eve of the visit of Mohammad Reza Shah to the Federal Republic of Germany and played a role in inspiring student demonstration against the royal visitor. The demonstrators were surrounded by West German Police and beaten to the ground. One was killed by a bullet in the back of his head. It is strange that although the book is entitled *Persien* in the original German, the English translator has preferred to call it *Iran*. He even calls the Persian language "Iranian"! "Iranian is spoken with an English or French accent" (p. 171).



# The Struggle For Independence In Aden

Janice J. Terry

After World War II, Great Britain found it increasingly difficult to maintain supremacy over its colony in Aden. In control of Aden since 1839, the British divided the area into two parts to facilitate its administration. The port and city of Aden was declared a Crown Colony under the direct administration of the Colonial Office in 1937. A British Governor was appointed to administer and act as Commander-in-Chief over the Colony. The autonomous Arab Shaykhdoms of East and West Aden were bound to Great Britain by separate treaties of protection designed to support the traditional rulers and British interests. These states were divided into the West and East Aden Protectorates both having a resident British adviser. As Britain gradually lost its empire east of the Suez, it became more determined to maintain control in Aden. The British govern-

ment contended that its continued presence in Aden was necessary for three reasons: 1. Aden served as a base to protect British oil interests in the Persian Gulf; 2. the presence of the British military forces in Aden contributed to the defense of the Western world; and 3. The garrison was vital to secure the best interests and continued tranquility of both the Colony and the Protectorate.<sup>1</sup>

Owing to the diversity in the economies and populations between the Colony, which was predominately urban and a center for oil refining and shipping; and the Protectorate which was mainly tribal with traditional conservative leadership, the British concluded that it was in its best interests to develop separate policies for each area. For the Protectorate, Britain envisioned forming a federation of the twenty-four separate states in the area. According to

this plan the local ruler of each of the states retained a large measure of autonomy, but joined Great Britain and the other rulers in maintaining a common army, foreign policy, and supervision of the borders. The latter was of primary importance because of continued border clashes with Yemen and the tribes along the ill-defined border with Saudi Arabia. The federation plan was first proposed by Sir Kennedy Travaskis, Adviser for the Western Protectorate. The proposal was enlarged and its adoption encouraged by Sir Tom Hickenbotham, Governor in Aden, in 1954. After the independence movements within the Colony emerged, the federation plan was expanded to include the Colony as well as the Protectorate. Through such a scheme the British hoped to counterbalance the demands for independence from within the Colony with the traditional tribal rulers of the Protectorate most of whom were reluctant to forego British military protection.

To understand Britain's policy towards the Colony from 1950-1967, it is necessary to look briefly at the government within the Colony, and, more importantly, to the reactions to British policies. The struggle for independence in Aden closely followed the often repeated pattern whereby Britain initially ignored, then repressed nationalist movements for self-government. After nationalist agitation became impossible, or costly to eradicate, the British attempted to gain the co-operation of those leaders they perceived to be the most moderate. Usually those leaders had formerly been ignored or declared unsatisfactory representatives by the British. The moderates who accepted positions amenable to Great Britain generally tried to maintain credibility as independents in order to keep the support of their constituents. On the other hand, the nationalists who refused to support or negotiate with the British generally

had a more unified front and were able to win the allegiance of the majority of the population. Thus, these latter groups, which the British termed extremist or radical, ultimately proved to be the strongest of the contending forces. By rendering cooperation with the British an untenable position, the leftist nationalists forced the moderates out of office. This occurred in Aden when the National Front for the Liberation of the Yemeni Occupied South, widely known as the National Liberation Front or NLF, which advocated the use of armed violence took control of the nationalist movement. The NLF had an efficient internal organization, a program to employ force, terrorism, and secured support from the international community in order to attain independence for Aden. Ultimately, the British government was unable to reach an agreement with the moderates and was forced to negotiate with the NLF. Because of external pressure and widespread guerilla activity within Aden, Britain accepted the NLF demands to evacuate hastily, and to declare Aden's independence under a government formed by the NLF.

#### BRITISH ADMINISTRATION PRIOR TO 1967

Historically, the British had formed in 1947 a legislative council of eight official and eight non-official members. Four of the official and all of the unofficial members were nominated by the Governor. The non-official members were pro-British Adeni notables who rarely if ever opposed British policy. The council's functions were purely advisory, and its recommendations could be vetoed or superseded by the British Governor. In July 1955 an electoral element was introduced through four elected members, but the Governor continued to nominate five of the unofficial mem-

bers, the four *ex-officio* members and the five official members. More importantly, the council continued to be an advisory body.

The inclusion of an elected element was immediately proclaimed inadequate by the Aden Association, whose members were mostly merchants who wanted to maintain ties with the British, and from the Aden Trade Unions. By the mid-1950's, the Trade Unions in Aden had developed into a growing political force which was exercised through the Aden Trade Union Congress (ATUC). The ATUC included thirty of the thirty-three major unions by 1960. Through the ATUC, the Adenis organized an effective boycott of the elections for the British dominated legislative advisory council. The ATUC also increased opposition to the British through protests, strikes, and publications like the ATUC newspaper, *Al-Aml*. The ATUC leadership saw the British move to provide an elected element as a colonial attempt to co-opt nationalist agitation. The minority party, the National Front had ties with the growing unionist movement and advocated complete independence. The Nationalist Front was dismissed as extremist by both the British and the moderate nationalist bourgeoisie.

In 1957, the British, in response to nationalist pressure, initiated discussions for a new constitution. This culminated in an enactment which went into effect in 1958 whereby a new legislative council of twenty-three members was created. Twelve members were to be elected, five were *ex-officio* and six were nominated. The speaker was an independent chosen from among the membership by the Governor. Members of the legislative council were elected every four years. English remained the official language but, for the first time, Arabic was introduced as an alternative. There was

also an executive council composed of five *ex-officio* members and the five heads of governmental departments (public works, education, communications, medicine, and labor and social service), which were also members of the legislative council. As the Governor kept his full executive and legislative powers, the councils were nothing more than advisory bureaus designed to co-opt Adeni nationalists. Suffrage was granted on a greatly circumscribed basis. All males over twenty-one years of age who held British citizenship or were members of the Commonwealth and who had resided in Aden for two years could vote. Most Adenis were restricted from voting by complicated property qualifications which few could meet.<sup>2</sup> In effect this meant that most of the Indians who were generally middle class merchants could vote. The Indians feared Adeni domination and were consequently usually pro-British. On the other hand, most native Adenis and Yemenis, who had come to Aden for work, remained disenfranchised.<sup>3</sup>

The ATUC, led by Abdullah. Asnaj, the Secretary-General, vigorously objected to both the constitution and to the limited franchise. The ATUC denounced the British program as being one designed to maintain British domination. Demonstrating Adeni nationalist resistance to his plan, the ATUC organized labor strikes and a boycott of all elections. The strikes were so effective that they threatened to paralyze the shipping and oil industry, Britain's main economic concerns in the Colony. The boycott also severely limited the effectiveness of the elections, at which only 27% of the eligible voters participated.<sup>4</sup> To counteract this disruption, the British declared a state of emergency in Aden in May 1959. This emergency continued periodically until 1967. The Governor imposed a curfew and strict censorship of all publica-

tions. Union leaders, including Asnaj, were arrested, tried of charges of inciting to riot, disturbing the peace, and were sentenced to prison. In addition, over two hundred Yemenis were deported on the grounds that they had contributed to the general disorder.<sup>5</sup>

Following these disruptions, Britain announced, in 1958, that the Colony of Aden would be included in the projected federation of the Protectorate. Under this plan British troops were to remain in the Colony. The ATUC and other Adeni groups immediately opposed this plan. In spite of the continued opposition, Great Britain proceeded with its plans for the federation. The federal constitution was signed in 1958, and was first implemented in 1959 with the opening of the capital city of Ittihad (Union), located just outside the city of Aden in Bir Ahmed. In the Colony strikes protesting the federation and the Colony's incorporation into it continued; during 1959 there were no fewer than eighty-four serious strikes.<sup>7</sup> Strikes and rioting continued into 1960 and intensified after the Republican revolt in Yemen in 1962. After this revolt, aid for the Adeni independence movement came through Yemen, causing the British to deploy a greater concentration of troops both in the Colony and along the Yemeni border where clashes became more and more frequent.

#### ADENI POLITICAL PARTIES

By 1962, no fewer than eight Adeni political parties, each representing a slightly different philosophy and aim, had emerged on the political scene. The ATUC remained the main center for organization of strikes and boycotts; in fact, the parties were often political off-shoots of the ATUC or had close contact with it. One

of the first parties to emerge was the South Arabian League (SAL), a labor unionist organization. The League was originally connected with the Sultan of Lahej who had ambitions to augment the importance of Lahej. For a time the League was led by Sheikan al-Habashi and subsequently by Muhammad Ali Jifri who was exiled from Aden in 1956. Other parties included the Ba'ath Party, and the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM), which were local branches of pan-Arab parties, but which would have little consequence during the struggle with the British.<sup>8</sup> One of the most important of the parties to emerge was the People's Socialist Party (PSP), the political arm of the ATUC under the leadership of Asnaj. The PSP advocated a program calling for a union of Southern Yemen (Aden and the Protectorate) and the Yemen. Initially, the PSP refused to negotiate with the British, but in an attempt to lessen the PSP demands, the British ultimately persuaded a PSP member, Abd al-Qawi Maqawi, to become Prime Minister in 1963. By foregoing its staunch opposition to the British, the PSP compromised its basic position and, therefore, lost a large measure of popular Adeni support.

The National Front for the Liberation of the Yemeni Occupied South (NLF) ultimately emerged as the most important party, although its key position was not apparent until the middle of the 1960's. The leadership of the organization was not immediately clear, but the spokesman and Secretary-General, Qahtan al-Shaabi, was eventually to become the most well known personality within the organization. Al-Shaabi became President of the newly independent People's Republic of South Yemen in 1967, but was ousted in a bloodless coup in June 1969. For a short period, it appeared that the NLF was a more radical off-shoot of the PSP;<sup>9</sup> however, develop-

ments prior to and after independence indicate that the NLF had basically different goals. From its inception the NLF urged armed struggle and a revolutionary program as a means for ending British domination and for transforming the traditional tribal society. The NLF was also firmly committed to the policy of non-negotiation with the British. Through armed struggle and a revolutionary program of social change, they hoped to gain the support of both the peasants in the Protectorate and the urban workers in Aden. The NLF moved quickly to consolidate all existing guerilla organizations under its leadership, and by 1965, the NLF successes were evident.

The formation of the Organization for the Liberation of the Occupied South (OLOS) appeared to have been an attempt by Asnaj and others to counter the effectiveness of the NLF. OLOS also disseminated propaganda for the PSP, but in the end, exercised little influence over the developments of the armed struggle. The Federation for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOS Y), a group whose aims were similar to the NLF program, was, initially, considered another terrorist, extremist organization by the British. It received, for a time, the tacit support of Egypt which became a center for Adeni exiles. Egypt contributed to the armed struggle through Republican Yemen where Egyptian troops and weapons were used against the Imam's royalist forces. Through the Yemen the Egyptians maintained close contacts with the leadership in Adeni nationalist organizations, but generally opposed the NLF.

Between 1965 and 1967 numerous attempts were made to merge the NLF and FLOS Y; these much heralded negotiations failed, and any co-operation between the two was short lived. Prior to independence

and the British withdrawal from Aden, the NLF and FLOS Y would engage in an open battle for control of the independence movement and the governmental apparatus.

## EVENTS LEADING TO INDEPENDENCE

By 1962 the NLF had initiated a program of terrorism, predominantly aimed at the foreign communities and British facilities in Aden. These acts included bombings and hand grenade attacks on military outposts, governmental buildings, and private individuals. During this period, many union and nationalist leaders went into exile in Yemen or Egypt in order to escape British detention. Through continued repression against the nationalist organizations, and support of the pro-British Adenis, British officials thought they could preserve British authority. The leftist Adeni nationalists generally came from upwardly mobile lower socio-economic groups (labor leaders, first generation professionals, journalists) which considered British domination the main obstacle to social revolution, and who were determined that the resources and functions of government should be controlled by Adenis in an independent Aden. Opposing these forces, the British preferred to support the Adeni groups who had traditionally been pro-British; these included the merchants, the Indians and other minorities, and a few noted families. Both the nominated and elected members of the councils were generally from these groups, and the same people appeared time after time in the councils which were periodically reshuffled.

In the early nineteen-sixties, Hassan Ali Bayumi was undoubtedly the most effective of these leaders. Bayumi came from a family of moderate means and had been Minister of Labor in 1960. In this position



he had alienated the Adeni workers by supporting legislation curbing strikes. Bayumi was firmly committed to the inclusion of the Colony within the federation; he held this position even when most Adenis opposed it and when the British, owing to the extent of this opposition, began to waver. The bill for the merger of the Colony with the federation ultimately passed Parliament in November 1962. The British then attempted to reassert their dominance by arresting most of the nationalist leaders. Aden was incorporated into the Federation in January 1963. Chief Minister Bayumi became a Minister without Portfolio in the federation. Although Bayumi's United National Party had done poorly in the 1962 local elections, he filled his eight member cabinet with supporters of his position and ignored the opposition. Under constitutional changes the British ex-officio members in the council retired, and the positions were filled by Adenis. The Aden government also selected twenty-four representatives to the Federal Council and had four ministers in the federal government. However, the traditional leaders from the Protectorate exercised greater authority than the representatives from the Colony. The Adenis had been granted greater representation in terms of numbers on the Colony's councils, but the British remained in the predominate role both in the city of Aden and within the federation.

With Bayumi's loyal leadership, the British hoped to be able to facilitate the federation plan. Unfortunately for the British, Bayumi died in June 1963. His determination and policies have been compared to Nuri Sa'id's, certainly with Bayumi's death the British lost one of the few able Adeni politicians who was also a willing ally. Zein Baharun, from a wealthy merchant family, succeeded Bayumi. Baharun's cabinet included supporters of

the trade unions and the PSP; this indicated British willingness, at this juncture, to try and secure a compromise with some of the more moderate nationalist groups.

The Adeni nationalists also carried their struggle for independence to the international community. They petitioned the United Nations several times, urging it to formulate a policy vis-à-vis Aden. Great Britain, like the French in Algeria, consistently opposed these moves and asserted that the matter was an internal problem to be settled between themselves and the Adenis. However, the General Assembly passed resolutions in 1960 and 1963 urging the end of colonial rule in Aden and the granting of self-determination through a plebiscite.<sup>11</sup> The nationalist leaders regarded these actions by the U.N. as significant political victories. Nationalists also looked to the U.A.R. and Yemen for support and found some willingness to provide advice and arms. Asnaj's relationship with officials in Cairo was fairly close, and he made frequent trips to Cairo as did other nationalist leaders. President Nasir made an appeal for the Adeni cause in April 1964 when he visited Republican Yemen. He urged Yemen to support Aden and to intervene in the South. This statement served to exacerbate relations between the U.A.R. and Great Britain, where conservative politicians in particular contended that Nasir had fomented the agitation in Aden to further his own imperial ambitions.<sup>12</sup>

The Arab League met concerning Aden in March 1964. The U.A.R., Yemen, Tunisia, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia were present, while the Adenis were represented by Asnaj for the PSP, Muhammad al-Jifri for SAL, and al-Shaabi for the NLF. All of these leaders pleaded the case for Adeni independence and for their particu-

lar political parties, or movements. Some tribal leaders, were also represented. After an extended debate, which reflected the ideological differences of the League's members, the Arab League granted the NLF delegate a seat as the Adeni representative. This was a significant victory for the NLF.

Appeals were also made by Asnaj and others to international groups and the Red Cross for investigations of charges concerning torture of prisoners by the British. Britain denegated these charges, but was reluctant to allow full scale investigations. Amnesty International made an investigation, and a report was issued which substantiated the charges of torture. In Parliament, the government was eventually forced to admit that there had been isolated cases of floggings in order to gain information concerning nationalist plans and military strategy.<sup>13</sup> However, these were not successful in destroying the nationalist movement.

Realizing that the nationalists were too entrenched to be effectively eradicated, the British decided to seek a compromise which would enable them to maintain the military base in Aden, while the Adenis received a semblance of independence. In spite of opposition the British, supported by the pliable Adeni cabinet, continued plans for the implementation of the federation. Elections had been slated for January 1964, but were postponed because the British failed to agree with the Baharun cabinet over the franchise issue. The British wanted to include all Commonwealth citizens and Indians, while the Adenis did not. From the British point of view, the matter was further complicated by the United Nations' attempts to send an investigatory committee to Aden. The British announced that they were working towards

an agreement with the Adenis; on these grounds, the British refused entry into Aden to the U.N. committee. This refusal caused further rioting and strikes in Aden, accompanied with an escalation of attacks against British personnel stationed in Aden.

On July 4, 1964, Great Britain announced that independence would be granted not later than 1968, but that the military base was to remain. The PSP refused to accept this plan and continued to call for a U.N. referendum. In 1965 Great Britain's policy was to try and to secure as much Adeni support for the independence plan as possible; the British appeared, at this time, to be particularly hopeful that it could reach a compromise with the PSP. As its political support within Aden continued to dissipate the position of the Baharun cabinet became more untenable; finally, after a dispute with the British over plans to bring three of the Eastern Sultanates of the Protectorate into the federation, Baharun resigned in February 1965. This forced the British to postpone further negotiations with the Adenis. The British then selected Abd al-Qawi Maqawi as Prime Minister. Maqawi, an important figure in Adeni commerce, was known for his nationalist views. He had consistently argued in favor of British evacuation and independence for Aden, but he lost the support of the NLF by his willingness to negotiate with the British. For its part, Britain viewed Maqawi as part of the opposition, although it was willing to work with him because he was one of the few noted nationalists who were willing to compromise and negotiate.

Terrorism continued to intensify, forcing the British to counter in June by granting the High Commissioner extensive powers. Maqawi promptly disassociated himself from this policy, but simultaneously

entered direct negotiations with the British Defence Minister, Denis Healey. By late June, 1965, repression of the nationalists had become so severe that the PSP announced it had moved its Headquarters to Yemen. Attempting to reach a compromise, Maqawi urged Britain to adopt a more flexible position. The NLF simultaneously publicly opposed all negotiations with Britain, either in Aden or in London, and openly attacked those Adenis who were willing to enter such negotiations.

Faced with steadily escalating guerilla warfare tactics, and the eroding of support from the traditional tribal leaders who were annoyed by Britain's negotiations with the moderate nationalists, the British government decided in September to suspend the Adeni constitution and permit the High Commissioner to rule directly. Maqawi warned the British that these actions would consolidate the nationalists and would only increase their determination to gain independence. The ATUC responded by calling a general strike scheduled for October second. The strike was about 95% effective and resulted in rioting and further demonstrations.

At this time, Maqawi was in New York presenting the Adeni case for independence before the United Nations. On November 4, the Trusteeship Council of the U.N. adopted a resolution calling for the removal of British military bases, lifting of the state of emergency, and adherence to the 1963 U.N. Resolution for independence. Britain then sent Lord Beswick, Under-Secretary for the Commonwealth, to Aden where he announced that Britain only wanted to maintain military bases in Aden for security reasons. This was seen by the nationalists as evidence that the British still had no intentions of granting full independence to Aden.

In January 1966, the NLF and OLOS agreed to merge in order to continue the struggle on a unified and more effective basis. The organization threatened death to all its opponents and to those who negotiated or co-operated with the British. As the strength of the NLF grew, the moderates tended to abandon their contacts with the British; this created a situation in which the British found themselves without a base of support from the Adeni population. In February, Britain made known that the military bases would be removed by 1968. By this time, the British understood that they could not hold Aden indefinitely because of the level of violent opposition from the Adenis. In March 1966, Maqawi was elected Secretary-General of a new twenty man revolutionary committee for FLOSY, which would include for a short time the NLF, and whose Headquarters was located in Ta'iz, Yemen. Other members included Asnaj and important union leaders. This indicated an attempt on the part of the various Adeni nationalist movement to unify their struggle against the British, but the union was purely transitory because of the contradictions among the movements.

As the situation in Aden continued to become more violent, the British announced in June that they intended to leave by 1968 and to provide £5.5 million a year in military and other aid until 1971. To facilitate British evacuation, the U.N. Committee on Colonialism urged U Thant to appoint a special committee to study the problem. This three man committee under the chairmanship of Dr. Manuel Perez-Guerrero of Venezuela eventually reached Aden where it was rejected by the nationalists. The NLF demanded that the British release the political prisoners and lift the state of emergency before it met with any committee which had had negotiations with the

federal government. Others contended that no plebiscites or negotiations were necessary because the Adeni people were overwhelmingly in favor of immediate independence. Strikes and terrorist attacks continued during the committee's visit which was subsequently acknowledged to have been a complete failure.

As it became clear that no outside intervention could halt the escalation of violence, Britain was confronted with the problem of how to maintain its government in Aden until the projected 1968 withdrawal date. The NLF was determined that the British troops should evacuate immediately, and with this policy continued to escalate their attacks. For example, in February 1967, Maqawi's three sons were killed in a bomb incident; this attack also revealed the extent of the division between the PSP and NLF. Two months later, in May, the British evacuated the dependents of British personnel in Aden. As a consequence of the generalized state of warfare, on June 19, George Brown, Foreign Secretary, formally announced that independence would be granted on January 9, 1968, that a naval force would be stationed off Aden for six months, and bombers would be stationed on several offshore islands for an indefinite period.

The nationalists replied that the British pronouncements were inadequate and that evacuation must be immediate. Terrorism mounted throughout the Colony while British troops were attacked daily. Britain had lost control over several areas altogether, particularly the Crater district of the city of Aden which fell entirely into the hands of the nationalists. As a last attempt to re-establish control, British troops and armor drove into the Crater area on July 3, 1967, retaking it after intensive fighting. The Crater district had been held by the

nationalists for thirteen days following an armed insurrection which had begun over promotions in the South Arabian army, composed mainly of recruits from provincial tribes. In a last colonialist display of power, the Scots troops entered the Crater to the sound of bagpipes; they were in military control by July 4. The British ordered trials for the men who had fired upon a British reconnaissance party in June and also demanded that the roof tops opposite the army barracks be manned by armed police—not terrorists. Although the Crater incident indicated that the British could still periodically re-establish their control through the concerted use of force, it was evident that such control could only be achieved through tremendous expenditures of military personnel and equipment. The ability of British government to support, economically and politically, such expenditures was dubious. In fact, the Crater incident marked the end of any meaningful British government in Aden and the start of a hurried evacuation.

In hopes of creating an interim government, the British tried to form a new Cabinet under Husayn Ali Bayumi, a former journalist and ex-minister; Bayumi was also the brother of the late Hassan who had been pro-British. Bayumi negotiated with leaders from the NLF and FLOSY, but, not surprisingly, was unable to come to terms with them. He succeeded in forming an interim government which lasted only a month and which never had support of most Adenis or, for that matter, extensive support from the British who by this time had concluded that it was too late to secure any compromise with the Adeni independence movement.

Recognizing that the British would be unable to form a stable interim government prior to their evacuation, the NLF and

FLOSY began to struggle between themselves for control of the political leadership. By September, the conflict between them had reached the point that FLOSY asked the U.A.R. to intervene on its behalf. It became apparent that of the two groups, the NLF was the stronger. By October, the NLF gained control of Kathiri, the area northeast of the port; again on October 25 the NLF called for immediate British withdrawal. Britain announced that most of its troops would be evacuated by November. The British and the NLF then began secret negotiations in Geneva. Britain was forced into these negotiations when it became evident that it was impossible to create a moderately pro-British government. Britain negotiated in an attempt to salvage something from the forced withdrawal and the predominance of the NLF which was the only organization which seemed to present the capabilities of forming a viable government.

On November 28, Humphrey Trevelyan, the High Commissioner, left Aden. The next day, November 29, Britain and the NLF issued a joint communique announcing the independence of Aden. The British also agreed to continue some foreign aid. The newly independent state was named, the People's Republic of South Yemen with Qahtan al-Shaabi as president. Al-Shaabi's "moderate" leftist regime inherited an almost bankrupt state.<sup>14</sup> The port of Aden, once one of the busiest, was largely idle owing to the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967 Arab-Israeli war, and the mass exodus of the British and wealthy merchants; professionals and foreign technicians also left en masse. In addition, the British stopped all foreign aid to independent South Yemen after they realized that the new government would not permit British aid to be allotted for the South Yemeni army. After eighteen months, al-Shaabi's

regime fell in a left wing coup of the National Front. The state was renamed the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. Headed by Salem Ali Rubayyi, Chairman of the Presidential Council, the Marxist regime moved to consolidate its support and to embark on a program emphasizing a popular militia, agricultural co-operatives and state farms, development of light industry on a worker management basis, and a militant foreign policy. South Yemen's foreign policy eschewed Nasserism regionally and Saudi Arabian hegemony over the Arabian Peninsula. The National Front's success in creating a social revolution in South Yemen and in withstanding foreign military and political pressures is yet to be determined.

## CONCLUSIONS

The collapse of British colonial control over Aden, and the development of an independent South Yemen under NLF radical leadership evolved through several distinct stages. The historical development of independent South Yemen provides an excellent case study as its stages of evolution are typical of independence struggles against imperial domination.

1. *Colonial Domination:* The British initially based their dominance upon the support of the traditional tribal leaders, a few upper class families, and leading merchants. For administrative purposes, Aden was divided into the Protectorate and the Colony, which was under direct British rule. The British and the traditional elites controlled both the political and economic institutions.

2. *Growing Nationalist Agitation:* With the development of a new middle class, and an urban laboring class with high expectations, nationalism became one of the

main motivating factors among urban Adenis. They demanded a larger share in the decision making process both in political and economic spheres. The British responded to these demands by trying to isolate the Colony from the Protectorate. By creating a federation of the old Protectorate, the British hoped to form a quasi-independent state which, because of the nature of its traditional leadership, would maintain its close ties with Britain. In the Colony, Britain planned to maintain its control, but to placate the nationalists by expanding the numbers of Adenis participating in the government. The nationalists were not satisfied with these measures and increased their demands for independence. Because the nationalists had wide support among the urban workers and professional groups they could paralyze the economic life of Aden—this, of course, was exactly what the British wanted to avoid. Additionally, the nationalists could severely threaten British military installations.

### 3. *Isolation of Moderate Elements:*

The British responded to the increased nationalist agitation by announcing that the Colony would be incorporated within the federation. Through this plan, the British believed they could balance the nationalists with the traditional elements. However, by this time, the nationalist forces had begun to gather strength in the Protectorate. Some tribal leaders joined forces with the nationalists because they hoped to augment their own power; the small peasantry and other workers were also willing recruits. Further aid came for the Republican forces in Yemen and from Egypt. Then, too, some traditional leaders resented Britain's attempts to negotiate with the nationalist forces. Initially, Britain tried to force a settlement in the Colony through pro-British politicians like Bayumi. When this failed, Britain tried to gather support

of a nationalist group like the PSP. By the time the British moved to negotiate with the PSP, it had become more and more politically isolated from the climate of opinion in Aden. Consequently, the PSP did not have the mass support adequate to effectuate a moderate program whereby Britain would be allowed to maintain some control, or at very least, the military base in Aden. Therefore, even politicians as Maqawi, whom the British had initially labelled radical, found themselves on the conservative side of the nationalist movement.

4. *Nationalist Ascendancy:* Through a broadly based program of social revolution, determination not to negotiate with the British, and the concerted use of guerilla warfare, the NLF was first able to escalate the confrontation with the British. Secondly, the NLF dominated the other Adeni nationalist parties. As it became evident that the British were withdrawing, a full scale war between the NLF and FLOS, which represented an amalgamation of the other nationalist groups, erupted. With more organized leadership, and with the use of armed strength, the NLF assumed control of the nationalist movement. Reluctant to negotiate with FLOS because of its apparent pro-Nasserist program, the British opened discussions with the NLF. These negotiations were begun only after the British had publicly announced the dates for their evacuation. The British were forced into negotiating by the collapse of pro-British support within Aden and the tremendous military and economic cost necessitated by the mounting NLF program of terrorism and guerilla warfare. The British concluded an agreement with the NLF whereby Britain closed its military base, evacuated the country, and declared Aden an independent state under the control of NLF leadership.

## NOTES

(1) Great Britain, Cmd, 124 (1957). British policies are reiterated in Cmd. 1639 (1962).

(2) According to the property qualifications, a voter had to own property valued at 1,500 shillings, or have a monthly income of 200 shillings, or occupy premises valued at 250 shillings. Under this system 21,554 persons qualified for the vote out of a population of 138,441. Reginald Sorensen, "Aden, the Protectorate and the Yemen," *Fabian Society Tracts*, July, 1961.

(3) According to the 1955 Census, the population of the Colony was 138,441 of which 15,800 were Indians and 106,400 were Arabs. The rest were foreigners or Yemenis. The figures from 1962 give the population as 221,000.

(4) *London Times*, January 3, 1959. Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), 667 (November 13, 1962).

(5) *Aden: Report for the years 1957 and 1958*, London, 1961.

(6) Great Britain, Cmd. 1814 (1959).

(7) *Parliamentary Debates*, November 18 1962. Also see: Gillian King. *Imperial Outpost—Aden: its place in British strategic policy*. R.I.I.A. (Oxford, 1964).

(8) Salim E Tamara. "Consolidation of the guerilla movement," *Arab Journal*, 1968. This is the best discussion of the various parties and the programs.

(9) *Ibid.*

(10) Tom Little. *South Arabia* (New York, 1968), p. 101.

(11) General Assembly Resolutions, 1960, 1514 (XI), and 1963, 1945 (XVIII).

(12) See *Parliamentary Debates* for 1964.

(13) *Parliamentary Debates*, November 13, 1962, December 21, 1962.

(14) For an extensive discussion of developments in South Yemen since independence see: Eric Rouleau, "Yemen: Hitched to a Red Star, and South Yemen after Independence," *The Guardian*, June 10 and June 17, 1972.

# The American Zionist Lobby—Basic Patterns and Recent Trends

Alan Balboni

Since the World War I period until quite recently the policies advocated by the American Zionist lobby have been at variance with the "national interest" of the United States. Certainly, the "national interest" is a somewhat vague and subjective term; however, one can demonstrate, at the very least, that the policies urged upon American policy makers by the Zionist lobby brought no tangible benefits to the United States. Indeed, until the last several years, the Zionist spokesmen have consistently been at odds with the overwhelming majority of State Department professionals.

As one looks back to the beginning of Zionist attempts to influence United States foreign policy, one sees that the Zionists

obtained President Wilson's endorsement of the Balfour Declaration and, what is more surprising, convinced him to reject the King-Crane Commission reports which advocated that the principle of self-determination, supposedly dear to President Wilson's heart, be applied to Palestine. No economic or strategic benefits accrued to the United States from either of these actions. One could offer the argument that President Wilson's endorsement of the Balfour Declaration helped to increase support for the Allied cause among American Jewry, particularly among the pro-Zionist recent arrivals from Eastern Europe; however there was no reason other than the fact that Louis Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter had convinced Woodrow Wilson of the



fundamental justice of the Zionist cause to account for the rejection of the King-Crane Commission reports.<sup>1</sup> The language of the Balfour Declaration was flexible enough so that President Wilson could have accepted the King-Crane Commission recommendations without renegeing on United States endorsement of the Declaration. Secretary of State Lansing and most others of the President's foreign policy advisers argued against support of the Balfour Declaration and rejection of the King-Crane Commission reports.<sup>2</sup>

The period of Republican ascendancy (1919-1933) was a time in which the American Zionists had little success in convincing the Executive Department to render support for the Jewish minority in the Palestine Mandate by exerting pressure on the British Government.<sup>3</sup> A major reason for this lack of success was that there were no Zionist Jews who had direct access to any of the three Republican chief executives. The Zionists were able, however, to demonstrate considerable support in the United States Congress for a broad interpretation of both the Balfour Declaration and United States responsibility to insure that the British Government facilitated the establishment of a Jewish Homeland in the Palestine Mandate.

It was during the Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower Administrations that the United States support for Zionist goals became crucial as the United States emerged as a world power and the center of Diaspora Zionism became the United States Jewish community. Fortunately, there is much research material—autobiographies, personal files, public papers and documents, and Zionist periodicals—available to the scholar who wishes to reconstruct the strategies and tactics of the American Zionist lobby during these three administrations.<sup>4</sup>

It was during the Roosevelt Administration that the United States Government became more active in making known its concern to the British Government that Jewish immigration and settlement in Palestine be guaranteed. This occurred at a time when the U.S. Government and American businessmen were becoming increasingly interested in the oil resources of the Arab Middle East. Were it not for the activities of the American Zionist lobby it is most likely that the United States would have done nothing to further Zionist goals in Palestine as the Arabs were growing quite concerned about the possibility of a Jewish state in Palestine. Indeed, many State Department officials made this point in arguing against various American Zionist proposals for a more active United States role vis-à-vis the Palestine Mandate. Also, the fact that the United States and Great Britain were moving closer together because of their mutual concern about Germany, Italy, and Japan during the late 1930's would ordinarily have seemed to rule out even the relatively mild protests rendered by the United States concerning British policy in Palestine. Of course, one could argue that even though Great Britain and the United States were closely cooperative it was necessary for the United States to demonstrate that they were not sacrificing American interests for British interests. Even if one accepts this viewpoint, this does not weaken the argument that had the Zionist lobby not been effective, the United States Government probably would not have chosen the Palestine issue to demonstrate its independence from Great Britain.

During the early part of World War II the Middle East was a main area of conflict between the Allied and Axis powers. President Roosevelt and his advisors refus-

ed to say or do anything in behalf of Zionist goals so as to avoid alienating Arab support for the Allies. As soon as the Axis forces were defeated and Axis influence eliminated from the Middle East the Zionists renewed their efforts to gain United States support for a Jewish state in Palestine. President Roosevelt was very much sympathetic to Zionist goals but he realized the growing importance of the Arab Middle East for post World War II American interests and he sought to retain the goodwill of most Arab leaders toward the United States by arranging a compromise on the issue of the future of Palestine. The odds against such a compromise appear to have been quite formidable but one cannot rule out the possibility that someone such as Franklin Delano Roosevelt, a man of great political skill who had the trust of most Zionist leaders, might have accomplished it.

Roosevelt, of course, died in 1945 and was succeeded by Vice-President Harry Truman. Initially President Truman was disposed to accept the advice of his leading State Department advisors and Secretary Forrestal on the Palestine issue but then, after a period of indecision brought about at least in part by the pressures of the Zionist lobby, he decided that the United States should officially go on record as supporting the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. During Truman's second term of office the United States became Israel's chief ally among the great powers.

Once again the narrow rational calculation of United States policy alternatives would seem to have dictated a policy on the Palestine issue almost diametrically opposed to the one decided upon. The Arabs had become, following World War II, more the masters of their own fate as Syria and Lebanon became independent. Western

Europe was dependent upon Middle East oil (most of it in Arab nations) to rebuild its war-shattered economy. In addition to these factors which would have seemed to have led the United States to a policy on the Palestine issue more in accord with Arab wishes the cold war was in progress by 1948 and the United States had determined to combat the spread of communism and Soviet influence to the Arab Middle East. Most American State Department and military leaders argued that the emergence of a Jewish state in a land that had been Arab for so many centuries would be a disruptive element in the Middle East and that United States support for a Jewish state would undercut the substantial good-will of the Arabs toward this nation.

The Zionist lobby worked hard to counter the arguments of the professional diplomats and military leaders and convinced President Truman, as well as the overwhelming majority of the attentive American public, that the creation of a Jewish state was both the only way for the western world to atone for the persecution of the Jews and the only guarantee against further persecution.<sup>5</sup>

Of course there is one other factor that helped lead to an American policy agreeable to the Zionists. That is, it was a fact that there were almost 800,000 Jews and over 1,000,000 Arabs in Palestine in 1947 and any attempted solution to the Palestine issue other than partition would almost certainly have required substantial American financial aid, and even more importantly, military assistance to be successfully carried out. At this time the United States would not have been able to send any large number of troops to Palestine to act as a policing force.

During the last part of President Truman's term of office, as many Arab leaders

became more and more critical of the United States because of its support of the Jewish state, the Zionist lobby successfully endeavoured to present Israel as America's closest ally in the Middle East as well as a bastion of the Western type of representative democracy in that area. Many State Department personnel did not accept this point of view but they had little influence in either the formulation and conduct of United States policy vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli dispute during the Truman Administration. Indeed, the American ambassador to Israel, James MacDonald, was a long-time supporter of Zionist goals, and reported directly to President Truman.

The return of the Republicans to the White House during Dwight Eisenhower's two terms of office saw the viewpoint of the professional policy-makers coming more into the ascendancy in the formulation and conduct of American policy toward Israel and the Arab states. Secretary Dulles and others decided the extent of American economic and diplomatic support for Israel should be modified so as better to secure American economic interests in the Arab Middle East and bring several of the Arab states into military cooperation with the United States and its allies.

It was during this period that the United States became more critical, both publicly at the United Nations and in private exchanges with the Israelis, of Israeli actions against neighboring Arab states and refused to support Israel's objectives in the Suez campaign. The Eisenhower Administration also, on several occasions, suspended American assistance to the Jewish state.

However, it is most important to keep in mind that even during the Eisenhower Administration, a low ebb in terms of the influence of the Zionist lobby, the United States continued to support both Israel's

territorial integrity and its economic growth and did not attempt to challenge the tax-exempt status of United Jewish Appeal funds sent to Israel in spite of the fact that the Israeli Government played a large role in determining how these funds were to be spent and in spite of the fact that a portion of such funds were sent back into the United States to underwrite Zionist lobbying and public relations expenditures within the United States.<sup>6</sup>

There are several reasons why the American Zionist lobby was able to influence the formulation and conduct of American foreign policy. First, the nature of the decision-making process in the United States facilitates the powers of foreign policy interest groups. It is considered legitimate for such groups, whether they are economic or ethnic in character, to offer their opinions on foreign policy issues.<sup>7</sup> The President, the ultimate decision-maker in foreign policy matters, most often takes into consideration in his efforts to build a general consensus, the mood of the Congress, informed public opinion, the position of concerned interest groups, and the views of military leaders, and professional diplomats. The American Zionists, as has been shown, had the almost total support of Congress and informed public opinion was favorably disposed towards the stated Zionist aspirations. While United States military leaders were generally opposed to American support for Zionist goals during Roosevelt's last term of office and up until the existence of the Jewish state became an accepted fact in 1949 and State Department professionals were, with some notable exceptions, opposed to the Zionists during the period under consideration in this paper, the Zionists were generally successful in countering their influence.

A second reason for the Zionist suc-

cesses lies in the fact that the Zionist lobby had all the attributes required of an effective interest group.<sup>8</sup> The Zionist lobby was, especially from 1942 onwards, well-coordinated and well-led. Leaders of the American Zionist Emergency Council (AZEC), and later the American Zionist Council (AZC), truly believed in the worthiness of what they were doing and were interested in carrying out much more than their minimum responsibilities.

The various Zionist organizations coming under the AZEC and AZC umbrella contained a large portion of members who were well-informed, dedicated and active. These members were willing to send telegrams to Congress and the White House, write letters to newspapers and periodicals, and attend mass demonstrations. They made their decisions about voting largely on the basis of a candidate's attitudes towards the Zionist position.

The Zionists were not beyond the boundaries of acceptable American politics. Political leaders of all persuasions, in both Congress and the Executive branches of government, were quite willing to listen to the point of view of spokesmen for the American Zionist lobby. Thus the Zionists usually were able to communicate directly with decision-makers when they felt this was necessary.

The Zionists also had, from the time of the Nuremberg laws onward, the overwhelming backing and assistance of the American Jewish community (most of whose members have never belonged to any official Zionist organization.) The Zionists never took the support of the American Jewish community for granted. The Zionist leaders constantly endeavoured to keep their point of view on a variety of issues before the Jewish public. Initially the goal of the Zionists was to translate the natural con-

cern of American Jewry for the suffering of their co-religionists in Europe into desire to see a Jewish state established in Palestine; later the Zionists strove to prove to American Jews that they could best serve their co-religionists by giving financial and political support to Israel.

The fact that the Zionists were quite successful in these efforts meant that American politicians seeking the "Jewish vote" had to go on record as supporting the creation, and later the prospering of the Jewish state. The Zionist lobby tried to keep both Jews and non-Jewish pro-Zionists aware of how well those candidates who were elected kept their promises. The fact that the "Jewish vote" was in so many respects, the Zionist vote, was especially significant in presidential campaigns as Jews, who have a higher rate of electoral participation than most other ethnic groups, are concentrated in the urban centers of "swing states" having many electoral votes.

Another benefit to the Zionist lobby of this great support of the American Jewish community was the large financial contribution made each year to the United Jewish Appeal. A portion of the United Jewish Appeal money which is sent to the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem to be used in Israel is allocated to the Jewish Agency, American Section, Inc. This Agency then distributes the money, sometimes through the AZC and sometimes directly, to various institutions and publications which the leaders of the Agency judge to have been helpful in creating a favorable attitude on the part of the American articulate public toward Israel and the Zionists. The list of publications and institutions receiving this assistance is impressive. The most notable recipients have been the Herzl Institute, the American Synagogue Council, *Near East Report*, and *Middle Eastern Affairs*.<sup>9</sup> As

has been mentioned, all of this is of dubious legality and the fact that it continues, even after the exposures of Senator Fulbright's investigation in 1963, would seem to be indicative of the continuing power of the American Zionist lobby.

In addition, many individuals holding influential positions, both Jews and non-Jews, were deeply shocked by the suffering undergone by European Jewry during World War II. They felt that something had to be done to insure that such persecution would never again occur. The Zionists were able to enlist a good deal of this natural humanitarian concern for their cause. Many of these individuals who were concerned about the plight of European Jewry and unaware of the situation of the Arabs in the Middle East held positions of leadership in all areas of American life—cultural, academic, economic and political. They played a large though immeasurable role in bringing about a pro-Israel orientation on the part of a majority of the attentive public.

Lastly, the American Zionist lobby profited from the absence of any really effective group which opposed their aims. The American Council for Judaism, composed of Jews who believed that Judaism was a religion, and thus, that Jews did not constitute a national entity, tried to combat the Zionist influence on both American political leaders and the American Jewish community. The Council lacked numbers and money and became increasingly less effective as Israel loomed larger in the affairs of more and more American Jews in the decade of the 1950's. The United States office of the League of Arab States and some concerned American citizens have tried to offset the overwhelmingly pro-Zionist sentiment of the American media, but they too have had little success. It does

appear that the pro-Israel bias of the American media is so great as to be virtually impossible to change in the foreseeable future. The author had access to files of the AZEC and was very much impressed with the extent to which Zionist leaders urged local Zionist committees to establish a very close relationship with journalists, editors, and radio commentators during the 1940's. This effort has paid off handsomely for the Zionists.

It has been pointed out that the American Zionist lobby was not equally successful in its endeavours with the Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower Administrations. The factors accounting for the particular degree of success with each of the three administrations are many and complex. Indeed, comparison will shed some light on the importance of a particular chief executive's emotional commitments, personality and his relationship with his advisors, on the formulation of American foreign policy.

President Roosevelt was favorably disposed toward the broad goals of the American Zionists. He had several Jewish associates who were sympathetic to Zionist aims and he was willing to allow these individuals to play a role in formulating American foreign policy on the Palestine issue.

The Zionists benefited, in part, from President Roosevelt's rather unorthodox method of dealing with his subordinates and with the federal bureaucracy. That is, Roosevelt did not wish to delegate total authority in any issue-area to any specific individual or agency and, indeed, desired to receive information from diverse sources so as to be in a position to intervene and make directly any decisions that he felt were necessary. Thus he was unwilling to follow strictly the advice of the State

Department on the formulation of American policy towards the Palestine issue. On the other hand, Roosevelt, in typical fashion, was unwilling to commit the United States completely to a pro-Zionist policy.

President Roosevelt's belief that all problems could be solved by compromise and negotiation also had both positive and negative ramifications for the American Zionist lobby. He believed that if the Zionists were to modify their goals then their immediate aim, a Jewish state in Palestine, might well be achieved with United States support and, at the same time, without this nation's substantially sacrificing its overall-foreign policy aims in the Middle East.<sup>10</sup> Roosevelt was, of course, unsuccessful in bringing about a modification of either Zionist or Arab policies but had he served out his fourth term, he almost certainly would have continued in his efforts.

Most Zionist leaders were deeply saddened by Roosevelt's death. They had little idea of what the new chief executive, Harry Truman, would adopt as his position on the Palestine issue.

Truman was to prove to be a real supporter of Zionists aims. Although he did not have as many Jewish associates as his predecessor he was even more emotionally committed to the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine than was Roosevelt. He was convinced that the settlement of European Jews in the Middle East could be beneficial to all the peoples of that area.

Although President Truman was emotionally committed to the broad aims of the Zionists and was willing eventually to allow both recognized leaders of Zionism such as Drs. Silver, Weizmann, and Wise and his close personal friend, Eddie Jacobson, to plead the Zionist case directly, he

was initially less disposed than Roosevelt had been to reject the advice of many leading officials of the State and Defense Departments in reaching a decision on the issue of Palestine.<sup>11</sup>

The fact that Truman was being pulled in two directions concerning the formulation of United States policy toward the creation of a Jewish state explains, in large part, the seeming inconsistencies in the American policy from September of 1947 until May of 1948. Eventually, however, Truman determined to back the creation of the Jewish state against the advice of many of his closest advisors. And, once having made this basic decision, Truman spared little effort in ensuring the growth and well-being of Israel. He was less concerned than President Roosevelt had been about the possible damage to American interests throughout the Arab world that might result from United States support for the Zionists and made it clear to Arab leaders that this nation was irrevocably committed to Israel's continued existence and development.

The Zionist lobby was least successful during the Eisenhower administration. Several factors probably account for this relative lack of success. First, Dwight D. Eisenhower did not come into the office of president with either the emotional commitment to Zionist aspirations that Harry Truman had or the many pro-Zionist Jewish associates and advisors that Roosevelt brought with him.

Secondly, President Eisenhower had an administrative style which made it more difficult for the Zionist lobby to achieve their aims. He delegated responsibility and trusted, by and large, the opinions of his chosen advisors. Eisenhower, thus, was much less likely to be moved by Zionist

appeals that contradicted the opinions of his Secretary of State and other trusted foreign affairs advisors than were his two predecessors in the White House.

Both of these factors made it difficult for the Zionist lobby effectively to employ one of their most successful techniques in times of crisis — direct personal access to the chief executive. In addition, President Eisenhower was an individual who reacted unfavorably to what he perceived to be undue pressures being exerted on him.

Another element contributing to a lack of responsiveness to Zionist demands by the Eisenhower Administration was the fact that the overwhelming majority of American Jews voted for Eisenhower's opponent, Adlai Stevenson, in the 1952 and 1956 elections. Thus, the spokesmen of the Zionist lobby were unable to put forth the argument to President Eisenhower that he was indebted to Jewish voters or, during the period of the Suez crisis in 1956, that American Jews would back the Republican ticket if the President were supportive of Israel's goals in the Middle East.

Zionist leaders had always tried to insure that the votes of American Jews would not be taken for granted by either party or by any candidate for public office. Their goal, and, as has been indicated throughout this article, one they were rather successful in attaining, was to influence Jewish citizens to cast their votes for those candidates expressing support for Zionist policies. The Zionists did not, however, have total control over the manner in which American Jews determined their electoral preferences. That is, the Zionists could not prevent the overwhelming majority of American Jews from indicating their preferences (both in polls and in the elections) for those candidates who appeared

to be in favor of those policies and programs which most American Jews have traditionally supported.<sup>12</sup> That is, American Jewish voters tend to support programs and policies which are generally termed liberal. Candidates for office who advocate such things as expanded spending on health, education, and welfare, a larger role for the federal government in guaranteeing the civil rights of all citizens, or United States aid for the United Nations are quite likely to garner most of the votes of Jewish citizens. Adlai Stevenson, a presidential aspirant in 1952 and 1956, is an excellent example of the type of candidate favored by the majority of Jewish voters.

This limitation on the power of the Zionist lobby was not important during the first two administrations under investigation because Roosevelt was perceived by Jewish voters as being more liberal than his opponents and Truman was viewed as more liberal than his major opponent, and, in both cases the American Zionist leaders wanted Jewish voters to unreservedly support the more liberal candidate. However, the Zionist policy-makers knew that Eisenhower was quite likely to defeat his more liberal opponent, Adlai Stevenson, even without the support of Jewish voters and thus it would have been more beneficial for the Zionists in dealing with the Eisenhower Administration had they been able to manipulate the preferences of Jewish voters. In other words, the American Zionist lobby's effectiveness has been reduced because American Jews have become attracted to the Democratic Party.

The Zionists have, at least partially, offset this weakness by playing a leading role in the development of the Conference of the Heads of American Jewish Organizations. Leaders of sixteen major American Jewish religious, educational, cultural,

and philanthropic organizations are represented. The Conference allows the American Jewish community to present something of a united front on particular issues. Not surprisingly, the Conference has taken a strong stance in behalf of a high level of United States diplomatic, economic, and military support for Israel. Most importantly, the Conference performs the function of informing the American Jewish community as to how much support a particular administration is rendering to Israel. The Conference will be discussed further when the Nixon Administration is examined.

One cannot make as in-depth an analysis of the relationship between the Zionist lobby and the three administrations of the past twelve years as has been made of earlier administrations. Papers relating to the formulation of United States Middle East policy are not open to examination by scholars and the memoirs of the foreign policy decision-makers are not yet written. However, a review of both United States policy over this period and accessible research materials indicate that the pattern which had developed over the past three decades was maintained to 1970. That is, the Zionist lobby was more successful in achieving its goals with Democratic administrations than with Republican ones. That was, in large part, though not exclusively, because American Jews, most of whom are located in crucial "swing" states, voted overwhelmingly in favor of Democratic presidential aspirants and, what may well be as important, Jews contributed significantly to the campaign funds of liberal Democrats.

John F. Kennedy, in preparing his bid for office for several years prior to the 1960 election had on several occasions emphasized his support of Israel. Nevertheless American Jews were not especially enthu-

siastic about Kennedy's candidacy and it was probably to garner greater Jewish support that Kennedy accepted an invitation to speak before the national convention of the Zionist Organization of America. Vice-President Nixon, also given an opportunity to speak, turned down the invitation.<sup>13</sup> At the convention Kennedy was lavish in his praise of Zionist achievements and critical of the Eisenhower Administration's policies toward Israel. Some of Kennedy's comments bear reviewing as they epitomize the type of election rhetoric American politicians undertake in order to get Jewish votes and financial support. Kennedy said the following:

"It is worth remembering that the cause of Israel stands beyond Jewish life... it has not been merely a Jewish cause... because wherever freedom exists, there we are all committed.

The ideals of Zionism have, in the last half century, been endorsed by both parties, and Americans of all ranks in all sections. Friendship for Israel is not a partisan matter. It is a national commitment".

Not surprisingly Kennedy then went on to stress the particular contributions to Zionism of the Democratic Party.

"It was President Wilson who prophesied with great wisdom a Jewish homeland. It was President Franklin Roosevelt who kept alive the hope of Jewish redemption in the days of the Nazi terror. It was President Truman who first recognized the status of Israel in world affairs".<sup>14</sup>

Reprints of Kennedy's address were distributed in areas having large Jewish populations. Because of Kennedy's support for Israel, as well as the fact that Kennedy



clearly emerged as the more liberal candidate during the campaign, he received between 75% and 90% of Jewish votes.

During Kennedy's three years as chief executive the Zionist lobby was satisfied but not enthusiastic about his policies toward the Middle East. That is, a survey of American Zionist periodicals indicates that there was some mild displeasure at the President's friendly correspondence with Gamal Abdel Nasser and his efforts to give the United Arab Republic limited United States economic assistance. Zionist spokesmen were also critical of the United States' sponsoring of a resolution condemning an Israeli raid into Syria in April 1962 and wary of some limited interest in an overall settlement of the Palestine refugee issue expressed by individuals in the Kennedy Administration.<sup>15</sup>

However, the Israeli Government, which directs the broad outlines of the activities of the American Zionist lobby was basically satisfied with the policies of the Kennedy Administration. The lower echelons of the American Zionist movement were probably not aware that in 1961 the President had sent his White House assistant, Myer Feldman, to Israel to renew America's pledge of support to the Zionist state and, more importantly, to promise Israel Hawk antiaircraft missiles in return for an Israeli promise not to develop nuclear weapons.<sup>16</sup>

It is impossible to say what policies toward the Arab-Israeli issue John F. Kennedy and his advisors would have adopted had he lived out his term and been reelected to a second four years as chief executive. It is the author's belief that too many Arab intellectuals, impressed more by the words of the Kennedy Administration spokesmen than by their actions, have been unduly optimistic about a more even-hand-

ed United States policy emerging had John F. Kennedy lived. Not only was Kennedy indebted to Jewish voters but he also drew most of his advisors from the eastern intellectual community of the United States; a community in which there were many Zionists, both Jewish and non-Jewish.

President Lyndon B. Johnson was more unequivocal than Kennedy had been in his support for Israel. He had spent many years in the United States Congress and knew well the political benefits to be gained by support for Israel. In addition he lacked his predecessor's close personal rapport with liberal leaders of the American Jewish community and probably felt that he had to indicate consistently, in both word and deed, his support for Zionism and Israel. Two months after assuming office President Johnson accepted an invitation to speak before the Friends of the Weizmann Institute and affirmed that his administration would continue to support the growth of the Zionist state.<sup>17</sup>

Early in 1964 the Israeli Prime Minister, Levi Eshkol, came to the United States on an official visit. As one might expect, President Johnson issued statements following meetings between the two leaders, reaffirming American determination to prevent aggression in the Middle East and praising the accomplishments of the Zionist state. The Zionist press reflected the satisfaction in Zionist circles with the talks and, in particular, the satisfaction with the public rebuke given by the United States State Department to the thirteen Arab ambassadors who had issued a joint statement criticizing the visit of the Israeli Prime Minister.<sup>18</sup>

A survey of Zionist and Jewish periodicals from 1964 to May, 1967 indicates that the Zionist lobby was satisfied with the policies of the Johnson Administra-

tion.<sup>19</sup> During the three weeks preceding the Six Days War a great many Zionists were critical of the Johnson Administration. They attempted to present a picture of Israel as a state besieged by hostile Arab powers aided by the Soviet Union and virtually abandoned by the United States. As has been mentioned, the Zionists had spent many years and much effort and money in developing a favorable image of Israel in the American press and this effort really bore fruit during May-June, 1967.<sup>20</sup> The Zionist lobby, now effectively coordinated by the Conference of Presidents of American Jewish Organizations, established an emergency committee on the Near East crisis and began issuing statements urging stronger American support for Israel. In addition the committee organized mass demonstrations and parades, and urged their supporters to telephone, telegram, and meet with Congressmen. The extent of deep support, often bordering on the hysterical, of the American Jewish community was almost total and, indeed, there were very few non-Jewish opinion leaders who did not speak out to urge greater United States support for Israel.

Interestingly, however, the clamor died out as soon as Israel achieved its expansionist goals. Even though the official spokesmen of the Johnson Administration stated that the United States opposed acquisition of territory by force, there was very little public criticism of the Johnson Administration by Zionist leaders and no significant criticism of American policy in Zionist periodicals.

The reason for this would seem to have been that the Israeli Government and the higher echelons of the American Zionist lobby were primarily concerned that the United States do nothing of a substantive nature to modify Israel's control over

the conquered territories. The Zionists would have preferred that the United States had not criticized Israel at the United Nations and had not begun to explore the possibilities of an overall settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute through agreement of the four major world powers. These, however, were minor irritations as compared to actions contemplated by the Eisenhower Administrations after the Suez War to compel the Israelis to leave the conquered territory.

The presidential election campaign which began in 1968 had few surprises. The several Democratic aspirants tried to outdo one another in pledging military and economic support for Israel. This is quite natural as the several Democratic candidates were desperately searching for campaign funds among the affluent American Jewish community. Senator Robert Kennedy was the most vehement in his statements of support for Israel and it was for this reason that the Palestinian, Sirhan Bishara Sirhan, chose to assassinate him.

Senator Kennedy's death did not discourage either Vice-President Humphrey, the Democratic nominee, or Richard Nixon, the Republican candidate, from seeking Jewish votes and money. Nixon went further in support for Israel and its foreign policy goals than he had in 1960 by promising to maintain Israel's technical superiority. Hubert Humphrey, however, had for many years been a virtual spokesman for the Zionist lobby in the United States Senate and had many close personal contacts with leading American Zionists. Thus he received endorsements from most leading Zionist spokesmen. Humphrey received about 80 to 85% of the Jewish vote.<sup>21</sup>

It should be pointed out that the fact that Humphrey was the more pro-Zionist of the two candidates was a major factor,

but not the sole determinant, accounting for his achievement. The majority of Jews are registered Democrats and tend to vote for the more liberal candidate.

Nixon's first year in office was a disquieting period for the Zionists. First the President-elect sent William Scranton, a former Governor of Pennsylvania and Nixon's first choice as Secretary of State, to the Middle East on a fact-finding mission. Scranton held discussions with a number of Middle Eastern leaders including individuals prominent in the Palestinian community. The Israelis have never accepted the existence of a Palestinian Arab community and they, and the American Zionists, were displeased by Scranton's efforts to give some legitimacy to the Palestinian position. Scranton's comments during and after the trip indicated that the Republican chief executive would adopt a more even-handed policy than had been the case for the previous eight years. Naturally the Zionists feared that Nixon contemplated a settlement to the Arab-Israeli dispute which would entail Israel's returning the territories gained by force in June, 1967.

Zionist fears seemed even more well-founded as several leading American businessmen visited the Arab world and publicly proclaimed that the United States bias in favor of Israel threatened American investments in the Arab Middle East.<sup>22</sup> Even more threatening for the Zionists was the fact that President Nixon gave Secretary of State William Rogers and Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco full authority to try to work out an overall settlement of the problems stemming from the Six Days War in consultation with officials of the Soviet Union. The goal was to reach agreement with the Soviet Union, then have the agreement endorsed by Great Britain and France, and, finally, to have the agree-

ment implemented through the efforts of special United Nations mediator, Gunnar Jarring.<sup>23</sup>

Initially the American Zionist lobby preferred to take a low-key form of protest against the general trend of developments. In 1956-57 President Eisenhower had been greatly put off at Zionist attempts to apply pressure to force him to change his plans and the Zionists probably wanted to avoid having pressure backfire again. Late in 1969 they changed this strategy and began to lobby more openly and aggressively. At the same time that Chase Manhattan Bank president David Rockefeller was reporting to President Nixon about his recent conversations with Egyptian President Nasser, leaders of a variety of Jewish organizations were in Washington presenting their views to Congressmen of both parties.<sup>24</sup>

By January 1970 virtually every American Jewish leader had criticized the Nixon Administration and a number of Congressmen and local political figures had also jumped aboard the bandwagon. Public rallies were held in areas of substantial Jewish population and on January 25 over 1000 Jewish community and organization leaders met in New York City to express apprehension over the Nixon Administration's policy in the Middle East. The meeting was called by the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, the coordinating body of the American Zionist lobby. The protests and lobbying would seem to have achieved at least partial success as President Nixon sent a conciliatory message to the gathering vowing that the United States was prepared to supply Israel with military equipment to help provide for its safety.<sup>25</sup>

By the spring of 1970 negotiations between United States and Soviet officials

were stalled and the likelihood of an overall settlement being reached was quite dim. Nonetheless, the Nixon Administration was still interested in achieving, at the least, an end to the fighting which had erupted due to the penetration raids by the Israelis into the United Arab Republic. Even as the Zionist lobby clamored for shipment of sophisticated military equipment to Israel, President Nixon warned Israeli leaders that unless they accepted a cease-fire they would not be given either loans or permission to buy advanced military hardware from the United States.<sup>26</sup>

The President had a view of the substantial power of the Zionist lobby when President Pompidou of France came to the United States in March, 1970. He was met with waves of protest demonstrations in the various cities he visited and Zionist leaders demanded an audience with the French head of state to voice their opposition to France's new policies toward the Arab-Israeli dispute. The Zionist press took exception to President Nixon's apology to President Pompidou in which he said that the demonstrators did not really represent American opinion.<sup>27</sup> In spite of Zionist pressures the President continued to press Israel and in June Israeli leaders acceded to the pressure and acquiesced to a cease-fire. Almost immediately, for a variety of reasons not the least of which was Zionist propaganda, Administration officials questioned the sincerity of the Soviet Union's and the United Arab Republic's observance of the letter and spirit of the cease-fire agreement. The President then agreed to allow Israel to purchase the latest United States military aircraft and, consequently, the Zionist's lobby's criticism of the Nixon Administration became much less strident.

The most significant event which led to a reversal of the opinion of the Ame-

rican Zionist lobby toward President Nixon and, ultimately, to a Republican courting of the Jewish vote was the fighting between Palestinian commando groups and forces loyal to King Hussein of Jordan in September, 1970.

Both Israel and the United States were determined to keep Jordan in the western sphere of influence and to break the growing power of the Palestinian resistance organizations. Both nations coordinated their efforts to insure that King Hussein's Bedouin troops would be able to move against the Palestinian commandos without fear of intervention by Palestinians in Syria or by any Arab state.<sup>28</sup>

Following the success of this cooperative enterprise United States policy became more openly pro-Israel in both words and deeds. During the next twelve months the American Zionists remained suspicious of Secretary of State Rogers but muted their criticism of President Nixon. The political figure most highly praised in the Zionist press was Senator Henry M. Jackson (Democrat, Washington), a presidential aspirant. He had led the fight in the Congress in 1971 to insure that funds appropriated for Israel would actually be spent by the Nixon Administration.<sup>29</sup>

It was probably at the end of 1971 that political strategists close to the chief executive decided that the Republican ticket had an excellent opportunity to gain a more substantial portion of the Jewish vote than any Republican presidential candidate had achieved in four decades. This was an astute analysis for two reasons. First, the Administration of President Nixon had become as supportive of Israel as any Democratic administration could have been expected to be and there was no reason why Nixon should not reap the political benefits stemming from a pro-Israel policy. Se-

condly, a number of political analysts had noticed that a substantial number of traditionally Democratic Jewish voters were becoming more conservative on a number of social and economic issues.<sup>30</sup> That is, many American Jews, having achieved relative affluence, were increasingly wary both of calls by liberal Democrats for more taxes to be paid by the wealthy and of the seeming unconcern of the liberals about destruction of property caused by disturbances in ghetto communities. Nor were many American Jews really enthusiastic about racial integration in housing and education, two goals of liberal Democrats.

During the first eight months of 1972 President Nixon has been quite successful in obtaining financial support from wealthy Jews who have traditionally contributed to liberal Democrats. Probably the most important switch has been that of Louis H. Boyar, a Beverly Hills real estate executive, who had contributed heavily to the Democrats in previous contests. Mr. Boyar is a frequent companion of Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir as well as a former national co-chairman of the Israel Bonds campaign who switched his support from Democratic presidential aspirant Hubert Humphrey in May, 1972 to President Nixon. He has been quite successful in convincing other wealthy Jews to do the same.<sup>34</sup>

On June 10 Israel's ambassador to the United States, Lieut. General Yitzhak Rabin, indicated on Israeli state-owned radio that he favored President Nixon's reelection and that it was his duty to maximize support for his country.<sup>32</sup> The ambassador was rebuked for this blatant interference in United States politics but the rebuke did little to limit the effect of his words. For instance, Max Fisher, a Jewish millionaire, who officially serves as President Nixon's

financial liaison with the Jewish community, stated that his task "had never been easier" and that he had collected three-fold as much money from Jews as went to the President in 1968.<sup>33</sup>

Endorsements of President Nixon from leading Zionist spokesmen have multiplied in recent months. Jacob Stein, present Chairman of the Heads of American Jewish Organizations asserted that "President Nixon will get a large share of the Jewish vote in this year's election" and that "Nixon's positive policy on Israel would influence many Jews who usually vote Democratic."<sup>34</sup> Two prominent Washington journalists, Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, recently wrote that Dr. William Wexler, former head of B'nai B'rith and a critic of the President when he was Chairman of the Conference of the Heads of American Jewish Organizations in 1969-70, promised the Republican chief executive that he would have his vote and his help in the fall.<sup>35</sup> It is expected that Dr. Wexler will be named co-chairman of a committee of prominent American Jewish leaders endorsing President Nixon's reelection.<sup>36</sup> Dr. Wexler is now Chairman of the World Conference of Jewish Organizations, the political coordinating arm of the world Zionist movement, and is on very close terms with Israeli officials.

What makes all of this Zionist-Jewish support even more impressive is that the Democratic Party, and, in particular the Democratic presidential aspirants in their primary election campaigns, spared no effort to retain Jewish support. In the Florida campaign each Democratic candidate, with the noteworthy exception of Black Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm, promised that he could do more for Israel than any other contender when he became president.<sup>37</sup>

The fact that both political parties are seeking Jewish votes and money by promising to do more for Israel represents a significant gain in the power of the American Zionist lobby. The Zionists became aware that the attachment of American Jews to the Democratic Party constituted a source of weakness during the Eisenhower Administration and they have sought to eliminate this weakness. Thus at the same time that President Nixon decided to seek Jewish support the Zionist lobby wished to have Jewish voters support the Republican Administration.

No longer will Zionist spokesmen and lobbyists have to expend so much time and effort organizing protest rallies, letter-writing campaigns, and personal interviews with Congressmen and White House offi-

cial. No longer will the personal views of a particular chief executive or number of Zionists (both Jewish and non-Jewish) in key positions in an administration be major factors in determining the extent of Zionist influence on the formulation of United States foreign policy as they were from 1914 through 1968.

Rather, virtually total support for Israel's foreign policy goals will be enunciated by all office holders. From time to time American policy-makers will try to manipulate Arab public opinion and Arab governments by appearing to withdraw from support of certain of Israel's minor goals, but, on major issues, the United States will continue to render great financial, military, and diplomatic assistance to the Jewish state.

## NOTES

(1) See Selig Adler, "The Palestine Question In The Wilson Era," *Jewish Social Studies*, X (1948), pp. 300-310 for a full discussion of the roles of Louis Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter.

(2) See Seth, Tillman, *Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961), especially pp. 226-228.

(3) The several volumes of the *Foreign Relations Of The United States* from 1920-1933 give indication of both Zionist efforts to get the United States Government more involved on behalf of the Jews in Palestine and State Department reluctance to embark on any such venture.

(4) The author has found that the Judaica Room of the Goldfarb Library at Brandeis University in Waltham, Massachusetts has a fine collection of Zionist and non-Zionist Jewish periodicals and newsletters. The Zionist Archives in New York City have excellent primary source material but use of the Archives is restricted. *The Foreign Relations Of The Uni-*

*ted States* from 1934 through 1947 and the Palestine Files in the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, New York also provide excellent sources of information on Zionist strategy and tactics. Autobiographies and other books that the author has determined to be particularly useful in his research will be listed in the bibliography.

(5) The subject of the relations between the Zionist lobby and the Truman Administration, especially during the crucial 1947-48 period, is one about which a good deal has been written, most of it of a polemical nature. Pro-Zionist accounts are given in Jorge Garia-Granados, *The Birth Of Israel: The Drama As I Saw It* (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1949), Frank E. Manuel, *The Realities Of American-Palestine Relations* (Washington, D.C. Public Affairs Press, 1949), and Joseph Schechtman, *The United States and the Jewish State Movement: The Crucial Decade 1939-1949* (New York: Herzl Press, 1966); an anti-Zionist account is presented in Kermit Roosevelt, "The Partition of Palestine: A Lesson In Pressure Politics," *Middle East Journal*, Volume 2, January,

1948, pp. 1-16. More scholarly accounts are given in Robert Riggs, *Politics In The United Nations: A Study Of United States Influence in the General Assembly* (Urbana, Illinois Press, 1958), Chapter 4, and, hopefully, in Chapter 4 of this author's Ph.D. dissertation, *A Study Of The Efforts Of The American Zionists To Influence The Formulation And Conduct Of United States Foreign Policy During The Roosevelt, Truman, And Eisenhower Administrations* (Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island, June, 1972).

(6) United States Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *A Study Of The Activities Of Nondiplomatic Representatives Of Foreign Principles*, 88th Congress, 1st Session, May, 1963, see especially pp. 1218-1339 and August, 1963, pp. 1706-1764. The Hearings are conveniently summarized in *Issues* (an American Council for Judaism periodical), Volume 17, Winter, 1963.

(7) Lawrence H. Fuchs, "Minority Groups and Foreign Policy," *Political Science Quarterly*, Volume 14, June, 1959, pp. 161-175. The author notes both that many political scientists mention in a general fashion the influence of such groups on United States foreign policy and that there has been little meaningful research on the strategy and tactics of such groups.

(8) David Truman, *Governmental Process* (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1951), Chapters V-VIII, XI, *passim*.

(9) United States Congress, *loc. cit.*

(10) Franklin Delano Roosevelt Official File, Palestine, 700, 1940-1945. Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York.

(11) Harry S. Truman, *1946-1952: Years of Trial and Hope* (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1956) especially pp. 158, 184-185.

(12) See Lawrence H. Fuchs, *The Political Behavior of American Jews* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1956), pp. 173-203 for a discussion of liberal values and American Jewish voting behavior.

(13) Robert Silverberg, *If I Forget Thee O Jerusalem: American Jews and the State of Israel* (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1970), pp. 550-551.

(14) *Ibid.*, pp. 551-552.

(15) *Congress Bi-Weekly* (American Jewish Congress), Vols. 28, 30, 1960-1963; *The American Zionist* (Zionist Organization of America), Vol. 51-53, 1960-1963.

(16) Silverberg, *op. cit.*, p. 553.

(17) *Ibid.*, pp. 553-554.

(18) *Congress Bi-Weekly*, Vol. 31, June 15, 1964.

(19) There was some dissatisfaction with the decision of the United States to vote to censure Israel for the Es Samu raid against Jordan in November, 1966 but the Zionists have always been more concerned with United States actions than with the words of its United Nations delegates.

(20) Two excellent articles dealing with the pro-Israel bias of the American media are "The Arab Portrayed" by Edward Said and "American Mass Media and the June War" by Michael Suleiman in Ibrahim Abu-Lughad (ed.), *The Arab-Israeli Confrontation of June, 1967: An Arab Perspective* (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1970)

(21) Silverberg, *op.cit.*, p. 586.

(22) *Ibid.*, p. 587.

(23) See Rowland Evans and Robert D. Novak, *Nixon In The White House: The Frustration Of Power* (New York: Random House, 1971), pp. 86-91 for what would appear to be a balanced review of Nixon's goals in the Middle East during 1969-1970.

(24) Silverberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 588-589; *The American Zionist*, Vol. 60, September, 1969 and October, 1969

(25) *Ibid.*, p. 590; See also Shlomo Slonim, "The United States, the Big Four, and the Middle East," in *The American Zionist*, Vol. 60, February, 1970.

(26) Evans and Novak, *op.cit.*, pp. 259-260.

(27) *The American Zionist*, Vol. 60, March-April, 1970.

(28) See Evans and Novak, *op.cit.*, pp. 262-265 for a discussion of this crisis and United States-Israeli response.

(29) *The Evening Bulletin* (Philadelphia), November 12, 1971.

(30) Both Kevin P. Phillips, *The Emerging Republican Majority* (New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House, 1969) pp. 117-121 and Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg, *The Real Majority* (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1970), pp. 238, 243 discuss this tendency.

(31) Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Nixon Woos Jewish Voters," in *Washington Post* (Washington, D.C.) June 21, 1972. See also Steven Roberts, "A New Breed of Fat Cats Gets into Politics," in *Washington Post*, May 13, 1972.

(32) *Washington Post*, June 11, 1972.

(33) Terence Smith, "Nixon Aides. Seeing Big Gains, Plan a Drive for Jewish Votes," in *New York Times*, July 7, 1972.

(34) *Washington Post*, March 7, 1972.

(35) *Washington Post*, June 21, 1972.

(36) *New York Times*, July 7, 1972.

(37) *New York Times*, March 10, 1972.







# American Jewry and the Democratic and Republican Parties

Odeh Aburdeneh

In this presidential campaign year, both the Republican and Democratic parties have expressed concern for Israel and Soviet Jewry. This article will try to analyze and assess the impact of American Jews on the two parties.

The fact that the two major parties and their candidates should be solicitous of Israel and her concern is not entirely coincidental. As Columnist William Buckley put it, "A U.S. pledge to Israeli independence is for the time being necessary for anyone who aspires to be president, for the simple reason that the strategically situated Jewish community is for the most part very generous in backing political causes, and very insistent on the matter of Israeli independence."<sup>1</sup> American Jews

now make up about 2.9 per cent of the total American population. This should make the Jewish vote minor and insignificant to presidential candidates. Because of the peculiarities of the American electoral system, however, the Jewish vote affects presidential elections far beyond its numerical strength. The American system of electing a president by electoral college, gives relative weight to the 50 states in accordance with their population. And since American Jews are most numerous in the industrialized and urban states, their vote can affect the elections of these states which are most eagerly sought by the candidates.

American Jews are concentrated in 11 states. They are : New York, 2,500,000; California, 1,000,000; Pennsylvania,

443,595; New Jersey, 387,220; Illinois, 283,000; Massachusetts, 259,000; Florida, 189,000; Maryland, 177,000; Ohio, 160,000; Connecticut, 103,000; Michigan, 98,000 and Texas, 65,000.

The total combined electoral college seats of these states is 277. It must be remembered that a presidential candidate needs 270 electoral votes to be elected.

Aside from the fact that American Jews are concentrated in the large urban states and cities, they "register and vote to the last man and woman, while others do not."<sup>2</sup>

The Jewish vote is twice as important as its number might seem to indicate. Columnist Joseph Alsop writes: "In New York City, for instance, only a quarter of the population is Jewish, but 40 per cent of the vote is Jewish."<sup>3</sup>

The major Democratic contenders for the presidency—Muskie, Jackson, Humphrey and McGovern, campaigned "as if their real ambition was to sit in the Knesset in Jerusalem."<sup>4</sup>

During the Florida primary, a handbill from the campaign head-quarters of Senator Muskie of Maine hails him as, "a winner fighting for a winning cause—the security of Israel."<sup>6</sup>

Humphrey forces placed a two-page advertisement in the *Jewish Floridian*, a weekly newspaper, which gave a predictable answer to the question, "Which Democratic candidate is the Jew's best friend?"<sup>6</sup> Senator Humphrey, it pointed out, is the only candidate who supports Israel's claims to the Arab section of Jerusalem. The Jackson forces retorted with a two-page ad in the same newspaper insisting—"Nobody, but nobody, has done more to help Israel than Senator M. Jackson."<sup>7</sup>

With an "I shall go to Israel" statement, Senator Humphrey of Minnesota sought the sizable Jewish vote in Philadelphia during the Pennsylvania primary. Because of the sizable Jewish population of Pennsylvania, Humphrey was told by Jewish leaders, according to the *New York Times*, that he must, "renew his credentials" if he expects a Jewish turnout for him at the polls. Acting accordingly, the Senator issued a statement saying that the U.S. had refused to acknowledge a Jewish Jerusalem and that President Nixon, "had never found time to visit our most loyal friend in the Middle East. Whatever my role may be in American public life next year," Mr. Humphrey added, "I shall journey to Jerusalem to join in the celebrations of Israel's 25th anniversary."<sup>8</sup>

Even Senator McGovern, the most dovish candidate, abandoned his former moderation on the Middle East, and "became a super-militant supporter of Israel to woo Jewish votes."<sup>9</sup>

Wearing a prayer cap in a San Fernando Valley synagogue, McGovern called on the Nixon administration to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, "and move our embassy there."<sup>10</sup>

McGovern also said the U.S. should "furnish Israel the advanced aircraft and other equipment necessary to prevent attack. Such arms delivery... should not be made contingent upon Israeli agreement to American diplomatic demands, but should be an ongoing commitment based solely upon military requirements."<sup>11</sup>

Moreover, according to George Lardner Jr., of the *Washington Post*: "But here in California... McGovern has been playing the same old-fashioned game, singing psalms of praise for every one from the prophet Abraham to Moshe Dayan."<sup>12</sup>

In the New York primary, the McGovern forces printed 3 million pamphlets describing the Senator as a "staunch defender of Israel."<sup>13</sup> The pamphlet quotes McGovern as saying that he would sell phantom jets to Israel and deliver them within a week after he were inaugurated and also notes that he supports Israel's annexation of Jerusalem.<sup>14</sup> The above was done partly to counteract the claims by the Humphrey forces that McGovern is "weak" on Israel and partly according to New York State Senator Manfred Ohrenstein "part of the Zionist establishment in this country... (U.S.) will determine their vote by what they believe Nixon did for Israel, and they believe he's done a great deal.

"They are so one-issue orientated that that's all that they'll be able to see. Therefore, they feel that they owe an obligation and they will discharge that obligation."<sup>15</sup>

Jewish political leaders received prominent roles with high visibility thrusts of Senator George McGovern's successful campaign to be the Democratic Party's candidate against Richard M. Nixon in the Presidential election November 7, 1972.

Senator and former Governor of Connecticut, Abraham Ribicoff, nominated his 'old and good friend' McGovern, at the party's convention. Of the 18 speeches putting six candidates into nomination before the 3016 delegates, 300 of whom were Jewish, Ribicoff alone referred to Israel. The New Englander said McGovern's "leadership in ending the tragedy of Vietnam has not reduced his determination to protect the real interests of the United States in Europe and the survival of Israel in the Middle East."<sup>16</sup>

After McGovern had triumphed on the first ballot, Ribicoff and Mandel were

announced as members of the party's official delegation that will formally inform McGovern of his nomination. Mandel is one of three Jewish governors, all of them Democrats. The others are Milton Schapp of Pennsylvania and Frank Licht of Rhode Island. Licht was chairman of his state's delegation which cast all of its 32 votes for McGovern. Mandel also personally headed the Maryland delegation but it failed to deliver a majority for McGovern, giving him 13 votes and 38 to Alabama Governor George C. Wallace.

The influence of American Jews in the Democratic party was demonstrated by the adoption of a strong plank on Israel. The plank reads as follows: "The U.S. must be unequivocally committed to support of Israel's right to exist within secure and defensible boundaries.

The next Democratic Administration should:

Make and carry out a firm, long-term public commitment to provide Israel with aircraft and other military equipment in the quantity and sophistication she needs to preserve her deterrent strength in the face of Soviet arming of Arab threats of renewed war;

Seek to bring the parties into direct negotiations toward a permanent political solution...

Maintain a political commitment and a military force in Europe and at sea in the Mediterranean ample to deter the Soviet Union from putting unbearable pressure on Israel.

Recognize and support the established status of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, with free access to all its holy places provided to all faiths."<sup>17</sup>

American Jews are, "among the major

financiers of political parties, especially the Democrats, just as they are the major financiers of Israel itself."<sup>18</sup>

American politicians are more and more dependent on large sums of campaign cash. This was succinctly put by Senator Muskie as he pulled out of the primaries: "We don't have the money... It simply could not be done without the money."<sup>19</sup>

Thus candidates for the presidency are increasingly beholden to those Jewish contributors who can supply the money. "As the costs of campaigning skyrocket, so does the influence of the dollar."<sup>20</sup> The financial heart of the Democratic party is the Jewish investment bankers of Wall Street. It must be pointed out that Wall Street is controlled by two major groups. They are the WASPS (Yankees) and the Jews.

Within the Jewish investment banking group are the following: Lehman Brothers, Goldman, Sachs and Company, Kuhn, Loeb and Company, Lazard Freres, Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades. The people who manage these firms are intimately related by family and business ties that go back to the time when the first members of their families arrived in the United States.

For example, Lehman relatives alone connect most of the Jewish banking houses into one big family. John L. Loeb of Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades and Benjamin Buttenwieser, one of the top partners at Kuhn, Loeb, are both married to Lehmans. Arthur Altschutl of Goldman, Sachs is a close Lehman relative. The example could go on and on. Kuhn is married to Loeb, Schiffs (of Kuhn, Loeb) married to Warburgs (of Kuhn, Loeb).

Many partners and offices of the Jewish banking houses are directors of large corporations. This means that they represent a significant role, though not neces-

sarily controlling financial interest. For example, Lazard Freres and Co. has been described as one of the most powerful financial houses on Wall Street.

It is dominated by 73 year old Andre Meyer, "one of the most powerful men on Wall Street and, for that matter, a major force in international financial circles."<sup>21</sup> Current records indicate that Lazard partners currently serve as directors of more than 60 companies, about half of them large public corporations.<sup>22</sup>

Meyer's connection with the Kennedy family is close. In addition to advising the Kennedy family on financial matters, Meyer counts among his friends former President Lyndon B. Johnson and David Rockefeller of the Chase Manhattan Bank.

Other influential friends of Meyer include U.S. Senators Jacob Javits, Charles Percy and Edward Kennedy and former Secretaries of the Treasury Henry Fowler and Douglas Dillon.

"After all this build-up, it is needless to say that it is the Jewish businessmen, not the Gentiles, who provide the leadership of the Democratic Party financial support on Wall Street, in addition to rendering a number of services and amenities for candidates and officials of the party. For one thing, several families of this group provide the party with some of its biggest contributors and fund-raisers. In 1964, for example, various Lehmans are on record for a total of \$37,000 to Democratic candidates and Andre Meyer of Lazard Freres chipped in with \$35,000 on his own. In 1968, John L. Loeb together with relatives and partners donated \$90,500, and Loeb personally lent another \$10,000."<sup>23</sup>

A big donor to Democratic causes from the New York area is Mary Lasker, widow of ad tycoon Albert Lasker.<sup>24</sup>

Other major Democratic money raisers in New York are Arthur Krim, Robert Benjamin, and Arnold Picker of United Artists, and Howard Stein of the Dreyfus Corporations.

Most of the Democratic money in New Jersey have come in recent years from Leon Hess of Amerada-Hess Petroleum and the late Charles Engelhard of Engelhard Industries.<sup>26</sup>

In Pennsylvania the leading fund-raiser for many decades was Albert M. Greenfield. Now that he is dead, the fund raising mantle probably will fall to Gustave Amsterdam of Greenfield's Bankers Securities Corporation. He will have assistance, however, from other prominent Jews such as Frederic Mann, president of the Industrial Container Corporation, Philip Berman, president of Hess Department store, and Aaron Goldman of Macke Vending Company.<sup>26</sup>

The role of Jewish businessmen of Chicago in financing the Democratic Party can be seen most quickly in the fact that "29 of the approximately 120 men who gave \$1000 or more to Johnson's President Club in 1964 were members of the highly-exclusive, Jewish-only Standard Club, whereas only 10 could be identified as members of the Chicago Club, the exclusive stronghold of the wealthy Gentiles in that city."<sup>27</sup>

Out in California, the leading fund-raisers and contributors are predominantly wealthy Jewish businessmen and they include real-estate men Ben Swig and Walter Shorestein and their friend and business associate Adolph Schuman, president of a dressmaking company. In Los Angeles, the fund-raisers mostly belong to the city's most exclusive Jewish club, the Hillcrest Country Club, which means savings and loan magnate Mark Taper, lawyer Eugene Wyman, Joe Shane and Lawrence Harvey.

Other important political contributors are Paul Zifferen, John Factor, Miles Rubin and Max Palevsky. It is estimated that 60 to 90 per cent of the money raised in California is Jewish.<sup>28</sup> New Orleans is the only large Southern city, where Jews are at the financial helm of the Democratic party. This includes all the Stern family which owns a large part of Sears and Roebuck, investment banker, Herman Kohlmeier and Company, attorney Stephen Lemann, and coffee broker, Sam Israel.<sup>29</sup>

American Jews played a pivotal role in the financing of Senator Humphrey's presidential campaign in 1968. According to the Citizens Research Foundation, Humphrey received the following:

Mr. and Mrs. John Factor	\$100,000
Mrs. Albert Lasker	60,000
Mr. and Mrs. Jack Dreyfus	63,000
Norman Cousins	55,000
Mr. and Mrs. Lew Wasserman	54,000
Mr. and Mrs. Harry Brandt	45,000
Fredrick R. Mann	30,000 <sup>30</sup>

John Factor put up an additional 240,000 dollars in loans.

John Factor, a California Insurance man was pardoned in 1962 by President Kennedy of his 1943 mail-fraud conviction. Lew Wasserman, president of the Music Corporation of America, Inc. also lent Humphrey \$240,000 in 1968.<sup>31</sup>

The man responsible for raising most of Humphrey's money in 1968 and 1972 is Eugene Wyman. Wyman heads a 60-man office in Los Angeles. One key to Wyman's success as a political money man is simply that he operates out of super-rich Beverly Hills, an oasis of Mercede-Benzes and mansions and heavily populated by Jews. The other is the contacts Wyman had among America's wealthiest Jews in

his Israel Bond work. In his office Wyman has a photograph showing him with Golda Meir, when Meir met with Wyman to express her gratitude for his role in selling \$21 million in Israel bonds.<sup>32</sup>

Humphrey's financial support from American Jews stems from his blind support of Israel. "Hubert Humphrey," said Wyman, "is the best salesman of Israel bonds in the country."<sup>33</sup>

#### MAJOR JEWISH CONTRIBUTORS TO HUMPHREY<sup>34</sup>

Names	Gifts	Table A	
		Loans	
Charles Bassine	\$44,000		
Louis Boyar	15,000		
Arthur Cohen	10,000	\$325,000	
Joseph Cole	45,000		
John Factor	60,000		
Milton Gilbert	10,000		
Stanley Goldblum	25,000	25,000	
Irving Kahn	75,000		
Irving Kosloff	10,000		
Max Kampelman	5,000		
Eugene Klein	37,500	62,500	
Philip Klutznick	5,000		
Mr. and Mrs. John Loeb	50,000		
Arthur Levien	20,000		
A.B. Polinsky	5,000		
Laurence Rosenthal	11,000		
Marvin Rosenberg	5,000		
Meshullam Riklis	125,000	150,000	
Samuel Rothberg	15,000		
Daniel Schwartz	38,000	50,000	
Walter Shorestein	25,000		
Robert Kogod	5,000		
Eugene Wyman	27,000		
Gilbert Lehrman	12,500	50,000	

Table A shows Jewish contributors to Humphrey's 1972 campaign. It is to be noted that the list includes only those who gave 5,000 or more dollars. There were a

sizable number of Jewish contributors who gave under five thousand dollars.

Among the Humphrey contributors, there are a number of people who have close ties to Israel. They are Louis Boyar, a leader of the Israel Bond Organization and "who is a frequent companion of Israeli premier Golda Meir."<sup>35</sup>

Meshullam Riklis, is co-chairman of the greater New York United Jewish appeal. Joseph Cole is listed as a director of the PEC Israel Corporation, which owns major portions of such Israeli firms, as Carmel Wines, Ltd., Ihud Insurance, and Tambour Paints.

Samuel Rothberg, general chairman of the Israel Bond Organization, and Robert Kogod, member of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), which lobbies on behalf of Israel in Congress.

Table B presents a partial list of Jewish contributors who gave \$5,000 or more to Senator Muskie's campaign.

Predictably, the Muskie list contains a roster of Jewish contributors. The largest contribution was from the Arnold Picker family. Picker is the chairman of the Executive Committee of United Artists Corp., and a principal fund-raiser for Muskie. The Picker family gave a total of \$53,893.<sup>36</sup>

Muskie also disclosed additional significant sums given by American Jews in United Artists and elsewhere in the motion picture industry. The contributions from United Artists include, besides the \$53,893: \$1,250 from Arnold's nephew, David Picker, President of United Artists; \$1,000 from Arthur Krim, Chairman of the Board; \$2,000 from Co-chairman of the Board, Robert S. Benjamin; \$18,750 from Mrs. Benjamin; and \$500 from Eric R. Pleskow; and \$100 from Fred Gold-

berg, both of whom are vice-presidents. The indicated grand total for the firm : \$77,443.<sup>37</sup>

Muskie's fund-raiser in California were Paul Ziffern who gave \$5,000 and Joe Sinay who donated \$12,000, both staunch supporters of Israel. Other Jewish gifts from the movie business include: Laurence Tisch, Chairman, and Preston R. Tisch, President of Loew's Corp., \$5,000 each; Michael Redstone, chairman and his son, Sumner M., president, Northeast Theater Corp. \$5,000 each, plus \$1,500 from Edward Redstone, Sumner's brother.<sup>38</sup>

TABLE B  
MAJOR JEWISH CONTRIBUTIONS  
TO MUSKIE

Alex Abraham, New York	\$5,000
Joe Alperson, Beverly Hills, California	12,500
Alex Jean Benjamin, New York	18,750
Soloman Baker, Beverly Hills, California	10,000
Irving Blum, Baltimore, Maryland	6,000
B. Gerald Cantor, Beverly Hills, California	5,000
Norman Cousins, New York	15,000
Sidney Factor, Beverly Hills, California	5,500
Joseph Fliner and Sons, New York	32,000
Edward Ginsberg, Cleveland	5,000
Billy Goldberg, Houston, Texas	10,000
Mr. and Mrs. Bram Goldsmith, Beverly Hills, California	5,500
Charles Goldstein, Miami, Florida	5,000
Stanley Goldstein, Providence, R.I.	5,000
Mr. and Mrs. Sanford Greenberg, Washington, D.C.	5,000
Malcolm Hecht Jr. Watertown, Mass.	5,000
Jerald Hoffberger, Baltimore, Maryland	6,000
David Karr, Paris	5,000

Howard Koven, Chicago, Ill.	5,000
David Kreeger, Washington, D.C.	10,000
Frederick and Paula Dietz Morgan, New York	16,000
Harold L. Perlman, Chicago, Ill.	32,000
Mr. and Mrs. Arnold Picker, Golden Beach, Florida	39,893
Lionel Pincus, New York	5,000
Mrs Ralph Pomeronce, Cos, Cos, Conn.	25,000
Edward Piszek, Philadelphia	10,000
Sumner Redstone, Boston, Mass.	5,000
Arnold Saltzman, New York	5,232.63
Walter Shoreinstein, San Francisco, California	5,000
Philip Shaneddling, Beverly Hills, California	7,500
Charles Smith, Washington, D.C.	5,000
Al-A Stienberg, New York	5,000
Sydney Stein Jr. Chicago, Illinois	10,000
Mrs. Leonard Sperry, Beverly Hills, California	5,000
Joseph Sinay, Los Angeles	12,000
Laurence Tisch, New York	5,000
Preston Tisch, New York	5,000
Paul Ziffern, Malibu, California	5,000
Jay and Sellig Zises, New York	11,000
Alvin Zises, Newton, Mass.	7,978

Source : The Washington Post, March 28, 1972, page A-10.  
The New York Times, March 28, 1972, page 26.  
The New York Times, August 9, 1972, page 18.

The former editor of *Saturday Review*, Norman Cousins contributed \$15,000 to the Muskie Campaign. And Frederick Morgan, editor of the *Hudson Review* and a member of the Princeton University faculty, and his wife, Paula Dietz Morgan, together donated \$16,000. Other Jewish donors of note included Lionel Pincus who



gave \$5,000 and Mrs. Ralph Pomeronce \$25,000.

Harold Perlman, a Jewish businessman from Wilmette, Illinois, contributed \$32,000. Prior to Muskie's withdrawal from active campaigning in the primaries, Perlman told Muskie that he, "is prepared to appropriate \$100,000 for the... purpose of helping you to be nominated and elected."<sup>39</sup> Perlman is one of the largest stock holders of Westinghouse (165,000 shares), which operates in Israel. The Muskie list also included prominent Jews who are actively working for Israel: Laurence Tisch, co-chairman of the Greater New York United Jewish Appeal; David Kreeger of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, (AIPAC); and Charles Smith of AIPAC; Irving Blum, who headed the committee that developed the Institute for Jewish Living of the Council of Jewish Federations; Edward Ginsburg, Cleveland National Chairman of the Joint Distribution Committee; Jerold C. Hoffberger of AIPAC; and top officials of the Jewish Telegraphic Agency. Others are: Mrs. Leonard Sperry, whose husband served as chairman of the board of Scientific Data Systems (XEROX) which has a subsidiary in Israel; and Robert Benjamin, listed as a trustee and chairman of the Executive Committee of the American Israel Cultural Foundation.

Joseph Filner is a fund-raiser for the United Jewish Appeal. American Jews are playing an important role in the financing of Senator McGovern's campaign for the presidency against Richard Nixon. One of his largest financial backers is Max Palevsky. Palevsky has given McGovern, since January 1, 1972, \$434,000 in gifts and loans before the Democratic Convention.<sup>40</sup>

Palevsky is the largest stockholder in XEROX. He is also listed as chairman of

the board of Scientific Data Systems, Israel Limited, a subsidiary of XEROX in Israel.

"Everytime we notify him we're selling Israel bonds," a spokesman in Los Angeles for the Israel Bond Organization said, "he replies 'I'll send you a check.' And soon a letter comes from him, not with a pledge, but a check for \$100,000 or so."<sup>41</sup> The United Jewish Appeal also is not ignored by Palevsky.

The second largest donor to the McGovern campaign is Miles Rubin, an industrialist from Los Angeles. So far he has given over \$150,000 of his money on behalf of McGovern.<sup>42</sup> The third largest contributor is Henry Kimelman, a Washington, D.C. distributor of major imports in the Virgin Islands and an owner of the Virgin Island Hilton. He is chairman of the McGovern National Finance Committee and himself has given more than \$59,000 in gifts and \$100,000 more in loans.<sup>43</sup>

Kimelman says that his fund drive will generate \$5 million to \$10 million going into the fall campaign and \$30 to \$35 million in all.<sup>44</sup> Other major donors include a loan of \$50,000 from Max Factor III;<sup>45</sup> and gifts from Charles Seibel, \$12,500; Frank Towbin, \$14,995; Abner Levine, \$6,875; Edgar Bronfman, \$5,000; Fred Epstein, \$6,000; Mr. and Mrs. Bernard Robin, \$10,000; Jack Holtzman, \$5,000; Louis Wolfson, \$5,000; Norbert Kriegel, \$10,000;<sup>46</sup> and Bernard Weissboured, \$7,000 in gifts and \$50,000 in loans.<sup>47</sup> It is to be pointed out that there were many prominent Jews who gave under \$5,000. Many Jews who are prominent in show business are also raising money such as Barbara Streisand.

Also giving active support to Senator McGovern is Martin Peretz, a 33 year old assistant professor at Harvard, who said

he has given \$25,000. He has further pledged eventual contributions reaching \$250,000<sup>47</sup> a Peretz was one of many Jewish professors who signed a statement saying that Zionism is a movement of national liberation. Another Jewish millionaire who is raising funds for McGovern is Morris Dees, a lawyer from Alabama. He expects to raise \$250,000.

Other loans from Jewish contributors include: \$150,000 from John Tishman, New York City builder, and probably \$200,000 combined from Howard Metzenbaum and Alva Bonda from Cleveland.<sup>48</sup> Howard Metzenbaum is a leader of the Israel Bond Organization from Ohio.

It was reported that on May 1, 1972, Mr. and Mrs. Jack Kaplan of New York, raised \$1 million in gifts and pledges for McGovern at a session in their Park Avenue apartment. Among those who attended the session, or those whose pledges were announced in their absence, was: Joan Palevsky, former wife of Max Palevsky, who gave \$50,000.<sup>49</sup>

On the other hand, many Jews are defecting to Nixon because they are worried about McGovern's foreign and economic policies. The defection of rich Jews to Nixon will be discussed further in this study.

McGovern contributors who are known for their dedication to Israel are Charles Smith of AIPAC, who gave \$2,100.<sup>50</sup> There is also Myer Feldman, who gave \$1000<sup>51</sup> and served as a counselor to President Kennedy and, "who was the guiding force in the decision that sent the first substantial American military aid to Israel—the hawk missiles shipped over in 1963. Feldman once pressed so hard on an issue having to do with a graveyard in the part of Jerusalem then held by Jordan, that he triggered what he regarded as a possible threat of resi-

gnation from Secretary of State Dean Rusk.<sup>52</sup>

Frank Lautenberg, first Vice-President of the American Friends of Hebrew University, Inc., is also a major fund-raiser for Israeli educational institutions. Abner Levine is also a fund-raiser for Israel and McGovern.

There are Jewish fund-raisers and backers in the Republican Party. "What makes Jewish fund-raisers stand out so prominently among the Democrats is not so much a conspicuous presence of Jews as a conspicuous absence of Protestants."<sup>53</sup>

For example, in the New York's Harmonie Club, the oldest and most exclusive Jewish men's clubs, as many local members in 1968 gave \$500 or more to the Republicans as did to the Democrats. At the Standard Club—the Harmonie's equivalent in Chicago, twenty-three resident members gave \$43,000 to the Democrats and eleven gave \$35,000 to the Republicans.<sup>54</sup>

In 1960, there were sixty known Republican contributors of \$10,000 or more and only 10 per cent of these were Jewish.<sup>55</sup>

In this election, many traditional Democratic fund-raisers will be supporting Nixon. This is due to Nixon's decision to supply Israel with U.S. phantom jets and the ending of Rogers attempts for Israeli withdrawal from Sinai.<sup>56</sup>

This shift was signaled when Vice-President Spiro Agnew was invited as a speaker to the 62nd annual banquet of the Religious Zionists of America in early June and the Democrats were spurned.

Jack Fishbein, editor and publisher of *The Sentinel*, a weekly Jewish newspaper published in Chicago believes that some of the hardest political blows struck against McGovern among Jews came from Sena-

tors Humphrey and Henry Jackson during the bitter series of Democratic presidential primaries.

"The Humphrey ads in the Jewish press during the California primary unquestionably have had a very strong effect," said Fishbein. "They were much rougher than the Republicans would ever use on the same issue."<sup>57</sup>

Fishbein adds, "You also have to remember that for a long time we have been told by Israelis at our Israel Bond meetings that the Nixon administration has done more for Israel in terms of aid than any other administration. I think that's registered with a lot of Jewish voters."<sup>58</sup>

Moreover, the Israeli ambassador to the United States indicated that he would favor President Nixon's reelection this year.

"We have to differentiate between aid in the form of action and aid in the form of words," Rabin said.<sup>59</sup> "While we appreciate support in the form of words we are getting from one camp, we must prefer support in the form of deeds we are getting from the other camp."<sup>60</sup>

Rabin also said that no other president had made such a far-reaching statement committing the United States to support Israel's existence as the declaration made by President Nixon in his address to Congress upon his return from Moscow.

Israel is very satisfied with Nixon. "During the four years of the Nixon administration, Israel will have received more than \$1,178 million in total assistance, including loans and grants. That is more than Israel received in assistance during the previous nineteen years."<sup>61</sup> Moreover, Senator Javits says that Nixon will soon transfer the American embassy from Tel

Aviv to Jerusalem.<sup>62</sup> Personal letters of support from traditional pro-Democratic Jewish leaders have gone to Nixon from Sam Rothberg and Louis Boyar of the Israel Bond Organization. Boyar told the *Jerusalem Post*: "I am working to try and re-elect President Nixon. I make no secret of it."<sup>63</sup>

According to columnists Evans and Novak, "It is inconceivable that this shift would occur without the blessing of the Israeli government."<sup>64</sup> Although the Israeli government and its Ambassador in Washington have denied that they favor the re-election of Nixon, columnist Stewart Alsop says, "It is, of course, true."<sup>65</sup> Alsop attributes Israel's support for Nixon stems from the fact that during the fighting in Jordan in September of 1970 between the Jordanian army and Fedayeen, Israel's ambassador, Rabin, received a call from the White House. What could the Israelis do to halt the Syrian tanks that were moving into Jordan to assist the Fedayeen? Rabin replied that the Israelis were absolutely confident that their own forces, operating from the Golan Heights, could capture or destroy the entire Syrian force. The Israelis were willing to take the risks involved on condition only that the American government make it clear to the Soviets that the U.S. would vigorously oppose any counteraction at the Suez Canal or elsewhere. Nixon unhesitatingly made a commitment to Israel to that effect. From then on, Nixon issued a stern order—absolutely no communication with Moscow or any other capital. There would be, deeds but not words.<sup>66</sup> One of the five U.S. divisions stationed in Germany was put on full alert, and so was the elite 82nd Airborne Division in the U.S. At the same time secret arrangements were made with the Greek government to provide staging areas and

base support in case of a move by U.S. troops.

Moreover, the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean was heavily reinforced with aircraft carriers and their attendant task force. The sixth fleet was rapidly built up from its normal on-station strength to no less than five carrier task forces. This formidable task force began to redeploy toward the eastern Mediterranean. This action on the part of Nixon was done in total secrecy. The American people were and for the most part are still unaware that an immensely dangerous crisis had taken place. The Israeli government was aware of the crisis and extremely happy about Nixon's move.

The 1970 crisis underlined to the Israelis the need for a powerful U.S. fleet in the Mediterranean. Under the McGovern program, the U.S. will maintain not five but only two divisions in Europe. Furthermore, McGovern wants to reduce the U.S. carrier task forces from 14 to 6. Finally, McGovern would cut all U.S. aid to the Greek regime and close all American installations in Greece.<sup>67</sup> Stewart Alsop writes: "In such circumstances—as the Israelis are well aware—the United States would be capable of words—but precious few deeds."<sup>68</sup> Peter Grose of the *New York Times* states: "The Israeli preference arises from the President's strong anti-Soviet stance in the Middle East and from his policy in pursuing the Vietnam war. Over the years, politically sensitive Israelis have not hesitated to differ over Vietnam with liberal Americans.

"The mood of this country (Israel) is hawkish, and the Israeli viewpoint is one of a powerful nation standing for a small ally—a policy with obviously strong attraction for Israelis."<sup>69</sup> The reason most frequently given for this change of heart

among American Jews is Israel. "As an issue, Israel is primordial"<sup>70</sup> says Rita Hauser, a Nixon campaign director in New York City. The concern in the Jewish community goes well behind McGovern's foreign policy. Equally important to rich and non-rich Jews is McGovern's tax program of heavily taxing the rich and his support of busing and "Scatter housing" for poor blacks in suburban areas as Forest Hills, New York.<sup>71</sup>

'American Jews are becoming more conservative, more ethnic if you will. The move to the suburbs is a factor, but so is the disillusionment with certain actions of the New Left. Much of it is directly connected to the pro-Arab statements by members of the New Left, and some Jews are asking themselves, 'Where are the Blacks?' 'Where are the liberals?' They have decided to become more concerned about their interests. The matter of the Jewish poor, for example.

"For these reasons, McGovern may just be the wrong man in the wrong place at the wrong time," explains Judah Graubart, a McGovern delegate from Chicago who is employed by a national Jewish Service Agency.<sup>72</sup>

Democratic leaders, writes Columnist Thomas Braden, have linked Israel's ambassador in Washington, Rabin, with a \$5 million fund-raising effort in the American Jewish community on behalf of President Nixon's re-election. Leader of the drive which has been completed is Louis Boyar, Los Angeles builder and long time contributor to Democratic causes.<sup>73</sup>

Max Fisher, a leading fund-raiser for Israel and Nixon said that "substantial amounts" of Jewish money that previously went to Democratic candidates are flowing into Nixon campaign funds.<sup>74</sup>

Fisher has declined to use figures, but he said that he had already raised "three times as much" money from Jewish contributors so far this year as he did in all of 1968. "There is simply no comparison," he said. "My work has never been easier."<sup>75</sup> *Time Magazine* estimates that Fisher has already collected \$3,000,000 toward a goal of \$5,000,000.<sup>76</sup>

Lou Boyar invited Fisher and 45 of his wealthy Democratic Jewish friends to his Beverly Hills home in May to raise money for Nixon. When the meeting was over, Fisher said, "all but a handful" pledged contributions to Nixon. A week after Mr. McGovern's nomination, Boyar gave President Nixon \$10,539.<sup>77</sup>

Similar fund-raising sessions have been held around the country, and the response so far, according to Fisher has been "excellent."<sup>78</sup> During the month of July, Henry Kissinger spoke to Jewish businessmen in New York and Beverly Hills who are traditionally democrats and at present deeply apprehensive about McGovern's position on Israel and economic policy.

On July 26, Kissinger addressed 65 very rich Jewish Democrats in New York City. This was the final stage of Nixon's successful roundup of Humphrey's political contributors.

The key Nixon fund-raisers in hastening this mass defection are five Jewish millionaires.

Max Fisher; Gustave Levy, a Wall Street financier; Taft Schreiber, of Music Corporation of America; Ted Cummings, former owner of Giant Food Markets, Inc.; and Bernard Lasker of Wall Street.

Some of the Jewish defectors include John Factor, Gene Klein, Stanley Beyer (Pennsylvania Life Insurance Co.), and

Stanley Goldblum, (Equite Funding). In addition, Victor Carter, a west coast Jewish millionaire and a Zionist who supported Jackson for the Presidency.<sup>79</sup> Other Jewish millionaires who signed up for the Nixon campaign are Mehsulam Riklis, Charles Bassine and Arthur Cohen.<sup>80</sup>

Jewish community leaders are backing Nixon under the banner of a new group called Concerned Citizens for the Re-Election of President Nixon—a euphemism for Nixon's men with Jewish voters. The two co-chairmen of Nixon's Jewish operation are former Democratic fund-raiser William Wexler, the former chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, and Samuel Rothberg, the current chairman of the Israel Bond drive. Other members of the Nixon operation include Herschel Schacter, past chairman of the American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry and religious Zionists of America; and Rabbi Seymour Siegel, theology professor at the Jewish Theological Seminary of America. The adoption of a strong plank on Israel, Soviet Jews, and the Republican opposition to the "quota" or "proportional representation" system will undoubtedly bring *Nixon more Jewish* votes.

Jewish delegates and alternates at the Republican Party's convention aggregate 71 or less than three percent of the 2696 representatives from all parts of the United States. This percentage is almost in precise proportion to the Jews—an estimated six million—in the country's total population of 210 million. Jewish representatives at the Democratic Party's convention totaled "300-plus", according to that party's national committee, of the 3018 delegates and alternates or about 10 percent.

In both Republican and Democratic convention, and especially among the De-

mocrats, some states allowed representatives half or even quarter votes. Thus, percentages on proportions derived from a delegate and alternate list prepared by the party's "Jewish Vote Division" and made available to the *Jewish Telegraphic Agency* by Mrs. Esther Weinrott, the sculptor and wife of Judge Leo Weinrott of Philadelphia. Mrs. Weinrott, who is co-chairman with Mrs. John Eisenhower of the "Pledges to the President" organization in Pennsylvania, and Mrs. Roslyn Levit, also of Philadelphia, and a leader in the Pennsylvania committee to re-elect the President.

Almost exactly half of the states—24—have Jews among their delegates. New York State with 20 out of 176 delegates and alternates has the highest number. Pennsylvania with eight out of 120 is second. Arizona, Connecticut, New Jersey have four each. Massachusetts, Illinois and Texas have three each.

Michigan, Missouri and Oklahoma have two and Alaska, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, West Virginia each have one. While few of the Jewish Republicans among the delegates hold national prominence, many are outstanding in state and local politics. Thus, for example, the three Massachusetts Jewish members are Frank Freedman who is Mayor of Springfield; Mrs. Rosalind Brooker, a lawyer who is the only woman member of New Bedford's City Council and a state committeewoman, and Mrs. Aileen H. Belford, of Fall River, who is also a lawyer and a state committeewoman, who was for seven years assistant attorney general of Massachusetts.

The Missouri delegation's chairman is Lawrence K. Roos, the chief executive of St. Louis County. Alfred J. Fleischer, also

of St. Louis, is the state party's finance chairman. The vice-chairman of the Minnesota delegation is Rudy Boschwitz a national GOP committeeman.

Among Connecticut's representatives is Julius M. Wilensky, the Mayor of Stamford. Arizona's group includes Republican state Chairman Harry Rosenzweig and state finance chairman Burton Bruglick. A Kentucky delegate is Theodore H. Lavit, a lawyer from Lebanon who is a county chairman. Michigan sent Alfred A. May, head of Michigan's first Congressional district, and David Laro, of Flint, a county chairman. Mrs. Sari Reingolf of Henrietta, Oklahoma, near Tulsa, leads Oklahoma's second Congressional district.

Perhaps the leading Jewish figure in the Republican convention organization is Mrs. Ellie Selig of Seguin, Texas, chairman of the all-important credentials committee. She is deputy state chairman of Texas, where she has been living for 27 years. Mrs. Selig, a native of Spring Valley, N.Y., is the wife of Marvin Selig. "I'm just a housewife," Mrs. Selig modestly told JTA. Martin Feldman, a New Orleans lawyer, is secretary of the Louisiana delegation.

Besides those already named as convention participants, some Jews holding state or municipal offices who are representing their states at the convention include: Philadelphia District Attorney Arlen Specter, New York State Senator Roy B. Goodman, Pennsylvania State Senator Robert Rovner, Phillip D. Kaltenbacher of the New Jersey Legislature and Robert F. Silverstein, of the Charleston, W. Virginia city council who is president of the city's Jewish Federation.

California's sole Jewish representative is Albert Spiegel, a Beverly Hills lawyer. Ohio's only Jewish delegate is Saul G.

Stillman, a state committeeman and chairman of the county board of electors which embraces Cleveland. Alaska's delegation includes Moe Kadish, who left Los Angeles four years ago to establish a lady's retail clothing store in Anchorage and is now the party's state finance chairman. Alaska has only 190 Jewish souls. From Nebraska is Dr. B.N. Greenberg, a physician who was formerly a member of the Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska at Lincoln.<sup>81</sup>

The Republican party's Middle East plank declares:

"We firmly support the right of all persons to emigrate from any country, and we have consistently upheld that doctrine. We are fully aware of and share the concern of many citizens for the plight of Soviet Jews with regard to their freedoms and emigration.

We support the right of Israel and its courageous people to survive and prosper in peace. We have sought a stable peace for the Middle East and helped to obtain a cease-fire which contained the tragic conflict. We will help in any way possible to bring Israel and the Arab states to the conference table, where they may negotiate a lasting peace. We will continue to act to prevent the development of a military imbalance which would imperil peace in the region and elsewhere by providing Israel with support essential for her security, including aircraft, training and modern and sophisticated military equipment, and also by helping friendly Arab governments and peoples, including support for their efforts to diminish their dependence on outside powers.

We support programs of economic assistance to Israel pursued by President Nixon that have helped her achieve a 9 per

cent annual economic growth rate. This and the special refugee assistance ordered by the President have also helped to provide resettlement for the thousands of immigrants seeking refuge in Israel.

We will maintain our tactical forces in Europe and the Mediterranean area at adequate strength and high levels of efficiency. The irresponsible proposals of our political opposition to slash the defense forces of the United States—specifically, by cutting the strength of our fleet, by reducing our aircraft carriers from 16 to six and by unilateral withdrawals from Europe—would increase the threat of war in the Middle East and gravely menace Israel. We flatly reject these dangerous proposals."<sup>82</sup>

Despite the fact that the Democratic party platform is more pro-Israel than the Republican one, many Jewish newspapers in the United States opted for the Republican plank.

For example, the *Jewish Week* stated:

"The Democratic plank is briefer, terser, and on its face, more vigorously pro-Israel. The Republican plank is more circumspect with reference to Russia and the Arab nations, but it is just as reassuring to friends of Israel and rests on a record of performance that is highly pleasing to Israel.

Despite surface appearance, and judged in the context of the past, we prefer the Republican plank. Although this plank desists from mentioning Russia as the source of Israel's insecurity and shows some concern for Arab sensibilities, it is clear enough in its pronouncements of support for Israel's right to live in security and to negotiate with her neighbours free from outside pressure. The commitments to fur-

nish Israel with military deterrent power are sufficient in both planks, but the Republican plank fails to meet the Democratic proposal in its recognition of Jerusalem as the nation's rightful capital. The Republican plank gains from the context of past performance, while the Democratic plank suffers from the context of past doubts and misgivings concerning Senator McGovern and some of his more leftist supporters. The Republican platform reads like the statement of an administration that wishes to avoid overstatement of a resolute intention, while the Democratic plank seems tailored to overcome a reputation for lukewarmness toward Israel."<sup>83</sup> Because of Nixon's strong support of Israel, many political analysts predict Jewish defection to President Nixon, in a race with McGovern, will range from 30 to 50 per cent, with 35 a good average.<sup>84</sup>

Rabbi Elkanah Schwartz, director of Community Relations at the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America, has predicated that more than half of the New York Jewish Community will support Mr. Nixon. Rabbi Schwartz felt that most Orthodox Jews did not support McGovern's anti-Vietnam policies.

Rabbi Harold Hahn of Rochdale Temple, Cincinnati, thought Jewish voters "feel safer with Nixon than McGovern." Both these Rabbis agreed that the Jewish voters would be thinking, "In Nixon we know what we have, in McGovern we don't know what we'll get."<sup>85</sup>

Thus, a switch of Jewish voters this November to Nixon could make his election a cinch.

Richard Cohen, who heads Mr. McGovern's Jewish Unit, said that before the Senator can persuade Jews of his ability to deal with other issues he must first over-

come "a residue of doubt" about McGovern's attitude toward Israel and Soviet Jewry.<sup>86</sup> Acknowledging that he has a "Jewish problem in New York," Senator McGovern on August 30, 1972, urged an audience of Rabbis and their families to "judge me today and in the weeks ahead on the basis of what the opposition says, or prints, or whispers." "My commitment to Israel is a moral commitment that began with my entry into public life in 1957, the first year I was in Congress." "In contrast", he continued, "the Administration's commitment has been an instrument largely of power politics that really began with the Soviet military build-up in the Mediterranean." "I was not the president who imposed the long and dangerous delay in the shipment of phantom jets and other vital arms to Israel. I was not part of an Administration that voted with the Soviet-Arab bloc to condemn Israel five times in the United Nations over the last five years... It was not I who tried to impose a big-power settlement on the Middle East."<sup>87</sup>

With regard to Soviet Jews, McGovern said that if he had gone to a summit meeting in Moscow, as Mr. Nixon did, "I would have told the Russian leaders, in the strongest possible terms, how deeply the American people feel about the Soviet Jewish struggle, and that should have been done."

While he was in Moscow, McGovern said: "The President apparently concurred in the Russian view that this is an internal matter."

Since the summit meeting, McGovern declared, there has been a deterioration in the situation faced by Soviet Jews. Their plight, he said, "was not an internal matter, any more than what was going on in Germany in 1930 was an internal matter."<sup>88</sup>



## Conclusion

There is no question that the forthcoming presidential election will witness a slow but decisive change in the political outlook and behavior of American Jews tending toward a shift from the Democrats to the Republicans. Nixon will get more Jewish money and votes.

Calculating the returns on political investments is difficult. Yet it is clear that Jews play a major role in determining the Democratic party's presidential candidate and "form the biggest contingent among the biggest donor."<sup>89</sup>

According to the Jewish author and critic, T.R. Fyvel, "It is obvious that Israel as we know it could not have come into being without American financial help and

the political support of American Jewry as a unique pressure group on any U.S. Administration."<sup>90</sup>

Stephen Klaidman of the *Washington Post* writes that the information brought before the President and members of Congress by individual Jews and Jewish lobbying organizations "make up part of the input, and sometimes an important part, that goes into a Presidential decision on such matters as economic and military aid to Israel."<sup>91</sup>

Finally, the influence of American Jews on U.S. politics was aptly put by *Time magazine*: "No presidential candidate, for example, would risk the hostility of the nation's Jewish voters—and wealthy Jewish contributors—by even hinting that his affection for Israel was less than total."<sup>92</sup>

## NOTES

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(2) *Washington Post*, June 28, 1972, page A-15.

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(4) *New York Times*, March 10, 1972, page 20.

(5) *Ibid.*

(6) *New York Times*, March 10, 1972, page 20.

(7) *Ibid.*

(8) *New York Times*, April 19, 1972, page 28.

(9) *Washington Post*, June 5, 1972, page A-21.

(10) *Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Daily News Bulletin*, May 30, 1972, page 4.

(11) *Ibid.*

(12) *Washington Post*, June 1, 1972, page F-1.

(13) *New York Times*, June 10, 1972, page 12.

(14) *Ibid.*

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(16) *Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Daily News Bulletin*, July 14, 1972, page 4.

(17) *Jewish Week*, July 20, 1972, page 2.

(18) *Washington Post*, February 20, 1972, page A-4.

(19) *National Journal*, May 13, 1972, page 805.

(20) *Washington Post*, November 14, 1972, page B-1.

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(22) *Ibid.*

(23) A. William Donhoff, 'Fat Cats and Democrats,' *Ramparts*, June, 1972, page 28.

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(25) *Ibid.*

(26) *Ibid*, page 42.

(27) *Ibid.*

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(30) Newsweek, December 13, 1972, page 29.

(31) Wall Street Journal, March 8, 1972, page 1.

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(36) Washington Post, March 28, 1972, page A-10.

(37) *Ibid.*

(38) *Ibid.*

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(40) New York Times, September 6, 1972, page 33.

(41) Jewish Post and Opinion, August 25, 1972, page 5.

(42) New York Times, August 23, 1972, page 29.

(43) Washingtonian, August, 1972, page 41.

(44) Los Angeles Times, June 6, 1972, page 3.

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(47) Jewish Week, March 2, 1972, page 1. Wall Street Journal, September 1, page 8.

(47a) Washington Post, September 8, 1972, page A-23. New York Times, August 23, 1972, page 29.

(48) Wall Street Journal, September 1, 1972, page 8.

(49) National Journal, May 13, 1972, page 800.

(50) Jewish Week, March 2, 1972, page 1.

(51) New York Times, March 30, 1972, page 32.

(52) New York Times Magazine, November 7, 1971, pages 88-89.

(53) *Ramparts*, June, 1972, page 43.

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(62) Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Daily News Bulletin, July 11, 1972, page 2.

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(83) Jewish Week, August 31, 1972, page 8.

(84) Washington Post, June 28, 1972, page A-15.

(85) Jewish Chronicle, July 21, 1972, page 8.

(86) New York Times, August 31, 1972, page 1.

(87) New York Times, August 31, 1972, pages 1 and 24.

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Urīd an Aqtul  
(I Want to Kill)  
a Play by Tawfiq al-Hakim  
Translated and Introduced By

Mohammed Bakir Alwan

Introduction

Al Ḥakīm is one of the most, if not the most, important Arab playwright of this century. His plays are numerous and varied. Most of them, certainly the most significant ones, belong to the "Theater of Ideas," which was developed by such dramatists as Ibsen, George Bernard Shaw and Galsworthy. *I Want to Kill* (Urīd an Aqtul) belongs to that genre. Al-Ḥakīm included it in his collection *Masrah al-Mujtamāʿ*, a title which, perhaps, can be best rendered into English as "The Theater of Social Life." By this title, one is led to believe that the plays in this volume deal with social problems encountered by real

people or at least with problems whose existence is possible in a daily or communal life. To a certain extent the plays do deal with some aspects of social life, and the title is, consequently, justified. On another level, *I Want to Kill* is somewhat remote from day-to-day living; its place can be localized in the psychological and, perhaps, in the philosophical domain.

*I Want to Kill*, is subtitled *min wahy al-nafs al-bashariyyah* (From the Realm of the Human Soul), which is quite appropriate. *I Want to Kill* is a study of the act of killing as it is unfolded by both the psy-

chology of the killer and the killed during and just before the act is committed. Obviously, al-Ḥakīm is not interested in violence on the stage; almost all his plays lack any act of violence. But, he is extremely interested in the question of life and death. In fact, his best plays are in one way or another a study of that perplexing question. *Ahl al-Kabf* (The People of the Cave) deals with the question of resurrection, *Yā Tali' al-Shajarah* (Tree-Climber) can be read on many levels; on the factual level, it is a study of a murder committed in order to fertilize a four-fruit-bearing tree with the murdered body; on the psychological level it is a study of an old theme; the war between the sexes; on the philosophical level, it is a study of the constant conflict between materialism and spiritualism; *I Want to Kill* deals with the same question but from a different angle.

The first thing to be observed about the play is that the would-be murderess is insane, so far as we can tell, at the time she wanted to commit the murder. This, it seems, is a very crucial fact in the play. It can be assumed, therefore, that when someone decides to extinguish someone else's life he must be, at that time, mad, and the act of murdering is an insane act. The second fact to be observed is that although Sihām is an intelligent, pious, educated and compassionate young girl, her mother's middle class mores and morals have stifled her ability to love, and so left the door of savage animalistic instinct wide open. Sihām tells the frightened old couple that she is often seized by this horrible mood, her lust to kill, and that she has no other alternative but to kill to relieve her inward dammed-up feelings. As soon as Sihām pulls the trigger she is completely relieved of her burden and immediately regains her composure. In other words killing is a di-

rect result of an animalistic instinct residing in each individual unleashed by an imbalance of the psychological constituents of the human soul. There is a chain reaction incessantly at work within Sihām's psyche; a basic imbalance triggers the inner destructive force in her which results in temporary madness, which, in turn, results in lust for murder.

Al-Ḥakīm is very skillful in building the character of Sihām. Intent on killing, she slowly reveals her inner-self piecemeal; and at the same time conducting herself in a reasonable, controlled and objective manner. By doing so, she facilitates the action of the play and builds up a slowly rising tension between the married couple themselves.

At first the couple are shown to be peaceful, withdrawn, loving and faithful unto death to each other. As soon as death steps in in the form of an insane girl, a cloud of uneasiness sets into their lives. A moment ago they claimed they would die for each other, now neither wants to die. Gradually the cloud darkens, and ultimately their mutual trust creaks, cracks and crumbles. What does this mean? What conclusions can we draw from the breakdown of human love and understanding?

The old couple *vis à vis* death have as much lust for life as the young girl's for murder. It is true that they are old but their instinct to live is strong enough to sweep aside long companionship, friendship and even the strongest of human bonds—love. Man, al-Ḥakīm seems to tell us, is weak, terribly weak. Yet, when the salesman comes back for his pen, the couple, who have, just now, each wished to send the other to die first, using such base means as lying, unite to sentence the salesman to death in order to save their skins. The burden of

death appears to debase man and to drag his finest emotions into mire.

There is a parallel in the psychological process experienced by the murderer and the murdered. From the beginning of the play we are given to understand that the old couple are timid, apprehensive and fearful; death seems to be hanging over their heads just like Damocles' sword. Obsessed with the idea of death, each overtly fears for the other's death, but covertly fears for his own. It is this disproportionate fear of the future, of the unknown, of the other world that cuts a dichotomy into their lives, resulting in an imbalance between their ideals as a happily married couple and their reality which is overburdened with premonitions, apprehension and timidity. No small wonder, therefore, that no sooner than the death-incarnate Sihām appears on the stage than their ideals falter, fall and vanish; a struggle to ward off death ensues. Clinging to life with all their might, they both use whatever ammunition they have: begging, beseeching, tears and lies in order to prolong their lives even for a short while. But death is, ostensibly, imminent, and so they are seized by a temporarily degrading, blinding and paralyzing mood, just as Sihām, urged by her "inner voice" to kill, is seized by a temporary madness. The wife, Latifah, fares worse than her husband in all of this process. After all, she is the first one to break down. Feeling the approach of death's pangs, she lies about her pregnancy, and so damns herself.

The case of the salesman is somewhat different from that of the old couple. He is absolutely terrified of Sihām, that is death, because he has cares in this world and has children whom he loves, and a wife whom he adores. Death would uproot him

from this "singing, dancing and palpitating world." He does not want to die. Why should he? Yet he would not raise a finger to defend a devoted couple. On the contrary, he tries to conspire with the wife against the husband. Nevertheless, he is the only one who provides some light moments in this grim drama. It is also because of his questions that Sihām reveals her hidden motives. Despite all this, there seems to be something foreboding about the salesman. His valuable and auspicious pen brought nothing but anxiety, suspense and fear to him. No sooner than he insures the husband's life than it becomes dearer to the husband.

It is logical that the ultimate result of this dramatic experience is the breakdown of a seemingly happy and compatible marriage. The would-be murderess does not kill, and the salesman leaves as he came only this time with one more nightmarish experience. But it is no longer the same with the old couple. Half an hour ago, they seemed perfectly happy and content; now they have irretrievably sown in their lives the seeds of mistrust. When the husband says; "You've killed our marital happiness," he means every word of it.

In *I Want to Kill*, al-Hakīm has put four people on trial for half an hour. Each one of them, at the same time, is, and is not, guilty. They are not guilty because they have not committed any crime; they are guilty because they are human, that is to say possessing a complex and unfathomable psyche, which has the potential to commit any crime. Once the four of them are put on trial, a magnificent show of dialectics unfolds itself. Each character tries, and often succeeds, in out-arguing the others, each attempts to outsmart the others, each, clinging tooth and nail to life, endea-

vors to disprove the others' conclusion. The art of dialectics is not unfamiliar to al-Ḥakīm. He was trained as a lawyer, and for a number of years he held the position of Public prosecutor in Alexandria and elsewhere in the Delta. In this play al-Ḥakīm seems to tell us that there are two concealed forces residing in the soul of man, one for good, the other for evil. For an ideal life a proper balance must be maintained between them. An imbalance is capable of unleashing the evil force. Murder is a direct result of this imbalance. He seems to tell us also that man is weak, though this is covered by his instinct to live. Man's weakness is exposed when he is placed *vis à vis* death. The noblest feeling does not reduce his craving for life, and there is no base means he is incapable of using to save his neck.

Characters:

Husband (Fu'ad)

Wife (Latifah)

Salesman for a life insurance company

Girl (Siham)

(A small reception hall of an apartment. Everything in it reflects an atmosphere of simplicity, tranquility and peace. On a table in the middle of the hall there is a small open briefcase belonging to the life insurance salesman. He is handing a contract and an ebony pen to the husband.)

Salesman: Sign here... with my ebony pen... it brings luck!

Husband: (Giving the contract a final glance.) If I die my wife will get two thousand pounds from the company?

Salesman: Immediately. As death occurs.

Husband: (Taking the pen from him.) There is my signature. (He signs the contract, puts the pen on the table and

gives the contract to the salesman.)

Salesman: (As he takes the contract.) Congratulations!

Husband: On my death?

Salesman: On the completion of the contract.

Husband: The most important thing to me is that my wife should know nothing about this insurance as long as I live. She is very sensitive and so faithful that sometimes it affects her health. Nothing worries her during the day, and keeps her awake at night more than the idea that I might die before her. She cannot imagine that this might happen one day. When such an idea crosses her mind, she cries, "May God make my day before his." I am more anxious, however, than her, and I ask God nothing but to make my day before hers!

Salesman: How wonderful! Perfect reciprocal trust!

Husband: So I am afraid she might get wind of my life insurance and become pessimistic, and frighten her.

Salesman: You may be sure that nothing will reach her from us. Guarding secrets is one of our foremost duties and specialties.

Husband: Luckily she is upstairs with some neighbors, visiting a sick girl. But if by an unlucky chance she finds you here, beware of telling her that you are a salesman for the life insurance company!

Salesman: Don't worry! Depend upon my skill!

Husband: I depend upon God, you and the company that my widow will live in affluence, prosperity, luxury and comfort.

Salesman: There is, however, a condition in the contract that if your widow... I mean wife, dies before you, you will lose all your payments even if they were thousands of pounds.

Husband: (Frightened.) Shut up! Shut up!... she dies before me... she goes before me. What is the use of my life after her? What is the value of my money? Why should I demand anything from you? Why should I think at all? Are you crazy, madman... salesman?

Salesman: Please forgive me... I only meant... to refer to an article of the contract.

Husband: That's enough! I don't want to see such a painful article.

Salesman: My skill failed me here... forgive me... I shall take care from now on. All I hope for is that you are satisfied and that God prolongs your wife's life.

Husband: And that I die before her.

Salesman: And that you die before her... and she receives the insurance money in peace and happiness. (He takes the small briefcase and is ready to leave.)

Husband: You are leaving... and I haven't offered you coffee... Please forgive us, our servant is on leave... And my wife and I are alone in the apartment... As I said before, she is upstairs with the neighbors.

Salesman: Don't bother yourself... I am always happy to be of service to you.

Husband: Remember always: my wife must not know.

Salesman: She won't... So long.

(At this moment the apartment door opens and the wife appears, and sees the salesman

going toward the door with his small briefcase.)

Wife: (To the salesman quickly.) Doctor... you are the doctor?

Salesman: (Surprised.) I?

Husband: (To the salesman quickly.) My wife... my wife.

Salesman: Madam? Ah... I'm honored, Madam.

Wife: You are, of course...

Husband: (Confused.) Yes... he is, of course.

Wife: The doctor.

Salesman: (Looking at the briefcase in his hand) Doctor?

Husband: (Winking to the salesman.) Yes... doctor... Don't worry... Don't worry... I'm in perfect health.

Wife: The doctor, of course, mistook the floor, the patient is upstairs with the neighbors... they telephoned you half an hour ago...

Husband: Go up, doctor... go up.

Salesman: I'll go up... immediately. (He walks quickly towards the door as if to escape.)

Wife: Wait, doctor... I'm warning you, don't tell the patient that you're a doctor who has come to examine her, because she doesn't think she is sick, and speaks calmly and logically. She might even refuse to see you if she knew that you are a doctor... It's better to tell her that you are... you are... something else... say, for example, you are...

Salesman: An insurance company salesman, come to insure her life.



Husband: (To salesman.) Couldn't you find something else besides that.

Wife: It doesn't matter... it doesn't matter; let him assume what he wants. The important thing is to hide the fact that he's a doctor.

Salesman: (Quickly as he leaves.) She won't know... She won't know.

Wife: Wait, doctor, wait... You'll find her alone in her room absorbed in her thoughts. She is withdrawn... living alone with her mother... doesn't go out very much, but reads a great deal. I rarely see her when I visit them. But her mother, with tears streaming down her eyes, often tells me about her strange disposition. A maid or a servant doesn't stay long with them due to constant fear for his life.

Salesman: Fear for his life?

Wife: Yes, doctor. This girl has become dangerous, though her appearance doesn't indicate that. On the contrary, you will see her beautiful, meek, gentle, polite, cultured, but no sooner than she finds herself alone with a servant than her eyes flash with a strange glitter... and she tries to stab him with the knife. If it weren't for his shouting, escaping or the appearance of the mother...

Salesman: (Frightened.) God protect us!

Wife: What do you call such cases medically, doctor?

Salesman: (Confused.) This case is called... is called..

Husband: (Quickly.) It is called undoubtedly mental imbalance or at least psychological disturbance...

Wife: (To her husband.) Let the doctor speak... He knows better about his pro-

fession. What is your opinion, doctor?

Salesman: In my opinion this is a terrible thing.

Wife: How do you diagnose it, how do you explain it, how do you cure it?

Salesman: (Confused.) In my opinion drugs now-a-days can cure anything; the pharmacies are filled with drugs, and every day a new invention comes out... diseases are disappearing... age is doubled, so that insurance companies have become...

Husband: (Whispering.) What have we got to do with insurance?

Wife: (To salesman.) The doctor means that there is a cure in this case?

Husband: (To his wife.) Do you want the doctor to speak about a case he has not examined?

Salesman: This is true... I can't speak about a case I haven't yet examined.

Wife: Forgive me, doctor... curiosity urged me to ask all these questions, and something else greater than mere curiosity... my pity for the poor mother... I must not keep you here any longer. They're waiting for you upstairs, and I hope that the girl will be cured by you.

Salesman: Thank you... Good night! (Moves as if to leave.)

Wife: Wait, doctor... be cautious with the girl. Her mother told me a moment ago that she saw in her room something like a gun.

Salesman: A gun?

Wife: Yes. The girl left this morning, the mother told me, and didn't return until noon. The mother doesn't know where her daughter brought this gun from nor for what reason.

Salesman: (Leaving quickly.) Good-bye!

Wife: Wait one moment, doctor. Do you know where the apartment is?

Salesman: (With an outburst.) No!

Wife: Come with me... I will take you upstairs and show you the apartment.

Salesman: (Frightened.) No... No... Please, I know it, I know it... I'll ask about it... No need to bother yourself.

Husband: (Holding his wife.) Yes, there's no need to bother yourself, my dear. Let the doctor go alone. You stay with me, I want to tell you something.

Wife: (To the salesman.) The apartment is right above us... on the right.

Salesman: (As he leaves, running.) I'll go down immediately... I mean I'll go up... Thank you. (Leaves quickly.)

Wife: (Turning to her husband.) Now, tell me.

Husband: What?

Wife: Didn't you say you wanted to tell me something?

Husband: Ah... I forgot... I forgot what I wanted to tell you.

Wife: Was it important?

Husband: I don't remember.

Wife: Does it concern you?

Husband: No.

Wife: Does it concern me?

Husband: No.

Wife: Then don't think about it. Anything that doesn't concern us, we two, is unimportant.

Husband: You're right, my dear. We two... the whole world... the whole universe... a soul in two bodies, a life in two persons... and this is the secret of my torment.

Wife: You too, my dear Fu'ad?

Husband: Yes, I live in constant fear. If I am afflicted you will suffer, if you are afflicted I shall die.

Wife: If affliction has to come to one of us I always prefer to be your ransom.

Husband: You'll not save me by that, because you know the result.

Wife: True, it's one soul for both of us. Neither of us can assume it for himself.

Husband: If we had children, Latifah, you would have found in them other souls, and other lives.

Wife: I'm not sorry.

Husband: Neither am I.

Wife: This one soul is enough, for both of us, we share it together and neither monopolizes it... and if it is extinguished in one...

Husband: It is extinguished in the other immediately.

Wife: That's enough, Fu'ad... Please, leave this subject alone, I already feel dizzy, the world blackens in my eye. Please, God, let my day be before his!

Husband: Please, God, don't hear her!

Wife: Don't say that! Don't say that!

Husband: Please, God, make my day before hers!

Wife: Please, God, don't hear him!

(A young, slender and well-dressed girl of eighteen comes into the apartment through the open door.)

Girl: He will not hear either!

Wife: (Taken aback.) Siham!

Husband: Who is she?

Wife: (Frightened.) The neighbor's girl.

Husband: (Whispers, trembling.) The mad girl!

Girl: (Taking a pistol from her pocket.)

Please sit in front of me, next to each other, and listen carefully to what I say. (She points with her gun to a sofa. They sit very close to each other. Fear has tied their tongues.) First of all allow me to sit on this chair in front of you. (She sits on a chair next to the table, with the table between her and the couple.) And permit me to thank the circumstances which left your apartment door open in order to provide me with this happy opportunity. (The lips of the couple tremble but say nothing. The girl continues calmly.) The question is very simple: I came to kill... to kill one of you.

Wife: (With a trembling voice.) Siham! Siham!

Girl: (Politely.) I'm sorry, I'm very sorry, but I must do that.

Wife: (Pleading.) Siham!

Girl: I'm compelled... an irresistible desire, an overwhelming force compels me to kill someone.

Wife: (With a trembling voice.) We are your neighbors, Siham. I'm a friend of your mother, you're like my younger sister, how do you have the heart to inflict evil upon us.

Girl: I don't want to inflict evil upon you. I don't think about the damage you undergo, but I do think about this voice crying inside me: Kill! Kill! Kill!

Wife: (Beseeching.) Be sensible, Siham, please, please.

Girl: I know what I'm doing. I'm in full control of my faculties.

Wife: If you knew what you were doing you wouldn't do this.

Husband: (Winking to his wife and whispering.) Don't stir her anger.

Girl: I know it's a horrible deed, but what can I do? I'm incapable of resisting it... I've tried many times to dissuade myself from it. How often I relied upon my will and wisdom to resist it and fight it. Persistent struggles took place within me, but I was finally defeated. Nothing could overcome this sweeping desire to kill, kill.

Husband: (With a trembling voice.) Miss... one word?

Girl: Okay... go ahead.

Husband: You're a refined girl. Often I used to meet you on the staircase, and greet you, and you greeted me respectfully. Do you remember?

Girl: I'm still very respectful of you.

Husband: Does it please you, to inflict harm upon us?

Girl: No, I'm not pleased, of course, but I'm compelled to do it in spite of myself. I must kill someone tonight, or go mad. The only cure for my suffering is to kill.

Husband: You want to kill someone?

Girl: Yes.

Husband: Why don't you go to the street, then, and kill the first person you meet?

Girl: I thought about that, and I was about to do it, but I found your door open, and remembered that you were alone.

Wife: Oh, what rotten luck!

Girl: Rather, how good is mine! Because the person I kill in the street would make enough commotion to gather people around him and so I couldn't reap the fruit of my deed in peace.

Husband: Is there any fruit you reap from such a deed?

Girl: Certainly. I constantly asked myself

the question: Why does the lust to kill burn so in me? The answer was: I want to know man's feeling as he dies, and the killer's as he kills. If there is prior acquaintance between the killer and the killed these feelings become clearer and the response can be seen. You are, therefore, best suited for what I want. I have just explained briefly my situation to you so that you may excuse me and help me. My cure is in the hands of one of you. I shall be grateful to the one I kill all my life. Now get ready. (She aims her gun. The couple, frightened, get closer to each other and protect themselves with their hands.)

Wife: (Shouting.) Siham!

Husband: (Pleading.) Miss!

Girl: I don't want to kill you together, because it isn't necessary, it may even spoil my purpose, and disturb my mind. I only want to kill one of you. As to the other, he will be of greater use to me, because I shall read in his face a variety of feelings which are of no less value than those of the killed.

Wife: (In a weeping voice.) Siham! My darling Siham! I have done nothing to you. We have been the best of friends and the best neighbors to you. You're dearer to me than most of my relatives. How often I wished I had a daughter like you! How often I told this to your mother, and praised your politeness, character and tenderness. Are you going to do this to us?

Girl: In spite of myself.

Husband: We're innocent, Miss. Remember you're going to shed innocent blood. We bear nothing but love for you. Are you going to attack peaceful, good and innocent people?

Girl: Yes, you are innocent, and this is exactly what I want. My desire to kill is not prompted by revenge. You are extremely good and peaceful. If you were evil or harmful, my urge to kill would be punishment. No, no, my deed has no ulterior motives, it should not have ulterior motives. It is the desire to kill for desire's sake, divorced from any ulterior motives.

Wife: Are you cruel to that extent?

Girl: You know I can't stand the cry of a hungry cat.

Wife: That's true, Siham. I heard it from your mother, and I saw you with my own eyes fasting and praying. Your heart was so torn apart by the sight of the janitor's son that you made a dress to cover his nakedness.

Husband: You have a heart like this, Miss, and yet do not pity a loving, lonely couple like us?

Wife: Didn't your mother tell you about us? Didn't she tell you that we are the most faithful couple.

Girl: I know that.

Husband: Yet you want to destroy this little family?

Girl: You haven't yet understood my view nor the state I'm in. You must know that there's a voice deep within me that overcomes my mercy and logic, overcomes your pleas and arguments. I don't give a hoot for this world with its people, its neighbors, its mercy, its logic, its proofs, its reward, its punishment, its goodness, its evil. No, no, that doesn't concern me now. All I care about at this moment is to strangle this hidden voice which keeps rising in me, a voice telling me, kill, you must kill. I must obey this voice.

Husband: This voice... didn't tell you why it asks you to do this?

Girl: No, it doesn't clarify or explain, it only orders. No doubt other people besides me have heard voices asking them to do other things, and they had to do them. Perhaps some of those things had meaning or great purpose, and thus changed the course of humanity. Yet other things had no meaning at all, and people were perplexed by its interpretation. My voice is of the latter kind. It demands something whose meaning or purpose I do not know. It's usually something evil, but I cannot refuse. I must do it. I must carry it out in order to be at peace. Do you understand? Do you know the real situation? Now, permit me to shoot. (She points her gun. The couple, frightened, retreat, and raise their arms beseeching.)

Wife: (Weeping.) You're going to do it! You're going to do it!

Girl: It's time now. I must stop talking and do it... and do it quickly.

Husband: (Shaking, beseeching.) One moment, Miss, one moment... one moment.

Girl: Be sure that there is no use in discussion, beseeching and weeping. I'm going to shoot one of you. It's settled. Which one of you? Which one of you?

Husband : (Trembling). Are you going to choose?

Girl : (As she considers them). Yes, I must choose one of you but this is not an easy job. How am I to choose and there you are huddled together like stones? Neither of you tried to escape or move... I would have shot and forgotten about choosing. But you are putting a heavy burden on my shoulder. Whom am I to choose? The wife... or the husband?

Wife : (Sobbing). Are we going to die now—We are really going to die. Have mercy upon us, God, mercy, mercy.

Husband : Oh, God, are we going to die like this... so quickly? Is it death, then? Have mercy upon us, Miss, mercy!

Girl : (As if speaking to herself). Every time you mention death, my desire to kill burns even more. It is time now. (Shouting). I hear the voice... I must kill. Which one of you? Which one? I must decide now... I must choose. Who? Who? (Perplexed she glances at one, then another, while the couple follow her glances speechless, their lips trembling with fear).

Girl : (Shouting with resolution). You, the wife. Step forward!

Wife: (Terrified). I! No, no, no!

Girl: You don't want to die?

Wife: No, no, I don't want to die.

Girl: Then let your husband step forward instead of you. Husband, step forward!

Husband : (Frightened). I? No, no, Miss, no! I beg you to let me live!

Girl : You don't want to die?

Husband : No, no, I don't... please.

Girl : This is impossible. This situation is impossible. One of you must die. I must shoot one. Who? Who? Don't leave me in this confusion ! Help me ! Aid me ! I'm going to shoot one of you haphazardly. (She aims). Let it be you, wife !

Wife: (Shouting with fear). No, no, Sihām ! Don't shoot me ! I must live ! I must live because... because... because... I'm pregnant !

Girl : Pregnant? Why didn't you tell me that before? Praise be to God who

saved you in the nick of time. Certainly, you must live... for your child. Oh, what a crime I would have committed were I to kill you with a child in your womb! You will live... Your husband must step forward !

Husband : (Shaking with fright). Miss, don't kill me, don't kill me !

Girl : (As she aims in his direction). You must be killed... No one is left but you... you are more preferable than her. It's not reasonable or acceptable that you remain alive, and your wife, who is pregnant dies.

Husband : She's not pregnant. She lies. I swear she lies.

Girl : Are you sure of that ?

Husband : I swear by every sacred oath. All the doctors assured her that she couldn't have children.

Wife : (To her husband). What a scoundrel !

Girl : (To the wife). You lie, just like that, to save your life ?

Wife : (Pointing to her husband). Rather he lies to save his life !

Girl : I seem to remember that my mother told me you were barren. In any case, I'm back again in the same confusion, not making one step forward. Neither of you wants to die, nor comes forward instead of the other. What am I to do now ? There ought to be a quick decision... Shall I just shoot at you and let the bullet hit whom it may ? (She aims at them and they protect themselves with their hands shouting).

Wife : Don't shoot, Don't shoot !

Husband : Don't shoot, Don't shoot !

Girl : I must shoot, just like this, at both of you, or you must agree upon a solu-

tion. Who of you volunteers to receive the bullet instead of his mate ? (Silence)

Girl : Is death so frightening ? Speak !

Don't you want to agree ? Listen, then what do you think of casting lots between you ? Chance alone will have its say with you. Husband, take a coin from your pocket. Each of you must choose a side, and the coin shall be thrown on the table : Heads, you live, tails, you die. (The husband takes a small coin from his pocket).

Husband: I choose heads. (He is about to throw the coin on the table).

Wife : (Holds his hand). No, don't throw, now I don't trust you any longer !

(At this moment the salesman approaches the apartment hall and knocks at the door with his fingers).

Salesman : Please, forgive me ! I forgot my ebony pen, which is a precious souvenir.

Wife : (As she sees the salesman). Doctor, save us, doctor !

Salesman : The sick girl is fine... upstairs... be at peace !

Wife : (In a whisper, winking to him and pointing to the girl). Here she is.

Girl : (Waving the gun). Is he a doctor?... Doctor, sit down quietly next to them without discussion or argument !

Salesman : (In fear). No, there's no need for discussion ! (He sits down as directed).

Girl : Now there are three of you instead of two, and this can make my problem more difficult or much easier. In any case, I have nothing to do with it... I leave it to you to make a final decision.

Salesman : What final decision ?

Girl : One of you three must die.

Salesman : (Frightened). God protect us !  
(He looks around him).

Girl : (Waving the gun). Any movement is in itself a decision which may save me the bother of choosing.

Salesman : (Firm in his seat). I am a stone statue !

Girl : Don't try to waste time. I warn you. The moment may come when I cannot control the situation and shoot haphazardly.

Wife : (Whispering). Doctor, isn't there a cure !

Salesman : (Whispering) A cure for me ? Where is it ? My blood is gone !

Wife : (Whispering). Are you going to let her kill us like that, doctor?

Husband : (With a loud voice). He's not a doctor. He's a salesman for a life insurance company.

Wife : Not a doctor ? He ?

Salesman : (To the husband whispering). Remember, your wife must not know.

Husband : (With a loud voice). Let her know, let her know. There's no reason to hide it from her anymore. The thought of my death will not terrify her, afflict her or harm her !

Wife : (To her husband). And the thought of my death. Did it move one hair of yours ?

Girl : (Shouting at them). Finally ! Finally ! You are playing with fire ! You don't seem to be able to realize that I might get impatient and commit a foolish deed in which all of you perish. I said to you I only want one of you. You must choose him. Now you are three so let the majority decide, just like what happens in courts. If two of you agree on a resolution it becomes mandate. Do

you hear ? I'm only going to stand here as an executioner. Two of you can sentence the third to death. Hurry up ! Discuss ! Give your sentence ! Quickly ! Quickly !

(The couple exchange glances).

Husband : This is reasonable.

Wife : This is just.

Husband : (Pointing to himself and his wife). We two are in agreement.

Wife : Yes, my husband and I are of the same opinion.

Girl : (Pointing at the salesman). You have sentenced him ?

Husband and Wife : Yes.

Salesman : (Shouting). They sentenced me ? To what ?

Girl : (Raising her gun). To death !

Salesman : (Raising his hands, shouting and beseeching). Madam... Miss, don't shoot, don't shoot, one word, one word, one word only.

Girl : What do you want to say ?

Salesman : (Relieved). Tell me, please, what is this sentence ? What is this court ? What is my crime ? I'm a poor man, an insurance salesman, who came here to sell life insurance, and now find myself confronted with death !

Girl : I have no time to relate the whole story to you once again. Yes, you are a poor man, and an insurance salesman...

Salesman : And a faithful husband.

Girl : And a faithful husband.

Salesman : And a father of small children.

Girl : And a father of small children whom you feed and take care of, and you have committed no crime or sin, and there's no reason for your death,

and you have done me no harm, and I bear no grudge against you. All this I know very well. Yet, I must kill.

Salesman : Oh, God ? Oh, Protector !

Girl : (As she raises her gun). Do you have anything else to say beside that ?

Salesman : -(Raising his hands). Wait, Miss, wait ! One moment, one moment !

Girl : Speak ! As you see I'm calm to an enviable degree. Speak !

Salesman : Suppose, Miss, that I was not here ?... It was my cursed ebony pen that brought me back, you know. What would you have done?

Girl : I would have killed one of the couple.

Salesman : There, suppose I am not here, and carry out your previous decision !

Girl : This is impossible, because you really are here, and the majority has sentenced you to death.

Salesman : The majority ? This wife doesn't know what is good for her. If she knew, she would have joined me against her husband, because as soon as he dies she receives two thousand pounds.

Husband : Don't take refuge in this base temptation, salesman ! Deep down you want my wife to die so that the company will get all my payments, and you undoubtedly get some commission from that.

Girl : Enough, enough ! I'm fed up with these polemics. I want fulfillment... I want deeds... I want to kill... Step forward, salesman !

Salesman : Miss, have mercy ! I kiss your two feet. Don't kill me so quickly: Spare me for another minute : Don't you know what mercy is ?

Girl : I know mercy. My heart is filled with it.

Salesman : Don't you know God?

Girl : I know God, and fast and always pray for Him.

Salesman : Don't you know love?

Girl : Love ? What do you mean?

Salesman : Love... I mean love... that which makes you live, and gives life a palpitating and dancing meaning... that which I felt when I saw my wife for the first time when she was still a girl. I thought, then, that I was living for the first time, that everything I touched became alive, that everything I saw became alive. Love is that feeling which makes people and things live.

Girl : What kind of talk is this ? I've never allowed myself, nor my mother allowed me, to give a space in my heart to feelings such as these. I'm eighteen years old but since childhood my mother has warned me about these sinful feelings which you dare to laud so much.

Salesman : Alas ! She has killed in you the love for life, and so the love for death nested in you instead.

Girl : Keep these thoughts for yourself. Anyway, you're not the one who can see what's inside of me. Who can ever know the reality of what he loves and the extent of what he loves ? Here you have a couple that was an example of trust and fidelity. How often I saw it with my own eyes and heard it from my mother.

Wife : Did I know that my husband was deceiving me like this ?

Husband : Was it I who deceived you or you who deceived me ?



Girl : Neither of you deceived the other, rather each deceived himself, since no man has descended to the bottom of his soul to see what is in it... It is like a sea with calm surface but underneath the sand is mingled with the plants, the rocks with the fish, the pearls with the scorpions. That is what the doctor told me this morning when I went to see him.

Wife : Did you go to a doctor this morning ?

Girl : Yes... One of the best psychiatrists. I had to see him today without telling any one about it, not even my mother. I went to see him about this inner voice which commands me to kill.

Wife : What did the doctor say ?

Girl : Told me to obey the voice, without opposing it or suppressing it, and to kill...

Salesman : (Shouting). He told you to kill ?

Girl : He told me that if I kill peace will descend upon me immediately, and he gave me this gun.

Salesman : He gave you a gun and told you to kill ? As simple as that ? As if he gave you an Aspirin pill and told you to swallow ?

Girl : He assured me that this is the only cure, and I must obey the doctor's orders. It will be good of you to help me get better and I shall appreciate this afterward... Step forward ! (She aims the gun at him).

Salesman : (Absent-mindedly). Afterward ? Where ? When ? While you are taking my life ? (Awakes and shouts). Don't point it at me, wait, wait !

Girl : I've waited long enough. I want to

rest, I want to rest, to take the medicine.

Salesman : To take the medicine ?

Girl : Yes... and quickly... You must be gentle and kind with me, and don't delay me from taking the cure.

Salesman : Have mercy on me ! I'm going to go mad before I die : She wants me to be gentle with her so as to put a bullet in my chest.

Girl : Yes, be kind and give me peace... give me peace ! Cure me ! Give me peace and a cure !

Salesman : (Shouting). With my death... with my blood ?

Girl : What's strange about that ? The blood of some people is a cure for others. There's nothing new about this. Please step forward so that the bullet doesn't hit any one but you. I'm going to shoot. (Points the gun).

Salesman : (Shouting with fear). Miss, have mercy upon me ! Have mercy upon my children ! (He gets closer to the couple).

Husband : (He clings to him) Get away from us ! Get away !

Salesman : (He clings to him.) Get away from you ? You're the cause of this calamity, ominous customer !

Husband : (Trying to rid himself of him). Leave me, leave me !

Salesman : (Clinging even more to him). I shall not leave you at all. Let us die together ! I shall not die alone ! What's my crime ? I enter your house to insure your life, and now the customer is saved, and I, the salesman whose life is not insured, die ?

Husband : (To his wife). Free me ! Free me from him !

Wife : How can I ? His arms are glued to you !

Husband : Try ! Make an effort ! Don't sit there like a spectator ! (They are all huddled together).

Girl : (As she watches them). Oh ! As I see it the problem has become too complicated. My time is running short, my breath is almost at a standstill, and I feel suffocated. No, no I must do it immediately to recover myself. I shall not die for you, or for anyone else. Now you are huddled together in one heap. Perhaps that solves the problem. I'm going to shoot one bullet at your huddled bodies and let it hit whom it may... every one to his chance. Here I kill one of you... anyone... kill... kill... kill... (She says this word through her teeth, her eyes glittering in a strange way. She shoots. A loud bang. The three of them fall to the ground shouting, "She killed us").

Girl : Goes toward them). Who is hit ?

Wife : (Shouting). I am... I am dead !

Husband : (Shouting). I am gone !

Salesman : (Shouting). I am in the other world ! !

Girl : Impossible. It is impossible that you are all dead... the three of you with one bullet ! Two of you at least are still living... Stand up ! Only one of you is hit. (The three of them stand up, feeling their bodies).

Girl : (As she looks at them). What is this black stuff on your faces and clothes ?

Salesman : Gunpowder smoke !

Girl : And the bullet ? Where's the bullet ? Whom did it hit ?

Husband : (As he examines his body and searches his pockets). You even ask us to search for the bullet ?

Girl : This doesn't need any search. Is there any blood ?

Wife : (As she wipes away her sweat.) Is there any blood left in us after all this ? (The salesman picks up the gun from the table, where the girl had placed it. He examines it and shouts).

Salesman : The gun was filled with nothing else but gunpowder.

Girl : (Turning to him). Are you sure ?

Salesman : (Giving her the gun). Here, look at it yourself !

Girl : This must have been the doctor's design. In any case I feel much better indeed... as if a heavy burden has been lifted from me.

Salesman : And from me too. Permit me, Miss, to leave now. God be my witness, I shall never enter this house again without insuring my life. (He carries his briefcase, picks up his ebony pen which he has forgotten on the table and leaves quickly).

Girl : (To the couple). I'm sorry that I disturbed you. Please forgive me and understand my condition. I am however, thankful to you. I feel much better now that I have fired the gun thinking that I killed someone. (She motions "good-bye" and moves towards the outside door while the wife, crestfallen, moves towards the door of her room on the right without looking at her husband).

Husband : (To the leaving girl). You have killed our matrimonial happiness.



# The Cambridge History of Islam: A Critique

A. L. Tibawi

## I

Cambridge University Press has recently been enterprising in promoting a series of works on Islam. The present history is one of these notable publications. The two volumes contain some fifty articles by some forty hands. A glance at the table of contents reveals a serious imbalance in the distribution of articles among contributors. Western writers preponderate not only in number but also in monopolising most of the key articles. As if by design Arab Muslim scholars are conspicuous by their absence.

There is a Christian Arab among the contributors, but his article is on pre-Islamic Arabia. There is also an Arabic-speaking Persian whose article is on recent political developments in the Near East. Two of the three Pakistani contributors wrote

on Islam in the Indian sub-continent and the third on modern Islamic revival. The four Turkish contributors wrote on Seljuq, Ottoman or modern Turkish history and Turco-Russian aspects. But that is all from Arab or Muslim writers. There is not a single contribution from the heartlands of Islam, where Islamic history was made. Forgotten are the scholars of such seats of Arabic and Islamic learning as Baghdad, Cairo and Damascus. Fifty years ago this omission might have been excused at least on the score of language difficulties, but there appears to be no justification for it at present. This was a missed opportunity of producing a work on Islam that is more representative and with more evidence of cooperation between occidental and oriental scholarship.

Naturally this imbalance is reflected in the content of the articles which vary in

depth, perception, accuracy and objectivity according to the accomplishments of the different writers. It is of course not possible, even if desirable, to cover more than a few of the articles in a short review. First of all let us note the disappointingly austere seven-page introduction by one of the editors, Professor Holt. It introduces very little, sums up even less and synthesises next to nothing. Yet it manages to open with the old Western prejudice that "the faith of Islam" is less "developed" than Judaism or Christianity.

## II

The same editor contributes an article on "Ottoman Rule in Egypt and the Fertile Crescent" (i, 374-93) stifled with dates and names. The first three pages, for example, are literally covered with double dates in A.H. and A.D. even for insignificant events. In addition to eleven double dates expressed in centuries these three pages have also twenty-one double dates expressed in years. The remaining space is dotted, between dates, with many and largely obscure names and but a few political facts. There is nothing on social, economic or cultural aspects of history. The writer is thus the first of the three editors to violate their dictum in the preface, that their work was not "a repository of facts, names and dates."

Nor are all his meagre facts accurate or accurately expressed. Thus on page 383 it is asserted that the books translated under Muhammad 'Ali Pasha in the 1830s were one of the principal channels by which "European culture was communicated to the Near East." Equally inaccurate, but not less fantastic, is the other assertion that the Pasha's schools provided "Western education." Another inaccuracy is the result of

the misuse of English. The Ottoman sultan certainly did not "cede" Syria to his vassal; he merely appointed him as its governor thereby validating the vassal's conquest. It is also mistaken to repeat (p. 384) the old and now discredited story that the civil war in Lebanon in 1860 was a "massacre" of Christians by Druzes or that the local Ottoman authorities connived at it.

The writer is certainly right when he says in the Introduction that only through "detailed research that a truer understanding of the past may be attained." Yet there is no evidence that he had conducted such research into the McMahon Pledge, the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration upon which he makes assertions, in line with post-war British and Zionist constructions but contrary to the facts as known at the time and now revealed in the British Foreign Office archives at the Public Record Office. These show that there were no "negotiations" with the Sharif (in fact these were resisted), that he was not "informed" (in fact he was deliberately misled), and that Palestine was not "clearly" excluded (if it really was, much ill-will and bloodshed would have been avoided.)

## III

The article by another editor, Professor Lewis, on "Egypt and Syria" (i, 175-230) from roughly the end of the Umayyad period till 1517, is more satisfactory. It is, however, more concerned with Egypt than Syria which is hardly mentioned before the Crusades and rather incidentally thereafter. While it concentrates on political history, and goes into boring details of minor squabbles and includes too many dates and names, it has the merit of providing occasional details of economic history. Unfor-

tunately the cultural aspect (e.g. schools and literature) is dismissed in a dozen lines of generalities scattered over three pages (205, 206, 228.) Nor is there any mention of the magnificent public works (e.g. mosques, schools etc.) of the long Mamluk period.

Generalisations, without supporting evidence, abound. Most of these are exaggerations concealed behind over-contrived rhetoric. On the very first page the writer states categorically that Syria's political life was characterised "by separatism, regionalism, and particularism — a pattern of recurring diversity and conflict." Yet none of these "isms" is substantiated later in the article. It may also be asked, when and where was the Greek language "so long and so firmly established" in Syria?

There are serious omissions and obfuscations. For example, al-Ma'mun is described as "the first caliph to visit Egypt." (p. 176) But since he certainly did not fly from Baghdad to Cairo, why is his more important visit to Palestine not mentioned? Is not the restoration of the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem ordered by the caliph more important than the installation of a military governor in Cairo? To al-Ma'mun himself it was, for he had special coins minted with the name of Jerusalem inscribed on them to commemorate the restoration of the holy mosque.

Another example is the treatment of Saladin with extreme brevity. We are told that he was not only the champion of Islam, but also a "ruthless, ambitious adventurer, bent on personal aggrandizement." (p. 204) The brighter as well as the darker picture is attributed to "Muslim historians." Yet in an article that gives references to very trivial matters it is strange, to say the least, that no exact quote or reference is given in this instance. Not a word is said

about Saladin's humanity, clemency and chivalry towards his enemies. All of this in a history of Islam! This is perhaps the only historian who is silent on this aspect of Saladin's life.

#### IV

A third article by Professor Zeine (i, 566-594) deals with "The Arab Lands" in two parts, the first takes political developments in 1918-1948, and the second discusses Arab nationalism which chronologically and logically might have been placed first. The treatment is uneven, exciting at times but dull journalese with little or no analysis or interpretation at others.

There are a number of verbal inaccuracies and inconsistencies. For example it is inaccurate to open the article with a reference to the "independence" of Lebanon which in 1918-19 had no existence. It is more correctly described (p. 569) as "autonomy" but the correction is invalidated on the same page by a reference to Lebanese "sovereignty." It is, of course, wrong to list al-Muntada al Adabi among "the secret [Arab] societies and political parties." (p. 591) On the same page there is a mistake in Arabic: the correct word for committee is *lajna*.

Nor is it true to say (p. 567) that in 1918-19 either the Union Jack or Tricolour was flying "over the major Arab cities in Syria and Iraq." So far as Syria is concerned General Allenby, the British Commander-in-chief, expressly forbade the flying of British or French flags over Jerusalem, Beirut and other major cities. As to Damascus the Arab flag alone was flying from 1 October 1918 with the agreement of the British government.

In March 1920 the Syrian Congress

merely supported the independence of Iraq. Its declaration and the nomination of 'Abdullah as king was made by Iraqi, not Syrian, delegates sitting separately in Damascus (p. 569). Nor is it correct to state (p. 572) that the Sharif Husáin was proclaimed "King of the Arabs". I have a photostatic copy of the proclamation signed by 'Abdullah as foreign minister — it is "of the Arab Nation", national not territorial, much to the relief of the British Foreign Office at the time.

Neither the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement nor those of the Balfour Declaration are made clear regarding Palestine. It is not stated that under the former Palestine was reserved for an international regime, and the verbatim quote from the latter omits the safeguards for the Arabs (568). Again, the bargain struck between Britain and France whereby Palestine became exclusively British is not mentioned. But the worst omission which amounts to suppression is concerning the application of the mandates. It is stated (p. 570) that foreign control was mitigated by the establishment of "local Arab government in the mandated territories." What Arab government, we may ask the writer, was established in the mandated territory of Palestine?

The same mistake occurs consistently where Palestine is concerned. Thus on page 574 f. it is not stated that Palestine was the only exception where the principle of political self-determination was deliberately denied. This suppression is carried to an absurd length when (p. 592) the writer says that after the Second World War "all the Arab countries of the Near East had obtained their political independence and sovereignty."

The second part of the article is a

summary of a section in its writer's published work. It is unfortunate that he did not take the opportunity of re-publication to correct the earlier version. For example he represents the Hijaz railway (p. 586) as serving strategic and political purposes, but says nothing about its religious purpose as facilitating the pilgrimage to Hijaz. Again, the writer displays uncritical acceptance of Faris Nimr's testimony (p. 588) concerning the authorship, inspiration and purpose of the revolutionary placards distributed in Beirut and Damascus in 1880. Nimr was co-editor of the daily *al-Muqattam* and the monthly *al-Muqtataf* for over half a century. Why he never wrote a word about such important episodes in his life? Why he spoke for the first time only fifty years later, and to his son-in-law, George Antonius? I have seen in the British archives a statement alleged to have been made by Nimr to Sir Mark Sykes (one of the authors of the Sykes-Picot agreement.) Nimr, the champion of Syrian Arab independence in 1880 (according to Antonius) desired to place Syria under British protection in 1915 (according to Sykes). Nimr, moreover, is alleged to have stated that he had not "the slightest hope" of an independent Syria holding together for a day.' Such are some of the questions which this article failed even to raise.

## V

Professor Grunebaum's article (ii. pp. 469-510) on "The Sources of Islamic Civilization" is typical of his erudition and originality. But a more accurate description of its content would perhaps be "Some Reflections on Islamic Civilization", for the many wide-ranging and necessarily cursory references to different aspects of that civilization do not definitely trace them to their supposed sources with convincing proofs.

Rather the method is to give an impressive citation of parallels found in other civilisations. Much as we admire the writer's learning this method proves little more than that parallels do exist. A typical example of mistaking parallels for proofs is found on page 480-81 where the inspiration for Islamic mysticism and law is seen in earlier foreign models.

The writer has often been accused of hostility to Islam, even on a notable occasion by a Christian, not Muslim, Arab scholar, the late Professor Nabih Faris. This may or may not be justified with reference to other works, but I have not detected very clear evidence in this particular contribution of such hostility or want of sympathetic understanding. Scepticism by one outside the circle of believers is legitimate. I have, however, one serious complaint as regards the style and language employed by the writer, which are not always conducive to understanding him and may sometimes create misunderstanding. One feels that the words are too many for the meaning and that the ideas may be more simply expressed with less craving for contrived elegance. The borrowing of terms from other disciplines, including sociology and psychology, tend to obscure rather than clarify the exposition, digressive enough without venturing into those notoriously vague realms.

On the whole the writing is characterised by Germanic density no longer in vogue in its native land. It is furthermore befogged by an excessive use of polysyllabic words. The composition is of inordinately long sentences, entwined with hypotatic or paratactic clauses and marred by confused pronouns. The very first paragraph requires more than the usual attention to unravel its verbose intricacies. Sen-

tences of ten printed lines or more are not rare in the article. Using such vehicle, the display of linguistic versatility tends sometimes to distract attention from the theme of the passage. The array of incidental evidence from remotely related fields may sometimes sound pardonable ostentation if it does not impede comprehension.

Apart from an admirable command of his main subject, the writer draws on a rich knowledge and wide reading encompassing Greco-Roman, Byzantine, medieval European, Jewish, Christian, Persian, Indian and other traditions including Tibetan. The result cannot be more than various glimpses whose impact must be minimal, if only because of such variety. Had the writer applied his knowledge and skill to dwelling on only a few items, the outcome might have been more instructive. I found the third and last part of the article clearer in exposition, partly because it contains less far-fetched material and partly because its language is curiously less involved.

There are a few specific points of details that may be questioned. The purpose of Abu Yusuf's *Kitab al-Kharaj* was not to discuss the nature of the state (p. 473) but to tender advice to its head. On the following page it would perhaps be more accurate to say that Islam entered the lands outside the Arabia Peninsula not with "one-sidedness" but "single-mindedness." Similarly it would be preferable, in Islamic context, to write "Allah" instead of "divinity." (p. 478) Is not Hellenistic more accurate, in a Near Eastern context, than Hellenic? (p. 480 *et passim*.)

Finally perhaps a pertinent general comment on the content and method of this article is to be found in al-Biruni's words writing on the Hindus in the eleventh century A.D. "If ever" he said, "a custom of



theirs resembles one of ours, it has certainly just the opposite meaning." (Professor Grunebaum's death was announced after writing the above.)

## VI

Professor Gabriéli's article (ii, pp. 851-889) on "The Transmission of Learning and Literary Influences to Western Europe" is, in a sense, a continuation of the theme of the article discussed above: cultural interaction. But whereas the discourse on the "sources" was largely speculation the study of transmission is exact tracing of philosophic, scientific and literary merchandise through well-defined routes. In the ninth and tenth centuries the Arabic language received, through translation, the philosophic and scientific heritage of Greece. This heritage was enriched by the speculative and experimental efforts of Muslim scholars, and from the eleventh century passed the cumulative heritage to Western Christendom largely via Spain, Sicily and Italy.

This article is an expression in details of this remarkable historical phenomenon. It seeks to show to what extent was medieval Europe and the Renaissance influenced by the Arabic and Islamic heritage. To do so it seeks to show the extent of European acquaintance with this heritage and what effect it had on subsequent evolution of Western thought.

Discussing philosophy first, the writer concludes: "Far from being merely transmitters the Arabs, and the Muslims in general, became the teachers and inspirers, or else the controverted and confuted adversaries of the West." Turning to Arab medicine the writer states that it was not merely an echo of the Greek, but was "fortified by its own experiments and con-

quests." The treatment of mathematics, astronomy and astrology is similar. The whole legacy was presented to Europe enriched with further studies, comments and experience.

Al of this is well-known in learned circles. What is little known, and is presented here with admirable erudition, is the Arabic literary influences which are in substance and range considerably more than hitherto suspected. Up to the Renaissance Arabic became the prototype for Latin Christendom. Islam and Christendom, which scarcely knew one another except on the battlefield or through commerce during peace time, lived in close proximity in Spain where the language, literature and social habits of the conquerors were adopted by their subjects. The impact of Arabic-Islamic literature on the Latin-Christian mind, only a century after the conquest, may be gauged from the testimony of Alvaro, Bishop of Cordova, who lamented, perhaps not without exaggeration, the displacement of Latin and Christian literature by Arabic and Islamic literature, theology and philosophy in these famous words:

"Where can any one meet nowadays with a layman who reads the Latin commentaries on the Holy Scriptures? Who studies the Gospels, the Prophets, the Apostles? Alas, all young Christians of conspicuous talents are acquainted only with the language and writings of the Arabs; they read and study Arabic books with the utmost zeal, spend immense sums of money in collecting them for their libraries, and proclaim everywhere that this literature is admirable. On the other hand, if you talk with them of Christian books, they reply contemptuously that these books are not worth their notice. Alas, the Christians have forgotten their own language, and amongst

thousands of us scarce one is to be found who can write a tolerable Latin letter to a friend; whereas very many are capable of expressing themselves exquisitely in Arabic and of composing poems in that tongue with even greater skill than the Arabs themselves."

With impressive evidence the writer discusses Arabic influence on Romance culture. He indicates that the influence of Arabic poetry embraced form, rhythmic structure, rhyme and content, and then surveys the pioneering studies of the Spanish scholar R ibera who established a relationship between the Andalusian *zajal* and the provincial troubadours. Furthermore, didactic works of Oriental and Arabic content became popular. *Kalila wa-Dimna* was translated under the patronage of Alfonso the Wise. Such works had wider circles of readers in Spain and adjacent countries than philosophy and science and hence they were translated into the vernacular rather than Latin. Of this order was the adaptation of the epistle of the disputation between men and animals which forms a long part of *Ras il Ikhw n as- af *.

But the most startling revelation was that Dante's *Divine Comedy* had Islamic inspiration and models. This was the thesis published in 1919 by Asin Palacios, a Catholic priest and professor of Arabic at Madrid University. The poetic genius of Dante was not in question, but the Spanish scholar proved that the subject-matter of the poem was derived from Islamic sources, notably the story of Muhammad's *M r j*, Ma'arri's *Ris lat al-Ghufr n* and Ibn al-'Arabi's *al-Fut h t al-Makiyya*.

This is not the place to discuss the historical developments by which after the Renaissance and down to the age of the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolu-

tion, the West outstripped the East. Meanwhile the Islamic political power suffered shattering blows, and Islamic civilisation and culture tended to stagnate in splendid isolation. When from the beginning of the nineteenth century active contact between the East and West was re-established the process of cultural exchange assumed a different character: No longer has Arabic and Islamic culture original elements to transmit to the West; on the contrary it was the East which has now "to absorb the myths, political ideologies and literary theories of the West."

## VII

The five articles briefly noted above are not necessarily representative of two composite volumes, but they may be indicative of the general value of the work. The editorial policy of minimising footnotes in a work of this nature is probably wise, if only to save space. But one would have expected some compensation in more generous bibliographies. Looking at those belonging to the five articles one observes a certain caprice, lack of uniformity and relevance in inclusion or exclusion of works of reference. Thus the list on page 745 of the first volume includes a work of miscellaneous articles (with the name of the author misspelled) published in 1970, yet it excludes a history of direct bearing on the subject published in 1969.

The glossary of two and a half pages might have been more ample in a work which according to the preface is not only for specialists. Nor are all the definitions adequate. For example the one and a half lines defining *fatw * do not make it clear that as a pronouncement by a jurisconsult it is usually in answer to a formal question. Similarly the one line defining *ma-*

*drasa* does not indicate its standard nor its exact curriculum, embracing not only Islamic sciences but also Arabic sciences.

Finally the editors properly assign responsibility for "opinions and interpretations" to the authors of the articles, including of course their own. But they surprisingly say nothing about factual errors or loose expressions. Are the editors absolved of responsibility for such lapses as have been pointed out above? It may be

added, in conclusion, that neither this question nor the content of this review is inspired by any "sour grapes" motives. The editors know very well that they invited me to contribute an article, but for reasons unsuitable for public discussion I did not. (Under more agreeable circumstances and more authoritative auspices I did contribute an article to a companion publication issued by Cambridge University Press, *Religion in the Middle East*, thanks to the late Professor A.J. Arberry, the general editor.)



# Document :

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## Yek Kalama - Part II

Introduction

E. Burke Inlow

The second part of *Yek Kalama* is of great interest to the student of comparative law. Here the author tries to set down, section by section, the principles of the French law of his day, and to seek a justification for them in Islam. By his own admission, the author had carefully researched what he calls "The Great Principles of the French Law." The French Constitution of 3 September 1791 was still the model for France. Its preliminary "Declaration des Droits de L'homme et du Citoyen" consisted of 17 sections which approximates those developed by the author in offering his comparative study.<sup>1</sup> It is not, however, an exact rendition which would indicate that the author had read much more widely than just the constitution. In truth the author appears to have possessed a lively analytical mind of far ranging interests. In his day, comparative study in law was in its infancy. This analysis stands, therefore, in its innocence as a worthy prototype of the many significant and comparable studies since made in the study of comparative law.

It is not without further interest that when the secularization of the law of Iran took place during the reign of Shah Reza, that the basic model followed was that of the French. From 1922 to 1937 eight French and two Italian professors were engaged to teach at the Faculty of Law at the University of Tehran and a top-ranking French advisor held a permanent position at the Ministry of Justice to assist in the codification of the laws.

...When I had finished my talk with my friend, I spent some time in research study of the principles of the French laws. After studying them very carefully, I found they were all in accordance with our Holy Book the Koran (praise the Islamic religion that after 1,280 years its laws and thoughts are still up to date). Now to acquaint my countrymen with the French law, I will discuss the principles of French law... I have translated them and include them in this book.

### *The Great Principles of the French Law*

Section one concerns equality before the court and in the execution of the laws. That means the law applies to the weak, the strong, the powerless, the powerful, the rich, the poor in the same way without exception. Even if a complaint is lodged against the Emperor himself, the law will consider him as any other individual. This shows the fairness and justice with which these laws are written and executed.

The principle of the Holy Religion of Islam has the same basis. It is recorded that our great religious leaders were considered as individuals before the law. Ali, our Imam, the son-in-law of our Prophet, Peace be on him, had a case against another person and he was treated as any other individual before the law. God has said, in the Holy Book of the Koran "whenever you give a judgement you must consider the persons involved equally." "As a matter of fact, justice in the Arabic language means equality. In another verse of the Koran,

God has said "whenever you want to give an order of judgement you must consider justice and equality." And also in another verse of the Koran, God has said to the judges: "You should not be afraid of people in executing laws, but you should be afraid of me in considering your judgements." God has also said in another verse of the Koran "Whenever you judge you should give your judgements in the light of justice and equality even though the guilty one is your close relative." God in another verse of the Koran referred to David the Prophet — "We have made you Caliph on earth now you must give your orders to people on the basis of truthfulness and equality."

Another Islamic leader has written in a religious book: "It is necessary to consider equality in executing law, even among your enemies." I can say frankly that justice is the basis of ruling a country, and injustice is evil and destroys the principle of ruling a country. Practicing injustice makes God angry and brings misfortune and misery to the people of the country. The present rulers of Islam for example, will take an offender such as a drinker of alcoholic beverages or some other offense to court. If the offense is serious they give a verdict for execution of the cutting off of a hand, or if the offense is minor, the judge will order a beating or whipping. The number of strokes to be administered is written in the order of the judge and the executor will do his duty according to the written orders. In some cases the number of strokes will vary according to the sentiment of the judge. If he is hardhearted, the victim could die of his beating, or his nails will fall off. Sound wisdom or just law will certify that the punishment for the victim should be established as part of the law. A judge should not have such

power that he can decide these things upon his own whims. As it is, the punishment of the sons of God depends on the decision of the rulers — as example, a group of offenders guilty of the same offense will suffer different punishments — some will be beaten, some will be beaten to death, others will be rewarded. If you think about it you will come to see the cruelty of judging in this manner. In this way the country will not be secure from the influence of the foreigners and the present laws are so unfair and poor that the description of their inadequacies could not be written in several thick volumes.

Section two of the French Constitution is called "Scientific Preferment" and refers to a person being appointed to a high position. He has gained it because of his knowledge and training and not because he is the son of an influential or rich family. He earns a position because of knowledge of literature, composition etc. A high ranking officer in the army shall not be a commander unless he has gone to the military school and has learned the military science and skill and has studied in the army college. Not only theory but practice must also be included. After having completed all these studies he will enter the regular army and gradually work his way up and when the time comes, he will reach the rank of General officer. Also, a high administrator in the government in the same way should have education in the schools that cover law and administration. After that he will enter the government service and gradually work his way up to a ruler. A ruler must know how to handle subordinates, treating them with justice and fairness. God has said in the Holy Book or Koran that "to Me, the dearest ones, most respected ones are the most righteous ones." Also, in another verse He

says, "God will pay to the man of science because of his science." (Recognition will be given because of ability, not because of position or wealth). Further God says, "I shall not ignore any deed of yours" and in another verse: "I shall punish the ones who have committed bad deeds and reward the ones who have done good deeds." In another verse he says repeatedly "Do not forget the value of education among yourselves."

Any wise man knows the kind of education and learning which is suitable to our time. Any wise man knows that science and industry is the thing to learn today. Because of science and industry the uncultured people of Europe have reached a very high degree of progress in one hundred years. The people of the Eastern countries are in need of their knowledge and skills.

Section three is about individual freedom. It means the body of the individual is free and no one has the right to strike or abuse him, and this also prohibits unwarranted, entry-search of a private home. No one shall be punished for the offense of another. No one can be imprisoned only on the basis of suspicion. No one can be punished without the written order of the court. This is also in accordance with Islamic law. As God has said in one of the verses of the Koran, "You that have come to believe in me be aware of the fact that if someone brings you information you must investigate thoroughly to find out if it is the truth or not. You must not give your judgement merely upon unproven information, which could result in a wrong or cruel judgement which you will regret later." In another verse, "You that have come to believe in me must keep from being pessimistic about people as pessimism is a sin in itself. Do not judge anything about which you are not sure or

knowledgeable." Another verse says, "You who have come to believe in me do not enter into the house of a stranger until you have come to know him and are familiar with him." Also it said, "Do not enter a house if the tenant or owner is not in the house, and even if the tenant is in the house do not enter until you have asked for and received his permission. If the tenant does not give you permission leave immediately and do not insist on meeting him as this action of leaving is more suitable and respectful." It also says in another verse "It is not proper to enter a house from the roof."

Section four concerns security of life. This is also in accord with the principles of Islamic religion. As God said, "If a person has committed no murder but has committed such sins such as robbery or adultery (fornication) it is just as bad as mass murder." Do not kill any person that has committed a sin unless it comes under the law calling for execution. In another verse, "My Believers, it is necessary for you to punish the murderer by executing him."

Section five of the French Constitution concerns the security of wife and family. God has said "A man or woman who has committed the act of adultery should receive a hundred lashes." In another verse, "A married woman should be secure from the advances of other men."

It is stated in this section that it is necessary for all to stand up against cruelty. Most of the comforts and good life that the French people enjoy is due to the fact that they have stood up to the cruel people by practicing their law conscientiously. God has similarly said in the Koran, "There should be some people among you to invite and encourage people to do good deeds and

discourage them from indulging themselves in unlawful, bad and dirty things as these will destroy the country and cause lack of security for the individual. Those people are blessed." In another verse, "Do not show any sympathy to the cruel ones." (There are many similar verses concerning this same thought in the Koran.)

Anybody, of high or low rank in France can write his opinion about the welfare of the people and country with absolute freedom and he can publish his own thoughts. If his thoughts are accepted by people he will be admired and if not he'll be criticized. This is also in accordance with Islamic religion and the leaders of Islam have indicated these points in their books on numerous occasions.

Section six concerns the security of property. God has said concerning this subject, "You should cut off the hand of a thief whether he is a man or woman." As you see this verse of the Koran provides for security of personal property which is in complete accord with French law. French people made their laws considering the orders of God and the rules of Islamic religion. In 40 years' time the population of France has increased from 30 million to 80 million but in our country Iran, the population over a period of many years has not increased to 80,000,000.

This section includes provision for freedom of press. The ability to write one's own ideas and thoughts freely is also provided for in Islam. I want you to know that in U.S.A., England, France, Switzerland, Belgium, Greece, freedom of press is greatly emphasized and practiced thoroughly. In the city of Paris today there are 100 printing houses and 600 book stores.

Section seven is about the freedom to assemble. This means that any group can gather in any place they wish and discuss science, politics, and government freely. Each group such as army, farmer, nobles and industrialists have their own special meetings. Even though each group has their own thoughts and ways, they all have the same goal and that is to provide ways and means for the progress of society. Freedom of society has also been practiced in the era of our Prophet, Peace be upon him, as the leaders of religion used to gather at the Mosque in the presence of the Prophet. They would present their problem for discussion and ask his opinion. After the problem was presented he would ascend his throne in the presence of the public. He would discuss the problem and its solution. At one time when the prophet assigned Assameh as the Commander of the Army a group of people protested his decision and said Assameh is too young for this position and expressed their doubts that he could fulfill the duties. When the protest took place Assameh was out of the city of Medinah on a military assignment — but his return was delayed until the good prophet went to the Mosque and logically proved that the man was qualified for the job. Even though at the time the prophet was bodily tired, he did not let this deter him from going to the Mosque because it was of vital importance.

In Section eight of the French Law it is stated that the acceptance of the populace is the basis of ruling. This statement is of great value and people of wisdom and intelligence consider this very important. It is also important in the Islamic religion as God said in one of the verses of Koran, "If a Ruler is bitter and angry his people will not accept or support him."

Section nine of the French Code discusses the selection of the representatives. When people select representatives who act in the parliament, the people actually participate in the rule of the country. These representatives, who are called deputies in France, are selected in accordance with the laws written in a book called "corps legislative". This is also considered in the Islamic religion and it is called consultation. The Merciful God has ordered people in another verse of the Koran to consult with the right people concerning any affair or work. The prophet himself had consulted the people to solve various problems. In one case, our Prophet had the desire to stay in the City of Medinah, but his followers did not want to stay in Medinah. So he had a group consultation and the people advised him against it. Then he put aside his own desire and followed the opinion of the group and left Medinah. It is also indicated in the Koran in many other instances where the Prophet complied with the desires of his disciples and put aside his own desires. Marvi, a well known authority figure in Islam has said, "People who consult with each other will not know misfortune or misery." Ali, our Imam and son-in-law of Mohammad, has frequently advised his people to consult with each other. In fact, consultation is one of the principles of Islamic religion. Consultation is an assured right of people regardless of their ranks or standings. Our Prophet, Mohammad, used to consult with his advisors frequently to solve problems.

Section ten regards taxation. Taxation is scheduled in accordance with the wealth of people, without exception. Neither the Emperor nor the government can issue any order regarding taxation. Even the head of the government cannot influence taxation. It is based on the yearly income of indi-

viduals. This law of course has been approved in the House of Parliament and therefore is accepted by the populace. People voluntarily pay their tax at the due time — and pay it willingly because the taxes are justly designed and any man of low or high rank will pay his tax to the government accordingly. There is no exception to this rule. This is also in accordance with Islamic religion. It is stated in the Holy Book of the Koran that people should pay 1/5 of their income to the representative of the Imam to be given or spent on poor people and the welfare of the country.

Section eleven concerns the written and published statement of the income and expenses of the government. The government should make a yearly statement concerning its expenses and income. If the expenses of the government are not lawfully written, the scheduling of taxation cannot be done justly. The government should also show the funds necessary to run its various internal offices, foreign offices, military affairs etc. That means that they must make a budget — for example for the Ministry of Works — or put aside a certain amount of budget for the Ministry of Interior or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this way since the people know what the expenses of the government are they will be willing to provide the necessary funds. This is also in accordance with the Islamic Religion as stated in various verses of the Holy Book of Koran

Today in the Islamic countries, since the populace are unaware of the expenses of the government, they think the tax which they are requested to pay will be spent according to the desire of individuals and not in accord with the need of the govern-



ment. Therefore, the majority of people try to find ways and tricks to avoid paying taxes. When the government finds this out their officials will punish and beat these people causing discord and anger. The government of England used to tax people on the basis of an investigation of an individual's wealth. But this is no longer practiced and only a statement of his wealth is now required. That means they ask the individual about his income and whatever he answers, the tax is based on that answer. You can see the degree to which the government trusts the people and it is because of this trust that they have such a high morale, in fact, truthfulness and righteousness has become the habit of their people. Ever since they started using this method of trust the income of the government through taxes had increased tremendously. Experience has proved that ever since they practiced this method, the number of people who lied about their income and wealth has decreased from 10% to 5%.

Section twelve states that any Ruler or Minister is responsible for his actions during his Rule. These rulers are obliged to act in accordance with the Laws and there is no exception to this rule. This is also in accordance with Islamic Religion because it is clearly stated in the Koran that even the Prophet himself cannot be exempted from this rule — the orders in Koran refer to everyone even the Prophet.

Section thirteen deals with freedom of the law. That means no one can read his personal influence into the law which has been accepted by the populace. There are two sections to the French parliament. One makes the law. The other enforces it. These two offices do not fear each other and do their work with maximum freedom and independence. The separation of the two

offices is of great importance. It is so important that if a hundred books be written about it, still the value and importance cannot be explained. All the progress, all the wealth, all the comfort and expanding trades that now exist among the European countries is merely due to the separation of the two offices; and all the disorder, poverty, lack of power in the government and poor trade, industry and farming that one can see in the countries of the East is due to the fact that the offices are not separated. The wise people have determined after long research and experience that if the two offices of government are not separated it will weaken the government and gradually destroy it. This is also one of the old rules of the Islamic Religion. In the old days in Islamic countries, the rule-making body has always been separated from the law-enforcement body and have always been independent of each other. Many religious leaders of Islam have mentioned this in their books and greatly emphasized this.

Section fourteen provides that a judge cannot be discharged from his post. This law has many uses. The first is: When a judge has been holding his post for a considerable time, he accumulates great experience. Second, judges will show no partiality to government or people. The third is that since judges are solidly established in their post, they do not need to seek support from anyone. This law is also in accordance with Islamic religion as it is emphasized that no official of the government can be discharged from his post without proof. It is considered a sin if someone tries to take an official from this post without proof.

Section fifteen calls for the presence of a jury (called *regeis*) in the investiga-

tion of a murder. These *regeis* are appointed by people from among the nobles and trustworthy and honest people. The minimum number of *regeis* should be twelve. They should always be present in the court when a murder trial or other important matter is taking place. When the judge has listened to the prosecutor and the defending counsel, then he hands over the work to the *regeis* and asks for their vote. Then the *regeis* go to a separate room by themselves and after consulting and discussing with each other present their votes. The *regeis* have no right to decide on the length of imprisonment. They only present their opinion about the case. This is also practiced in Islamic religion. According to the French Law these *regeis* are sworn to conduct themselves honestly and truthfully in giving their opinion to the judge. They must also swear not to allow their personal feelings to influence their opinions. Of course, one should know that *regeis* are different in each court so that one does not go from one court to another.

Section sixteen provides for the public announcement in the official paper of the government of such information as new posts, new ambassadorial assignments, high crimes, etc.

Section seventeen states that no one has the right to exact a confession from a victim by torture. No Ruler or high ranking officer in the army has the right to use his influence or power to get a confession from a victim. No one has the right to torture any victim or abuse him on the basis of suspicion. According to the French Law, lashing and whipping is prohibited. Also abusing and insulting the victim is not allowed. They don't even practice these inhuman ways on horses and animals. This is also in accordance with Islamic religion

as God indicated in one of the verses of the Holy book of Koran, "No one should be tortured and no one should be punished because of suspicions." But today the Islamic leaders have forgotten about these rules and orders of God that the European countries have adopted for themselves. At this point I should say that our Prophet himself said that a judge should always try to do away with the death sentence and find ways to reduce the punishment. The modern civilization does not approve of executions, lashings and beatings of people. The authorities in a modern society try to overlook faults and wrongs to a certain extent. They believe that nothing can be accomplished by torturing people. Based on this, in the European countries a king has the right to give amnesty to a victim. Though even the king does not have the right to give an order to punish someone he has the right to nullify the punishment decided by the verdict of the court for the death sentence by giving amnesty to the victim. Of course that is only if the relatives of the murder victim give their consent. You can see by the practice of this how the king can win the sympathy of the people and be popular. But in the countries of the East, the opposite is practiced and one can see the difference for oneself.

Section eighteen is concerned with freedom of trade and industries. One should know that the major reason for the progress of trade and industry in Europe is due to the fact that trade and industry are free. One can start any trade or industry he would care to. No one would blame him for that. If one invents something he gets royalties from his government and other countries that use his invention and he alone enjoys the privilege of the invention. This would encourage people to think, investigate, and research to find new in-

ventions which will benefit himself as well as his country and its progress.

Section nineteen concerns building schools to train and educate the poor children. Education in France is compulsory and the provision for it is part of the duty of the government. According to their law, the poor and the blind have a public right to education. This is also clearly indicated in the Holy Book of the Koran. God has said in one of the Holy verses, "Men of education and science have a high order with me." In other words, he respected men of science and education and looked down upon the uneducated and ignorant. Emphasis on education is seen frequently in the Holy Book of the Koran. In another verse of the Koran it is said, "One should learn from the cradle to the grave." (Many other verses have emphasized the same idea.) But it is interesting to know that according to the Islamic religion the study of science and daily living practices are preferred to religious study. Even though there are a number of schools in Iran, not much of daily living education will be given to the students, whereas God says you should educate your children to make a living. In France studying and learning science, modern education methods of earning a living are emphasized greatly. The ray of the science of industry of Europe has reflected a little to Iran and as a result we have a familiarity with medical science, small pox vaccination, telegram, photography which are all very useful to man.

In conclusion, I can say the reason for success the progress in France is based on two reasons:

First is that no one person in France from the King to the poor, from the farmer to the high ranking army authorities — no

one has the right to issue orders and no one alone can rule. It means a ruler cannot issue any order without considering the laws and rules of the country. The principle of Islamic religion is the same. God has said in one of the verses of the Koran, "No one is ruler but God." Whatever rule and/or order that God has given us is merely for our well-being and benefit. Secondly, I have to say, as you have observed in the foregoing sections of the French Law that even though they've entitled it the *public law*, it is in reality the law of the Islamic religion which has been inculcated into the civilized countries of Europe. And since all those laws and rules are quite in accordance with the Holy Book of Koran: — they are the orders of God and we must observe and practice them to reach prosperity and well being. If one truly practices the rules of the Holy Book of the Koran not only will he enjoy the results himself but he will be blessed as a son of God.

There are things like hospitals, first aid and lifeguard training in Europe that are very useful to the people. This is also mentioned in our Holy Book of the Koran. God in many verses encouraged people to learn these useful skills. It is also emphasized in the Holy Book of the Koran the necessity to keep the country clean, build new roads to the town, etc. God also stated in another verse of the Koran that the shopkeepers should weigh honestly for their customers. In another verse, God has emphasized mining and to make use of the products of the mines since this is in the interest of the public. God has indicated in another verse that people should have title documents for their property and belongings. Another verse calls for army training and the need for an efficient army and the having of ammunition supplies on

hand to be ready to face an enemy at any time. It also calls for the varied skills of soldiers in battles and for having qualified and learned commanders in the army. God also emphasizes that the army of the conqueror should treat the people of the defeated country with kindness and justice. When the enemy has surrendered, the conqueror should treat them nicely. If God gives me the opportunity I'll discuss this further in another book in which I'll present the reason for the lack of progress and modernization in the countries of the East. People in the East believe that this world is for others but that the next world is for us. This has never been indicated in our Holy Book of the Koran — this is a false interpretation. The truth is that God has said in the Holy Book of Koran that if a person is blind and cannot see the way in this world he will also be blind and lost in the next world.

At this point, it is not my duty to talk of the Godliness and faith of the people of France. I would suggest if one has the opportunity he should go to Europe and see for himself. No Islamic law prohibits the relationship of Moslems and foreigners. God never prohibited, in fact God told, the Moslems to treat non-Moslems with love and justice. God has emphasized in another verse of Koran that you should not turn your head away from the ones who did not fight with you, who did not attack or take your religion away. You should treat them nicely and in accordance with justice because God loves just people. God has called on people in another verse of Koran saying "We created you men and women and we separated you by tribes and groups so that you get to know each other." It is obvious that if there is no relation between countries one country cannot learn about the ways, traditions, industries and

goods of the other. Ali, the Imam of Islam has emphasized the need for travelling abroad and getting to know people: — "We should go to Europe and eye-witness their progress and civilization so that when we come back to Iran, we can be the cause of a thousand items of progress. God has said in the Koran, "We rewarded the sons of Adam; we provided animals for him to ride on, we provided ships on the sea for men to travel, we provided good and tasty food and we gave advantageous preference to men over all other of our creatures."

Any goodness that the Merciful God has created on the earth among any nation has only one center and one source and also any badness in a nation has one source: We have to take advantage of the good things, try to civilize our society, provide law, order, comfort, wealth, development, hygiene, trade and business, give support to the government, provide education for all men and women, aid the progress of our industries, build roads and streets, and be just in weighing and measuring goods for customers. Never use false coins. Whenever we see false coins they should be brought to the attention of the authorities. God has said in the Koran, "You who have come to believe in me: it is necessary for you to keep your good health; you must guide the lost ones; you must try to develop your country and provide wealth for it and enjoy it yourself; you should be active in public repairs and build roads." God has also said in the Koran that a good person is not the one who gives away this world for the sake of the other world or gives away the other world and enjoys this world, but a good person is the one who lives in this world and gains the other world also.

In France the law prohibits the abuse

and insult to the non-French residents and those who do not share that country's religion. They don't interfere with anyone's religion and no one asks "what is your religion," because this sort of question is very wrong. Concerning this matter, God in the Koran has said, "Do not abuse the ones who worship another God."

The people of France appreciate the good things that God provides for them more than the people of the countries of the East. They thoroughly believe in the reality of the day of resurrection. It is because of the blessing of God that people in Europe, men or women, know three or

four languages. But if a person speaks a foreign language in an Eastern country the people blame him in a thousand different ways. I have seen books in more than 50 different languages in the libraries of Paris and London. Written in Paris on the day of Friday, twentieth of Zi-Ghadeh, 1287. (February 9, 1871, according to Cattenoz, *Tables de Concordance*.)

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(1) For the text of the French Constitution of 1791 see Duguit, Monnier, Bonnard, *Les Constitutions et les Principales Lois Politiques de la France depuis 1789*, Paris, R. Pichon et R. Durand — Anzias, 1952, pp. 1-33.



# Reviews

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Samerah Al-Man'ie, *Al-Sabiqoon Wal Lahiqoon*  
Beirut : Dar Al-Awdah, 1972, 117 pp.

Since the mid-sixties, publication houses in the Arab World have concentrated on works of a political nature to the neglect of one of the most important channels of Arabic culture — literature. While the short novel is a fairly recent adaptation to the Arabic literary tradition, it lends itself well to the contemporary milieu. Samerah Al-Man'ie uses the short novel to explore, in microcosm, the conflict between Arab and Western cultures. In *Al-Sabiqoon Wal Lahiqoon* (The Forerunners and the Newcomers) Samerah Al-Man'ie places Arab society in juxtaposition to Western society by exploring the personal drama of a young Arab woman, Mona, living in London and working in an Arab embassy. Taken out of its social and cultural context and placed in the alien world of technology and industry, Arab culture appears decadent and wretched. Mona's conflict is to reconcile her "Arabism" with the Westernization she desires and admires; she cannot escape her heritage though she wishes to reject it.

Samerah Al-Man'ie's novel reflects the type of conflict experienced by many Arab migrants to Western society. Overwhelmed by the efficiency, material wealth, and technological ability of the West, they see Arab society as backward and decadent. They see simplistic and naïve solutions to Arab problems but do not see the intrinsic problems of Western society.

The novel develops its theme, the decadence of Arab society, by tracing the conflict raging between Mona's attachments to

her native country (Iraq) and Arab environment (the Arab Embassy in London), on the one hand, and her desire to rid herself of them, on the other. This struggle deepens whenever Mona recalls such memories as of Iraqi men lingering in Abu Nawas street in Baghdad "with their thick moustaches that rarely know trimming, who would not permit their wives, daughters or sisters to walk that street, but whose desire to see their 'beloved' passing by reaches an extent inconceivable to the mind." The struggle abates only when she returns to filing the doctor's reports on her sick compatriots who are seeking medication in England.

The Embassy provides the playground for depicting the wretchedness of Arab society, the land wherein great men are honoured only after their death, it being sufficient for them that they had enjoyed the bliss of living before being honoured. Officials of the Embassy display the same vanity and pettiness characteristic of their colleagues at home. When the Embassy driver tended his resignation, for instance, they interpreted his action as an affront to their dignity and reported that they dismissed him. Their attitude and behaviour with Mona displays a deep-rooted conservatism and moral 'double-standardness'. Her director is extremely cautious to address her as "sister," to assure her that he does not entertain any thoughts of sex. Meanwhile, he takes his liberty with the British secretary who had been instructed by her secretarial school to "make sure of her outer appearance before facing her di-

rector, in order to let him feel relaxed and fill the mood with joy." The Arab secretary, Mona, is forced to assume a reserved character, even in conversations. The brief dialogue with Jalal Kassem, a young man accompanying his sick father to London, illustrates her fears to engage in a political discussion with a citizen of the Embassy she works in:

- What is this, their river?
- No.
- And the water under the bridge?  
(They were then crossing a white bridge in the middle of Hyde Park).
- It is an artificial lake.
- Oh!
- They are industrious
- We need to be like them.
- Is your district arid?
- Like death, though we live near the river.
- You will change.
- When? When?

Because she learned to be cautious since she began to work at the Embassy, she did not respond and his question remained unanswered.

Fear of society stamps the Middle Eastern woman with cowardliness and reluctance. Mona could not conceivably match the British secretary, who enjoys driving with her Arab director to the Embassy in his car. Of course, the British secretary, who can see the extensive authority the director yields at the Embassy, thinks that he must, indeed, be a very popular man in his country. Ironically, the author informs her reader, the director is obeyed out of fear and has achieved his position because of nepotism.

The author contrasts the East with its

backwardness and the West with its progress. To the Easterner, the moon is an object of mystery and romance; to the Westerner it is something to explore and 200 million miles to be covered. While the Westerner succeeds in reaching this moon-destination, the Easterner, such as the new commercial attaché, fails to find his office within the Embassy despite the signs showing the way. The incident epitomizes, in a sarcastic manner, the wideness of the gap existing between East and West. It stresses the fact that the East has yet to attain a sense of purpose and direction. Mona struggles to free herself of the insecurity of her society and attempts to model her life to a western frame of reference. Back in Iraq, people around her thought she was insane to leave her job as a teacher and to seek a new opportunity in Europe. They could not understand nor respect her adventurous spirit. Mona defies her society and departs. She rebels against an oppressive and male-oriented social milieu even to the point of wishing that the man she loved would drop his Arab name and assume a European one.

Samerah's short novel does not confine itself to a criticism of the social relations and norms of Arab society. It indulges in an evaluation of political practices and issues. The commercial attaché, for instance, has no work to do since his predecessor ended the boycotting of British goods following the war with Israel. Here, the author is ridiculing the inability of the Arab world to punish the West, which she otherwise admires, for its collusion with Israel and their passivity. In other instances, the reader is shocked by the vast authority delegated to the British secretary who threatens the minor employees, who are mostly Palestinians. This was, perhaps, a condemnation to Arab regimes, which

have yet to demonstrate their solidarity with the Palestinians.

Then comes an order from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs transferring the Ambassador. Like the other Arab diplomats, he departs without leaving any trace on London or even Mona. The Embassy seemed to Mona to receive the same faceless ambassadors, directors and attachés. Near the end, cholera infection spreads in the East and employees, regardless of rank or salary, are instructed to vaccinate. The infection sounds more like a high fever of a revolution that brings about a new way of life. Despite vaccination, a new world seems to appear on the horizon, arising out of the debris of old conditions. It carries within itself the sperms of change and severs the old mode of social relations. The Eastern woman, symbolized by Mona, is called upon to assume her proper role in the building of a new society.

To conclude, Samerah Al-Man'ie drew a very pessimistic image of the underdeveloped East. The Embassy, a part of the East and its voice to another country, is chosen as the stage. It is important that this short novel be read with care, and attention be given to details. The sequence linking the dismissal of the driver, the director who is infatuated by his British secretary, the passivity of Arab regimes and their inability to gauge their natural resources for development, the aggressive and industrious spirit of the West, to the dreams, aspirations and emotional stirrings of a young Arab girl employed by an Arab Embassy, succeeds in portraying the trials and tribulations of an area and civilization in the process of transformation.

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## SOME RECENT AMERICAN PUBLICATIONS ON THE MIDDLE EAST

George Lenczowski, *SOVIET ADVANCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST* (Washington, D. C., American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1971), 176 pp. \$2.00.

Parker T. Hart, Special Editor, *AMERICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST* (The *Annals* of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 401 [May 1972], 1-146. \$2.00.

John C. Campbell and Helen Caruso, *THE WEST AND THE MIDDLE EAST* (New York, The Council on Foreign Relations, 1972), 71 pp.

Ferenc A. Vali, *THE TURKISH STRAITS AND NATO* (Stanford, California, The Hoover Institution, 1972), 348 pp.

George Lenczowski has written a very fitting addition to the series on U.S. interests in the Middle East, which the American Enterprise Institute has published in recent years. The aim of *Soviet Advances in the Middle East* is both to describe and to analyze the substantial advances which the USSR has made in the Middle East in recent years, with special stress on developments which followed the Israeli *blitzkrieg* of 1967. The author is well-aware, of course, of the long-range Russian interest in the area, and of the continuity of history in this respect. He believes, nevertheless, that recent Soviet penetration of the Middle East, south of the Northern Tier, has been so broad and intensive as to call for systematic examination of its nature. He has succeeded well in preparing a volume which should command the at-

tention of the educated and concerned layman, to which the book is primarily addressed, but the specialist as well. The work begins with an examination of the doctrinal foundations of Soviet policy, although the author does not overplay this element, and then treats in some detail of Soviet expansion in various parts of the Middle East. On a case-by-case, step-by-step basis, Professor Lenczowski develops the story of Soviet policy concerning Iran, Turkey, the Arab World, Egypt, Syria and Iraq. In the instances of Iran and Turkey, after brief discussion of the interwar years, the author traces the changes in Soviet policy essentially after World War II, while the emphasis in the Arab world is on the period after 1955, when the Soviet "break through" in Egypt, Syria and Iraq became more evident. Chapter VIII of the Lenczowski work covers Soviet arms shipments and the military presence in the Middle East, and the naval presence in the Mediterranean. The author well notes the obstacles in the way of the Soviet domination of the Middle East, if that be its ambition—the intense nationalism of the peoples of the area, the general rejection of communism as an ideology, the superiority of western technology and organization, and the cultural orientation of the intelligentsia toward the West. There are four appendices, which include the 1971 Egyptian-Soviet friendship agreement, a note on the tanker fleets of the Communist *bloc* (1970), merchant traffic and Soviet warships in the Turkish Straits. There are also seven black and white maps. As noted above, the book should commend itself to all those concerned with the Middle East and its problems, and particularly those

who have been unaware of the long and wide-ranging character of Soviet interest and policy.

Ambassador Hart's symposium on *America and the Middle East* strikes this reviewer as the best survey of the various facets of American policy and interest in the Middle East today, surely to be recommended to both layman and specialist alike. James A. Field, author of *America and the Mediterranean World* (Princeton, 1969), presents an excellent historical introduction, while the late Bayard Dodge, former President of the American University of Beirut, discusses the missionary-educational enterprise. Ambassador Raymond A. Hare writes authoritatively on World War II as marking "the great divide" in the development of American policy. The former President of ARAMCO, Thomas C. Barger, presents a very succinct, authoritative article on Middle Eastern oil. Other articles cover the Truman Doctrine (Ambassador Joseph C. Satterthwaite), the American interest in the Palestine Question and the establishment of Israel (Evan M. Wilson, former Consul General in Jerusalem). John C. Campbell surveys Soviet-American rivalry in the Middle East and Ambassador Hart closes with an essay on "Where We Stand." There are, of course, other essays—on Iran, regional pacts and the Eisenhower Doctrine, the Cyprus question, the Persian Gulf, etc. All told, this is the kind of thing which should be read by all those who deal with the Middle East and are interested in the development of American policy.

Another recent publication is that of John C. Campbell and Helen Caruso on *The West and the Middle East*. Published by the Council on Foreign Relations as Council Papers on International Affairs No. 1, this brochure treats of 1) the problem of international peace and security in the Middle East; Soviet, American, and European interests; 2) Politics: the Arab-Israel conflict; and 3) Economics: Petroleum. Neither the factual data nor the judgements expressed are novel, but the brochure is thoughtful in approach and rewarding in study.

Ferenc A. Vali has written an interesting study of *the Turkish Straits and NATO*. The problem of the Straits, as the author well observes, goes back almost to the dawn of history. While he takes some eighty-one pages to come down to the NATO aspect of the story, with Turkey on the southeastern flank, it is well told, and his appendix contains thirty-three well-selected documents. Some will question his firm conviction that the USSR, whose commercial fleet and warships have a vital interest in transit and navigation of the Straits, is likely soon to call into question the provisions of the still valid Montreux Convention and seek a new regime of the straits. There is a good bibliography.

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Marvin Zonis, *The Political Elite of Iran*. Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1971 .

\$ 12.50. 389 pp.

Professor Zonis has written a useful, if somewhat parochial, book. His approach to the study of Iran's political elite is, by his own description, "an empirical behavioral one." It is also quite American. All the old war horses—Lasswell, Dahl, Almond and Colman, *et al.*, are marched out for display in the introduction. All the new techniques of measurement are brought to bear with their mathematical jargon ("Note:  $x^2 = 34.364$ ;  $df = 6$ ;  $p. 001$ ;  $\gamma = .253$ ") (p. 146). It's a far cry from that earlier, more charming, if less "scientific" study of the Iranian elite by E. G. Browne, "A Year Among the Persians." Nevertheless, Professor Zonis—who describes himself as "aggressive" and "brash"—has done things in his way, just as Brown did them in his. If the results are somewhat different, it is only what one would expect from a Western culture that places great emphasis upon asking people questions that in Browne's day would have been considered quite insulting. If the non-response was higher than Professor Zonis had hoped, it is possible that there is still a connection in the thinking of many Iranians between questionnaires and bad taste. The Iranian élite is a very old, very sophisticated, very tough in-group that so impressed Alexander after he had conquered Iran with their splendour and numbers that he was prompted to write his old mentor, Aristotle, for advice on whether to kill them or not. Aristotle's answer was to the point:

The people of Pars are pre-eminent for courage and boldness and skill on the day of battle, qualities which form

one of the mightiest tools of empire and instruments of power. If you destroy them you will have overthrown one of the greatest pillars of excellence in the world. Moreover, when the noble among them have gone, you will be forced of necessity to promote the base to the same ranks and station...

Today's élite in Iran certainly deserves the time and effort that Professor Zonis has put into the study of them, and they are still as interesting as they were in Alexander's day. They are best seen, however, in their native habitat—in their homes, at diplomatic functions, on holiday at Ramsar or at the hunt. Many of the non-respondents to Professor Zonis's questionnaire are known personally to this reviewer and I must confess that I would blush at the thought of asking a member of the Farman-farmaian family the questions appearing on Table 7.2—the Maslow S-I Inventory. Example: "Do you have social ease." It reminds one of the probably apocryphal story about Wellington Koo, who, after delivering the speech of the evening at a distinguished banquet, sat down and gently asked the kind lady seated next to him, who had been trying to be so helpful during the meal, "Likee Speech?"

*The Political Elite of Iran* is divided into 10 chapters with appendices. In the opinion of this reviewer, Chapters III and IV are the strongest when the author is dealing with the Shah and the counter-élite and the élite. Here, of course, one finds a focus for the material presented; the Shah, after all, is the focal point for the

élite and they relate to him—not he to them. This is a point that seems to puzzle Professor Zonis. He expresses surprise, for example, at the reassignment by the Shah of General Pakravan after this study was complete. As he says: "...within our categorization system, there would be no means of predicting that the Shah had sufficient power to dismiss Pakravan, for both [the other reference is to Alam] received exactly equal scores of reputed power." (p. 8.) Professor Zonis surely must know that when the Shah states to a reporter, "I am the power here," he means just that. Anyone who has spent time in Iran has seen, more than once, changes in command that have moved with breathtaking speed—or, conversely, the process of isolation settling in that marks the beginning of the end for a challenger. Professor Zonis, in his power rating, put Pakravan and Alam at the top with the Shah and his sister. Pakravan has fallen from power and even Assadollah Alam, old friend of the Shah though he is, would not share the author's estimate of his power vis-à-vis the Shah.

A single rating of this type does not necessarily invalidate the bulk of Professor Zonis's findings, but it can't help but make them suspect. Terms used in dealing with the counter-élite could also stand clarification. For example, the author uses the late General Teimur Bakhtiar's position as his prime example of self-imposed exile—a euphemism if I ever heard of one, and one which the General himself would certainly have viewed with grim amusement. Likewise, death is nowhere listed as one of the methods used for dealing with the counter-élite. But surely Professor Zonis is not unaware of the fact that this extreme method of depoliticization is not unknown in Iran. Nevertheless, Chapters III and IV do offer insights and strengths that make them

well worth reading. Professor Zonis was in Tehran during the bloodletting of 1963 and knew what he was seeing. This comes through in the writing, but once again—it is almost exasperating—knowing the censorship that exists in Iran, censorship which kept reports of that great purge to a minimum, Professor Zonis still, in his questionnaire results, states that the general disbelief in the mass media in Iran among the élite is an indication of their cynicism.

In developing the Shah's power and its relationship to the élite, the author does tend to secularize his study perhaps beyond the bounds of prudence. His treatment of Shi'ism is cursory at best, and never does he suggest its political origins and its continuing important position. He speaks of the immobilization of the high-ranking clergy. This is highly questionable. The Shah meets with the mujtahids every Friday. He makes his barefoot pilgrimages to Qum and his wife gives generously to the Shrines. If the Shah does see himself—and he has never said he does—as *locum tenens* for the Hidden Imam, then Shi'ism does have still a political meaning that definitely relates to the Shah and to the élite.

Chapters VII and VIII—the orientation of the political élite—are heavily weighted toward the psychological probing that so many political scientists now indulge in. Such manifest weaknesses as insecurity, anxiety, mistrust, pessimism, are all identified in great or lesser degree with the élite. The author's conclusions are that "...in sum, then, we find members of the Iranian political élite beset with manifest insecurities." (p. 249.) What does this mean? Most people suffer a certain amount of insecurity, and Iranians are human like the rest of us. Does this suggest immobilization? This is patently not true in the case

of Iran. The development in that country in the last 10 years has been marked by great skill and strength on the part of the Shah and the élite, and the insecurities have largely lain with those outside the élite—Western oil interests, to take an example.

But it is the non-response that raises the really major questions in the book. Professor Zonis's final instrument was 250 questions. His analysis is based on the responses of 167 members of the élite. 147 did not answer, including all high-ranking officers in the armed forces of Savak; important cabinet ministers, the palace, the ministers of court, religious leaders, key civilians—Directors of NIOC, Plan Organization, Central Bank, National Bank, etc.—President (not the "Chief Justice" as Professor Zonis describes him) of the Supreme Court, and others. The list is long and it is impressive. Was Professor Zonis, as were so many before him, finally forced to settle for the lower echelons? Certainly some of his questions would imply as much. "Question: I don't think that the really powerful public officials and politicians care much what people like me think"—and *this* addressed to the élite!

The art of framing questions and asking them is rapidly becoming a lost one. Why anyone—scholar or otherwise—should assume (1) that people enjoy being asked a lot of questions; (2) that people will tell you the truth even when you ask them personal questions; and (3) that being questioned somehow obligates people to answer, is surely one of the mysteries of our modern day. The people of Iran are courteous in the extreme. It must test them

as they face one questionnaire after another by visiting scholars who are on a publisher's deadline—or a leave deadline—or a promotion deadline. Recently, this reviewer spent a year in Iran—and not his first. He was struck by the number of foreign scholars in Iran who wanted this and that from an overworked bureaucracy, all the while assuming the machinery was set up in Iran to serve their ends. He also recalls one member of the élite, educated at the Sorbonne, who finally, in exasperation, said to an aggressive interviewer, "What makes you think we enjoy submitting to this type of thing from you people who come from the West to study us? Why don't you study your own country and let us get on with our business?"

Perhaps it was the heat—it was a hot day—perhaps it was any number of things. But the East is old at not yielding up its secrets to the first person who asks for them. Great books on Iran are rare. But invariably they have been written by people who spent time—much time—watching as observers and not asking needless questions. Perhaps we should examine our own assumptions when dealing with foreign cultures and see if perhaps there are not other ways to the same ends. There is nothing sacred about the application of quantitative and analytical behavior science to the Middle East. Professor Zonis might well, in future books, consider other methods of research that would yield a higher response from respondents than is the case here.

E. Burke Inlow  
Professor of Political Science  
University of Calgary

James Alban Bill, *The Politics of Iran*, Columbus, Ohio: Chas. E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1972, 174 pp. No price listed.

Professor Bill has written an important study and one that throws a great deal of light on new developments in the ancient country of Iran. While, along with probably the majority of American scholars working in the Middle East, his approach is that of the familiar analytical, behavioral pattern, his methodology is not overly cumbersome and does not obtrude needlessly. In point of fact, the book makes very good reading and one does not have the feeling—as is not uncommon with studies of this type—that the facts are being bent to sustain the theory.

In the first place, Professor Bill knows his Iran. His grasp of history—which is so necessary for anyone working in this area—is good, and he understands tradition as it fits into modern Iran. His ability to see the systematic relationships of Safavi politics, for example, is clear, and he sees these same relationships as they carry over to the Pahlavi political system. Throughout, he goes to the right sources for his support—Barthold, Gibb, Minorsky, Savory, as well as the *Tadhkirat al-Muluk*, the *Qabus-nama*, etc.

The second aspect of Professor Bill's book that this reviewer notices is that he deals with groups and classes in a way that avoids the so-often arbitrary breakdown of scholars into the "elite", the bazaar group, etc. His concept of the Dawrah is the key to this flexibility. The relationship between the formal political system and the dawrah system is laid out clearly and concisely (pp. 44-49) and this is not easy to do.

Thirdly, Professor Bill's knowledge of the language is at least sufficient to enable

him to use Iranian source material. Over the years, some very excellent small monographs have been written by scholars at the University of Tehran in particular, which are really quite invaluable for anyone working in this field. Professor Bill lists four pages of Persian sources, and they are not just a re-run of Peter Avery's bibliography in his *Modern Iran*.

The fourth and final observation that this reviewer wishes to make is that Professor Bill uses the instruments of his analysis with modesty. There are no massive questionnaires unrolled before the reader. While the author does admit to having used the questionnaire method on occasion, he is circumspect in his use of it. Quite clearly, he understands that a questionnaire might be appropriate for college students but not for the ministers of court. He frequently cites the use of interview. This, the present reviewer has found to be quite workable in Iran if the interview is handled with care and the interviewee protected. Iranians are not at all disinclined to talk if they are permitted to develop their thoughts in their own way.

This reviewer then, overall, feels that this book makes a real contribution to Iranian studies. He does question the use of the terms "uprooter" and "the maneuverer" as having any real status in the broad field of political demarcation. These are catchy terms and, one would imagine, not always identifiable. This reviewer has spent enough time in Iran to know that Iranians wear all kinds of protective coloration. Professor Bill speaks of the security office that now sits on the campus of the University

of Tehran. This is a case in point. When one moves beyond the identifiable security manifestations, he then enters a domain not unlike Alice's wonderland. In class, for example, the "uprooter" who speaks so boldly may be, in fact, the police informer. The student who leads the parades on campus and shouts most loudly through the gates to the police may be the same. The wealthy young Iranian who has just returned from the Sorbonne and dines regularly at the French *cercle* may be a revolutionary or a member of the establishment or both. Particularly the younger generation is between two worlds; they are not certain as to which road to take. But, like all Iranians, they carry excellent political antennae and

their survival value is very high. One of the favourite games they play with foreign intellectuals is to try them. The foreigner should indeed be wary of trying to identify them in the easy manner of identification we have in North America.

Professor Bill's book runs to 174 pages including bibliography and index. It is a part of the Merrill Political Science series under the editorship of John C. Walke. The fact that it is paperback should guarantee a good sale, which it deserves to have.

E. Burke Inlow  
Professor of Political Science  
University of Calgary

Hamid Algar, *Religion and State in Iran, 1775 - 1906*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969. 286 pp. \$ 4.55.

The elevation of Shiism to the status of a national religion in Iran by the Safavids in the early 16th Century had, as its consequence, the creation of a body of clergy known as the Ulama. Although the Ulama partook — theologically speaking — of the charisma and authority of the Imam, they did not, in themselves, hold authority. In fact because Shiism denies legitimate authority to worldly power, the Ulama could in no way assume political position. Their function rather, was to provide a living and continuous direction to the community and in a certain sense to act as intermediaries between the community and the Imams.

The Qajar dynasty, whose Shahs ruled Iran from the death of Karim Khan in 1779 to their final overthrow in 1925 was of Turkish descent — a branch having been settled at Astarabad by one of the Safavid rulers. When dynastic power was finally consolidated under Aga Mohammed Khan, it was a power inheriting from the Safavids the absolute nature of monarchy and the attribution of sanctity to the person of the Shah. But the basis of the power was the Army unleavened by the religious tradition of the Safavids. The military forces of the Qajar's was composed of a standing army — a royal bodyguard, which was never disbanded and provincial, mainly tribal contingents. Similarly each prince holding a provincial government had his own bodyguard. It was a ruthless rule and was once described by an earlier historian as a picture of "decay, maladministration, oppression, and insecurity." Of religion, there was very little at the court level. Unlike the Safavids who sought identification with

Shiism, the Qajars never saw themselves as emanations of the Godhead with the result that absolutism remained untempered by any real element of sacerdotal responsibility. Under such circumstances the clash between the religious element and the Qajars became inevitable. Fortunately for the former, there were other elements with which they could combine against the Royal House (whose legitimacy they questioned) — the reformers, the intellectuals, some bazaar groups to mention three. But in a sense, the basic struggle was one of religion and state and it is this struggle which is the subject of Hamid Algar's very fine study of the role of the Ulama in the Qajar period.

Dr. Algar suggests three particular reasons for this study. First it embraces most of the events in Iran between 1785 and 1906. The comprehensive nature of the Ulama's interests makes this a natural focus for a study of the period. Second, it affords the opportunity to examine in theory and in practice the relations between religious and secular authority in a Shi'i context. This has often been done within the Sunni context but only seldom, and then in somewhat sketchy fashion within the Shi'a. Henri Corbin's studies for example are well known and of great authority, but they have not been consolidated politically in the way the present volume of Algar's seeks to do.

Third, in the course of 19th Century history of Iran, various aspects of Muslim reaction to the Western impact — military, economic, and finally ideological — became apparent. This reaction, Dr. Algar argues,



was formulated primarily by the Ulama. As an analysis, it offers another basis for comparison with related developments elsewhere in the Muslim world.

An important contribution to the present study is the author's brief note on sources. Dr. Algar has used original materials throughout. He has consulted the Qajar Chronicles, the biographical dictionaries of the Ulama, a large number of autobiographies and diaries of the period, and generally calls upon the best products of the field of modern Iranian historiography. He has also utilized European published sources and has obviously studied and reflected upon the writings of such modern authorities as Professor Lambton.

On the other hand, by his own admission, Dr. Algar has used few unpublished sources outside of those in the Public Records Office in London. He has had only brief access to materials in Iran and as is known, such access suffers from certain well-defined limitations. Research in Tehran is difficult as there are no properly constituted archives available and permission to use particular materials is often very difficult to achieve. There is a saying, "If you want to see Iran, go there. But if you want to write a book about it, stay in England." English sources are excellent and available and Dr. Algar uses them. But it is important that other European sources be used as well and Dr. Algar has noted only a few — and these published. There is a great deal of material on this period in the Soviet Union which has not been tapped. Both French and German materials would also be of great value. Nevertheless, over all, Dr. Algar's bibliography of works in Persian, Arabic and Turkish composes six closely packed pages of type that is a welcome addition to his book.

"Religion and State in Iran," consists of 15 chapters. The first deals briefly with the foundations of clerical influence in Iran, the second with the eve of Qajar rule. Then follows the clerical policy of Fath Ali Shah and the religious attitudes and authority of his heir apparent, Abbas Mirza. The early foreign impact and the reign of Muhammed Shah both receive a chapter as does Nasir ud-din Shah's reign. Between this chapter and those dealing with the beginnings of the reform movement in Iran, there is a brief chapter on Babism and Bahaism which in the opinion of the reviewer doesn't really go beyond Browne's studies of the period but it is understandable that a Cambridge man would not pass the memory of the sage of Pembroke College without paying his respects.

The Tobacco Concession and its consequences is dealt with once again as is the early Constitutional movement, although in the opinion of the reviewer, the chapter on the early Constitutional movement could have been developed in much larger and more detailed focus. Quite rightly Dr. Algar sees the Constitution revolution as the culmination of a long period of conflict between the state and the Ulama. He believes the role fulfilled by the Ulama throughout the period to be fairly constant both in inspiration and mode of expression. He believes that in the attainment of immediate aims, the Ulama were frequently successful but that their ability to foresee consequences and secondary results were all too often lacking. He does not cite the example of Article 2 of the Constitution although it is surprising as that article comes immediately to mind. While in effect that article gives a practical veto to the Ulama and the proofs of Islam (the leading mujtahids) in "matters proposed in the

Assembly," it has not with possibly one exception — the land distribution scheme — proved in any way decisive over the years and in fact can be said today to be held in distinct abeyance thanks primarily to the skillful guidance of the Shah whose present relations with the leading mujtahids in Iran is said to be excellent.

"Religion and State" in Iran is, then,

a first rate study of the role of the Ulama in the Qajar period and one which illuminates that important struggle which finally brought Iran to the threshold of Constitutional rule.

E. Burke Inlow  
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G. H. Jansen, *Zionism, Israel and Asian Nationalism*, Beirut, The Institute for Palestine Studies, monograph series no. 29, pp. 330.

This lively and informed study resembles Maxime Rodinson's *Israël et le refus arabe: 75 ans d'histoire* (Paris, 1960) in theme and argument, but extends "the refusal" to Asia (and to a lesser extent Africa). Because of cultural, political and economic characteristics "Asia" has come to see Israel as a hostile and indigestible Western (imperialist) element in its body. Unless Israel is transformed into a part of a "democratic, secular Palestine" or returns to its U.N. - set borders, Asia will, as her people become increasingly aware of the real nature of Israel, reject her.

Jansen's book is *not* an uncritical apologia for the Arabs — in fact he can be sharply critical (see pp. xi, xii, 295-96, 312-13) of them and even bitter (p. xiv) of his personal experiences among them as an Indian correspondent. Nor is this book as over-simplified or generalized as a reading of only the first five chapters might suggest — the last two chapters and conclusion help dissipate some of the impressions the first part might make, especially the impression that the author seems to believe that there is an "Asia" (or Asia-Africa) with a single, monolithic ethos or point of view. At one point while reading the first chapters the reviewer wondered who was properly "Asian" in the Indo-Pakistan war of 1972, India, Pakistan, Russia, China, the U.S.A., the General Assembly of the U.N.? Much of the confusion he felt, as indicated, was clarified in the very interesting and objective last part. Perhaps the book would have been stronger had the author moved from the complex to the general, rather than the reverse.

But even so, some questions remain. If "Asia" is characterized by economic backwardness, as he states, how can Japan be included in the author's "Asia" as he views it? If "the whole area (Asia and Africa) is striving desperately toward westernisation" (p. 298) what happens to the "Asia" which the author suggests is culturally incapable of accepting Israel because the latter is "western"? A final question is whether the author is correct in concluding that because Zionism is not a form of "nationalism", that Israel itself, especially among the younger generations, has not become nationalistic in the usual, territorial sense.


Asking these questions may seem petty of a book that covers so much and with such solid documentation (and often interesting accounts of personal interviews, with Dayan for example). The subject is most complex and it is treated multi-dimensionally on the levels of official government policies, public opinion, "declarator policy" and "action policy" (i.e. official stands versus real behavior).

Jansen's is a valuable addition to the dossier against Israel as the anomalously situated state that it is, and a fresh account of the racist and imperialistic consequences of its location in an area belonging, by all rights, to another people, a people ruled or exiled "imperialistically" as Jansen persuasively argues.

David C. Gordon

American University of Beirut  
Beirut, Lebanon

# PHOENICIAN TRAVEL TRADITION IS 3000 YEARS OLD



## WE CARRY IT ON...



# MEA

# МАКЛЕР?


When the Russians and the Americans finally run into each other on the moon, who will settle the claim? Marsh & McLennan, of course.

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